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The Philosophy of Art

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling

Edited, translated, and
introduced by
Douglas W. Stott

Foreword by David Simpson

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Foreword
David Simpson

Of all the major formative figures in nineteenth-century philosophy, Schelling is, along with Fichte, the least familiar to the English-speaking world. It was not until 1978 that the great work of his early period, the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, was made available in translation,[1] and to this day much of his work exists only in German or French. The difficulty of his thought has indeed served to intimidate all but the most committed readers. In the course of a long and productive career, Schelling himself changed his emphasis, and occasionally his mind, often enough to oblige his interpreters to ponder very carefully the differences between, for example, the texts of 1800 and those of 1804. It is very hard, in any exact sense, to come up with a single Schelling. But this is not the major cause of his obscurity; we happily devote close attention to the intellectual metamorphoses of those thinkers whom we deem to be central to our contemporary concerns. It is rather that the conceptual conventions within which Schelling operates, and which he did much to establish, are largely foreign to the late twentieth-century mind, whether it thinks in English or in German. To a culture that takes as its first principle a postmodern suspicion of grand systems, Schelling's entire metaphysical apparatus, with its commitment to the notion that all artistic, scientific, and social phenomena are in various ways emanations of a single entity, the absolute, must seem absurd. The enormous intellectual effort he expended upon the elaboration of the *Naturphilosophie* must now seem to many to have been a last-ditch attempt to turn back the clock, and to contend for a wholeness that could no longer be traced in sufficient empirical detail to allow for the attribution of an indwelling ideal. After Schelling, science and art were to

move so far apart as to require identification as two cultures, often at war with one another. Even if some of the rhetoric describing the contemporary search for a unified field theory seems to recall Schelling's postulates, we can only regard him as a precursor in the loosest sense—unless we belong to that class of historians of ideas that gives absolute power to ideal discursive formations—since his proofs are carried out not through detailed mathematical reasoning but by metaphysical assertion. Where modern physics speculates, Schelling tells us what is, and must be.

For reasons that will become clear by the end of this foreword, Schelling's metaphysics were not to prove very useful to the economists, political scientists, philosophers, and critics who found in Hegel such foundational potential for the elaboration of their own disciplines. His writings do, however, demonstrate a similarly radical broadening of the spectrum of philosophical analysis beyond what had been authorized by Kant. Kant had preserved strict limitations governing any statements about the real nature of the world, seeking instead to refine and expand the sphere of subjective philosophy. He concerned himself less with what might be in the world than with what must be thought to be the case if what we recognize as normal experience is to be explained. This emphasis upon self-consciousness marked the work of Fichte and of the early Schelling. But, within a decade or so of the publication of the last of the great *Critiques* in 1790, the boundaries that Kant had so carefully set up were breaking down. Kant's sophisticated skepticism, designed to set narrow limits upon what could be spoken about in order that it should be spoken about with absolute conviction, is quite absent in Schelling and in his like-minded contemporaries, who pursue instead an all-inclusive, organicist methodology aiming to describe nothing less than everything, past, present, and to come.

A major symptom of this shift is Schelling's endorsement of the Neoplatonic Plato whom Kant had tried hard to marginalize in restricting the demonstrability of the Platonic Idea to the sphere of practical reason (morality) and to the discussion of the totality of the universe.[2] Schelling also does away with the limits Plato had set upon the empirical expression of the Idea. For him, all absolute expressions of particularity are "simultaneously universes," and thus "*ideas*" (*Ideen*) (p. 34). The ideal is more real than the real itself, and is present *in* the real, not just thought of as such. Arguing early in his lectures that Plato's case against art was in fact only a case against vulgar realism (p. 4), Schelling elaborates upon the agenda he had set out for himself as early as 1796: the unification of all ideas in one. At this stage, and for some years thereafter, this one Idea was envisaged as the Idea of Beauty, "taken in the higher Platonic sense."[3] Hence the unique importance of art and aesthetics to Schelling's system. The *System* of 1800 had ended with a deduction of the work of art as the highest objectification of philosophy in itself.[4] The translation of *The Philosophy of Art* now makes it possible for English-speaking readers to understand the details and implications of Schelling's aesthetics better than ever before.

A brief comparison of *The Philosophy of Art* with the *Critique of Judgment* will serve to illuminate the shift between Kant and Schelling in the sphere of aesthetics, the subject of the text now before us. Kant had made scarcely any mention of particular artists or works of art, in order to preempt any identification of the critical method with the inherited disputes about good and bad art that marked most if not all of the available definitions of taste. Kant is interested only in aesthetic judgment, which is never derived from things in the world, however much one might like some of them. His inquiry concerns the transcendental faculties of the mind, which are not to be confused with the objects through which they become conscious of themselves. Schelling too is clear than philosophy should pronounce upon "the truth of the ideas" (p. 7) rather than upon an infinitely extendable aggregate of art objects: without philosophy, "nothing can be known about art in an absolute fashion" (p. 6), and aesthetics will remain at the level of "literary peasant wars" (p. 11). But, for Schelling, the ideal or absolute can and does appear *within* things in the world. The strong distinction that Kant had maintained (much to the chagrin of many of his followers) between the phenomenal and the noumenal no longer exists. An achieved work of art *is* the embodiment of the ideal within the real, not merely something through which the mind recognizes its own powers of judgment. We are back in the world from which Kant had sought to remove us inasmuch as we are philosophers: the world of contingent objects. But the distinctions of adequacy or completeness that Schelling makes are in no sense arbitrary. They are continually referred to principles that keep us from relying upon those preferences about which it is proverbially agreed that there is no disputing.

Schelling thus presents us with a philosophical analysis pitched principally at the level of the ideal, but obligated to include much empirical detail. Not only is there no contradiction between the ideal and the real; the very existence of art expresses the necessity whereby the two are synthesized. For Kant, the aesthetic judgment is not subsumable under a concept (*Begriff*), even though we are compelled to behave as if it were. For Schelling, beauty is itself defined as the concept perceived *in concreto* (p. 29). Similarly, the relation between beauty and truth that has caused trouble for generations of Keats's readers is for Schelling both obvious and necessary (p. 31).

The differences between Schelling and Kant are much more obvious than those between Schelling and Hegel, who was to become the most influential German philosopher between Kant and Heidegger. Schelling and Hegel were friends and companions in their early years, when Schelling's ideas on art were taking critical shape; and Hegel's own lectures on aesthetics, not delivered until 1818, owe much to Schelling even as they depart from him.[5] The differences are, however, quite radical, and much of this foreword will explore them both directly

and implicitly. For now, it is enough to recall that Hegel's idea of history, and thus of the history of art, was built around the logic of progression. Herein, the emergence of absolute spirit entails nothing less than the disappearance of art. The ultimate vehicle of *Geist* is the refined language of reflexive philosophy, the most immaterial of all forms of expression, and one beyond the limits of mere representation. In the modern era, the poetry of language will pass into the prose of thought, as that poetry itself has already moved beyond the perfect art of classical Greece. Greek sculpture is perfect only *as* art, as a medium still tied to material representation, and thus itself signals the beginning of the passage of art into religion. Art, religion, and philosophy represent a progressive hierarchy that can be seen operating through history even as all sorts of residual forms and variations continue to generate themselves. The modern era does not cease to make art, but its art is no longer in essential coincidence with the evolution of spirit.

Schelling, as will already have become clear, thought very differently. Art is not only essentially at one with the highest philosophy; it is "the repetition of that same philosophy in the highest potence" (p. 13). Reflexive self-consciousness does not occupy the same privileged position as it does for Hegel since all things are, understood within the absolute, finally one. While Reason is the "full expression of absolute identity as such" (p. 28), only art can express or represent the synthesis (*Indifferenz*) of knowledge and action, of that which is known in thought with that which can take on form in the world. It is in art that the "*real*" becomes "truly similar to and equal to its own idea" (p. 29). There is no Hegelian schism between the formative and the verbal arts, no need for a sequence whereby matter "gradually dematerializes into the ideal" (p. 200). Schelling's "potences" are "universal forms recurring in the same way in all objects." Even the inorganic contains the organic principle subordinated within itself.

Schelling then sees the history of art not as a history of progress but as a series of variously emphasized relations of the real to the ideal (or "indifferences" of the two), relations that are in the final analysis the same, when produced to the level of the absolute. Despite the obvious and important difference between Greek and Christian art, the world spirit (*Weltgeist*) is at work in both; historical and cultural syndromes determine the form that it can take, as they are reciprocally determined by it. In this way Schelling subsumes the momentum of cause and effect within a model whose final architecture is timeless and eternal. Indeed, time itself is analyzed as a world form of the Christian era, as we shall see. The difficulty and ingenuity of Schelling's system have much to do with its weaving of historical sequence together with a crystalline, symmetrical totality. When he writes that "the relationship between the individual parts in the closed and organic whole of philosophy resembles that between the various figures in a perfectly constructed poetic work, where every figure, by being a part of the whole, as a perfect reflex of that whole is actually absolute and independent in its own turn" (p. 282), he is not simply reproducing the familiar model of organic or

symbolic form as it is apparent in the writings of Coleridge and others. What we have here, and in similar passages, is an argument for the necessary identity of time (history) and space (eternity) construed at the level of the ideal. As the well-wrought poem (to invoke a phrase not yet invented) represents in its parts the whole that has yet to be laid before its reader, so philosophy is displayed in time while being finally out of and beyond time. It is not accidental that this paradox expresses also the conventional relation between the god of Christianity and his world. As the place where individual forms resolve into absolute identity, Reason is indeed the "full reflected image of God" (p. 27).

There is no space here for a thorough account of the details and implications of Schelling's argument; the translator's introduction and footnotes will perform much of this task. Here, I can only pick out a few questions that seem to focus most clearly the differences and continuities between Schelling's doctrines and our own common assumptions and practices. Douglas Stott follows in the main tradition of Schelling scholarship in emphasizing the philosopher's preoccupation with the problem of *how* a particular work of art comes to be, how "individual beautiful things can issue from universal and absolute beauty" (p. 17). For Schelling this is indeed the particular version, for aesthetics, of the general question of philosophy as a whole, "namely, to understand the manifestation of the ideas through particular things" (p. 98). It is important to recognize that Schelling does not here deploy the conventional motif of a fall or breaking away from God—which is how he was later to explain the phenomenon of evil. Art is a more positive act; it is the objectification of the spirit of nature that is within human beings, and is analogous to nature's own generation of phenomena with "consistency of form and regularity" (p. 9). Like natural things, art is an "emanation of the absolute" (p. 19); Schelling's word, *Ausfluss*, implies an active, vital process of coming into being. The archetypes of all things are absolutely beautiful (pp. 31-32), and the universe as a whole is the absolute artwork of God, himself the "source of all beauty" (p. 32). Art is thus the medium of our insight into the noumenal essence, "the *real* representation of the forms of things as they are in themselves" (p. 32).

One need not agree with this explanation to recognize that it contains no metaphysical contradictions. The question that arises is an empirical one (of course with consequences for metaphysics): how does art emerge through particular human beings? Kant had completely avoided this kind of speculation, for coherent reasons of his own. But Schelling has to raise the question. At one point he remarks that beauty emerges "automatically" with the "removal of that which does not belong to the essence" (p. 133). The activity of the artist would then consist in a stripping away, along the Neoplatonic lines described by Shelley as lifting "the veil from the hidden beauty of the world," a world otherwise obscured and distorted by "particular facts."[6] This explanation seems to lead to an idea of the artist as one possessed with superior vision, and to a strong dis-

tinction between individual human beings in the world. It is not pursued. Instead, we have, in sections 62 and 63 of the text, a universal, psychological model for the passage of "universal content" into the "particularity of form" (p. 83). In the "reflected world," God can only produce art in a mediated form, and this he does through human genius, the "indwelling element of divinity in human beings . . . a piece of the absoluteness of God" (p. 84). This activity is not made dependent upon individual will. And the fact that it is our nature to produce art explains not only its coming into being but also its reception as such; simply by being human, the many can understand what the few produce.[7] Where philosophy requires self-consciousness at the ideal level, art appears in an unconscious act in the real world.

Schelling thus somewhat bypasses or de-emphasizes the empirical-social implications of the scarcity of genius. These are not, strictly speaking, within his brief in these lectures; they do not have to do with making clear the identity of art at the essential level. And this identity itself presupposes that there is no critical gap between creator and perceiver, artist and ordinary person. All who are created in God share the archetypes of beauty and the capacity to understand them as such. To understand the debate that Schelling is here addressing, we need to recall that many of his precursors and contemporaries (Schiller chief among them) were very concerned that the ability to appreciate these archetypes was being lost, or was failing to develop in large sections of the populace who could no longer achieve a properly disinterested state of mind. They saw a modern culture founded in division of labor and division of interest, and marked by an economy of luxury and a psychology of desire. Hegel and Schopenhauer would try hard, as Kant and Schiller had tried, to set aside a place for aesthetic experience that was protected from or even triumphant over these pressures. Schelling admits that there are people who show themselves to be "crude and uncultured" (p. 9), and who cannot elevate themselves to the level where "the absolutely ideal is also immediately the real" (p. 35). If the argument is to work, these people must be discounted or tacitly passed over. In a tellingly pithy moment, he remarks that "only the understanding [*Verstand*] subordinates; within reason [*Vernunft*] and the creative imagination everything is free and moves about in the same realm without crowding or chafing, for each is within itself the equal of the whole" (p. 37). It is the understanding, of course, that handles the empirical, day-to-day world. Here, subordination is necessary. Pure freedom and equality exist only at the transcendental level, where there is no chafing or crowding.

I should not wish to be thought to be claiming to catch Schelling out here, or to be convicting him of an unconfessed elitism or mystification of the real state of the world. In fact, like his British contemporary, Coleridge, he is very well aware of the implications of his metaphysics; so much so that in the extensive comparison between the ancient and modern worlds that runs through *The Philosophy of Art* we can trace the necessary moment at which hierarchy and subordination

emerge as the inevitable demands of the *Weltgeist*. In this argument, and in others like it, we can identify the particular ingenuity and originality of Schelling's system, as it matches an eclectically inherited account of the ancient world (drawing upon Winckelmann, Schiller, and A. W. Schlegel, among others) with the analytical requirements of his own metaphysical system.

For Schelling, Greek mythology represents the "highest archetype of the poetic world" (p. 36). Here, the "synthesis of the absolute with limitation" that is the "mystery of all life" (p. 36) is most fully and completely carried out. The Greek gods, understood collectively, are an organic whole: "all possibilities within the realm of ideas as constructed by philosophy are completely exhausted in Greek mythology" (p. 41). Here the reigning mode is the symbolic, so that the particular is at all times also the universal (pp. 46-47). Thanks to this complete coexistence of the infinite within the finite, the condition of being in the world produces serenity and satisfaction. And, since all possibilities have been developed and are evident in essence to the senses, all interpretations are licensed ones (p. 50). The culture is a whole. It does not matter whether Homer was a single poet or a collective; true mythology comes from a "common formative impulse" (p. 51). Homer recites a poem that is already there in every sense except the empirical.

In the modern world, whose major formative syndrome is that of Christianity, things are very different. This world is founded in divisive individuality and in the "irrational" (p. 53). This predicament is frequently celebrated, indeed, especially by Protestants, as the only world worth having, one out of which authentic wholeness must be achieved and earned. But Schelling's account (unlike Hegel's) is distinctly reluctant to celebrate the *felix culpa* of the modern condition. Because Christianity does not accept, as the Greeks did, the achieved realization of the infinite within the finite (with the complex exception of Christ himself, who stands as the turning point between the two worlds [p. 64]), it disseminates the experience of dissatisfaction. It seeks always to "take up the finite into the infinite," so that the first becomes "allegorical" of the second, and worthwhile only insofar as the allegorical understanding is achieved (p. 61). While the Greeks could see the universe in nature, Christianity sees it only in time, as history (p. 59). What matters now is action carried out in time, because the finite must "pass over into" the infinite (p. 65). Baptism and death are the two most important acts, and it is only in such *acts* (rather than in being or existing) that Christianity can occupy the symbolic mode. It is thus only *occasionally* that the particular is wholly one with the ideal (p. 67).

In this way, Schelling diagnoses the modern condition as founded in nothing less than the "invention" of history. This does not, of course, mean that the Greeks could not tell one day from another, in some simply empirical sense. But for them time was not critical, since the infinite was already in the world with them, as nature. There was nothing to achieve. Christianity, on the other hand,

demands authentication in time (in the double sense, for one can run out of it, as Faustus did), after which one seeks to be taken out of time, which has then become an encumbrance. Nature is no longer sufficient in itself, but becomes a "mystery," an allegorical form needing to be deciphered (p. 80). Mythology (by which Schelling means the body of ideas and practices holding together a culture) no longer creates religion, as it did for the Greeks, but must somehow emerge from it.

We can now see why the modern world provides a more difficult medium for the emergence of the archetypes into the real world, as art, and why the maintenance of consensus and social harmony becomes so difficult, leading to an inevitably hierarchical establishment. As a dominantly allegorical culture, the modern world creates the likelihood of interpretative disagreement and strife. Things in the world now have to the read as signifying something that no longer appears *in* them; disputes will thus arise that are not subject to resolution by ostension. Access to the symbolic now comes only in *acts*, and these are self-confirming and performative only at the individual level. As construed by Schelling, the Greeks saw the identity of the absolute with the empirical as an everyday, familiar sight; for Christians, this can only come about in the miracle, which is thus their "only mythological material" (p. 69). Schelling well knew that nothing had occasioned more skeptical attention from Enlightenment thinkers than the deduction of faith from miracles. In here specifying the miracle as the only mythological element in Christianity, the only thing that can hold together a culture or community, he is signaling the fragile prospect for consensus in the modern world. And in the absence of consensus, some hierarchical conventions must appear.

Schelling's term for the definitive syndrome of the modern condition is *Entzweiung*. Douglas Stott renders this as "estrangement," appropriately enough, even if he risks thereby an overforceful association with J. B. Baillie's long-received translation of the Hegelian *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung*.[8] Again, it must be emphasized that what was to become for Hegel a fundamental mechanism of the mind itself, conceived as universal and normative—the self-projection through alienation that is the beginning of mature self-consciousness—is for Schelling a condition specific to the modern, Christian world. According to Hegel's account, both individuals (ontogeny) and the history of cultures (phylogeny) must go through this stage if they are to meet the requirements of an evolutionary *Geist*. Being human in a human culture involves experiencing and utilizing estrangement. Schelling's Greeks did not, however, experience estrangement, and missing it did not make them any less human. The breaking apart of the finite and the infinite was simply not a symptom of their mythology. Limiting this syndrome to the modern world, as Schelling does, he implicitly posits a historical rather than a universal identity for all the features of the social and individual psychology that we have since tended to define under the rubric of

"alienation." Although he himself does not pursue the exposition in these directions, we can infer that from this foundational *Entzweiung* there must devolve sectarianism (heightened, for Schelling, by the Reformation), interpretative disputes, and an insufficiently consensual mythology.

There is, however, at least one act in Christian culture wherein the individual may become one with the collective, where some faint echo of the Homeric creation may be heard: the church. As the "visible body of God," the church is an *act* uniting all its members. Its essence is thus symbolic and "its cult a living work of art" (p. 65). The last lines of Schelling's text refer to the "ideal drama" of the worship service as the single remaining symbolic act in modern public life (p. 280). Otherwise, all the energies of modern culture conspire to render the individual "the negation of the larger group" (p. 69). It is important to notice here that Schelling is speaking of the act of worship, and not of the institution of the church, or the physical space it occupies. As such, this one remaining symbolic act is subject to the same problems of conviction and consensus that we have remarked upon before. It must be carried out in the proper spirit, and that spirit cannot appear in essence in the world; what is absolute is always "infinitely removed" (p. 70). By looking at a congregation, we cannot decide who is and who is not worshipping in the proper spirit.

But how is the history or development of modern culture carried through? Because of this culture's necessary appearance as individuality, it can only be "through the influence of individuals of superior wisdom who are only personally, not collectively, filled with the universal and the infinite, and who, therefore, are prophets, seers, and divinely inspired people" (p. 69). The availability of the worship service for the many thus depends upon the efforts and abilities of the few. Schelling does not pursue the analogy that beckons here between prophets and artists, and his refusing it makes complete sense given that what he is here describing is a phenomenon specific to modern culture, rather than to history as a whole and hence to human nature. And we may now sense the import of his limiting the account of the coming into being of art (as a whole) to a general psychological vocabulary (sections 62 and 63, already mentioned) that does not set the possessor of genius apart from the rest of us. Had he done so, he would have participated uncritically in a Christian ideology, offering as normative a state of disjunction or "estrangement" that is in fact historical.

Hence it really does not matter whether Homer was one single person or five different ones, but Shakespeare was not and could not have been Ben Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher, or anybody else. The "mythology" that Shakespeare created *had* to bear at all times the stamp of his own nature (p. 74), as well as that of his times. For all his undoubted genius, not even Shakespeare could avoid contamination by the "barbarism" of his age (p. 269). And, being compelled to work with "character" (particularity) rather than with universal human nature, even he can never achieve the highest morality (pp. 270-71). Because Shake-

speare is *necessarily* subject to the constraints of place and time in the formative process of his art, he is not to be blamed for its limitations. No more could have been done by anyone, and no one else did as much.

At this point, we might seem to be on the verge of a comprehensively historical method, and one far more searching than that practiced by most of Schelling's British contemporaries, and indeed by many critics since. Calderón's superiority to Shakespeare has nothing to do with some Olympic-style competition between rival poets, but is premised upon his dwelling within a Catholic rather than a Protestant culture. Catholicism allows for the possibility of a "truly tragic fate," while Protestantism does not (p. 269). In the material of the lives of the saints, and in the greater proportion of its religious life that is given over to public rather than private embodiment, Catholic culture possesses a larger mythology than its Protestant counterpart (p. 70). Calderón simply has more to work with than Shakespeare. Questions about individual genius are misleading since what genius depends upon is not individual.

How, then, does Schelling's system prefigure or differ from what we would recognize as a historical method in the contemporary sense? Have we not suggested that within the perspective of the absolute, of which these lectures treat at such length, all art must by definition mean the same thing to all people at all times? Is there a historical dimension to the coming into being of art, but not to its reception? Those familiar with Schelling's argument will anticipate already the answers to these questions, but they are worth expounding in further detail, and they are central to both the conception and the presentation of *The Philosophy of Art*.

From what has been said already, we can see that Schelling's idea of the history of art is not founded upon a naïve progressivism of the sort that underlies Hegel's alternative model (sophisticated as it is on its surface). It is in this sense closer to a secular, twentieth-century notion of history, according to which things are simply different at different times, without offering evidence of some totalizing pattern evolving with the passing of time. (Needless to say, this is by no means a characterization of all twentieth-century historians.) But Schelling is committed, as we have seen, to the eternal identity of all art (and history) at the level of the absolute. At this level, and only at this level, history reveals "the essential and inner unity of all works of art," whose works are products of "the same spirit, a spirit that even in the antithesis of ancient and modern art is merely showing us two different faces" (p. 19). From this absolute perspective there is no time and thus no history, since "all time is merely the difference between possibility and actuality, and all manifested actuality is only the dismantling of that identity in which everything is simultaneous" (p. 213).

We thus have to think the idea of history at two coincident levels when we are reading Schelling. Because of the priority of the eternal, in absolute terms, there is no need to establish strong evaluative distinctions at the level of the empirically

historical. Neither modern nor ancient culture is in absolute terms superior to the other; history is neither progress nor regress. Differences may stand forth as simply differences. At the same time, insofar as we are not thinking or living at the level of the eternal or the ideal, it seems clear that our peace of mind must vary with the particular conditions brought about by the *Weltgeist* in our particular lifetimes. What we moderns perceive in the everyday world as longing and estrangement is not the symptom of some final dissatisfaction at the level of the absolute; but neither is it a fortunate self-redemptive incentive. It simply is. And there are going to be times when we are not thinking transcendentally, and will then experience pain and frustration, in a way that the Greeks never did. The reception of a work of art is thus not a single, unitary act. It invites different kinds and levels of response. Dante, Shakespeare, and Calderón are all different, and distinguished as such by all sorts of local and historical conditions. As Christian artists, they also express facets of a common culture, one based in estrangement. And as artists in the absolute mode, they maintain a fellowship with Homer and the Greeks: they too can be read back through their besetting particularities and seen as instances of the appearance of God or reason in the world. This ultimate synthesis includes not only all artists but also all the forms of art. The forms of music set forth "the forms of the eternal things," just as Dante's tripartite schema is a "universally symbolic form" (pp. 115, 243). A work of art, then, both does and does not mean the same thing to all people at all times. We can all, in theory, understand the essential element of Greek art *as* essential. At this level its meaning is assured. We cannot, however, experience the conjunction of a Greek work of art with the public life into which it first emerged, and whose conditions were symmetrical with it at the empirical level.

Again, we must register what Schelling does *not* infer here. He does not, for example, suggest, as Kierkegaard suggested in the case of the historical life of Christ, that the empirical experience of Greek art in any sense obscured or distorted its recognition as ideal by the Greeks themselves.[9] He does not imply that we moderns understand Greek art better than the Greek themselves did. Such a complacent conclusion might seem to follow from Schelling's analysis, for it is clear that the Greeks were not sufficiently impelled by dissatisfaction to require the particular forms of knowing now obligatory among us. But this, and only this, is the point. Schelling carefully refrains from turning his analysis of difference into a celebration of the modern European worldview. The Greeks did not know the ideal content of their art *as ideal* because the critical distinction between real and ideal had not yet come into being for them.

Despite his predilection for the analysis of the work of art from the perspective of the absolute, Schelling also does not say that the pursuit of an empirical-historical inquiry is a waste of time. What he says is that it cannot of itself produce any insight into truth in the absolute. Thus, while we can hardly suggest that Schelling's method is in any simple sense a precursor of what I have called a

contemporary historical consciousness, we can also see that its absolute schema is so broad and inclusive as to allow for (by not interfering with) the exploration of an unlimited number of local, empirical details affecting the coming into being of a work of art. Everything that has been, and will be, has to be. It is largely at the level of final causes and first causes that modern historians will differ irreconcilably from Schelling.

It is worth pointing out that the argued priority of the absolute also allows Schelling to depart on occasions from what might appear to be an obvious historical sequence in his exposition. For example, the sequence of epic, lyric, and drama that appears in empirical history (though this too might be disputed) does not correspond to the scientific order of analysis, which is the authentic schema of the absolute (p. 207). At other times there may be such a correspondence, and in the final stages of the evolution of the world spirit the two will come together (p. 247).

The interfusion of the ideal and the real in Schelling's model of history thus allows his argument a great deal of flexibility without threatening the ultimate priority of the absolute. Critical change is brought about by processes that we cannot, strictly speaking, name or imagine except as an overarching entity; the "universal spirit" or "world spirit" is Schelling's preferred term. This is more than just a *Zeitgeist*; it is behind and within all the *Zeitgeists*. The ancient and modern worlds are simply the two long-cycle forms of this world spirit, through which it is mediated to particular generations. At the moments of crucial transition, the world spirit appears *as* nature: "a necessity of nature executes what the spirit of history has designed in its own plans" (p. 60). Hence the function of the barbarians in the fall of Rome. We must assume that there is an end to this evolution, a closing couplet in the "great poem" upon which the world spirit reflects. This will be a moment of complete "*simultaneity*" (*Zumal*), when all time will be subsumed within eternity (p. 74). Whatever is the "final synthesis" according to the idea will also then be the "final manifestation in time," thanks to the predisposed orderliness of the world of nature (p. 247). Indeed it is, we must assume, only at this moment that such synthesis can occur. But it is again striking that Schelling, like Shelley in *A Defence of Poetry*, does not accord any descriptive function to the rhetoric of last judgments, and certainly does not predict an imminent end to historical time. We can assume that the world spirit is "doubtlessly preparing" a larger whole (p. 72), and that what we now have to achieve as individuals will at a later stage be effected by an "entire age" (p. 76) from within a "self-enclosed totality" (p. 240). But Schelling seems to be well aware of the strong tendency among inhabitants of the very Christian culture he has analyzed to try to step out of their moment in time, to act away the burdensome obligation to live in and through history. He is thus perhaps far more reluctant than Hegel was to prove in supplying his audience with food for their fantasies and aspirations. He does not see any signs of an imminent critical shift

beyond what he has defined as the modern condition. The final synthesis is not just around the corner, and it surely is not taking any convincing form in nineteenth-century European politics. Nor does he subscribe to a retrospective, reconstructive desire in imagining that the world spirit is about to produce for the moderns some facsimile of the serene synthesis of real and ideal enjoyed by the Greeks. There is a far-off divine event that is not only possible but necessary. But nothing in the present world can allow us to predict it.

I shall return at the end of this introduction to the implications of this limited optimism in Schelling's system, as it differs from the more confidently Eurocentric prognosis in Hegel's writings. Meanwhile, I would like to suggest a few of the ways in which we might begin to construe the legacy of Schelling for contemporary literary theory. Apart from his definite influence upon Coleridge, Schelling has been largely unread, so that we cannot identify him as a founding father in any direct sense. Nonetheless, various of the arguments and positions pursued in *The Philosophy of Art* do express in an exemplary way some of the early nineteenth-century prefigurings of modern critical theory. For example, in his comments on the relation of the epic to the novel (pp. 229-37), where he explains how the *form* of the novel strives to provide a closure that was at the heart of the content of the Greek epic, Schelling anticipates precisely the argument that would come to be stated by the young Lukács.[10] What Schelling has to say about the novel, and about the role of irony within it, is much more pertinent to subsequent criticism of prose fiction than anything in Hegel, who seems to have regarded the novel as a relatively redundant form in the evolution of *Geist* toward a rationally prosaic medium, best embodied in the language of philosophy. Schelling's remarks on the relation between the allegorical and symbolic modes, while not original in themselves, have also been frequently echoed since; Schelling renders them far more philosophically coherent than most of his precursors and contemporaries. Even at those moments—and there are many of them—where his concerns and priorities seem totally remote from those we might expect to take seriously today—for example, the materialization of music through the analysis of sonority, and the idealization of painting through the analysis of light—Schelling yet preserves an extraordinary degree of logical integrity and self-consciousness. Thus, even where we cannot hope to agree with or much appreciate what he says, we can learn a great deal from how he says it, and from the stringent concentration applied to the exposition of implications and consequences.

I have already discussed the importance of organic form to Schelling's account of the natural and spiritual worlds. When produced to the level of the absolute, it is not an argument that we are likely to be able to endorse today. But it is exactly the coherence of this otherwise anachronistic system that we have most to learn from. When Schelling says that a poem "must appear to be outside time, untouched by time, and thus must place all time, all successive elements, purely into the object, thereby maintaining itself in a serene condition and floating

above it immobile and unmoved by the sequential flow'' (p. 213), we are made aware of the identity of this formulation within a complex metaphysical paradigm upon which it depends and which it directly embodies. When we read most of the latterday facsimiles of this rhetoric in some of the canonical texts of literary criticism, we find that a contextualizing metaphysics very seldom emerges, and is equally seldom replaced by any logically satisfactory alternative, any demonstrated reason why poems, or the best poems, should be this way. Schelling, unlike so many of those who have employed a similar rhetoric, never lapses into the mere dissemination of unjustified standards of taste. And from his system we can learn a good deal about the possible hidden assumptions of his successors.

At many levels of the critical enterprise Schelling has something to tell us about the obligations of clear thinking. Given the structure of his system he does not, for example, have to make any crucial distinction between the terms in which a work of art is created and those in which it is received (at least, as we have discussed, at the ideal level). The archetypal identity of what the artist creates guarantees its authentic reception. When the structure of this system is removed, however, all sorts of problems arise from confusing the features of an object (say, words on the page) with the features of a response, as if they were simply the same thing. Modern literary critics cannot claim the authority of a Schelling-like system, but have often relied upon an analogous identification.

Even critics who embrace some version of a historical method can learn from these lectures. Schelling relates lyric poetry to the emergence of republicanism (p. 209f.). For him, the coincidence is necessary; both the form of art and the forms of public life are embodiments of the world spirit at a particular moment. This public life does not then determine the form of art, except at a secondary level. Again, historical critics often confuse or leave unexamined the empirical mechanisms whereby social life might or might not determine the forms of art, with the result that the ''historical'' method serves to define everything from Marxist-materialist to idealist models of cause and effect. The range of questions to which Schelling's system provides answers (on its own terms, of course) cannot but, when carefully pondered, assist us in becoming clearer about exactly what we mean by ''history.''

The sheer quality of intellect evident on every page of these lectures would then of itself be sufficient justification for reading them again today. They are extraordinarily useful for the production of a more exacting critical self-consciousness than literary critics who have not been trained in philosophy can usually achieve on their own. Because Schelling's argument and exposition is one wherein we both recognize and fail to recognize the paradigms of modern theory, its potential for developing logical self-awareness is greater than would be that of a text that is either wholly familiar or wholly strange. This quality of being *partly* familiar is also a very fertile stimulus for historical inquiry, for reading back to the early nineteenth-century with the aim of discovering something about its life

and thought. In particular—and here I return to a topic I have touched upon before—we can learn much from exploring the relation between Schelling and those important contemporaries who were *not* Schelling, those who made different choices and enunciated different options. The writings of Kant and Hegel, above all, proved far more persuasive to both contemporary and subsequent readers than did those of Schelling. Arguments within subjective philosophy tended to begin with Kant; initiatives within objective philosophy found Hegel far more compatible than they found Schelling.

We may begin to speculate about some reasons for these preferences by comparing Hegel and Schelling in their respective evaluations of the epic. In the argument of Hegel's later and more influential lectures, the epic represents a ''childlike consciousness,'' and is the product of a culture wherein there is as yet ''no separation between feeling and will'' (*Aesthetics*, p. 1045). As the Greek epic is more advanced than the Oriental epic, so it is itself in turn only a crude prototype of the process of individuation that Hegel celebrates as carried through by Christianity and modernity. Thus Hegel is concerned to argue, against Schelling among others, that Homer's poetry had to be written by a single individual rather than by a collective, ''for poetry is a spiritual production, and the spirit exists only as an actual individual consciousness and self-consciousness'' (p. 1049).

In Schelling's terms, Hegel is defining as universal and normative what is in fact itself historical; he is elevating Christian culture as an eternal standard toward which all history has moved. Schelling's own remarks on the epic speak for a very different understanding. Instead of being merely prototypic of something it is not, the epic achieved a fullness of its own, as ''indifference toward time'' (p. 215) and to the hierarchical demands of the individualized consciousness—a consciousness that had not yet come into being. Epic poetry achieves a ''participation in the divine nature, before which the large and the small are equal'' (p. 216). This is not a failure of taxonomical, rational intelligence, for the demands of that kind of intelligence have not yet come into being. Although Hegel includes in his lectures a much wider range of art objects from different periods and parts of the world than does Schelling, they are all there merely as preludes to the full emergence of European, Christian consciousness and its passage beyond art itself. Both Kant and Hegel, in different ways, privileged the identity of what Schelling defined as a specifically Christian individuality. Kant's subjective psychology placed the essence of the moral experience in an individual judgment whose integrity could only be guaranteed precisely by being cut off from an empirical community (and, in being cut off from a satisfactory mythology, in Schelling's terms). Hegel synthesizes the objective with the subjective philosophy through the paradigm of individuation, which represents the critical moment in the evolution of the single self as it also structures the movement of world history and all the phenomena governed by that history, art among them. Schelling, as we have seen, neither laments nor celebrates the moment of

"estrangement" that initiates the cycle of modern culture; its necessity is simply to be accepted. In this way he not only produces a relation between the ancient and the modern, the pagan and the Christian, that is marked by tolerance rather than hierarchy; he also himself manifests something of the epic virtues (which have now become virtues, being forever cut off from an everyday way of life)—he accepts being in the world, with all its attendant frustrations for the modern individual. For Schelling, the distant, pre-Christian past is no more marked by a condition of essential barbarism than the modern state is marked by any approximation to the demands of the absolute (*On University Studies*, pp. 83, xii). Where Hegel condescends toward the lack of ethical self-consciousness in the culture of Greek epic, Schelling respects the absolute freedom from morality enjoyed by the Greek gods. Again, the distinction between moral and immoral is based on an estrangement between infinite and finite that has not yet occurred (pp. 38-39).[11] It is true that for Schelling himself it is not the epic but the drama (tragedy and comedy) that images the high point of Greek art: drama is the "highest manifestation of the nature and essence of all art" (p. 247), because the antithesis between finite and infinite reaches its highest potence in that between necessity and freedom, which is synthesized in the drama. But the priority of drama is never invoked as a way of demeaning the epic. Nor, it must be said, has the modern drama produced anything as complete as the Greek theater.

Schelling thus comes far closer to a genuine acceptance of the otherness of non-Christian culture than does the more widely read Hegel. In this way he preserves one crucial legacy of the Enlightenment of which he was in so many other ways critical. We should not, of course, claim that Schelling was in some way beyond the sorts of ideological conditioning that is apparent in the texts of Kant and Hegel. But when we recover—as this new translation makes it possible to recover for a wider readership--a recognition of the differences between these thinkers, we are made forcefully aware that the spurious unity which we tend to attribute to a period called "romanticism" is nothing more than a product of our own superficiality and our willingness to take the part for the whole, the winners for the losers. There were considerable pressures upon German writers to produce texts through which German speakers might, in the words of A. W. Schlegel, experience a "unity" in the "mental dominion of thought and poetry," given that in the ordinary world they were "separated in so many ways from each other,"[12] Schelling did not, as Schlegel did, deliver a course of lectures that ended with a consolidation of his audience's "indestructible unity as Germans," confirming them as possessors of a "glorious picture" of national history (Schlegel, p. 529). The last pages of his text are muted, complex, even skeptical. They leave us not to conclude that Hegel was a better philosopher but to wonder why he, and not Schelling, should have emerged as the major philosophical voice incorporated into our habitual definitions of the modern condition.

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Translator's Introduction

I

For the winter semester of 1802-3, the University of Jena announced that Schelling would deliver the following series of lectures: *tradet philosophiam artis seu Aestheticen ea ratione et methodo, quam in constructione universae philosophiae secutus est, et quam alio loco pluribus exponet.*[1] In September of that year, Schelling wrote a rather lengthy letter to August Wilhelm Schlegel, who had just moved to Berlin and with whom he corresponded a great deal during this period, requesting a copy of Schlegel's own series of lectures entitled *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, a manuscript he probably first became acquainted with during his own visit to Berlin in May 1802.[2] He told Schlegel that he had decided to give the lectures on aesthetics because of the need to expand and develop his philosophy; he wished to "acquire for it some higher forms from this region." As it turns out, this reference to "higher forms" would be significant for an understanding of the lectures, since Schelling here juxtaposed such forms to the *empirical* side of art. His lectures would not, he asserted, deal with this empirical side: "Just as there are real or empirical things, there is also real or empirical art—and such art is the concern of *theory*." In contrast, he continued, "Just as there are intellectual things, things *in and for themselves*, however, there is also *art in and for itself*, of which empirical art is merely this appearance in the phenomenal world."

This, Schelling asserted, is the true object of the *philosophy* of art: not art to the extent that it is a particular, but rather as it is absolutely, ideally, or essen-

tially; not those aspects of art that might change in time, giving us what we know as the history of art, but rather those unchangeable, immutable features of art necessarily present in all ages, art as such or art taken from its "mystical side." "Music, the verbal arts, painting—all arts possess, just as does art as such, an *essential nature* within the absolute." It is this essential nature to which Schelling is referring in the phrase "higher forms."

Furthermore, he told Schlegel he would follow the same organizational scheme—or *construction*—in these lectures that he followed in his general philosophy, a scheme that successfully led him through "the most difficult entanglements of reflection." Schelling then requested a copy of Schlegel's own manuscript, which dealt more with the *empirical* side of art.[3] This, Schelling said, would save him considerable research and allow him to return more easily from that empirical (real) side to the intellectual (ideal) one. Schelling was, of course, already well acquainted with the world and history of what he is now calling the empirical side of art, and mentions as much in the lectures themselves. The specifics of Schlegel's own lectures, however, would allow him to get on more quickly to an investigation into those "higher forms."

Schelling's investigation, however, involved speculative presuppositions not immediately clear to a reader unacquainted with the philosophical tradition of German Idealism. An acquaintance with the basic speculative framework behind the lectures themselves will aid considerably in understanding the system of the arts they generate. Two areas will be of particular interest to the English-speaking reader.

First, many of the terms the Idealists used as common currency no longer possess that currency in modern German, and if their English renderings ever possessed such meaning, they do so today only within tightly circumscribed parameters that in their own turn set them off from ordinary English. Hence, a clarification of some of the more obscure or unusual terminology is necessary.

Second, the entire enterprise of Idealist philosophical speculation, the American transcendentalists notwithstanding, is fundamentally alien to the American, and to a certain extent also the English, philosophical sensibility. The Idealists were essentially metaphysicians, in spite of Kant's warnings, and it has been argued that Schelling was the last among them, indeed, the last in the Western metaphysical tradition as such.[4] The investigation into the essential nature of things necessarily involves metaphysical presuppositions, not the least of which is that language and the faculty of human reason really can supply such information. Kant was by no means of one mind with the German Idealists on this point; indeed, precisely this was the point of departure for much of Idealist thinking.

A consideration of the overall model of Schelling's philosophical considerations, particularly as they are fleshed out in the lectures on the philosophy of art, will give the reader a framework within which the various philosophical terms occupy specific, necessary positions.

II

Throughout his philosophical career, Schelling never gave up the hope of providing a metaphysical system for all reality that was grounded in an unassailable first principle, a principle both self-evident and absolute. Such a principle would ultimately ground knowledge itself. The goal was to provide a strictly scientific (*wissenschaftlich*), that is, a strictly systematic and methodical treatise demonstrating the first principle behind all knowledge, and indeed behind all reality. From such an absolute principle one could then explain the manifold of reality itself—both the phenomenal and intellectual worlds, or, as Schelling will put it, the *real* and *ideal* worlds—within one unified system. Furthermore, such a principle was conceived not only as accounting for all reality in the sense of explaining its structure and organization, but also as the generative, creative, and dynamic force or activity behind reality.

The initial Idealist notion was that the principle of subjectivity itself constituted that first principle. Ordinary human consciousness is first aware of something "out there" that is both very real and very different from the self we perceive in our own self-consciousness, and takes it to be that which affects or stimulates us, and thus as primal. It is somehow already there, and we then come to know it. In some way, objectivity—or something objective "out there"—constitutes the first principle or ground.

Kant had shown that this by no means must be the case. As a matter of fact, not only can we not know anything "out there" except through the filter of our own cognition, but the categories of that cognition—eminently subjective categories—account for the *way* in which we perceive. Our knowledge and perception are rather shaped and formed by the categories of human cognition itself. We cannot, Kant asserted, know anything about things-in-themselves or as they are apart from those filters of human cognition. Kant's critics quickly saw—and reminded him of this—that, as a matter of fact, we cannot even say that there is any thing-in-itself corresponding to that which we perceive, since by definition that thing-in-itself is precisely that which does not pass through those filters.

The Idealists seized on just this point. Apparently, the principle of subjectivity itself—of self-consciousness—was inextricably bound to whatever constituted knowledge or cognition, and must of necessity accompany all cognition. That primal act of self-consciousness was investigated from various angles of vision to see in what way the configuration present there was responsible both for what we perceive and for the way we perceive it. The configuration under consideration was, literally, that of consciousness of self: of the knower constituting the same entity as the known, or: of the knower knowing that he as knower constitutes the same entity as the known. Schelling ultimately saw that one could push this configuration—already annoying enough in its apparent redundancy—back an infinite number of steps, such that each successive act of knowing would itself be

known. The knower conceivably could know that he knows that he as knower constitutes precisely that which he knows, and so on. This infinite quality of the configuration proved extraordinarily attractive, since it seemed to constitute within cognition itself a point one could no longer transcend, an act rather than something that acts, activity or even relational structure rather than being, yet an activity grounding reality as we perceive it, a first principle.

At the turn of the century Schelling's own philosophical development had progressed into what many subsequently considered to be his most important period, namely, the philosophy of identity. He suggested that the dynamic force (act) at work in the various faculties of the human intellect or spirit was the same (identical) as that which was at work in the production of nature, though viewed merely from a different perspective. At the fundamental level of dynamic force or activity, the *reality* of nature was in fact identical with the *ideality* of the spirit or intellect. In other words, it was not quite correct to assert that the principle of subjectivity itself constituted the first principle of philosophy and of cognition, and that this principle thereby rendered ontologically inferior or subordinate that part of the world that was apparently separate from the human ego. Rather, Schelling pushed the infinite regression of the principle behind self-consciousness back yet a step further. Not the principle of subjectivity as displayed in human self-consciousness—its self-identity—constitutes that first principle, but rather the principle of *identity* itself implied by that configuration. Not the identity of knower and known (and of knower of the identity of knower and known), but rather identity *as such* constituted that first principle.[5] Hence, the absolute manifests itself equally both in the (real) products of nature and in the (ideal) products of the spirit.

Much of Schelling's philosophical activity during this period was directed toward articulating this fundamental vision. The implications of this vision, of course, are considerable, since the two realms into which ordinary understanding separates reality—the subjective and objective—no longer are really separate, or are separate only from certain perspectives. Ultimately, this identity implies what is now known as the unified field theory in physics, or the systems theory.[6] Schelling asserted that it was the task of the philosophy of nature to investigate the (real) world of nature, and the task of the philosophy of spirit to investigate the (ideal) world of the intellect.

Unfortunately, Schelling was to find that in its rather abstract identity that absolute was particularly recalcitrant when one tried philosophically to derive the palpable world of factical reality from it.[7] How does this absolute actually generate the world around us, and me as an individual human being? How is the transition effected between the abstract quality of absoluteness implied by this understanding of identity *as such*, and the phenomenal world around us?

In the philosophical pieces Schelling wrote during this period—and he wrote a great many—he tried to get at this question from various lines of attack. Most

of them, understandably, have Platonic or, more specifically, Neoplatonic overtones. He is never quite satisfied, though, with the interface—or lack of it—between the absolute and the factical world implied by such terms as "emanation" or "outflowing" from the absolute, though he constantly employs these terms. In one philosophical work associated closely with the philosophy of art, the *System der gesammten Philosophie und der Naturphilosophie insbesondere* of 1804, Schelling variously speaks about a thing being a "reflex" or "reflected image" of the All, about "expressions" of ideas, about things "going forth" from the absolute, and especially about things or circumstances "following from" the absolute, and about "results" of the activity within the absolute. Significantly, he did not publish this *System* of 1804, apparently because he was dissatisfied even though it was an accurate exposition of his view of the absolute and its consequences at the time.[8] Neither did Schelling publish these lectures on the philosophy of art, whose composition coincides roughly with that of the *System* of 1804. Although there were several probable reasons for this reluctance, reasons we will discuss shortly, at least one concerned the central problem within the *System* of 1804: the derivation of content from the absolute.

To understand this more clearly, one must comprehend the importance of the concept of the absolute, ground, or first principle in Idealist thinking. It has been said of the work of the twentieth-century theologian Karl Barth that, once one grants him his point of departure in revelation, everything else follows with strict necessity. Schelling ardently wished the same could be said of his own works, and indeed asserted that it could: once this understanding of the absolute has been posited, all else follows with logical necessity; there can be but one philosophy.

Schelling apparently challenged himself in the *System* of 1804 on just this point, and ultimately was not satisfied with his solution. He quickly moved on to rethink his understanding of that absolute first principle grounding the system. The *Philosophy of Art*, however, is yet predicated on this earlier understanding of the absolute.

III

Having once established the first principle, that of identity, Schelling is concerned with showing scientifically—with strictly systematic methodology—that the world of art as we know it results from the activity characterizing the absolute, and itself constitutes a systematic, self-enclosed whole. In a similar fashion, he believes he has already shown how both the world of nature and the world of the spirit result with equal necessity from that principle, since the dynamic force at work in both is identical (hence, system of identity). What he will actually construct or construe (*construiren*, *Construktion*) here is the *system* of arts necessarily resulting from that principle. Since it is a system of the individual art forms *as such*, and not one based on a particular selection of works of art (how-

ever exemplary one might consider them to be), it necessarily precedes any actual works themselves. It does not precede them temporally, however, as would a system based on principles extracted from actual works, nor is a temporal process involved in its actual generation by the absolute. Rather, it lacks all relationship to time, and precedes actual works of art absolutely, just as the idea of a circle precedes any one, individual circle absolutely. This recalls the problem of the derivation of finite content from an infinite absolute, for if that absolute lacks all relationship to time, how is the temporal world generated from within it?

If, however, we leave this question in abeyance for the sake of proceeding out from that absolute; if, that is, we assume that if finiteness exists at all, some transition must obtain between the absolute and the world of finitude—and not merely a logical transition—we can then analyze what Schelling considers to be a logical sequence proceeding from the absolute ultimately resulting in the real and ideal worlds of nature and the spirit. Everything further, Schelling now asserts, follows with utter necessity. (Schelling argues elsewhere that only from the perspective of finite consciousness itself does this question arise regarding the derivation of content from the absolute, or regarding this transition from infinity to finitude; he does, however, still encounter difficulties deriving finite consciousness.)

Although the principle behind the system—indeed, behind all reality, both real and ideal, behind both the realm of nature and that of the spirit—is absolute identity, that identity is not as purely *one* as it might appear upon first consideration. If one posits identity as such, one has also posited its two possible members, even if they are, as the term implies, themselves identical. If A = A (a common equation that both Fichte and Schelling use), one at least has to consider the unit A from both sides of the equation, and thus recognize difference in identity. This suggests that in some way one is nonetheless dealing with a dualistic first principle. In the works constituting the system of identity, Schelling attributes several terminological pairs to this identity. It is the identity of spirit and nature, subject and object, ideal and real, universal and particular, conscious and unconscious, and particularly the identity of freedom and necessity (the latter pair corresponding to the necessity with which the system of nature operates and the freedom with which, ideally, the human world or world of history should operate). This principle of identity or the absolute point of identity of philosophy is also the absolute in and for itself, *one* absolute reality, *one* essence. This *one* absolute, the *one* absolute idea of the identity of the real and the ideal, stands behind Schelling's philosophy during this period.

In the *System* of 1804, however, and also in the *Philosophy of Art*, Schelling begins referring to this absolute as God. His introduction of the term may be explained perhaps by the increasing attention he gives the ontological implications of his metaphysical assertions. That is, precisely the problem of the derivation of content from this absolute forced the issue of the ontological status both

of the absolute and of that which results from it. The revelatory aspect of art had already played an important role in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, a role that art arguably never relinquishes during Schelling's long career. In the final sections of that work, he postulates an intuition that discloses or reveals precisely that which the philosopher seeks to establish, namely, the identity of the real and the ideal, the

> *identity of the conscious* and the *unconscious* in the *self*, and *consciousness of this identity*. The product of this intuition [the work of art] will therefore verge on the one side upon the product of nature, and on the other upon the product of freedom, and must unite in itself the characteristics of both.[9]

Only artistic genius, Schelling asserts, is able to effect this union and lend it objective form in a work of art. There inheres, however, an unknown element within this production that makes this union possible in the first place, and which is thus actually the element we intuit in the objective manifestation of the work of art:

> This unknown, however, whereby the objective and the conscious activities are here brought into unexpected harmony, is none other than that absolute [the primordial self] which contains the common ground of the preestablished harmony between the conscious and the unconscious. (pp. 221-22)

The implications for philosophy, and thus for the relationship between art and philosophy, emerge from this expressly revelatory character of art:

> The whole of philosophy starts, and must start, from a principle which, as the absolute principle, is also at the same time the absolutely identical. An absolutely simple and identical cannot be grasped or communicated through description, nor through concepts at all. It can only be intuited. Such an intuition is the organ of all philosophy.—But this intuition, which is an intellectual rather than a sensory one, and has as its object neither the objective nor the subjective, but the absolutely identical, in itself neither subjective nor objective, is itself merely an internal one, which cannot in turn become objective for itself: it can become objective only through the second intuition. This second intuition is the aesthetic.
>
> The work of art merely reflects to me what is otherwise not reflected by anything, namely that absolutely identical which has already divided itself even in the self. Hence, that which the philosopher allows to be divided even in the primary act of consciousness, and which would otherwise be inaccessible to any intuition, comes, through the miracle of art, to be radiated back from the products thereof. (pp. 229-30)

Hence, in art the philosopher finds revealed objectively that which grounds his entire system, namely, the absolute itself, or absolute identity, and art is granted an expressly revelatory function:

> If aesthetic intuition is merely intellectual intuition become objective, it is self-evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form, namely the unconscious element in acting and producing, and its original identity. Art is paramount to the philosopher, precisely because it opens up to him, as it were, the holy of holies, where burns in eternal and original unity, as if in a single flame, that which in nature and history is rent asunder, and in life and action, no less than in thought, must forever fly apart. (p. 231)

By the time he gave the lectures on the philosophy of art, and by the time he had clarified his understanding of the absolute that we find presented in the *System* of 1804, Schelling had for all practical purposes parted ways with Fichte's one-sidedly subjective understanding of the absolute; the "primordial self" in the passage quoted earlier was itself subsumed under absolute identity, of which it is a mere expression, and the problem of differentiation between the two had become more urgent. This also pressed the issue of the revelatory function of mythology, and likely played a role in Schelling's shifting terminology and introduction of the designation of the absolute as God.[10]

In these lectures, however, Schelling associates several other terminological pairs with the idea of absolute identity as well. The concept of identity itself, and thus the ultimate identity of the various terminological pairs associated with it, constitutes what we may call the basic *organizational* or *relational* principle of the universe, and accordingly also of what Schelling will call the *All*, including the real and ideal worlds (of nature and of the spirit). Since God is now another designation for that absolute, the reader will not go astray if when encountering the term *God* he thinks instead "the ultimate or basic organizational principle of the universe." Indeed, this could apply to the terms *absolute* or *identity* as well. The logical nature of that structure should be noted; it is not an ultimate *being* but rather a relational principle. Additionally, as is consonant with Idealist thinking, it implies the idea of generative *activity*.

IV

In its overall conception, Schelling's system of identity encompasses three distinct "philosophies" that are, however, essentially one: the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of the spirit (transcendental philosophy), and the philosophy of art. The actual object of philosophy *as such*, however, is always the same; it is

the *one* essence, the *one* absolute reality, viewed as it manifests itself in nature, in the world of the spirit, and in art. Strictly speaking, one should also speak here of Schelling's philosophy of identity, that is, that philosophy explicating the identity as such of that which is in nature and spirit. The philosophy of art deals with that identity as it manifests itself in the world of art.

A crucial qualification of this one essence, however, is that it is indivisible. Absolute identity as such enters into everything encompassed by the world of nature, spirit, and art. Distinct "things" are then possible only if the entire absolute—the entirety of its quality as absolute identity, including the dual quality of its members—is *posited* under what Schelling calls different *potences*. Although one could also translate the German *Potenz* as *power*, *exponential*, or *potential*, I have chosen *potence*. The most significant translation of the term from Schelling into English (and, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first use of the word in general) occurs in Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*, Chapter 12, in reference to the syntheses of the imagination; Coleridge himself acquires the term from the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, though Schelling employs it elsewhere as well. Coleridge defends his own use of technical terms in philosophy "whenever they tend to preclude confusion of thought, and when they assist the memory by the exclusive singleness of their meaning more than they may, for a short time, bewilder the attention by their strangeness," and thus ventures "to use potence, in order to express a specific degree of a power, in imitation of the Algebraists."[11] I believe the "singleness of meaning" to which Coleridge refers applies in this case, since Schelling's use of the mathematical term in the present philosophical context is not that which one normally expects from the terms *power*, *exponential*, or *potential*, and the term *potence* may well "assist the memory" and understanding. That is, the central position the term *Potenz* occupies in Schelling's *Philosophy of Art* (as well as in other works) will itself help define the term. (Coleridge mentions the word and then uses it no more in the *Biographia Literaria*.) Schelling himself acquires the word from Giordano Bruno's *De la causa*, though not directly. That is, he did not himself translate it from the Italian, but got it rather—already translated—from an appendix to the second edition of Johann Heinrich Jacobi's *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza* (1789). Bruno's own term was *potenza*, and likely came from Latin *potentia* as used by Nicholas of Cusa.[12] August Wilhelm Schlegel also uses it in his lecture series entitled *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, though not in this strictly philosophical context.

This brings us to Schelling's understanding of *duplicity* and *triplicity*. The fundamental principle of organization behind both real and ideal reality is absolute identity. Furthermore, that absolute identity is by nature indivisible, since one cannot speak of the absolute identity of one member of an equation with nothing on the other side. Hence, the principle of organization of any particular thing ("thing" taken here broadly to include products of the worlds of nature and

spirit) necessarily manifests a duality or duplicity at its most fundamental level. Whereas in the absolute itself there is no distinction between the two members, in determinate being there must be; what makes it determinate is precisely some *quantitative* qualification that affects its actual being. Although in the *System* of 1804 Schelling goes to great lengths to assure us of the nonreality of such determinate being in the Platonic or Neoplatonic sense, such determinate qualification does obtain in the phenomenal world. That distinguishes it from the absolute.

Concerning actual, finite things, Schelling offers the following proposition in the *System* of 1804:

> §54. *The particularity of finite things through which the real All [first stage of emanation from the absolute] as real, the ideal All as ideal appears, can be based either on a reciprocal preponderance of the one factor over the other or on a balance between the two.*

This, Schelling asserts in the next sentence, concerns merely the method of presentation and thus needs no proof. It is, however, of greater significance than this offhand remark suggests, since the principle of construction is precisely the principle determining the internal organization of all that is, both real and ideal. Instead of a proof he offers an elucidation in which he presents the various possibilities for the *potences*. He also coins a new terminological pair to be applied to the principle of identity, one recalling the origin of that principle in the configuration of knower and known in self-consciousness. The ideal factor (corresponding to the act of knowing) is now called the *affirming* factor, and is active; the real factor (corresponding to the condition of being known) is now called the *affirmed* factor, and is passive. Of self-consciousness one might then say that the affirming element and affirmed element are one. Applied to the particularities within the real and ideal All—that sphere one remove from the absolute from which the actual world of particular things issues—the following principle will obtain:

> §56. *Triplicity of potences is the necessary mode of appearance of the real All as real, as well as of the ideal All as ideal*, for the All can only appear through *finite* things whose differences can be expressed only through three potences, of which the one designates the preponderance of the affirmed condition, the other of the affirming element, and the third the indifference of the two.

That is, a preponderance of the one or other factor results in a condition of *difference*; a balance between the two factors results in a condition of *indifference*.[13] The annotation Schelling then adds to §56 is significant enough to cite in its entirety:

> *Annotation*. The true *schema* of the immediate issuance from the idea of God would thus be this: God as the prototype is absolute identity in which the real and ideal All is contained. The immediate issuance of the real and ideal All as such is the indifference of the affirming and the affirmed, which for that reason has a double expression: one within the real and the other within the ideal (since absolute identity belongs neither to the one nor to the other). From this indifference there issues in declining order the affirming or the ideal in relative preponderance over the affirmed or real, and the affirmed or real in relative preponderance over the affirming or ideal, both follow or issue in the same way from the indifference within the real and ideal. This same schema can repeat itself into infinity.

The absolute itself transcends these potences, but includes them all. It pours its entire essence into each, such that each contains elements of the other (the entire identity), yet with a preponderance of the one factor over the other. Schelling expresses this mathematically with variations of the following scheme:[14]

$$\frac{\begin{matrix}+ & & + \\ A = B & & A = B\end{matrix}}{A = A}$$

These potences, however, though they determine the particular features of things in the real and ideal worlds (of nature and of the spirit or intellect), nonetheless do not determine the thing-in-itself or its essence, but rather only that part belonging to the phenomenal world. Hence, "all differences of *natura naturata* (of the real as well as of the ideal) are only of a quantitative nature, and are only differences in potence, not in essence" (§58).

These principles of duplicity of members and dialectic triplicity of relationships, the first quantitative determinations possible outside absolute identity itself, determine the organization of phenomena both of the world of nature and that of the intellect or spirit. (Phenomena, again, can refer to products of the intellect, since they are included in the finite world.) The principles also thoroughly determine appearances within the world of art, and will be the guiding principles throughout Schelling's presentation.

Let us now return to our point of departure—the three philosophies with one object. In the opening lectures Schelling will say the following:

> There is actually and essentially only *one* essence, *one* absolute reality, and this essence, as absolute, is indivisible such that it cannot change over into other essences by means of division or separation. Since it is indivisible, diversity among things is only possible to the extent that this indivisible whole is posited under various determinations.

This means that the entire absolute*ness* of the absolute will *inform* (*einbilden*) itself into every potence, whether it be a potence of nature, of the spirit, or of art.

When Schelling speaks in the following lectures of the *informing* (*Einbildung*) of one factor into another, or of one quality into another, this is what he means. This word recalls the dynamic, generative quality of the absolute, and also suggests that creative, generative, and formative power one associates with the artist. The difference between the various potences depends on the preponderance of the one or other factor of the real or ideal in the potence under consideration, or from the indifference (balance) between the two. Each philosophy—that of nature, of the spirit, or of art--is to be a presentation of this fundamental, primordial identity inherent within the absolute, one manifesting itself as the complete mutual informing of the real and ideal within nature, the spirit, or art. Accordingly, Schelling refers to these three realms as potences as well: the entirety of absoluteness is posited or informed into the potence of nature, of the spirit, and of art, though with varying degrees of preponderance of the one or other factor, or with their indifference. Similarly, within each of these potences we encounter yet another subdivision into triplicity, that is, three more possible potences. In some instances, each of these potences divides itself yet further into three more, and so on ("this entire schema can repeat itself into infinity"). We will consider shortly just how this increasing triplicity manifests itself in the three potences.

In nature, necessity predominates (the factor of the real, of the necessary chain of cause and effect and of physical laws). The dynamic force in nature corresponding to the creative activity within the absolute, or to the conscious activity of the spirit, operates unconsciously in creating that which we call nature. ("Nature is slumbering spirit.") In the spirit itself, freedom is the predominating factor. Human spirit operates consciously and freely in what we call the productions of the spirit (for example, in the activity of philosophy).

One of these products of the spirit is art; yet art presents us with that peculiar set of circumstances mentioned earlier in the discussion of the *System of Transcendental Idealism*. The conscious spirit in freedom does not operate *alone* within the artist. Otherwise, artistic talent could be taught just as that which we call the rudiments or mechanics of art. We all agree that talent cannot be taught. We sense in every work of genius that some element of necessity is also at work, something analogous to the necessity operating within nature, something that posits its own "laws" with a necessity we ordinarily encounter only in nature. The genius operates quite consciously, but there is always an element not quite under his control, some force acting through him, guiding him in his creation. The ordinary observer senses this as an element of, for lack of a better word, "rightness," even though the order or form imposed on the work of art may well violate what we call natural law. It is in this sense that, as we have seen, the philosophy of art concluded the *System of Transcendental Idealism*: "The work of art reflects to us the identity of the conscious and unconscious activities. . . . Besides what he has put into his work with manifest intention, the artist seems instinctively, as it were, to have depicted therein an infinity, which no finite understanding is capable of developing to the full" (p. 225). That is, the work of art discloses in actuality that identity of the conscious and the unconscious, of spirit and nature, of freedom and necessity, lying behind the philosopher's entire task as the principle of the absolute grounding all knowledge, and the disclosure of which actually constitutes the philosopher's primary goal.

The principles of identity, duplicity, and triplicity will now generate a systematic philosophical structure coordinating both the relationships between the three philosophies among themselves and their internal structures.

V

Schelling begins with the absolute. The absolute is God; God is both the *idea* and the *being* of absolute, infinite reality. By virtue of the law of absolute identity, *idea* and *being* coincide in God; indeed, God *is* this idea and this being which coincide. Schelling reminds us that an actual circle is clearly not the same as the idea of a circle. The idea of the circle precedes every actual manifestation of a circle, not temporally, but rather absolutely. This is not the case, however, in God. God *is* the identity of being and idea, or *is* absolute identity. God precedes everything—not temporally, since the absolute has no relationship to time whatever, but rather according to the idea.

Formulating this entire complex in terminology analogous to that of human self-consciousness—recalling the terminological pairs of knower-known, active-passive discussed earlier—Schelling also says that God *conceives* (*begreifen*) or *affirms* himself. He conceives himself as an infinitely affirming element (for he is doing the affirming), as infinitely affirmed (for he is affirmed in the passive sense), and as the indifference of the two (for he is both). Strictly speaking, he is neither of the three; it is more accurate to say he is infinite affirm*ation*, the infinite identity of all three. Furthermore, we say that the activity of knowing, conceiving, or affirming is *ideal* (an activity of the intellect or spirit), and that which is known, conceived, or affirmed is *real*. God as knowing, conceiving, or affirming himself is thus an *ideality* encompassing its own reality, and as being known, conceived, or affirmed by himself is a *reality* encompassing its own ideality (the activity of knowing, conceiving, or affirming). In a word, God is a total, absolute identity of ideality and reality, the identity of—to use yet another terminological pair—the universal (ideal) and the particular (real), and is the indifference of the two.

Schelling now deduces his entire series of duplicity and of the ultimate unity or indifference of its members from this essential nature of God as the absolute. God is neither singularly ideal nor singularly real nor singularly the indifference of the two, but is rather all three, or: he is all*ness*, and this suffix *-ness* is as significant as the suffix *-ation* in affirmation, since it is reserved for God alone. In reality—our reality—ideality and reality are always sundered and separate.

The concrete circle is never fully congruous with its own idea. The particular or concrete is never fully commensurate with its own universal or its essence.

In a highly significant work of 1802, *Bruno; or, On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things*, Schelling develops an understanding both of the absolute and of the ideas that carries over into his work on the philosophy of art. Particularly in its initial discussions, he works out the philosophical background for the assertion that truth can be equated with beauty and beauty with truth. The fundamental notion is that the more closely a particular, actual thing approximates the perfection of its universal or idea, such that the idea itself (the universal) can be intuited in the particular, the more closely does that particular participate in beauty, which is thus defined as the concurrence of universal and particular intuited in the particular. This is the object of aesthetic intuition. The object of intellectual intuition, on the other hand, is the concurrence of the universal with its particular in the abstract, such concurrence then constituting truth. Hence, beauty (in the concrete) can be equated with truth (in the abstract), and the objects of aesthetic and intellectual intuition are actually the same identity of the universal and the particular, though viewed from opposite directions. This was, as we saw earlier, precisely the point made in the final sections of the *System of Transcendental Idealism*.

Concerning the fundamental separation of the universal and particular in ordinary reality, we find that the idea or universal does appear within that particular—that is the basis for recognition and cognition as such—but never completely; the reality of the particular never completely corresponds to the possibility inherent within its universal. To use Schelling's own words: The positing of the universal of a thing into its concrete is already a limitation (of that universal or idea); hence, the thing—any thing—is never at once and in fact everything it could be essentially or according to its idea or universal. Reality is by definition a privation of ideality. This is not the case, however, in God. Hence, one does not say that God is conscious (ideal); neither is he unconscious (real) or nonconscious, but is rather the absolute unity of the two. He is neither free nor necessary (the opposite of free), but is rather the unity of the two.

This duplicity and the resulting triplicity of relationships, or the triadic structure of the dialectic of the absolute, determines, according to Schelling, the structure of all reality in the larger sense, and does so in a fashion analogous to the inner character of the absolute. Again, the absolute or God is the infinitely affirming, the infinitely affirmed, and the unity of the two, or is the ideal, the real, and the unity of the two. The same is true of reality as such. Proceeding out from the absolute, the next stages are the universe and the All (God is all*ness*, not the All); the universe and the All contain that which is contained in God. For example, the dynamic force in the All conceives itself as infinitely affirming, infinitely affirmed, and as the indifference of the two. There is a real world of

nature and an ideal world of the intellect or of spirit; the world—"our" world—constitutes the unity of the two.

The triplicity now continues. Within each of these—the real and ideal worlds—there inheres what Schelling now calls a real series, an ideal series, and the indifference of the two, such that triplicity imprints itself onto our entire reality. We will see that the world of art, as the indifference of the worlds of nature and of the spirit, then constitutes the third element in the triplicity of worlds, recalling yet again the understanding of art presented in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*. As such, the philosophy of art concludes or rounds off the triadic organization of the philosophy of nature, of spirit, and of art.

Following this triplicity further down from the absolute (after the universe and the All), one encounters first the *real* world, reality as the affirmed condition rather than as activity. The infinite affirmed condition of God in the All is the real world, or it is the *informing* (again, Schelling asks that we take this word literally, as active in-form-ing, *Einbildung*) of God's infinite identity into reality. Schelling calls this the real unity, eternal nature, nature in itself (*an sich*, *natura naturans*). It is not the world of phenomenal nature (*natura naturata*), not nature in its particularity, but rather nature insofar as it is itself a potence of God, namely, insofar as it is God in his infinite affirmed condition.

Here, too, however, we encounter all three unities, and Schelling uses the terms *potence*, *unity*, and *determination* interchangeably in this sense: that of the affirmed condition, that of the affirming activity, and the indifference of the two, or all three as the infinite affirmation or as the entire essence of God. We recall that God is identity, and each unity accordingly manifests the imprint of the whole, though in a particular potence. These three subpotences, if we may call them such (Schelling does not use this term himself), are actually that which we call the real world of phenomenal nature, and it is the task of the philosophy of nature to investigate this world. The triadic structure disclosing the foci of the philosophy of nature is thus:

1. real potence—affirmed condition—*matter (informing* of the ideal into the real);
2. ideal potence—affirming activity—*light* (ideality resolving all reality); and
3. potence of indifference—*organism*.

It is important to understand these terms relationally, that is, as indicating relational rather than substantive or material features. These potences or unities are the particular results (*Folgen*) of God's affirmation within the *real* All, in the *real* world, within the *real*. Breaking this affirmation itself down further, the real potence within this real world is matter, or, as Schelling calls it, being. This is not matter in and for itself, but rather viewed from the perspective of its phenomenal, corporeal appearance; it is not substance but rather form, *accidens*. Furthermore,

matter, as we might expect, is posited with a preponderance of the real, of the affirmed condition. It constitutes the informing of ideality into reality.

The ideal potence, or light, Schelling also calls *activity*, or that ideality that resolves (*auflösen*) all reality within itself. This is essence or the universal. The integration of the two, or the indifference of being and activity, of form and essence, is the organism. The essence of an organism is inseparable from the subsistence of its form.

Although the terminology in Schelling's philosophy of nature may appear somewhat bizarre, it should not unnerve the reader too much. Schelling's concern is to account for the organization both of nature as a whole and of the individual phenomena within nature, and to do so within a unified system, a system from which no part can be extracted without damaging the whole (nature itself, he explains, constitutes an organism), and outside of which no single part can be comprehended. His understanding of matter and light as condition and activity, though based on the limited scientific knowledge of his own age, does betray an impulse to understand and conceive nature as a nonmechanistic system based on a nexus of relations and forces, these relations being inherent within the absolute and manifested within reality as a result of the dynamic, generative aspect of the absolute. In any case, for our present purposes the reader need only follow the triadic structure and the various relationships obtaining within it (duplicity and triplicity).

Let us now move to the ideal world. This constitutes ideality, the activity of affirming. The infinitely affirming activity of God within the All is the ideal world, the informing of his reality into ideality. The act of thinking the concept "tree," for example, constitutes the resolution or informing of reality into ideality. Acting according to an ideal, to take another example, constitutes the elevation or resolution or "taking up" (*aufnehmen*) of reality into ideality. The potences or unities of the ideal world are then:

1. real potence—affirmed condition—*knowledge*—preponderance of the subjective;
2. ideal potence—affirming activity—*action*—preponderance of the objective; and
3. potence of indifference—knowledge and action in indifference
   nonconscious and conscious in indifference
   necessity and freedom in indifference—*art*.

Art is the representation (*Darstellung*) of this indifference of the ideal and the real *as* indifference. Art is concerned precisely with this indifference *as indifference*, and constitutes its representation or portrayal, as we can now see, within the *ideal* world of the intellect or spirit. (The representation in the *real world*, or the manifestation within the real world, is the organism.)[15] Art, the work of art, is a product neither of action nor of knowledge alone, neither of freedom nor of

necessity alone, neither of conscious nor of unconscious activity alone. As Schelling puts it, "Art is in itself neither mere activity nor mere knowledge, but is rather an activity completely permeated by knowledge, or, in a reverse fashion, knowledge which has completely become activity. That is, it is the indifference of both" (§14).

We recall that knowledge is the real potence within the ideal world, the potence of necessity, just as action is the ideal potence within the ideal world, the potence of freedom. In the work of art, as we can now see, both coincide: freedom with necessity, conscious or intentional with nonconscious or unintentional activity. Again, the final section of the *System of Transcendental Idealism* establishes the position of art here.

Schelling also views this complex from the perspective of the ideas themselves, and here, too, we encounter triplicity. The first potence of the real world is matter or being, that of the ideal world knowledge. The idea corresponding to these two potences is that of *truth*. The triadic members are then *being—knowledge—truth*. The second potence of the real world is light or activity, that of the ideal world (free) action; their idea is that of *goodness* or *virtue*. The triadic members are then *activity—free action—virtue*. The third potence of the real world is the organism as indifference, that of the ideal world art as indifference; their idea is *beauty*. The triadic members are thus *organism—art—beauty*.

If we now look more closely at the ideal world (of the intellect or spirit), the world in which art constitutes the third potence, we see that truth manifests itself as necessity, goodness or virtue as freedom, and beauty as the indifference of freedom and necessity, though indifference intuited objectively within the real. Beauty is the informing into unity (*Ineinsbildung*) of the real and the ideal within a reflected image (*Gegenbild*). Art is accordingly an absolute synthesis or mutual interpenetration of freedom and necessity. One can see the analogous position God or the absolute as the absolute unity of freedom and necessity possesses in relation to the work of art, and the enormous metaphysical, revelatory, and symbolic significance Schelling can attribute to the work of art within his system.

At this point we can also see how Schelling understands the German word for imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) in the artist: literally, the power of in-form-ing. It is the power whereby the ideal or universal is in-formed in actual fact into the real or particular; the more fully or completely the artist is able to in-form that ideal or universal into the real or particular, the more beautiful and true will his work of art be. The artist is thus a creator within the reflected image just as God is a creator in the archetype (*Urbild*).[16]

In these lectures, Schelling repeatedly emphasizes that this informing of the ideal into the real is not to be confused with mere correct approximation of nature, what we might call naturalism. In fact, nature or the natural, phenomenal world by definition does *not* constitute a concurrence of the ideal and the real, for no particular object fully renders its own idea or universal, but consists precisely

in a privation of that universal. Hence, an approximation of nature in art virtually assures the abrogation of beauty and thus also of truth. A van Gogh sunflower need not approximate the appearance of an actual sunflower, and indeed does not, in order to allow us to intuit the *idea* sunflower; in fact, precisely in its departure from the appearance of an actual sunflower do we sense its closer approximation to that idea that can never be fully rendered in the natural world. In other words, the apparent unnatural particularity of van Gogh's sunflower may well allow us to intuit the idea sunflower or its ideal reality better than any actual sunflower, and thus represents the specific *type* "sunflower" better than any particular natural sunflower could.[17]

The philosophy of nature investigates the real world in its three potences: matter, light, organism. The philosophy of transcendental Idealism (of spirit) investigates the ideal world in its three potences: truth, action (ethics), art. Art concludes both series, and the *Philosophy of Art* itself accordingly has not merely one series of three potences, but rather two series of three potences each; its *real* series corresponds to the philosophy of nature, its *ideal* series to the philosophy of spirit.

As we saw in the concluding sections of the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, what for philosophy is comprehensible nonobjectively in intellectual intuition (within the ideal) is comprehensible objectively within aesthetic intuition in art as the complete informing into unity of the universal and the particular (within the real). The further constructions of the *Philosophy of Art* thus deal with the particular potences of this informing within art. These particular potences themselves, not only within art, but also within nature and the world of the spirit, represent particular *modes of representation* of the universal within the particular (§39):

> That representation in which the universal means the particular or in which the particular is intuited through the universal is *schematism*.
>
> That representation, however, in which the particular means the universal or in which the universal is intuited through the particular is *allegory*.
>
> The synthesis of these two, where neither the universal means the particular nor the particular the universal, but rather where both are absolutely one, is the *symbolic*.

Schelling also calls the third, or symbolic, mode of representation absolute form. In his discussion of mythology, he remarks that as the representation of the forms of the absolute indifference of the universal and the particular within the real as gods, mythology is necessarily symbolic, since the meaning of the gods is simultaneously their being. (Schelling will explain how he considers the symbolic development of mythology to have taken place only within Greek art; the development of modern mythology is still in transition.)

Schelling understands these modes of representation as a progressive series of potences themselves (general categories) in nature, spirit, and art as such. Each particular potence or unity includes all others (§39):

Nature in the corporeal series: allegorical
Nature in light: schematic
Nature in the organism: symbolic
Spirit in thinking: schematic
Spirit in action: allegorical
Spirit in art: symbolic
Science in arithmetic: allegorical
Science in geometry: schematic
Science in philosophy: symbolic

VI

If we now view the world of art as such, we find that the structure of the two series of potences is analogous to that of the real and ideal world. Duplicity and triplicity necessarily recur, and constitute Schelling's *system* of the arts.

Just as in the real world, in nature, ideality is informed into reality, the infinite into the finite, the universal into the particular, so also in the *real* series within art. Hence, the real series in art corresponds to the philosophy of nature. Here, too, we encounter three subpotences analogous to the three potences within the real world.

Schelling calls the real series within art—music, painting, plastic art—the series of the formative arts, since here matter or being itself is elevated into a symbol of the idea; the infinite, the idea is informed into the finite.

The real unity or potence within the real series is music. It may seem somewhat odd that Schelling commences the real series of art in its own real potence with music, seemingly the most unreal or noncorporeal of the arts. We recall, however, that the first potence in the real world, matter, is not matter in and for itself, not substance, but rather form, *accidens*, or the informing of ideality into reality. The same is the case with music in an analogous fashion. Schelling understands music as the first, as it were, the lowest level of the informing of form as such into reality. This is rhythm, represented symbolically by sound. He will also call it the first or lowest level of the informing of unity (here: the unity of regularity) into multiplicity (here: the multiplicity of beats). Naturally, this informing on the first or lowest level is least characterized by the actual substance of the real. In its own turn, music itself encompasses triplicity in the form of three potences, a real and ideal potence, and the indifference: rhythm, modulation or harmony, and melody.

The ideal unity or potence in the real series of art is painting, where the finite or real is taken up into the infinite or ideal, or the particular into the universal.

Here, too, we encounter three more subpotences corresponding to the real, ideal, and indifference: drawing, chiaroscuro, and coloring. Within the first potence—drawing—we even encounter three more: perspective, truth, necessity. Its corresponding potence in nature is, not surprisingly, light.

The third potence in the real series of art, that of indifference, is itself the potence in which the real and ideal potences are synthesized: the plastic arts (in nature: the organism). Whereas the first potence is characterized least by actual substance, the third is characterized most by it. Here the real *is* the ideal. In the plastic arts, the real or tangible element *is* the ideal, and vice versa. Here, too, we encounter three more subpotences corresponding to the real, ideal, and indifference: architecture, bas-relief, and sculpture. Carrying the analogy of triplicity even further, Schelling asserts that architecture is the music, bas-relief the painting, and sculpture the indifference of the plastic arts.

This leads us back into the discussion of the various modes of representation. Here, too, Schelling strives to disclose the inherent symmetry (§39): "Music is an allegorizing art, painting schematizes, the plastic arts are symbolic."

The *ideal* series within art—lyric poetry, epic, and drama—corresponds to the ideal world of the spirit or to the philosophy of the spirit. Here language is elevated into a symbol of the idea. In language the particular, finite, or concrete is informed into the universal, infinite, or into the concept, or rather, it is resolved (*aufgelöst*). Accordingly, this is the series of the verbal arts, or poesy.[18] The idea remains relatively ideal.

Here, too, in the ideal series of art, we encounter three subpotences. The real potence in the ideal series of art is lyric poetry, the informing of the infinite into the finite or particular. It corresponds to music as the first potence in the real series of art, and one can see how Schelling will seek to ground the traditional kinship between music and lyric poetry: both are characterized by particularity, subjectivity, and freedom, and are subordinated to rhythm. This correspondence extends to the mode of representation (§39): "Similarly, in poesy lyric poetry is allegorical."

The ideal potence in the ideal series of art is the epic, the resolution or suspension of the finite or real into the infinite or universal. Necessity predominates here insofar as it is not antithetical to the subject and thus ceases to be necessity as such. As Schelling will point out, necessity is a concept determinable only through antithesis. In his discussion of the various genres included in this potence, he focuses (1) on the displacement of subjectivity (the particular) into the object within the elegy, and of objectivity (the universal) into the poet himself within the idyll, and (2) on the displacement of objectivity (the universal) into the object within the didactic poem, and of subjectivity into the poet himself within the satire. He then focuses on the modern or romantic epic and the novel. The corresponding potence in the real series of art is painting, and the mode of representation follows (§39): "Epic poesy demonstrates the necessary inclination to schematization."

The final potence of the ideal series of art, the synthesis of lyric poetry and the epic, and the concluding genre of the ideal series of art and thus of both series together, is drama, which Schelling deduces as tragedy. Since its corresponding potence in the real series is plastic art as such, the mode of representation is similarly symbolic.

In tragedy there obtains neither a merely subjective conflict between freedom and necessity, as in the lyrical poem, which is characterized by freedom, nor merely pure necessity, as in the epic. Here there must be a real, objective conflict between freedom and necessity, yet such that both as such nonetheless appear in a balance. Since human nature is both subject to necessity and capable of freedom, it constitutes the most appropriate symbol of this equipoise. This condition of balance is achieved when the person who succumbs to necessity nonetheless is victorious over it within his own disposition and elevates himself above it. Schelling deduces drama as tragedy, since the original, absolute manifestation of the conflict between freedom and necessity from which the drama issues is one in which freedom constitutes the subjective, necessity the objective element. Comedy is then merely the intentional reversal of this state of affairs.

Schelling parts company with Aristotle concerning the nature of the misfortune imposed by necessity upon the person. The person does not, as Aristotle suggests, become guilty merely because of an error, but rather through necessity. The tragic person must necessarily transgress; necessity undermines the will itself, and freedom, as Schelling puts it, is attacked on its own turf. The person transgresses by necessity, and without guilt in the ordinary sense, and yet freely accepts the punishment for the transgression. Precisely in this loss of freedom, freedom is affirmed. This constitutes the identity of freedom with necessity, and the art form presenting this objectively and symbolically thus concludes the ideal series of art.

In the course of the lectures, Schelling makes frequent reference to the essential differences between the art of antiquity and that of modernity, or between the mythology of antiquity and that of modernity (Christianity). These distinctions, however, are generated by the same duplicity and triplicity we have discussed here. By concentrating on the essentials, he hopes to "open again the primal sources of art for reflection," thus aiding artists and critics alike. Since he is concerned with essentials, and not with the historical appearance of this or that artist as such, he discusses individual artists or works of art only to the extent that they represent or illustrate the essential features under discussion.

VII

In the lectures themselves, the first section in Part I discusses the metaphysical

framework behind the world of art (and of nature and the spirit): "General Section of the Philosophy of Art." The second section discusses the content or subject matter of art, namely, the ideas. We recall that in art, the more closely a particular corresponds to its idea, the more it participates in beauty. A further consideration, however, is the following: "These same syntheses of the universal and particular which viewed in themselves are ideas, that is, images of the divine, are, if viewed on the plane of the real, the *gods*." Hence, this complex involves a discussion of mythology, both as such and in its historical manifestations. The third section discusses the particularity or form of art in the broader sense and the division of art into the subcategories of art and poesy;[19] this includes sections on sublimity and beauty, the naive and sentimental art, and style and mannerism. Here Schelling quite intentionally borrows from his contemporaries. The section closes with a deduction of the various forms of the formative and verbal arts.

The largest section in the lectures, Part II, or the "Specific Section of the Philosophy of Art," then presents the system of the arts as discussed earlier, though in considerably more detail and with considerably more attention to the principle of identity with its attendant duplicity and triplicity. Schelling clearly does not treat each art form or subpotence equally. This is due in part to the limitations of his own acquaintance with the arts (prompting the letter to Schlegel), and in part to his own interests and the interests of those surrounding him. Since the majority of his acquaintances in the Romantic circle and in literary circles were, indeed, writers and literary critics, the section on the verbal arts gets more attention than, say, that on music. (The same holds true for August Wilhelm Schlegel's *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*.) Since the art gallery in Dresden contained such an excellent collection and had already influenced that circle of early Romantics, much of his discussion of painting draws from material he had seen there, or, conversely, from material his contemporaries had seen and described elsewhere, primarily, of course, in Italy. In the summer of 1798, the Schlegel brothers lived in Dresden with their sister; virtually every day they visited the Gemäldegallerie, which had been opened to the public in 1765. Friedrich von Hardenberg (whose pen name was Novalis) also visited the brothers that summer, as did Schelling himself and even Fichte. Before Schelling left Jena for Würzburg in 1803, he had originally planned to travel to Italy with his wife, Caroline; it seems clear in light of these lectures that he was intent on augmenting his own familiarity with the works of antiquity to be seen in Rome. (Instead of making the trip, he accepted the position in Würzburg, where these lectures were then given the second time.) In any case, when he does discuss individual artists or works of art, his choices reflect much of what was of current interest in the larger literary and critical community. We will have occasion to note such influences during the lectures.

As a summarization of the foregoing discussion, and as an aid to the reader both in understanding Schelling's overall systematic conception and in locating

certain terms within that whole, I have included the following scheme of the system. The reader may wish to refer to this scheme in referencing both the introductory discussion and the lectures themselves. It is by no means complete, since the inclusion of the triplicity Schelling tries to follow would necessitate a much more intricate rendering than would be practical here. Nonetheless, it should provide the reader with an initial orientation, an orientation Schelling himself thought to provide to his own students in similar tables and schemes.[20]

VIII

Schelling's lectures on the philosophy of art are based on the understanding of the absolute he developed in those years roughly between 1800 and 1804, and presented in the *System* of 1804. As such, the lectures constitute an integral part of his philosophy of identity. Not only had he already provided the extraordinarily important philosophical basis for his estimation of art as such in the concluding sections of the *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), as well as in sections of various other works during this period; he also delivered these lectures twice: once in Jena in the winter semester of 1802-3, and once two years later, during 1804-5 in Würzburg. Considering the pace of Schelling's philosophical activity during this period, it is not surprising to hear from his son and later editor that the lectures had undergone at least some change between cities:

> For the rest, let me remark concerning the *Philosophy of Art* that its initial paragraphs (§1-§15) as printed here probably belong to the later, Würzburg, lectures. The author appears to have formulated them differently during the initial lectures in Jena, something I can surmise from the external condition of the manuscript, and doubtlessly more in conformity with the original presentation of the system of identity.[21]

Those initial fifteen paragraphs deal precisely with the concept of the absolute, its inner constitution, and its expression in the initial stages of what, as we saw above, Schelling was to call its emanation, outflowing, and results. Predictably, these initial fifteen paragraphs, from the lectures as delivered in Würzburg in 1804-5, closely recall the language and concepts worked out in considerably more detail in the *System* of 1804. Since the *System* of 1804 marked a turning point in Schelling's philosophical thinking, one can say that the lectures on the philosophy of art, particularly in their initial sections, reflect Schelling's most mature considerations within his system of identity. Their importance is underscored by the observation that it was perhaps in aesthetics more than in any other area that the transcendental inspiration proved most successful, and that Schelling's lectures here were his own most important attempt in this area. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that Schelling never prepared them for publication, they

the absolute—absolute identity
God—Universe—the All
self-affirmation

potences	the affirmed reality	the affirming ideality	indifference identity	
	real All real world nature	ideal All ideal world spirit	God ideas	
real	matter— being allegorical	knowledge schematic reflection	truth	necessity
ideal	light— activity schematic	action allegorical subsumption	goodness	freedom
indifference	organism symbolic	art symbolic reason	beauty	indifference

real potence — Philosophy of Nature
ideal potence — Transcendental Philosophy

indifference
Philosophy of Art

the absolute becomes objective

real series of art	ideal series of art
the ideal informed into the real	the real informed into the ideal
the infinite into the finite	the finite into the infinite
the universal into the particular	the particular into the universal
the real unity as symbol	the ideal unity as symbol
matter as symbol	language as symbol
affirmed condition	affirming act
formative art	verbal art

real potence	ideal potence	indifference	real potence	ideal potence	indifference
music allegorical	painting schematic	plastic arts symbolic	lyric allegorical	epic schematic	drama symbolic

are arguably the most important system of this kind after Hegel's own lectures on aesthetics.[22]

His son explains why Schelling perhaps never intended to edit the lectures as a whole.

> It appears that Schelling never intended to edit the aesthetics as a whole; neither could he do it without repetition, since some things had already been published in *On University Studies* and the *Kritisches Journal*. Furthermore, in parts of the aesthetics he had merely enlisted the views of Schiller, Goethe, and the Schlegels, and precisely these views prevented him from valuing his own original contributions too highly.

Besides having borrowed from August Wilhelm Schlegel's manuscript, particularly from the sections on architecture, Calderón (whom Schlegel was translating), Dante, and Shakespeare, Schelling also had access to the new edition of the works of the recently deceased Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), and Friedrich Schlegel's periodical *Europa*, in which Schlegel described paintings both of Italian and "old German" masters.[23] Friedrich Schlegel's work on Gothic architecture doubtlessly also influenced Schelling during this period, as did his writings on Greek literature. We will have occasion during the lectures themselves to consider these and other influences.

It is important to realize that such borrowing alone would have been no hindrance to publication, since the literary and philosophical circles at the time, particularly that of the Romantics in Jena, with which Schelling was intimately familiar, borrowed from one another and discussed such ideas regularly.[24] Friedrich Schlegel even coined terms for such symbiotic intellectual relationships, *symphilosophy* and *sympoetry*, to describe what he thought would be a new epoch of sciences and arts, one in which "it would no longer be unusual if several characters who complement each other would produce common works."[25]

In his own introduction to the lectures, Schelling's son adds the following comments concerning Schelling's hesitation to publish them:

> The *Philosophy of Art* could only serve as an attempt, undertaken initially only for himself, to apply the ideas and method of his philosophy to the scientific or methodical investigation of art, and thus through this application to awaken in his listeners a living understanding of and heightened interest in a system through which—for the first time, to be sure—the essence of art, difficult to understand in itself, was organized for the layperson into a definite, simple, and internally harmonious construction. Even if this latter feature, after further development, made the lectures seem worthy of publication, in the meantime he probably had departed from one or the other of the most crucial ideas formulated at the time of the initial conception of his aesthetics, ideas that may well have been even more pronounced in

those aesthetics than in other writings of the same period. Hence, it was really impossible to publish the *Philosophy of Art* without at least partially reworking whole parts of it. Furthermore, after a few years he may have changed his mind concerning certain historical points, such as the origin of Gothic architecture.

In justifying his decision to publish the lectures after all, Schelling's son touches on several important points. First, he recognizes that the *Philosophy of Art*, particularly in its general sections—those establishing the principles of construction resulting from the character of the absolute—serves as a "commentary and pendant" to some of Schelling's other philosophical works. Furthermore, certain sections serve to illuminate various uncertainties concerning authorship in the *Kritisches Journal*, which Hegel and Schelling had edited together.

Second, his son recognized the harmony, balance, and symmetry of the inner structure of the philosophy of art itself, that particular *system* or *systematic order* of the individual art forms emerging from the initial premises. He sensed that one could not extract different parts of the system for publication without disturbing the harmony of the whole. That is, the harmony of the system itself was the point, the structure itself that which Schelling intended.[26] We have already seen that he borrowed from others concerning the *empirical* aspects of art, what he called the *particular* manifestations of art. Of much more interest to him in the *philosophy* of art (as opposed to a *theory* of art) were those "higher forms," or the essence of art; a consideration of the "higher forms" themselves generated the actual structure of his system, a system accordingly not dependent on or even primarily concerned with subjective factors determining artistic taste, nor structured by any subjective view of art, but rather by the necessity inherent within the idea of art (and of the individual art forms) *as such*, within the *essential nature* of art.

In the previously published works containing Schelling's pronouncements on art, this *systematic* nature of his philosophy of art was by no means evident. Although the lectures themselves were first published only in 1859 by Schelling's son, they circulated very quickly as student notes from both the Jena and Würzburg lectures. One incomplete copy of such notes was made by the Englishman Henry Crabb Robinson during his stay in Jena. Indeed, Robinson instructed Madame de Staël herself on the basis of just such notes.[27] The lectures in Jena were immensely popular; in the fall of 1802, with over 200 students between his two lecture courses, some students had to be turned away because of lack of space.

Finally, Schelling's son recognized the interest the section on mythology in the *Philosophy of Art* would generate among those already familiar—in the 1850s—with Schelling's work, since toward the end of his life Schelling devoted enormous energy to his *Philosophy of Mythology*. Although certain features of his

view of mythology did change over the years, the essentials remained the same. Indeed, Schelling's first published work dealt with mythology, and he never lost interest in the phenomenon itself. His return to it in later years was quite in keeping with his further development, and consonant with some crucial views he presented in the lectures on the philosophy of art. It has been argued that his apparent abandonment of aesthetics, and yet continued interest in mythology, can be understood as a result of the enormous service his understanding of art rendered him.[28]

IX

In the winter semester of 1799-1800 Schelling held his first lectures on the foundations of the philosophy of art. During the winter semester of 1798-99 and the summer semester of 1799 he also lectured on transcendental Idealism, the philosophy of nature, and the organic doctrine of nature.[29] In the winter semester of 1800-1 he lectured on the philosophy of art along with both his transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature. (The *System of Transcendental Idealism* itself was published in 1800.) In the summer semester of 1801 he lectured both on transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of art. In the winter semester of 1802-3 he lectured both on his speculative system of philosophy and on the philosophy of art we have before us, the latter now based on his philosophical system of identity. These lectures on the philosophy of art, with the alterations mentioned by Schelling's son (concerning the initial paragraphs), were repeated in the winter semester of 1804-5, and constitute the form published by Schelling's son Karl F. A. Schelling in Schelling's *Sämmtliche Werke* in 1859. The present translation is based on this edition.

His son's edition has served as the basis for all subsequent editions: those of editors Otto Weiss (1907, 1911) and Manfred Schroeter (whose entire edition was published in Munich between 1927 and 1954), and that of the reprint edition published by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Scholarly Book Society).

Schelling's son deleted certain portions of the manuscript that Schelling himself had published elsewhere and that were then included in other parts of the *Sämmtliche Werke*; he refers readers to these other works in notes at the appropriate junctures. The edition of the Scholarly Book Society included these excerpts in an appendix, since this was a reprint edition and no insertions could be made. In the present edition, I have included them in the main body of the text itself and alerted readers to the insertions. Only in one instance is such an addendum not integrated into the text itself, since Schelling's son referred to it as an illustration, not as an originally integral part of the lectures.

Schelling's son apparently made other deletions as well, none of which he thought abrogated the content or structure of the lectures. He alerts readers to

such deletions directly by means of footnotes, which are included in the present edition as endnotes.

Other peculiarities readers will encounter result from Schelling's predilection during this period for what he considers "strictly scientific" procedure. This results not only in the organization of the lectures into sequentially numbered paragraphs instead of actual lectures (as is the case in his lectures entitled *On University Studies*), but also in his insistence on providing proofs, explications, elucidations, or an explanation of why he need provide none of the three, since such would already be given in his system of general philosophy. Finally, his conviction regarding the inherent necessity and logical sequential nature of his exposition often prompts him to use mathematical equations as a kind of philosophical shorthand, including the equality sign (=). These have been included in the present edition. His use of the word *potence* is congruent with these mathematical analogies.

Translations of the works of others cited by Schelling have been given from standard English translations and duly noted. Otherwise such translations are my own.

The notes serve several purposes. Besides providing some terminological clarification, I also identify most of Schelling's own contemporaries and their works whom he either mentions or actually cites, as well as most of the critics, artists, and artworks mentioned or discussed during the course of the lectures; I did assume, however, that readers are already familiar with such figures as Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Shakespeare, and Dante.

Unfortunately, Schelling is not always consistent in citing mythological figures, and sometimes uses the Roman names, sometimes the Greek names. I have left these as they were, and have identified some of the lesser-known mythological figures or events.

Schelling never actually prepared the manuscript for publication, and thus provided no reference notes; his son provided only very few himself, and then usually cited editions from the mid-nineteenth century. Furthermore, since Schelling often cites erroneously or loosely despite enclosing the citation in quotation marks, I have on several occasions pointed this out and provided the corrected citation either in the text itself or in a note.

Since the lectures show Schelling very much in the intellectual fray of late eighteenth-century Germany, particularly as regards the early Romantic circles in Berlin and Jena, I have pointed out various parallels between Schelling and his contemporaries. Indeed, this mutual interplay may be one of the more intriguing features of the lectures, after their systematic character. Such references are by no means exhaustive, and readers already acquainted with the period doubtlessly will miss this or that writer; enough has been given, however, to suggest the nature of the influence and where to look further.

The notes also occasionally provide cross-references to other works by Schelling. Since none of his works on the philosophy of nature specifically has yet been translated, I refer readers on several occasions instead to secondary works in English that will give further guidance. Although much of the speculative basis of these lectures does indeed depend on conclusions reached in other works, Schelling provides an extracted or abbreviated version of the essentials when appropriate, and insists in his introduction that "for those already acquainted with my system of philosophy, the philosophy of art will be merely the repetition of that same philosophy in the highest potence. For those not yet acquainted with it, its method as I employ it in the present context will be perhaps even more obvious and clear." This is essentially a valid statement, and readers need not trouble themselves unduly with anything beyond what Schelling himself actually presents here, and with the explanations in this introduction, though a look at the other works quickly discloses numerous methodological and terminological parallels. Indeed, if one were to reference in certain sections every allusion or parallel to Schelling's other works during this period, a note would be needed after virtually every sentence, or at least every paragraph. In the bibliography I have listed several works in English that will provide the reader with a more detailed introduction to Schelling's philosophy. The works cited all include bibliographies for further reference.

More annotations could have been included, though also fewer. Given the broad intellectual spectrum from which Schelling draws, doubtlessly every reader will be acquainted with some areas, but probably very few with them all. Hence, I have tried to be as comprehensive as possible in providing information from which everyone can draw as befits his or her own needs.

A new historical-critical edition of Schelling's works is currently being prepared by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. (Despite the title *Sämmtliche Werke*, the edition by Schelling's son is not exhaustive.) As of this writing, they do not anticipate the historical-critical edition of the *Philosophy of Art* to appear before the next ten or fifteen years. In any case, it is unlikely that edition will introduce anything substantially new into the text of the *Philosophy of Art* regarding the *system* itself, though some changes will no doubt occur.

The Philosophy of Art

Introduction

The methodical study or science of art can first of all mean the historical construction of art.[1] In this sense it requires as its necessary external condition the direct evaluation of extant monuments and examples. Since such evaluation is generally possible with regard to literary works, such science in this regard, as philology, is expressly included among the objects of academic discussion. In spite of this, nothing is taught less often at universities than philology in this sense, though this cannot surprise us, since philology is just as much an art as is poesy, and the philologist no less than the poet must be born, not made.

The idea of a historical construction of the works of the formative arts is even rarer in universities, since it is robbed of any direct observation of such works. Even where such lectures are attempted for the sake of honor and with the support of a rich library, they automatically restrict themselves to merely scholarly knowledge of art history.

Since universities are not art schools, the science of art in a practical or technical sense can be taught there with even less justification.

Thus only the completely speculative science is left, one not directed toward the cultivation of the empirical intuition of art, but rather of its intellectual intuition. Yet just this constitutes the prerequisite for a philosophical construction of art, one against which significant doubts can be raised from the side of both philosophy and art.

In the first place, should the philosopher, whose intellectual intuition should be directed only toward that particular truth that is concealed to sensual eyes, unattainable and accessible only to the spirit itself—should that philosopher con-

cern himself with the science of art? For the latter intends only the production of beautiful appearances, and either shows merely the deceiving, reflected images of the same or is totally sensual. This is how the majority of people understand art, viewing it as sensual stimulation, as recreation, as relaxation for a spirit fatigued by more serious matters and as a pleasant stimulant, one with the advantage of occurring through a more delicate medium. For the judgment of the philosopher, however, who in addition must view it as an effect of sensual impulse or desire, it thereby acquires the even more objectionable imprint of corruption and civilization. According to this view, only through absolute condemnation might philosophy distinguish itself from the flaccid sensuality art tolerates in this respect.

I am speaking of a more sacred art, one that in the words of antiquity is a tool of the gods, a proclaimer of divine mysteries, the unveiler of the ideas; I am speaking of that unborn beauty whose undesecrated radiance only dwells in and illuminates purer souls, and whose form is just as concealed and inaccessible to the sensual eye as is the truth corresponding to it. Nothing of that which a baser sensibility calls art can concern the philosopher. For him it is a necessary phenomenon emanating directly from the absolute, and only to the extent it can be presented and proved as such does it possess reality for him.

But did not even the divine Plato condemn imitative art in his *Republic*, and ban poets from his state of reason not only as useless members but as pernicious as well, and can any authority be more persuasive for the incompatibility of poesy and philosophy than this judgment of the king of philosophers?

It is essential that we recognize the particular standpoint from which Plato speaks this judgment on poets. If any philosopher observed the careful distinction between points of view, he did, and as is the case everywhere, without such differentiation it would be impossible, especially here, to comprehend all the ramifications of his meaning or to unite the contradictions in his works concerning the same topic. We must first resolve to understand the higher philosophy, and that of Plato in particular, as the decisive opposing factor within Greek culture with respect not only to the sensual concepts of religion but also to the objective and thoroughly real forms of the state. An answer to the question of whether in a completely ideal and, in a sense, inner state such as the Platonic one there might be other ways of speaking about poesy, and whether that restriction he imposes might not be a necessary one—this answer would lead us too far astray here. That particular opposition of all public institutions against philosophy necessarily had to elicit a similar opposition of the latter toward the former, and Plato is neither the earliest nor the only example of this. From Pythagoras onward, and even further back, down to Plato, philosophy perceived itself as an exotic plant in Greek soil, and this feeling expressed itself among other places in the universal impulse leading those initiated into higher teachings—either through the wisdom

of earlier philosophers or through the mysteries—back to the birthplace of the ideas, namely, the Orient.

Yet aside from this merely historical, not philosophical, opposition, an opposition philosophers readily admit, what is Plato's rejection of the poetic arts—compared particularly with what he says in other works in praise of enthusiastic poesy—other than a polemic against poetic realism, a foreboding of that later inclination of the spirit in general and of poesy in particular? That judgment could be applied least of all to Christian poesy, which on the whole just as decisively displays the character of the infinite as the poesy of antiquity as a whole displays that of the finite. We owe it to the experience of subsequent ages that we can determine the limits of the latter more exactly than could Plato, who was not acquainted with its opposite. For just that reason we are able to elevate ourselves to a more comprehensive understanding and construction of poesy than he. That which he saw as the objectionable element in the poesy of his age we refer to only as its beautiful limitations, and we see it as the fulfillment of what Plato foresaw but did not experience. The Christian religion, and with it a sensibility directed toward the intellectual and ideal—a sensibility that in the poesy of antiquity could find neither its full satisfaction nor even the means for portrayal—created its own poesy and art in which such sensibility could find satisfaction. This creates the conditions for a complete and totally objective view of art, including that of antiquity.

This shows clearly that the construction of that art is a worthy object not only of the philosopher as such but of the Christian philosopher in particular, who should make it his concern to measure and present the universe of that art.

Viewing things from the other side, we must ask whether the philosopher for his own part is suited to penetrate the essence of art and to portray it with truth.

Who can, I already hear being asked, speak worthily of that divine principle driving the artist, and of that spiritual breath animating his works, other than he who is himself possessed by this sacred flame? Can one really attempt to subject to construction that which is just as incomprehensible in its origin as it is miraculous in its effects? Can one claim to subsume and to determine according to laws that whose essence is precisely to recognize no law other than itself? Or cannot genius be comprehended by concepts just as little as it can be created through methodical principles? Who dares to claim actual insights into that which is obviously the most free and absolute element in the entire universe? Or to claim an expansion of his own mental horizon beyond the ultimate boundaries in order to establish yet newer boundaries there?

Such could speak a certain enthusiasm that had comprehended art only in its effects, and which was genuinely acquainted neither with art itself nor with the position given to philosophy in the universe. Even assuming that art is not comprehensible from any higher perspective, that law of the universe which decrees that everything encompassed by it have its prototype or reflex in something else

is so pervasive and so omnipotent, and the form of the universal juxtaposition of the real and the ideal is so absolute, that even at the ultimate boundaries of the infinite and the finite, where the contradictions of phenomenal appearance disappear into the purest absoluteness, the same relationship asserts its rights and recurs in the final potence. This is the relationship between philosophy and art.

The ultimate, albeit completely absolute, and perfect informing into unity of the real and the ideal is itself related to philosophy as the real to the ideal. In the latter the final contradiction of knowledge resolves itself into pure identity, and nonetheless it too, in its antithesis to art, always remains only ideal. Hence, both encounter one another on the final pinnacle, and precisely by virtue of that common absoluteness are for one another both prototype and reflex. This is the reason no sensibility can penetrate scientifically more deeply into the interior of art than that of philosophy; indeed, this is why the philosopher possesses better vision within the essence of art than does the artist himself. Insofar as the ideal is always a higher reflex of the real, the philosopher necessarily possesses an even higher ideal reflex of that which in the artist is real. This indicates not only in a larger sense that art can become the object of knowledge in philosophy, but more specifically that outside of philosophy and other than through philosophy, nothing can be known about art in an absolute fashion.

Since in the artist the same principle is objective that in the philosopher reflects itself subjectively, he thus does not relate to that principle subjectively or consciously—though he, too, could become conscious of it through a higher reflex. He is not, however, conscious of it in the quality of being an artist. As such he is driven by that principle and for just that reason does not himself possess it. When he does achieve the standpoint of the ideal reflex with regards to that principle, he thereby elevates himself as an artist to a higher potence, yet as an artist still always relates to it *objectively*. The subjective element within him passes over again to the objective element, just as in the philosopher the objective element is constantly taken up into the subjective one. For this reason philosophy, notwithstanding its inner identity with art, is nonetheless always and necessarily science, that is, ideal, whereas art is always and necessarily art, that is, real.

Hence, the way in which the philosopher is thus able to pursue art even into its secret primal source and into the first workshop of its production is incomprehensible only from the purely objective standpoint, or from that of a philosophy that does not achieve the same heights within the ideal as does art within the real. The particular rules that genius is able to cast off are only those that a merely mechanical understanding may prescribe. Genius is autonomous, yet it escapes only external determination by laws, not determination by its own laws, since it is only genius insofar as it actually constitutes the highest law-governed qualities. Yet it is precisely this absolute legislation that philosophy recognizes in it. It is not only itself autonomous but also penetrates through to the principle of all autonomy. Thus in all ages it has been evident that the true artists are self-contained, simple, great, and necessary in their own fashion, just as is nature. That enthusiasm that sees in them nothing but genius unfettered by rules itself emerges first only through reflection, which recognizes only the negative side of genius. It is a derivative enthusiasm, not that which inspires the artist and which in its godlike freedom is simultaneously the purest and highest necessity.

Yet even if the philosopher is best suited for presenting the unfathomable quality of art, and for recognizing the absolute within it, will he be just as skilled at comprehending that which really is comprehensible within it and in determining it according to laws? I mean the technical side of art: will philosophy be able to lower itself to the empirical sphere of execution and of the medium itself and the conditions for execution?

Philosophy, which concerns itself only with ideas, must present only the general laws of phenomenal appearance as regards the empirical side of art, and must present these only in the form of ideas, for the forms of art are the essential forms of things as they are in the archetypes. Hence, to the extent that these can be comprehended universally and from the perspective of the universe in and for itself, their presentation is a necessary part of the philosophy of art, not, however, to the extent that they encompass rules for the execution and the practice of art. Philosophy of art in the larger sense is the presentation of the absolute world in the form of art. Only theory concerns itself directly with the particular or with a goal, and only according to theory can a project be executed empirically. In contrast, philosophy is totally unconditioned and without external purpose. Even if one were to object that the technical side of art is that whereby it acquires the appearance of truth, the concern for which might then fall to the philosopher, this truth is nonetheless merely empirical. That which the philosopher must recognize and present in it is of a higher sort, and is one and the same with absolute beauty: the truth of the ideas.

The situation of contradiction and dissension, even concerning the primary concepts, in which artistic judgment must necessarily find itself in an age that wishes to reopen the exhausted sources of art, makes it doubly desirable that the absolute view of art be carried through in a methodical, scientific fashion also as regards the forms in which art expresses itself, from the first principles onward. As long as this has not been done, a limited, one-sided, and capricious view will persist both in judgment and in demands, alongside what is already base and vulgar in and of itself.

The construction of art in each of its specific forms all the way into the concrete leads of itself to the determination of art through temporal conditions, and thus passes over into historical construction. One can doubt neither the possibility of such a construction nor its expansion to include the entire history of art; that is, such doubt is removed when the pervasive dualism of the universe in the antithesis between ancient and modern art has been presented in this area as well and has been thoroughly validated partly through the organ of poesy itself, partly

through criticism. Since construction as such is the suspension of antitheses, and since those that obtain regarding art through its temporal dependency must, like time itself, be nonessential and merely formal, then scientific construction will consist in the presentation of the common unity from which these features have emanated, and thus will elevate itself above them to a more comprehensive viewpoint.

Such a construction of art can by no means be compared with anything that has existed up to the present under the name of aesthetics, theory of the fine arts and sciences, or any other designation. In the most general principles of the first founder of that designation there still inhered at least the trace of the idea of the beautiful as that archetypal element appearing in the concrete and reflected world. Since then this designation has acquired an ever more definite dependency on the moral and useful, just as in psychological theories certain phenomena have been explained away more or less like ghost stories or similar superstitions, until Kantian formalism, following upon all this, bore a new and higher view, though also a host of artistically empty doctrines of art.

The seeds of a genuine methodical presentation or science of art that excellent spirits have sown since then have not yet structured themselves into a scientific whole—something they do, however, lead us to expect.[2] The philosophy of art is a necessary goal of the philosopher, who in art views the inner essence of his own discipline as if in a magic and symbolic mirror.[3] As a science it is important to him in and for itself, just as is, for example, the philosophy of nature, as the construction of the most remarkable of all products and phenomenal appearances, or as the construction of a world as self-enclosed and as perfect as nature itself. Through such philosophy the inspired natural scientist learns to recognize symbolically or emblematically the true archetypes of forms in works of art, archetypes he finds expressed only in a confused fashion in nature;[4] through such works of art themselves he learns to recognize symbolically the way sensual things emerge from those archetypes.

The inner bond uniting art and religion—the total impossibility on the one hand of giving the former any other poetic world than within and through religion, and the impossibility on the other hand of bringing the latter to any true objective manifestation other than through art—makes the scientific knowledge of art in this respect a necessity for the genuinely religious person.[5]

Finally, it is shameful for anyone either directly or indirectly involved in state government to have neither receptivity for art nor any true knowledge of it. Just as nothing is more honorable for princes and those in power than to value and appreciate the arts, to respect artistic works, and to elicit them through encouragement, nothing, in contrast, is more grievous and disgraceful than for those who have the means to promote art to its highest fruition to squander such means on tastelessness, barbarianism, or ingratiating baseness. Even if not everyone can comprehend that art is a necessary and integral part of a state constitution conceived according to ideas, at least antiquity should remind us of this fact, for the universal festivals of antiquity, its immortalizing monuments and plays, as well as all the actions of public life were merely the different branches of *one* universal, objective, and living work of art.

During the following lectures, I would like for you constantly to keep in mind their purely scientific intentions. Just as in the case of all other scientific or methodical investigations, so also is the science of art interesting *in itself* and without any external purpose. So many unimportant objects attract the attention of our desire for knowledge and even the attention of scientific investigation—how utterly peculiar if art itself were not able to do so, this *one* object that almost by itself encompasses the loftiest objects of our admiration.

That person is still lagging far behind for whom art has not yet appeared just as unified, organic, and in all its parts necessary a whole as does nature. If we feel perpetually moved to view the inner essence of nature and to discover that fertile source that generates so many great phenomena with eternal consistency of form and regularity, how much more must it interest us to penetrate the organism of art, which generates the highest unity and regularity and reveals to us far more directly than does nature the miracles of our own spirit? If we are interested in tracing as far as possible the structure, inner disposition, relationships, and intricacies of a plant or of an organic being in general, how much more alluring must it be for us to recognize the same intricacies and relationships in the much more highly organized and complex growths that we call works of art?

Most people have the same experience with art as Molière's Monsieur Jourdain[6] had with prose: he was astonished to find he had spoken prose his whole life without even knowing it. Very few people realize that even the language in which they express themselves is the most perfect work of art. How many people have stood before a theater without asking themselves even once just how many conditions are necessary to ensure even a relatively successful theatrical production? How many have enjoyed the noble effect of beautiful architecture without ever being tempted to retrace the source of the harmony therein that addresses them? How many have been affected by a poem or by a sublime dramatic piece, have been moved by it, enchanted, or stirred without ever looking to see by what means the artist has succeeded in dominating their disposition, cleansing their soul, and exciting their innermost being—without ever thinking of transforming this completely passive and to that extent rather lowly pleasure into the much more sublime pleasure of active perception and reconstruction of the work of art by the understanding!

We consider crude and uncultured any person who does not *everywhere* allow art to flow over and affect him. It is, however, while perhaps not to the same degree, nonetheless in the same spirit just as crude if the merely sensual feelings, responses, and pleasure elicited by works of art are taken to be the effects of art as such.

All effects of art are merely effects of nature for the person who has not attained a perception of art that is free, that is, one that is both passive and active, both swept away and reflective. Such a person behaves merely as a creature of nature and has never really experienced and appreciated art as art. What moves him are perhaps individual moments of beauty, while in the true work of art there is no individualized beauty; only the whole is beautiful. The person who has not yet elevated himself to the idea of the *whole* is totally incapable of evaluating a work of art. Yet in spite of this indifference, the majority of those who consider themselves cultured are most prone to display their judgment in matters of art and to play the connoisseur; rarely is a negative judgment more painful for them than the accusation that they have no taste at all. Those who sense a weakness in their own judgment would rather withhold judgment entirely—regardless of how decisively a work of art affects them or how original their view of it may well be—than expose that weakness. Others, those who are less modest, make fools of themselves with their judgment or annoy those who do understand. It is therefore an integral part of one's general social education—since there is in any case no realm of study that is more social than that of art[7]—to acquire a methodical and well-founded knowledge of art, to cultivate the ability to comprehend the *idea* or the whole as well as the mutual relationships between the various parts and between those parts and the whole. Yet this is possible only through *science*, and specifically through philosophy. The more strictly one construes the idea both of art and of the work of art, the more strictly can one provide a corrective both for the laxity of judgment and for those thoughtless attempts made in art or poesy usually undertaken without any idea of what art actually is.

In what follows I want to indicate briefly just how necessary precisely this kind of strictly methodical view of art is for the cultivation of the intellectual intuition of a work of art as well as for the cultivation of artistic judgment itself.

Very often, particularly nowadays, one finds that even artists themselves disagree in their judgment; indeed they often hold completely opposite opinions in matters of art. This phenomenon can be easily explained. In periods in which art flourishes, the necessity of the generally dominant spirit of the time, fortunate circumstances, and what one might call the springtime of the age generate more or less a common, fundamental agreement among the great masters. As the history of art shows, this causes the great works of art to arise and mature virtually on one another's heels, almost simultaneously, as if animated by a common breath of life beneath a common sun: Albrecht Dürer simultaneous with Raphael, Cervantes and Calderón simultaneous with Shakespeare. When such a fortunate age of pure production has passed, reflection enters, and with it an element of estrangement. What was earlier living spirit is now transmitted theory.

The inclination of the artists of antiquity proceeded from the center out toward the periphery. Later artists take the externally extracted form and seek to imitate it, retaining the shadow without the body. Each forms his own particular point of

view regarding art and employs it to evaluate even existing art. Those who notice the emptiness of form without content preach the return to substantiality by means of imitation of nature. Those who cannot elevate themselves above that empty and vacant external extraction of form preach the ideal, the imitation of what has already been formed. None, however, returns to the true primal sources of art from which form and substance issue together as one. This is more or less the present situation of art and of artistic judgment. As multifarious as art is within itself, so also are the various viewpoints of artistic evaluation multifarious and full of nuances. None of the disputants understands the others. The one judges according to the standard of truth, the other according to that of beauty; yet neither knows what truth or beauty is. With few exceptions, one can learn very little about the essence of art from those who actually practice art in such an age, since as a rule they have no guide concerning the actual idea of art and of beauty. Precisely this dominant disagreement even among those who practice art is a compelling reason for seeking the true idea and principles of art itself by means of science.

A serious study of art based on ideas is even more necessary in this age of literary peasant wars, wars conducted against all that is sublime, great, or ideal, indeed against beauty itself in poesy and art, an age in which the frivolous, the sensually provocative, or nobly base are the idols to which the greatest reverence is paid.

Only philosophy can reopen the primal sources of art for reflection, sources that for the most part no longer nourish production. Only through philosophy can we hope to attain a true science of art. Philosophy cannot lend meaning to art; only a god can do that. It cannot bestow artistic sensibility on someone to whom nature has already denied such sensibility. Philosophy can, however, express immutably in ideas that which true artistic sensibility actually intuits in the concrete work of art, and can disclose those factors determining genuine artistic judgment.

I think it is appropriate that I also indicate which *specific* factors have prompted me not only to study this science but also to give these lectures.

Above all I request that you not confuse this science of art with anything previously presented under this or any other title as aesthetics or as a theory of the fine arts and sciences.[8] There does not yet exist anywhere a scientific and philosophical doctrine of art. At most only fragments of such a doctrine exist, and even these are little understood and can be comprehended only within the context of the whole.

All pre-Kantian doctrines of art in Germany were merely children of Baumgarten's *Aesthetica*, since the latter was the first to employ the term aesthetics.[9] It suffices merely to point out that this aesthetics was in its own turn an offspring of Wolffian philosophy. In the period immediately preceding Kant, a period in which shallow popularity and philosophical empiricism held sway, various well-

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known theories of the fine arts and sciences were proposed, theories whose foundations were the psychological principles of the English and the French. One tried to explain beauty using empirical psychology, and in general treated the miracles of art the same way one treated ghost stories and other superstitions: by enlightening us and explaining them away. We still encounter fragments of this empiricism even in later writings, writings that at least in part have been conceived according to a much more sophisticated point of view.

Other aesthetics are virtual recipes or cookbooks in which the recipe for a tragedy reads approximately as follows: a great deal of fright, but not too much; as much sympathy as possible, and tears without end.

Kant's *Critique of Judgment* experienced the same fate as his other writings. From the Kantians themselves one could naturally expect the most extreme tastelessness, just as one could expect complete sterility of spirit in their philosophy. A multitude of people learned the *Critique of Judgment* by heart and then presented it both from the lectern and in writing as aesthetics.

After Kant a few excellent minds provided us with some admirable points of departure for the idea of a genuine philosophical science of art and even with various contributions to such a science. No one, however, has yet brought forth a scientifically constructed whole or even the *absolute* principles themselves, principles that would be universally valid and presented in a consistent, strict form. Furthermore, many of these people have not yet rigorously separated empiricism from philosophy, a separation absolutely necessary for true scientific investigation.

The system of the philosophy of art that I intend to present here will thus differentiate itself fundamentally from the previous systems, and will do so as regards both form and content; I will retrace even the principles themselves further back than has hitherto been the case. The method by which, if I am not mistaken, my philosophy of nature has been able to unravel the intricately entwined web of nature to a certain extent and to order the chaos of its phenomena—this same method will guide us through the even more labyrinthine entwinements of the world of art and will illuminate anew the objects of that world.

I can be less sure of satisfying my own demands regarding the *historical* side of art, a side that as I will explain later, is an essential element of any construction. I recognize too well how difficult it is in this most infinite of all areas to acquire even the most general knowledge of each part, not to speak of acquiring the most pointed and specific knowledge about all of those parts. The only thing I can claim for myself is that I have long been engaged in serious study of both ancient and contemporary works of poesy, and that I have made it my most earnest business to acquire some acquaintance and views regarding works of the plastic arts. I have spent time with actual practicing artists, and must admit that I have in part become acquainted only with their own disagreement and lack of understanding of the matter at hand; yet I have also spent time with those who

besides having been successful in their artistic endeavors have also considered their art philosophically. From all these I have acquired at least a part of the historical background I consider necessary for my present purpose.[10]

For those already acquainted with my system of philosophy, the philosophy of art will be merely the repetition of that same philosophy in the highest potence. For those not yet acquainted with it, its method as I employ it in the present context will be perhaps even more obvious and clear.

The construction will encompass not merely generalities, but will also extend to those individuals who represent an entire genre. I will construe both them and the world of their poesy. For now I will mention only Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare. In the discussion of the formative or plastic arts the personalities of the greatest masters will be discussed in a general sense. In the discussion of poesy and poetic genres I will even progress as far as a characterization of individual works of the most preeminent poets, for example, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and Goethe, so as to provide the contemporary view of those poets that is as yet still lacking.

In general philosophy we are fortunate to view the stern countenance of truth in and for itself. In the particular sphere of philosophy circumscribing the philosophy of art we attain to an intuition of eternal beauty and of the archetypes of all that is beautiful.[11]

Philosophy is the basis of everything, encompasses everything, and extends its constructions to all potences and objects of knowledge. Only through it does one have access to the highest. By means of the doctrine of art an even smaller circle is formed within philosophy itself, one in which we view more immediately the eternal in a visible form, as it were. Hence, the doctrine of art, properly understood, is in complete agreement with philosophy.

A hint at what the philosophy of art actually is has in part already been suggested in our discussion. It is necessary, however, that I now explain myself more specifically in this regard. I will pose the question in the most general terms: *how is the philosophy of art possible*? (Proof of possibility as regards science is also proof of its reality.)

Anyone can see that the concept of a philosophy of art combines antithetical elements. Art is real and objective, philosophy ideal and subjective. We might thus define in advance the task of the philosophy of art as *the presentation in the ideal medium of the real element inherent in art*. Of course, the question is then precisely what it means to present *something real in the ideal*; before we know this, we have not yet sufficiently clarified our concept of the philosophy of art. Hence, we must address the investigation on an even deeper level. Since presentation within an ideal medium in general = construction, and hence also the philosophy of art should = construction of art, this investigation will of necessity simultaneously have to penetrate more deeply into the nature of construction itself.

The addition of the term *art* in "philosophy of art" merely limits the general concept of philosophy; it does not suspend it. Our methodical investigation or science should be philosophy; that is essential. That it is to be specifically philosophy in relationship to art is accidental as regards our concept. Now a concept's accidentals can change nothing regarding its essentials; neither can philosophy specifically as philosophy of art be anything other than what it is when viewed in and for itself and absolutely. Philosophy is absolutely and essentially one; it cannot be subdivided. Hence, whatever is philosophy at all is philosophy completely and undividedly. It is this concept of the indivisibility of philosophy that I want you particularly to keep in mind so as to comprehend the entire idea of our science. We all know with what disastrous results the concept of philosophy is misused. We have already been presented with a philosophy of, indeed a doctrine of, knowledge of agriculture, and we can expect someone to present us with a philosophy of vehicles as well. Finally there will be as many philosophies as there are objects, and the sheer quantity of philosophies will make us lose philosophy itself entirely. Besides these many philosophies, we also have various philosophical sciences or philosophical theories. And not even that is enough. Yet there is only *one* philosophy and *one* science of philosophy. What everyone is calling different philosophical sciences is either something totally oblique as regards philosophy, or is only a series of representations of the *one* and undivided whole of philosophy in its various *potences* or from the viewpoint of various ideal determinations.

Let me explain the expression *potence* now, since it occurs here for the first time in a context in which it is imperative that it be understood.[12] It refers to the general proposition of philosophy concerning the essential and inner identity of all things and of all that we are able to discern and distinguish in general. There is actually and essentially only *one* essence, *one* absolute reality, and this essence, as absolute, is indivisible such that it cannot change over into other essences by means of division or separation. Since it is indivisible, diversity among things is only possible to the extent that this indivisible whole is posited under various determinations. I call these determinations *potences*. They change absolutely nothing in the one essence itself. It always and necessarily remains the same; that is why they are called *ideal* determinations. For example, what we recognize or perceive in history or in art is essentially the same as that which is also in nature, since the entire absoluteness is infused into each. Yet this absoluteness inheres in nature, in history, and in art in different potences. If one could remove these and view the *pure essence*, as it were, completely exposed, the same essence would truly be found in each.

Philosophy emerges in its most complete manifestation only within the totality of all potences, since it is to be an accurate image of the universe; the universe, however, = *the absolute, represented in the totality of all ideal determinations*. God and universe are one, or are merely different views of one and the same

thing. God is the universe viewed from the perspective of identity. He is *everything*, since he is the only reality; outside him there is therefore nothing. The *universe* is God viewed from the perspective of totality. In the absolute idea, however, which is the principle of philosophy, identity and totality are again one. The complete manifestation of philosophy, as I have said, emerges only within the totality of all potences. Within the absolute as such—and hence also within the principle of philosophy, since it encompasses *all* potences—there inheres no *individual* potence; by the same token, only to the extent that no individual potence inheres within it, are all contained within it. Precisely for this reason, precisely because it is not equal to any particular or individual potence and yet encompasses them all, I call this principle the *absolute point of identity* of philosophy.

This point of indifference, precisely because it is such a point and because it is absolutely one, inseparable and indivisible, inheres necessarily in its own turn within every *particular* unity (also called potence). This, too, is possible only if within each of these *particular* unities all unities, and therefore *all potences*, are also present. Therefore, nothing inheres in philosophy as absolute, or we know nothing in philosophy as absolute. Rather, we always know only the absolutely one or absolute unity, and this absolutely one only in particular forms. Philosophy is concerned—I beg you to take this in the strictest sense—not at all with the particular as such, but rather immediately only with the absolute, and with the particular only to the extent that it takes up the entire absolute within itself and represents it in itself.

This makes it clear that there can be neither *particular* philosophies nor particular or individual philosophical sciences. Philosophy has in all its objects only *one* object, and is for just that reason itself only one. Within philosophy in general each individual potence is absolute for itself, and in this absoluteness, or without detriment to it, is in its own turn a member of the whole. Each is a genuine part of the whole only to the extent that it is the complete reflex of the whole and completely takes it up into itself. This is precisely that peculiar union of the particular and the universal that we find in every organic being as well as in every poetic work. In the latter, for example, each of various elements or forms is a part subservient to the whole and yet from the perspective of the overall construction of the work is absolute in itself.

We can, of course, extract the individual potence from the whole and treat it by itself; only to the extent, however, that we really do present the *absolute* in it is our presentation itself *philosophy*. We can then justifiably call this presentation, for example, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of history,[13] the philosophy of art.

We have thus proved (1) that no object qualifies as an object of philosophy except to the extent that it is itself grounded within the absolute by an eternal and necessary idea and is capable of taking up the entire, undivided essence of the

absolute into itself. All differentiated objects as differentiated are only *forms* without essentiality. Only the absolutely one has essentiality; only that which is capable of taking up into itself that absolutely one as the universal (or into its *own* form as the particular) also possesses essentiality through that absolutely one. Thus, there is, for example, a philosophy of nature, since the absolute is formed into the particularity of nature and since there is accordingly an absolute and eternal idea of nature. Similarly, there is a philosophy of history and a philosophy of art.[14]

This proves (2) the reality of a philosophy of art by proving its *possibility*. This simultaneously shows its limits and the features distinguishing it from a mere *theory* of art. That is, only to the extent that the science of nature or of art presents the absolute within it is this science genuine philosophy, *philosophy* of nature, *philosophy* of art. In every other case, cases in which the particular potence as *particular* is treated and in which laws are presented for it as a *particular* potence, one is thus by no means concerned with philosophy as philosophy—which is always absolutely universal—but rather with *particular* knowledge of the object and hence with a finite purpose. In each such case the science under question cannot be called philosophy but rather only a *theory* of a particular subject, such as a theory of nature or a theory of art. Such a theory could, of course, *borrow* its principles from philosophy, as for example the theory of nature does from the philosophy of nature. For just that reason, however—because it only *borrows* them—it is not philosophy.

In the philosophy of art I accordingly intend to construe first of all not art *as* art, as this ***particular***, but rather *the universe in the form of art*, and the philosophy of art is *the science of the All in the form or potence of art*. Not until we have taken this step do we elevate ourselves regarding this science to the level of an absolute science of art.

The assertion that the philosophy of art is the presentation of the universe in the form of art does not yet, however, give us any complete idea of this science; we must specify more closely the *mode* of construction necessary for a philosophy of art.

An object of construction and thereby of philosophy is essentially only that which is capable as a particular of taking up the infinite into itself. Therefore, art, in order to be the object of philosophy, must as such either genuinely represent the infinite within itself as the particular, or must be capable of doing so. Not only does this actually take place as regards art, but it also stands as a representation of the infinite on the same level with philosophy; just as philosophy presents the absolute in the *archetype* so also does art present the absolute in a *reflex* or *reflected image*.[15]

Since art exactly corresponds to philosophy and is merely the latter's complete objective reflex, it must also proceed through all the potences within the real as

does philosophy in the ideal. This one fact suffices to remove all doubt regarding the necessary method of our science.

Philosophy does not present real things, but rather only their archetypes; the same holds true for art. The same archetypes that according to philosophy are merely reproduced imperfectly by these (the real things) are those that become objective in art itself—as archetypes and accordingly in their perfection. They thus represent the intellectual world in the reflected world. As examples we might take *music*, which is nothing other than the primal rhythm of nature and of the universe itself, which by means of this art breaks through into the world of representation. The complete forms generated by the *plastic* arts are the objectively portrayed archetypes of organic nature itself. The Homeric epic is identity itself as this identity lies at the base of history within the absolute. Every painting discloses the intellectual world.

Given these assertions, in the philosophy of art we will have all those problems to solve regarding art that we also must solve in general philosophy regarding the universe.

(1) In the philosophy of art, no principle other than that of the infinite can serve as our point of departure; hence, we must present the infinite as the unconditioned principle of art. Just as for philosophy in general the absolute is the archetype of truth, so also for art is it the archetype of *beauty*. We must therefore show that truth and beauty are merely two different ways of viewing the one absolute.[16]

(2) The second question, both as regards philosophy as such as well as the philosophy of art, will be just how this principle, a principle that is in and for itself absolutely one and simple, can pass over into multiplicity and differentiation, and thus how individual beautiful things can issue from universal and absolute beauty.[17] Philosophy answers this question with the doctrine of the ideas or archetypes.[18] The absolute is absolutely one; viewed absolutely in particular forms, however, such that the absolute is thereby not suspended, this one = idea. The same holds true for art. It, too, views or intuits primal beauty only in ideas as particular forms, each of which, however, is divine and absolute for itself. Whereas philosophy intuits these ideas as they are *in themselves*, art intuits them *objectively*. The *ideas*, to the extent that they are intuited objectively, are therefore the substance and as it were the universal and absolute material of art from which all particular works of art emerge as mature entities. These *real* or *objective*, living and existing ideas are the gods. The universal symbolism or universal *representation* of the *ideas* as real is thus given in mythology, and the solution to the second aforementioned task consists in the construction of mythology. Indeed, the gods of any mythology are nothing other than the ideas of philosophy intuited objectively or concretely.

This still does not answer the question of how a *real*, individual work of art comes to be. Just as the absolute or unreal is always characterized by the condi-

tion of identity, so also is the real always characterized by the nonidentity of the universal and the particular, by disjunction, such that either the particular or universal predominates. An antithesis thus arises here, one between plastic or formative art on the one hand, and verbal art on the other. Formative and verbal art = the real and ideal series of philosophy. The former is characterized by that unity in which the infinite is taken up into the finite, and the construction of this series corresponds to the *philosophy of nature*. The latter is characterized by the other unity, the one in which the finite is formed into the infinite, and the construction of this series corresponds to *idealism* in the general system of philosophy. I will call the first unity the real unity, the second the ideal unity; that which encompasses both I will call indifference.

If we now concentrate on each of these unities individually, then, since each is absolute for itself, the same unities must recur in each; hence, the real unity, the ideal unity, and that in which both are one must all recur in the real unity itself. The same holds true for the ideal unity.

A particular form of art corresponds to each of these forms to the extent that they are encompassed within the real or ideal unity. *Music* corresponds to the real form within the real series. *Painting* corresponds to the ideal form within the real series. The *plastic arts* correspond to that form within the real series that represents the confluence of the previous two unities.

The same holds true as regards the ideal unity, which in its own turn encompasses within itself the three forms of lyric, epic, and dramatic poetry. Lyric poetry = the informing of the infinite into the finite = the particular. The epic = the representation (subsumption) of the finite within the infinite = the universal. Drama = the synthesis of the universal and the particular. Hence, the entire world of art is to be construed according to these basic forms both in its real and ideal manifestation.

By tracing art in each of its particular forms all the way into the concrete, we also arrive at a determination of art within the conditions of time. Just as art is inherently eternal and necessary, so also is there no fortuitousness in its temporal manifestation, but rather only absolute necessity. In this respect, too, it is the object of possible knowledge, and the elements of this construction are given in the antitheses manifested in art in its temporal appearance. Any antitheses posited as regards art in its temporal dependence, however, are, as is time itself, necessarily nonessential and merely formal antitheses; hence, they are completely different from those *real* antitheses grounded in the essence or in the idea of art itself. This universal, formal antithesis extending through all branches of art is that of *ancient* and *modern* art.

It would be an essential weakness of our construction if we were to neglect the consideration of this antithesis in our discussion of each individual form of art. Since, however, we consider this antithesis to be a merely formal one, its construction necessarily consists in negation or suspension. By considering this

antithesis, we will simultaneously present the *historical* dimension of art; only by this means can we hope to bring our construction in the larger sense to its final completion.

According to my entire understanding here, art is itself an emanation of the absolute. The history of art will show us most revealingly its immediate connections to the conditions of the universe and thereby to that absolute identity in which art is preordained. Only in the history of art does the essential and inner unity of all works of art reveal itself, a unity showing that all poetry is of the same spirit, a spirit that even in the antitheses of ancient and modern art is merely showing us two different faces.

Part I
General Section of the Philosophy of Art

1
Construction of Art As Such and in General

To construe art means to determine its position in the universe. Since determination of this position is the only explanation one can give of it, we must return to the first principles of philosophy. It is clear, however, that we will not follow these principles in every possible direction, but rather only in the one predetermined by our particular object of investigation. It is further clear that at the beginning most of these propositions will be presented as simply borrowed philosophical propositions, which will not be so much proved as simply elucidated. With this in mind, I would like to propose the following propositions.[1]

§1. *The absolute or God is that with regards to which being or reality follows* ***immediately*** *from the idea, that is, by virtue of the simple law of identity*, or, *God is the immediate affirmation of himself.*

Elucidation. If being did not follow immediately from the idea of God, that is, if his idea were not itself the idea of *absolute*, *infinite* reality, God would be conditioned by something that is not his idea; he would be conditioned by something other than his own concept and therefore would be simply dependent and not absolute. Being does not follow directly from concept with regard to anything that is dependent or conditioned. For example, the individual human being is conditioned by something that is not his own idea. It follows that *true* reality or reality in itself cannot be attributed to any individual person. As regards the particular form in which we express the idea of God in the second instance (God as the immediate affirmation of himself), the following elucidation can be given. To be real = to be affirmed. Now, God *is* by virtue of his own idea; that is, he is his

own affirmation, and since he cannot affirm himself finitely (since he is absolute), he is the infinite affirmation of himself.

§2. *God as the infinite affirmation of himself* ***comprehends*** *himself as infinitely affirming, as infinitely affirmed, and as the indifference of both, though he himself* ***is none*** *of these in particular.*

Through his idea, God *comprehends* himself as infinitely affirming (since he is the affirmation of himself) *and* as infinitely affirmed for the same reason. Furthermore, since it is one and the same thing that both affirms and is affirmed, he accordingly comprehends himself also as indifference. He, however, *is* himself none of these in particular, for he himself is only the *infinite affirmation*, and is infinite in such a way that he merely encompasses all three. That which encompasses, however, is not *identical* with that which it encompasses. For example, length = space, width = space, depth = space; space itself, however, is for precisely this reason none of these in particular, but is rather the absolute identity of all three, their infinite affirmation, their essence. Similarly, God is nothing as a particular; rather, what he is, he is only by virtue of infinite affirmation. Hence, God is understood as affirming himself, as affirmed by himself, and as indifference, only once again by means of the infinite affirmation of himself.

Addendum. God as affirming himself can also be described as infinite ideality encompassing all reality within itself. As affirmed by himself, he can also be described as infinite reality encompassing all ideality.

§3. *By virtue of his idea, God is immediately the absolute* ***All.*** The infinite follows immediately from the idea of God; it follows necessarily and in an infinite fashion, since God as infinite affirmation of himself also comprehends himself infinitely as that which affirms, infinitely as that which is affirmed, and infinitely as the indifference of both. Now, infinite reality that follows from the idea of God is (1) already in and for itself = the All (since there is nothing outside it), but it is also (2) to be taken positively, since everything that is possible by virtue of the idea of God—something infinite in its own turn—is also real by virtue of the fact that this idea affirms itself. All possibilities are realities in God. That in which all possibilities are real, however, = the All. Hence, the absolute All follows immediately from the idea of God. Furthermore, it follows by virtue of the simple law of identity; that is, God himself, viewed in the infinite affirmation of himself, is = absolute All.

§4. *As absolute identity, God is immediately also absolute totality, and vice versa.*

Elucidation. God is a totality that is not a multiplicity but rather absolute simplicity. God is a unity that itself is not conditioned in contrast to multiplicity; that is, he is not singular in the numerical sense. Neither is he simply the One, but is rather absolute unity itself, not everything, but rather absolute allness itself, and is both of these immediately as one.

§5. *The absolute is utterly eternal.*

In the intuition of every *idea*, for example, the idea of the circle, we are also intuiting eternity. This is the positive intuition of eternity. The negative concept of eternity is not only independence from time but also complete disconnection from time. If the absolute were not utterly eternal, it would have a relationship to time.

Annotation. If the eternity of the absolute were conditioned by an existence enduring since *infinite time*, we would have to say, for example, that God has been existing now for a longer period of time than he had at the time of the origin of the world. This would presuppose for God an increase in existence, which is impossible, since his existence is his essence, and his essence can be neither increased nor decreased. It is generally conceded that longevity cannot be attributed to the *essence* of things. We can very well maintain, for example, that an individual or concrete circle has existed for a certain period of time. Yet no one will say that the essence or the idea of the circle has lasted for a certain period of time, or that it has now existed for a longer time than it had at the beginning of the world. Now, the absolute is precisely that with regards to which no antithesis obtains between the idea and the concrete. In it, that which is the concrete or particular in things is itself the essence or universal (not negation), such that no being can be attributed to God other than that of his idea.

The same can be seen from another perspective. We say that a thing *endures*, since its existence or its particular is *incommensurate* with its essence or its universal. This longevity is nothing other than a perpetual positing of its universal into *its* concrete manifestation. By virtue of the limitation of the latter, it *is* not everything here and now and at once what it could be according to its essence or its universal. This is inconceivable within the absolute. Since the particular within it is absolutely equal to the universal, it is everything it *can* be, and is so in *reality* and, simultaneously, without any temporal mediation. It is thus void of time and is eternal in itself.

The idea of the utterly eternal is an extremely important idea both for philosophy as such and for our particular construction. As regards the former, it follows immediately (something you may note as a corollary) that the *true* universe is *eternal*, since the absolute can have no temporal relationship to it. This idea is important for our particular construction because it shows that time never affects that which is eternal *in itself*; hence, that which is eternal *in itself* has no relationship to time even within time.

The same assertion can also be expressed as follows:

(a) The absolute, therefore, cannot be conceived as having *preceded* anything in time (this is a simple conclusion from what has just been said). Expressed *positively*: The absolute precedes all else only as regards the *idea*. Everything *else*, everything that is not the absolute, *is* only to the extent that within it, being is not equal to the idea, that is, to the extent that it is itself merely privation and not true being. The concrete circle as such belongs only to the phenomenal world. The

circle in itself, however, never precedes the concrete circle in time, but rather only as regards the idea. Similarly, the absolute precedes all else only as regards the idea.

(b) Within the absolute itself, there can be no before or after; hence, no single determination can precede or follow any other. If this were the case, we would have to posit affectability, passivity, or passive conditioning within the absolute. It is, however, completely unaffectable and devoid of any internal antithesis.

§6. *The absolute as such is neither conscious nor nonconscious, neither free nor unfree nor necessary*. It is not conscious, for all consciousness results from the relative unity of thinking and being, whereas absolute unity or identity obtains within the absolute. It is not nonconscious, for it is not conscious only because it is absolute consciousness. It is not *free*, for freedom results from the relative antithesis and relative unity of possibility and reality, whereas both are absolutely one within the absolute. It is not unfree or necessary, for it is without affectability; there is nothing within or outside it that could condition it or to which it could be attracted.

§7. *The All encompasses that which God encompasses*. Accordingly, the All, just as God, comprehends itself as infinitely affirming, as infinitely affirmed and as the unity of both, without itself being one of these forms in particular (precisely because it is affirming); yet it does so, not such that the forms are separated, but rather such that they are resolved into absolute identity.

§8. *God's infinite affirmed condition within the All or the informing of his infinite* ***ideality*** *into reality as such is eternal nature*.

This is actually a borrowed proposition, yet I wish to prove it here. As everyone will concede, nature is related to the universe, viewed absolutely, as that which is real. Now, that particular unity that is posited through the informing of infinite ideality into reality is God's infinite affirmed *condition* within the All = real unity. The predominating factor is that which takes up the other.

Annotation. Please note the difference between nature *to the extent that it actually appears* (this is mere *natura naturata*, nature in its particularity and separation from the All and as a mere reflection of the absolute All), and *nature in itself* to the extent that it is resolved into the *absolute All* and is God in his infinite affirmed condition.

§9. *Eternal nature similarly encompasses within itself all unities: that of being affirmed, of affirming, and of their indifference*, for the universe in and for itself = God. If the unity encompassed by the universe in and for itself did not inhere within each, that is, if the entire infinite affirmation and therefore the entire essence of God were not also found within nature itself, God would have divided himself within the All, which is impossible. Each of the unities encompassed within the All is therefore similarly endowed with the imprint of the entire All.

Explication. These consequences of infinite affirmation can also be shown to obtain throughout phenomenal nature, except that here they do not permeate one

another as within the absolute All, but are rather separated and asunder. For example, the informing of the ideal into the real or the form of the affirmed condition within the All expresses itself through material existence. Ideality that dissolves all reality, or that which affirms, is = light. The indifference = organism.

§10. *Phenomenal nature as such is not a complete revelation of God*, for even the organism itself is only a particular potence.

§11. *Complete revelation of God only occurs where in the reflected world itself the individual forms resolve into absolute identity, and this occurs only within* ***reason***. *Reason is thus* ***within*** *the All itself the full reflected image of God*.

Elucidation. God's infinite affirmed condition manifests itself in nature, which itself, as the real world within the All, in its own turn encompasses all unity within itself. Concerning this let me say the following.

We designate as potences those unities or particular consequences of God's affirmation to the extent that these recur within the real or ideal All. The first potence of nature is matter to the extent that it is posited with a predominance of affirmed existence or under the form of the informing of ideality into reality. The other potence is light as that ideality that resolves all reality into itself. The *essence* of nature as nature, however, can be represented only by the *third potence*, which equally affirms both real or material existence and the ideal or light, thereby equating both. The essence of matter = being, the essence of light = activity. In the third potence, then, activity and being must be *combined* and indifferent. Matter, viewed according to its corporeal appearance rather than in itself, is not substance but rather merely *accidens* (form) with which the essence or the universal within light is juxtaposed. In the third potence both are cointegrated. An indifference arises in which essence and form are the same and in which essence is inseparable from form, form inseparable from essence. The organism constitutes such a condition of indifference, since its essence as an organism is inseparable from the subsistence of its form, and since being also immediately constitutes activity within it. Hence, the affirmed element is absolutely equal to the affirming. None of these forms in particular is a full revelation of the divine, nor for precisely that reason is even nature itself such a revelation in the separate multiplicity of its own forms. For God is not equal to the particular result of his affirmation but rather only to the *allness* of these results to the extent that it is a pure position and as allness simultaneously absolute identity. Hence, only to the extent that nature transfigures itself into totality and absolute unity of forms would it be a mirror of the divine. This, however, is the case only within reason, since reason is just as much the dissolution of all particular forms as is the All or God. For precisely this reason, reason belongs neither to the real nor to the ideal world exclusively, and (a corollary of this) neither the real nor the ideal world in and for itself can attain a level higher than that of *indifference*, and can never attain absolute identity itself.

We will now proceed as regards the ideal All precisely as we have regarding the real All, and will first introduce the following proposition:

§12. *God as infinite ideality that encompasses all reality within itself, or God as infinitely affirming is, as such, the essence of the ideal All.* This is immediately self-evident through the antithesis.

§13. *The ideal All encompasses within itself the same unities that the real All encompasses within itself: the real, the ideal, and*—not the absolute identity of both (since such identity belongs neither to it nor to the real in particular)—*the indifference of both*. Here, too, we designate these unities as potences. We must only mention here that just as in the real world the potences are potences of the ideal factor, so also here they are potences of the real factor by virtue of the antithetical relationship of the two. The first potence designates here the predominance of the ideal. Reality is posited here only in the first potence of the affirmed condition. *Knowledge* is included here, and is posited accordingly with the greatest predominance of the ideal factor or of the subjective. The second potence rests on a predominance of the real: the factor of the real is raised here to the second potence. *Action* is included here as the objective or real factor to which knowledge corresponds as the subjective factor.

The *essence* of the ideal world is, however, indifference, just as is the *essence* of the real world. Knowledge and action therefore necessarily integrate themselves in indifference within a third element, which as the element affirming both is the third potence. *Here* we find *art*, and I accordingly introduce specifically the following proposition:

§14. *The indifference of the ideal and the real as indifference manifests itself in the ideal world through art*, for art is in itself neither mere activity nor mere knowledge, but is rather an activity completely permeated by knowledge, or in a reverse fashion knowledge that has completely become activity. That is, it is the indifference of both.

This proof suffices for the present purpose, though we will, of course, return to this proposition later. Here our purpose is merely to outline the general model of the universe so that we may later extract the individual potence from the whole and treat it according to its relationship to that whole. Hence, we will now continue with our presentation.

§15. *The full expression of absolute identity as such or of the divine to the extent that it is the principle of resolution of all potences is the absolute science of reason, or philosophy*. It is neither the expression of the *real* nor of the *ideal* nor even of the indifference of both (for the latter, as we now see, has a double expression).

Philosophy is thus within the phenomenal ideal world just as much the resolution of all particularity as is God in the archetypal world (divine science). Neither reason nor philosophy belongs to the real or ideal world as such, although it is true that—within this identity—reason and philosophy can relate to one another as real and ideal. Since, however, each in itself is absolute identity, this relationship does not constitute any real difference. Philosophy is merely reason that has become or is becoming aware of itself; reason is merely the matter or objective model of all philosophy.[2]

If we determine in a preliminary fashion the relationship of philosophy to art, it is the following: philosophy is the immediate or direct representation of the divine, whereas art is immediately or directly only the representation of indifference as such. (The fact that it is only indifference constitutes the reflective element of art; absolute identity = archetype.) The degree of perfection or of the reality of a thing increases to the extent that it corresponds to its own absolute idea and to the fullness of infinite affirmation, and thus the more it encompasses other potences within itself. Hence, it is clear that art enjoys the most immediate relationship to philosophy and distinguishes itself from it only by virtue of the determination of particularity or of the reflected nature of its images. For art is, by the way, the highest potence of the ideal world. Now let us continue.

§16. *The three ideas truth, goodness, and beauty correspond to the three potences of the real and ideal world*. (The *idea* as divine belongs similarly neither to the real nor to the ideal world in particular.) Truth corresponds to the first potence of the ideal and real world; goodness to the second; beauty to the third—in the natural organism and in art.

This is not the place to explain either the relationship obtaining between these three ideas or the manner in which they differentiate themselves in the real and ideal world. This explanation is given in general philosophy. At this point it is necessary to explain only the relationship obtaining for *beauty*.

One can say that beauty is posited everywhere light and material existence, ideal and real come into contact. Beauty is neither merely the universal or ideal (this = truth) nor the merely real (this = action). Hence, it is only the complete interpenetration or mutual informing of both. Beauty is posited wherever the particular (real) is so commensurate with its concept that the latter itself, as infinite, enters into the finite and is intuited *in concreto*. The *real* in which it (the concept) appears thereby *becomes* truly similar and equal to its own idea, the idea in which precisely this universal and this particular are in absolute identity. The rational as rational becomes simultaneously phenomenal or sensuous.

Annotation. (1) Just as God hovers *above* the ideas of truth, goodness, and beauty as their common element, so also does philosophy. Philosophy treats neither truth, virtue, nor beauty alone, but rather the common element in all three, and deduces them from this *one* primal source. If one were to ask how it is that philosophy, even though it hovers above truth as well as goodness and beauty, nonetheless has the character of a science whose highest goal is truth, we would remark the following. The determination of philosophy as a science is merely its formal determination. It is indeed a science, yet is a science such that *in* it truth, goodness, and beauty, or science, virtue, and art, interpenetrate one another. To

that extent it is thus *not science* but rather the common link between science, virtue, and art. This distinguishes it sharply from all other sciences. Mathematics, for example, makes precisely no ethical demands. Philosophy demands character, and demands that it be of definite moral elevation and energy. Similarly, philosophy is inconceivable without art and an acquaintance with beauty.[3]

(2) Necessity corresponds to truth, freedom to goodness. Since our explanation of beauty asserts that it is the mutual informing of the real and the ideal to the extent that this informing is represented in reflected imagery, this explanation also includes the following assertion: beauty is the indifference, intuited within the real, of freedom and necessity. For example, we say a figure is beautiful in whose design nature appears to have played with the greatest freedom and the most sublime presence of mind, yet always within the forms or boundaries of the strictest necessity and adherence to law. A poem is beautiful in which the highest freedom conceives and comprehends itself within necessity. Accordingly, art is an absolute synthesis or mutual interpenetration of freedom and necessity.

Let us move now to the remaining conditions of the work of art.

§17. *In the ideal world, philosophy is related to art just as in the real world reason is related to the organism*. Just as reason becomes immediately objective only through the organism, and the eternal ideas of reason become objective in nature as souls of organic bodies, so also does philosophy become objective through art, and the ideas of philosophy become objective through art as the souls of real things.[4] For just this reason, art is to the ideal world what the organism is to the real world.

Concerning this, we may include the following proposition:

§18. *The organic work of nature represents the same indifference in an unseparated state that the work of art represents* ***after*** *separation yet as indifference*.

The organic product encompasses within itself both unities, that of material existence or of the informing of unity into multiplicity, and the opposite unity of light or of the resolution of reality into ideality; furthermore, it encompasses both as one. Yet the universal element or infinite ideality, combined with the particular is itself still that which is subordinated to the finite or the particular (the universal = light). This is the case because the infinite itself here is still subordinated to the universal determination of finitude and does not appear *as* infinite. Further, necessity and freedom (the infinite that appears as infinite) still slumber as if beneath a common covering, as if in a bud, which upon opening reveals a new world, a world of freedom. Since only in the ideal world does the antithesis of the universal and the particular, the ideal and the real manifest itself specifically as that between necessity and freedom, the organic product represents that same antithesis still unresolved (because it is not yet developed) that the work of art represents as suspended (in both the same identity).

§19. *Necessity and freedom are related as the unconscious and the conscious. Art, therefore, is based on the identity of conscious and unconscious activity*. The

perfection of a work of art as such increases to the degree it expresses this identity within itself, or to the degree purpose and necessity interpenetrate one another within it.

Let us now draw a few general conclusions.

§20. *Beauty and truth are essentially or ideally one*, for truth, just as beauty, is *ideally* the identity of the subjective and the objective.[5] For truth, however, this identity is intuited subjectively or prototypically, whereas for beauty it is intuited objectively or in a reflected image.

Annotation. Truth that is not beauty is also not absolute truth, and vice versa. The extremely crass antithesis between truth and beauty in art rests on the understanding of truth as that deceptive truth that extends only as far as the finite. The imitation of this truth generates those works of art in which we admire only the artificiality with which the artist has approximated the element of the natural without combining it with the divine. *This* kind of truth, however, is not yet beauty in art, and only absolute beauty in art is also genuine and actual truth.[6]

For the same reason, goodness that is not beauty is also not absolute goodness, and vice versa. For goodness, too, in its absoluteness, becomes *beauty*—in every disposition, for example, whose morality no longer depends on the struggle of freedom with necessity, but rather expresses the absolute harmony and reconciliation of both.[7]

Addendum. Truth and beauty, just as goodness and beauty, are for that reason never related as end and means. Rather, they are one, and only a harmonious disposition (harmony, however, = true morality) is genuinely receptive to poesy and art. Poesy and art can never really be taught.

§21. *The universe is formed in God as an absolute work of art and in eternal beauty*.[8]

By universe we do not mean the real or ideal All, but rather the absolute identity of both. If the indifference of the real and the ideal within the real and ideal All is beauty, specifically beauty in reflected images, then the absolute identity of the real and ideal All is necessarily primal, that is, absolute beauty itself. To that extent the universe, as it is in God, is also to be viewed as an absolute work of art in which infinite intention mutually interpenetrates infinite necessity.

Annotation. It follows self-evidently that all things, viewed from the perspective of totality or as they are in themselves, are formed in absolute beauty, and that the archetypes of all things, just as they are absolutely true, are also absolutely beautiful. Perverted or ugly things, however, just as error or falsity, consist of mere privation and belong only to the temporal view of things.

§22. *Just as God as the archetype becomes beauty in the reflected image, so also do the ideas of reason become beauty when intuited in the reflected image*. Hence, the relationship of reason to art is the same as that of God to the ideas. The divine creation is represented objectively through art, for that creation is based on the same informing of infinite ideality into the real upon which art is

also based. The splendid German word "imagination" (*Einbildungskraft*) actually means the power of *mutual informing into unity*[9] (*Ineinsbildung*) upon which all creation really is based. It is the power whereby something ideal is simultaneously something real, the soul simultaneously the body, the power of individuation that is the real creative power.

§23. *The immediate cause of all art is God*, for God is by means of his absolute identity the source of all mutual informing (into indifference) of the real and the ideal upon which all art rests; or, God is the source of the ideas. The ideas originate only in God. Art, however, is the representation of the archetypes, hence God himself is the immediate cause and the final possibility of all art; he himself is the source of all beauty.

§24. *The true construction of art is a presentation of its forms as forms of things as those things are in themselves, or as they are within the absolute*, for according to §21 the universe is formed within God as eternal beauty and as an absolute work of art. Similarly, all things as they are in themselves or within God are just as absolutely beautiful as they are absolutely true. Accordingly, the forms of art, since they are the forms of beautiful things, are also forms of things as they are within God or in themselves. And since all construction is a presentation of things within the absolute, the construction of art in particular is the *presentation of its forms* as forms of things as they are within the absolute, and accordingly also a presentation of the universe itself as an absolute work of art as it is formed within God in eternal beauty.

Annotation. This proposition completes the construction of the universal idea of art. Art has been designated as the *real* representation of the forms of things as they are in themselves, and hence of the forms of the archetypes. This simultaneously shows us the direction the following construction of art must take both regarding its matter or content as well as its form. For if art is the representation of the forms of things as they are in themselves, then the universal *material* or *content* of art is found in the archetypes themselves,[10] and our next object is therefore a construction of the universal material or content of art or of its eternal archetypes. This construction constitutes the second section of the philosophy of art.

2
Construction of the Content of Art

In §24 we proved that the forms of art must be the forms of things as they are within the absolute or *in themselves*. Accordingly, we are presupposing that these *particular forms*—precisely those by means of which beauty is represented in individual, real, actual things—*are* particular forms within the absolute. The question is how this is possible. (This is the same problem expressed in general philosophy by the transition of the infinite into the finite, of unity into multiplicity.)[1]

§25. *The particular forms are as such without essence, and are pure forms that cannot inhere within the absolute except to the extent that they as particular forms in their own turn take up the entire essence of the absolute into themselves.* This is self-evident, since the essence of the absolute is indivisible. Only as such are the forms possible in respect to the absolute, that is, absolutely possible, and for precisely that reason also absolutely actual, since within the absolute there is no difference between actuality and possibility.

Addendum. We can illustrate this in the following manner. The universe (by which we always mean the universe in itself, eternal and unbegotten)—the universe is, like the absolute, utterly One, indivisible, since it is the absolute itself (§3); hence, there can be no particular things within the *true* universe except to the extent that they take up the entire undivided universe into themselves, and are thus themselves universes.

If one were now to conclude that there are accordingly as many universes as there are ideas of particular things, this would be precisely the conclusion we intend. Either there are no particular things at all, or each of them is a universe

unto itself. Since God is the unity of all *forms*, the universe does not reside within him in any particular form: it is in them all. Similarly, it resides within them all, since it is not in any particular one. If the *particular* form is to be real in itself, it cannot do so *as* a particular form, but only as a form of the universe. For example, the particular form *man* does not inhere within the absolute as a particular form, but rather as the one and undivided universe in the form of man. For just this reason nothing that we call individual things is real in itself. They are *individual* because they do not take up the *absolute whole* into themselves and into their particular form and have separated themselves from that whole; in a reverse fashion, to the extent that they do have it within themselves, they are no longer individual.

§26. *Within the absolute all particular things are genuinely separated and genuinely one only to the extent that each is the universe unto itself, and each is the absolute whole*. They are separated only thus, for no individual thing as such is truly separated; only the universe is absolutely separated, since it is neither equal nor unequal to any other thing—and this because there is nothing external to it to which it might be opposed or compared. They are truly *one* only thus, since the same is in each.

For just this reason, too, all number or determination by number is suspended. The *particular* thing in absoluteness is not determined by number, for if one reflects upon the particular within it, it is itself the absolute whole and possesses nothing outside of or external to itself. If one reflects upon the universal, it is in absolute unity with all other things. Accordingly, only it itself subsumes or comprehends unity and multiplicity within itself, though it is itself not capable of being determined by these concepts.

Annotation. These concepts are important (a) because of the double view of the universe that is necessary in any case: (α) the view of the universe as *chaos*, which, briefly stated, is the basic view of the sublime to the extent that within it everything is comprehended as unity in absolute identity; (β) the view of the universe as the highest beauty and form, since the universe is chaos precisely by means of the absoluteness of *form*, or because all forms and accordingly also the absolute form are structured into every particular and into every *form*. In what follows we will employ these concepts in an extremely precise fashion. (b) The concept of the absolute separateness of the particular is especially important for art, since art's ultimate effect is based on precisely this separation of forms. Yet this separation obtains only because each is absolute within itself.

§27. *Particular things, to the extent they are absolute in that particularity, and thus to the extent they as particulars are simultaneously universes, are called* ***ideas***.

This proposition is merely an *explication* and is thus in no need of proof, though one could demonstrate that even the first author of the doctrine of ideas[2] understood the same thing by this even if he did not explain it in just *this* way.

Elucidation. Every idea is = universe in the form of the particular. For just this reason, however, it is not real as this particular. The real is always only the universe itself. Every idea has two unities: the one through which it exists *within itself* and is *absolute*—hence the one through which the absolute is formed into the particularity of the idea—and the one through which it is taken up as a particular into the absolute as into its own center. This double unity of every idea is actually the mystery by which the particular can be comprehended both within the absolute and, in spite of this, also as a particular.

§28. *These same syntheses of the universal and particular that viewed in themselves are ideas, that is, images of the divine, are, if viewed on the plane of the real, the* ***gods***, for their essence, their essential nature, = *god*. They are ideas only to the extent that they are god in a particular form. Every idea, therefore, = god, but a particular god.

Annotation. This proposition needs no explanation, particularly since what follows will serve to illuminate it further. The idea of the gods is necessary for art. Our systematic construction of art leads us back precisely to the point to which instinct first led poesy at its inception. What ideas are for philosophy, the gods are for art, and vice versa.[3]

§29. *The absolute reality of the gods follows directly from their absolute ideality*, for they are absolute, and within the absolute, ideality and reality are one, absolute possibility = absolute actuality. The highest identity is at once the highest objectivity.

Anyone who has not yet elevated himself to the level upon which the absolutely ideal is also immediately the absolutely real for him, possesses neither philosophical nor poetic sensibility. The question posed by ordinary consciousness concerning reality is of no significance regarding what is absolute, neither in a poetic nor in a philosophical sense. This *common* reality *is* no true reality at all, but is rather in the true sense nonreality.

All figures and forms in art, and thus particularly the gods, are *actual* because they are *possible*. Anyone who is still able to ask how such highly cultivated spirits as the Greeks were able to believe in the reality or actuality of the gods, how Socrates was able to direct sacrifices, how the Socratic Xenophon as an army officer during the famous retreat was himself able to offer up sacrifices, and so forth—the person posing such questions proves only that he himself has not yet arrived at that stage of cultivation at which precisely the *ideal* is the real and is much more real than the so-called real itself. The Greeks did not at all take the gods to be real in the sense, for example, that common understanding believes in the reality of physical objects; from that perspective the Greeks considered the gods to be neither real nor unreal. In the higher sense they were more real for the Greeks than every other reality.[4]

§30. *The determining law of all gods is pure limitation on the one hand, and undivided absoluteness on the other*, for they are the ideas intuited in actuality.

Particular things, however, cannot be within the ideas unless, for precisely that reason, they are simultaneously truly or absolutely separated and truly one, namely, essentially absolute (according to §26). Hence, the determining law of the world of the gods is strict separation or limitation on the one hand, and equal absoluteness on the other.

Annotation. We must pay particular attention to this relationship if we wish to comprehend the enormous significance of the gods both as regards them individually and as a whole. The mystery of their charm and of their suitability for artistic portrayal actually lies, *first of all*, in the fact that they are strictly limited; hence, mutually limiting characteristics exclude one another within the same deity and are absolutely separated from one another. Nonetheless, within this limitation every form receives into itself the entire divinity.

This is the means by which art acquires separate, self-enclosed figures for portrayal, and yet within each figure simultaneously the totality, the entire divinity. In order to make this comprehensible by means of examples, I must here take such examples from the world of the Greek gods themselves, even though we will be able to construct that world in its entirety only in the entire following discussion. In the meantime, if you see that all the characteristics of the Greek gods fit our deduction of the law of all the figures of the gods, then right from the beginning it must be admitted that Greek mythology is the highest archetype of the poetic world.

Now, let us offer a few examples to support the proposition that pure limitation on the one hand, and undivided absoluteness on the other are the essence of the figures of the gods. Minerva is the archetype of wisdom and strength in unity; feminine tenderness, however, has been eliminated from her, since both characteristics together would reduce this figure to indifference and accordingly more or less to nullity. Juno is strength without wisdom and gentle charm, the latter of which she borrows from Venus in the form of a girdle. If, on the other hand, Venus were invested with the cold wisdom of Minerva, her influence would doubtlessly not be as destructive as it is in the Trojan War, which she causes in order to satisfy the desires of her favorite. Yet then she would no longer be the goddess of love and hence no longer the object of fantasy, for which the universal and absolute within the particular—in limitation—is the highest artistic virtue.

Considering things from this perspective, one can thus say with Moritz[5] that precisely the *missing* characteristics in the manifestations of the gods lend them their highest charm and yet still weave them back together into various relationships. The mystery of all life is the synthesis of the absolute with limitation. There is a kind of ultimate in one's view of the world that we demand for complete satisfaction: *highest* or *ultimate* life, the most free, unique existence and operation without stricture or limitation of the absolute. The absolute in and for itself offers no multiplicity or variety whatever, and to that extent it is for the understanding an absolute, bottomless emptiness. Life is found only within particularity. But life and multiplicity—in a general sense *particularity* without limitation of that which is without qualification *one*—are originally and within themselves possible only through the principle of the divine imagination; that is to say, in the derived world, they are possible only through fantasy, which brings the absolute and limitation together and forms into the particular the entire divinity of the universal. This is the means by which the universe is populated; according to this law life flows out into the world from the absolute as from that which is without qualification *one*. According to the same law the universe forms and molds itself within the reflex of human creative imagination into a world of fantasy whose consistent and pervading law is absoluteness in limitation.

For reason as well as for the creative imagination we demand that nothing in the universe be constrained, purely limited, and subordinated. We demand for every single thing a particular and free life. Only the understanding subordinates; within reason and the creative imagination everything is free and moves about in the same realm without crowding or chafing, for each is within itself the equal of the whole. The sight of pure limitation is from a subordinated perspective sometimes annoying, sometimes painful, sometimes even insulting—but in any case repugnant. For reason and fantasy limitation, too, becomes either simply a form of the absolute or, considered as *limitation*, an inexhaustible source of jest and play, for one is allowed to joke with limitation, since it takes nothing away from the *essence* and is within itself nullity, or nothingness. Hence, the most brazen jesting plays about within the world of the Greek gods with fantasy's images of the gods. For example, when Venus is wounded by Diomedes, and Minerva mocks: "I think Venus must have been persuading some one of the Achaean women to go with the Trojans, and while caressing one or other of them she must have torn her delicate hand with the gold pin of the woman's brooch." Zeus then speaks the following words to Venus with a smile: "My child, it has not been given you to be a warrior. Attend, henceforth, to your own delightful matrimonial duties, and leave all this fighting to Ares and to Athena."[6]

As a consequence of the principle we have presented one can see further that the complete assembly of the gods can first appear only after the purely formless, dark, frightful element is driven out. This region of darkness and formlessness includes everything that directly recalls eternity, the initial ground of existence. It has often been said that it is the ideas that first disclose the absolute; only within them do we find a positive, simultaneously limited and unlimited intuition of the absolute.

As the common germ of both gods and men, absolute chaos is night, obscurity. The first forms and figures fantasy allows to be born from within it are also still formless. A world of misshapen and frightful forms must perish before the mild realm of the blessed and enduring gods can enter. In this respect, too, the Greek poems remain true to the law of all fantasy. The first children born from the embrace of Uranus and Gaea are yet monstrous, hundred-armed Giants, pow-

erful Cyclopes, and wild Titans—children before whom even the father himself is horrified: he banishes them again into Tartarus. Chaos must devour its own children. Uranus, who hides his children, must be driven out, and the reign of Kronos begins. But Kronos, too, devours his own children. Finally the realm of Zeus begins, but here, too, not without preceding destruction. Jupiter must liberate the Cyclopes and hundred-armed Giants so that they may aid him against Saturn and the Titans, and only after he has conquered these monsters and the lost children of Gaea, who is angered at the shame of her children—namely, the heaven-besieging Giants and the monster on whom they expend their final powers, Typhoeus—only after this final victory does heaven become clear and Zeus take serene possession of tranquil Olympus. Well-defined, clearly drawn characters replace all the indefinite and formless deities; the old Oceanus is replaced by Neptune, Tartarus by Pluto, the Titan Helios by the eternally youthful Apollo. Even the oldest of all the gods, Eros, who in the oldest poetry is allowed to exist simultaneously with Chaos, is born anew as the son of Venus and Mars and as a well-defined, enduring form.

§31. *The world of the gods is the object neither of mere understanding nor of reason, but rather can be comprehended only by fantasy.*[7] It is not an object of understanding, since understanding remains bound to limitation; nor is it one of reason, since even in *scientific* or *systematic thinking* reason can portray or present the synthesis of the absolute with limitation only ideally (archetypally). Hence, it is the object only of fantasy, which presents this synthesis in images.

Explication. I define creative imagination in relation to fantasy as that in which the productions of art are received and formed, fantasy as that which intuits them externally, casts them out from within itself, as it were, and to that extent also portrays them. The relationship is the same as that between reason and intellectual intuition. Ideas are formed within reason and, in a sense, from the material of reason; intellectual intuition is that which presents them internally. Fantasy is thus the intellectual intuition within art.

§32. *The gods are in themselves neither moral nor immoral, but rather are freed from this relationship and are absolutely blessed.*[8]

(One must necessarily keep this in mind in order to comprehend the appropriate angle of vision particularly for the poetry of Homer. We all know how much has been said concerning the immorality of his gods, from which some critics have even tried to prove the superiority of modern poesy. The following discussion, however, shows that this standard of measurement cannot be applied to these higher beings of fantasy.)

Proof. Morality and immorality are based on disunion inasmuch as morality is nothing more than the taking up of the finite into the infinite in action. Wherever both are one to the point of absolute indifference, however, the former—and accordingly, morality—is eliminated along with its opposite. Immorality thus expresses itself in the Homeric figures for just that reason not as immorality, but rather only as pure limitation. Those figures act completely within this limitation and are divine only insofar as they do act within those parameters; only in this way is the infinite truly one with the element of limitation within them. They are to be viewed as beings of a higher nature. Within their own limitations they act with both the same freedom and the same necessity as does every natural creature within its own limitation. They act with *freedom*, since it is their nature to act thus and they know no other law than their own nature. They act with *necessity* for the same reason, since their actions are prescribed to them by their own nature. In their immorality, the Homeric gods are therefore merely naive and truly neither moral nor immoral, but rather are completely freed from this contrast.

We can also express the same proposition in the following way: *The gods are absolutely blessed.* No other attribute is applied to them more frequently. Their lives constitute the perpetual antithesis of human life, which is full of toil and discord and is subjected to illness and age. In Sophocles, too, the aged Oedipus says to Theseus: "Kind son of Aegeus, to the gods alone comes never old age or death, but all else is confounded by all-mastering time. Earth's strength decays, and the strength of the body; faith dies, distrust is born."[9]

Both tragedy and epic poetry are full of this contrast. We can understand the inevitability of this attribute of the gods directly from the principle according to which they are comprehended in the first place: *As absolute beings they are particular, and as particular beings absolute.* If we consider the antithesis between morality and blessedness or happiness, an antithesis in which everything finite is ensnared, we can see that *morality* is in any case not an ultimate, and is accordingly not something that could be attributed to the gods. Just as morality is the assumption of the finite or particular into the infinite, so is blessedness the assumption of the infinite into the finite or the particular. In the former instance, in which the particular is taken up into the universal, the particular is subjected to the law as the universal and behaves like a body obeying gravity.[10] For precisely that reason, the gods, in whose nature both unities are united, do not live a dependent, determined life, but rather a free and independent one. As *particular* beings they nonetheless enjoy the blessedness of the absolute, and vice versa (to strive toward blessedness = to strive as a particular to partake of absoluteness). This is a relationship for which perhaps only the cosmic bodies, as the first physical symbols of the gods, can serve as an example, since they are simultaneously as particulars nonetheless absolute—within themselves—and on the other hand in that absoluteness nonetheless *particular*. Accordingly, they are both outside of and in their own centers. To the extent, then, that both unities in their absoluteness include one another within themselves—since the particular cannot be absolute without, for the same reason, also being in the absolute—and to the extent that from this perspective blessedness and morality are actually one and the

same, one can also assert that the gods are absolutely moral precisely because they are absolutely blessed.

§33. *The basic law of all portrayals of the gods is the law of beauty*, for beauty is the absolute intuited *in reality*. Now, since the gods are the *absolute itself* intuited *actually* (or synthesized with limitation) within the particular, their basic law of portrayal is that of beauty.

One might object that precisely because the gods are limited, they are not absolutely beautiful. I, however, would rather assert the reverse, namely, that the absolute cannot be beautiful at all except as intuited within limitation, that is, within the particular. The complete removal of all limitation is either the complete negation of all form (this is only the case, however, where the negation of form is at the same time absolute form, as is the case in the beauty of the sublime—something we will discuss later), or thoroughgoing mutual restriction, that is, reduction to nullity. The former kind of beauty is found, for example, in the dignified and sublime figure of Jupiter, which is the same kind of expression of wisdom and power without boundary as in Juno, who is the pure expression of power without loss of beauty. These limitations are thus merely that which for now we will call the various modes of beauty, since we can present that particular investigation successfully only when we speak about the different forms of the plastic arts.

One might, however, lodge an objection with evidence based on Greek mythology itself: Vulcan, the various forms of Pan, of Silenus, of the fauns, satyrs, and so on. As regards the form of Vulcan, it shows us the considerable identity between the formations of the fantasy and those of nature, which creates organically. Just as nature is compelled by the eminent development of one organ or impulse in one type of creature to neglect it somewhat in another, fantasy here has had to extract from Hephaestus's feet—which are lame—what it gave to his powerful arms. As regards the ugly forms within Greek mythology in general, however, all of these are in their own turn also ideals, albeit *reverse ideals*, and as such are included in the realm of the beautiful. Yet even this merely anticipates our explication. As regards Vulcan himself, the limitations that in his case culminate in ugliness become for poetry a source of inexhaustible humor and of inextinguishable laughter within the circle of the gods whenever he passes around the cup of nectar.

The beautiful reveals itself eminently as the canon of all concepts of the gods in its alleviation of all that is frightful and terrible by means of the beautiful. The Fates—according to the oldest poetry daughters of the night, according to a later source daughters of Jupiter and Themis—are conceived in sublime beauty not only within the plastic arts; indeed, the entire conception of fantasy as regards them suggests this mollification. As servants of unbending necessity they yet execute the highest office, the steering of all human affairs, as if it were the easiest, lightest work—as a delicate thread that runs through their hands and is then gently severed without the least effort.

§34. *The gods taken together necessarily constitute a totality, a world.* (Here we begin our inner construction.) Since in each figure the absolute is posited with limitation, each figure therefore presupposes others; directly or indirectly each individual presupposes all others and all presuppose each individual. Accordingly, they necessarily constitute a world in their own turn collectively, one in which everything together is mutually determined, an organic whole, a totality, a world.

§35. *Only by collectively constituting a world in this way do the gods acquire independent existence for fantasy or an independent poetic existence.* This proposition follows directly, for only in this way do they become beings of their own world, a world existing completely in and for itself and completely separate from that world commonly known as the real one. Every encounter with common reality or with concepts of that reality necessarily destroys the fascination and charm of these beings, for this fascination results precisely from the fact that, according to §29, nothing more is needed for their reality than possibility itself, and from the fact that they therefore live in an absolute world that only fantasy is able to intuit in reality.

Elucidation concerning these two propositions (§34 and §35). After this genuine world of fantasy has been created there are no other limitations to what can be conceived within it; this is true precisely because within it, all possibility is also immediately real. This world therefore can and indeed must form and fashion itself out from *one* individual point into infinity. No possible relationship between the gods and no possible limitation as regards the absolute is excluded. Because all these beings are viewed as existing in and for themselves in all possible entanglements and relationships, and because among them yet another circle of relationships and a unique history generates itself, they attain the highest objectivity, whereby this unique poetic history itself passes over into mythology.

As regards particularly the totality of conceptions in Greek mythology, one can show that indeed all possibilities within the realm of ideas as constructed by philosophy are completely exhausted in Greek mythology. The night and fate, the latter itself standing *over* the gods just as the *former* is the mother of the gods, are the dark background, the hidden and mysterious identity from which all gods have emerged. These two are always hovering over them. Yet in the bright realm of limited and discernible forms, Jupiter is the absolute point of indifference; absolute power inheres within him coupled with absolute wisdom, for when he first wed Metis and it was prophesied that she would bear a son by him who would combine both natures and rule over the gods, he drew her into himself and united with her completely: manifest symbol of the absolute indifference of wisdom and power within eternal being. Then, from directly within himself, he gave birth to Minerva, who sprang fully equipped and armed from his eternal

head, the symbol of absolute form and of the universe as the image of divine wisdom, an image that springs totally formed and atemporally from within the eternal principle. *Not* that Jupiter or Minerva *means* or *signifies* this or *is supposed* to signify it. This would completely destroy the poetic independence of these figures. They do not *signify* it; they *are* it themselves. The ideas of philosophy and the gods of art are one and the same, yet each is in and for itself what it is; each is a unique view of the same thing. None is there for the sake of another or in order to signify the other.

All limitations are removed from the figure of Jupiter except those that are necessary; limitations serve only to allow the essentials to be seen. Absolute power, precisely because it is what it is, is also ultimate serenity. Jupiter blinks his eyes, and Mount Olympus quakes. Or as a recent poet put it: It is as if Jupiter merely sows the lightning.

Minerva encompasses within herself all forms of the elevated and powerful, the creative and destructive, the unifying and divisive. Form in and for itself is cold, since in such separation the material element is alien to it. It is, however, simultaneously the highest power, power knowing no weakness or error. Hence, it is simultaneously archetype and eternal designer of all *art* as well as the terrible *destroyer* of cities, both the one who wounds and the one who heals. As the absolute form, she unifies, but she is also the goddess of war in the realm of human beings. High on Olympus, in the ethereal region of the divine, there is no dissension, since antitheses here, whether separated or united, are equally absolute. Only in the lower world, where form rises against form, particular against particular, is there war. It is the workshop of unceasing formation and destruction, of change and variation. Yet all these manifestations of the destruction of war nonetheless exist as possibilities in the womb of absolute form. To that extent one can say that the virgin Minerva, though born of no mother's womb, is within herself the most fertile of all deities. Virtually all human works and affairs are her products. In her strictness (pure form) she is the same goddess of the philosopher, the artist, and the warrior, and her majesty consists above all in the following: Even though she alone of all gods unifies antitheses, neither disturbs the other within her, and in her image everything is reduced to *one* factor, namely, that she is immovable, eternally selfsame and unchangeable wisdom.

Juno possesses Zeus's pure power, but without sublime wisdom. This is the source of her hatred for everything that is divine by virtue of its form, and hence for all divinity formed by Jupiter in the newly subdued era of time: Apollo, Diana, and so forth. When Jupiter gives birth to Minerva from within himself, Juno, without Jupiter's participation and actually to spite him, gives birth to Vulcan. He is the formative artist of clever works, though without Minerva's majestic wisdom, the manipulator of fire and the creator of weapons, although his own arm only guides the hammer. An extremely significant addendum to this story and antithesis to Minerva is the fact that Vulcan strives to unite himself with

Minerva, and that in his futile struggle with her he fructifies the earth, whereupon the earth gives birth to Erichthonius with dragon feet. It is well known that the dragon form always signifies something that has issued from the earth. Hence, Vulcan is designated as the merely earthly form of art that seeks unsuccessfully to unite with the divine form of art, just as on the other hand and in a similar fashion Venus, who did unite with him, is the earthly form of beauty even though her majestic archetype dwells simultaneously in heaven.

Without seeking to impose an alien conceptual context onto these delicate creations of fantasy, we nonetheless can understand the entire chain from Jupiter onward to the other principal deities in the following fashion. Jupiter as the eternal father is the absolute point of indifference on Olympus, elevated above all conflict. With him dwells the figure of Minerva, eternal wisdom, his counterpart, born from within his head. Beneath him we find (a) in the *real* world both the forming and formless principle (iron and water), Vulcan and Neptune. To ensure that the chain is closed on both sides, these two are brought together again by a point of indifference corresponding to Jupiter, namely, a subterranean god, Pluto or the stygian Jupiter, ruler in the realm of night or gravity. Just as he is the point of indifference (corresponding to Jupiter) in the real world, so also is (b) Apollo the point of indifference in the ideal world, the antithetical figure to Pluto. Whereas the latter is imagined as being old, Apollo is formed in eternally youthful beauty. The one dwells in the bleak realm of shadows, of empty things, and of darkness; the other is the god of light, of ideas, of living form, who by tolerating only the element of life within his own realm sends death with his gentle arrow even to the person wilted by age. Similarly, his arrows, which shoot as thickly as rays, collectively annihilate what he hates, for example, the Greeks after they insult his priests.[11] All the other characteristics of this god, the fact that he is the healer, the begetter of the healer Asclepius,[12] the guide of the muses, illuminator of the future just as the all-seeing eye of the world in heaven—all these characteristics agree with the meaning we have given this god. We find the most important of these characteristics separated in the figure of Mars, who corresponds on the ideal side to Vulcan, and in Venus, who as the highest earthly form corresponds to the formless principle of Neptune and who according to the oldest myths extricated herself as form first from the realm of the formless—the ocean—a realm ruled under the new gods by Poseidon.

The totality of the world of the Greek gods would, by the way, not be complete if only the necessary and not every *particular* and perhaps even accidental view of things were not equally absolute. Whole masses of phenomena, which perhaps only from a certain point of view appear as one, and indeed all types of relationships are summarized as the universal through one individual, a state of affairs that is doubtlessly the most obvious example of the representation of the universal in the particular. In this way, for example, the whole collection of phenomena resulting from subterranean fire is summarized in the figure of Vulcan, just as all

with which the warm, inner life of nature fills our senses are summarized in the figure of Vesta. Even the horrible offspring of a nature not yet restrained, though subdued by Jupiter's power, are summarized by the Titans, whose still active members cause violent convulsions of the solid earth. The view of nature as a totality that always remains the same even amid variously changing forms is fixed in the figure of Proteus, who finally appeared in his original form and revealed the truth only to those who held him tightly with strong arms during every alteration.

The divinity acquired also by nature in this world of fantasy also permits metamorphoses of the gods into animal forms, although Greek fantasy, unlike Egyptian fantasy, never was able to disguise the gods entirely in purely animal forms. The totality demanded that in no realm could there be anything contradicting the world of fantasy. Hence, the deification of natural things necessarily had to be continued into the smallest detail. Trees, rocks, mountains, rivers, even individual springs had to be inhabited by divine beings (daemons as mediators). The daring performances of nature herself in which she often turns her own ideal upside down, in which she can be wasteful with her own overflowing energy—these performances renew themselves within the verdant fullness of fantasy, which finally concludes its world with the roguish, half-animal and half-human figures of satyrs and fauns. By pulling the human form down to that of the animal here, which only manifests expressions of sensual lust or disinterest, the antithetical effect emerges from that attained by the elevation of the same figure to the divine. Here, too, totality demands the satisfaction of fantasy by means of opposites. Finally, even the reverse appears, the union of totally animal bodies with a reflective face in the sphinxes.

Finally, the entanglements of the gods had to extend even into human relationships: not only particularly sacred places, resulting in the sanctification and elevation of all of nature into a higher world, but also the participation of the gods in human events such as the Trojan War. Even animals are woven into the history of the gods, such as in the story of the Twelve Labors of Hercules.

§36. *The relationship of dependence among gods can be conceived only as one of begetting or procreation* (theogony), for reproduction is the only mode of dependence allowing the dependent element nonetheless to remain absolute within itself. Now, since the idea of gods requires that they as particulars be absolute, reproduction is their necessary mode of dependence.

Elucidation. The begetting of the gods out of one another is itself a symbol of the way the ideas inhere in and issue from one another. The absolute idea or God, for example, encompasses all ideas within itself; to the extent that these ideas are conceived as being both encompassed within him as well as absolute in and for themselves, they are begotten of him. Hence, Jupiter is conceived as the father of gods and human beings; even beings already born are begotten of him again,

since only with him does the course of the world commence, and everything must be *in him* in order to be in the world.

§37. *Explication. The entirety of the poetic renderings of the gods*, by acquiring complete objectivity or independent poetic existence, *is mythology*. (This is merely an explication needing no proof.)

§38. *Mythology is the necessary condition and first content of all art*.

The entire preceding discussion serves as proof. The *nervus probandi* lies in the idea of art as representation, by means of particular beautiful things, of what is absolutely beautiful in itself, and hence as representation of the absolute within limitation without suspension of the absolute. This contradiction is resolved only in the ideas of the gods, who themselves can have no independent, truly objective existence except in the complete development of their own world and of a poetic totality that we call mythology.

Further elucidation. Mythology is nothing other than the universe in its higher manifestation, in its absolute form, the true universe in itself, image or symbol of life and of wondrous chaos in the divine imagination, itself already poesy and yet in and for itself the content and element of poesy. It (mythology) is the world and as it were the ground in which alone the exotic plants of art are able to bloom and grow. Only within such a world are abiding and definite forms possible through which alone the eternal concepts can be expressed. The creations of art must have the same reality as, indeed an even higher reality than, those of nature. The figures of the gods that endure so necessarily and so eternally must have a higher reality than those of human beings or of plants, yet must simultaneously possess the characteristics both of individuals and of types, including the immortality of the latter.[13]

Insofar as poesy is the formative element of the material or content, just as art in the narrower sense is the formative element of form, so also is mythology the absolute poesy, as it were the poesy en masse. It is eternal matter from which all forms issue so wondrously and variously.

§39. *Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular* ***within the particular*** *is possible only symbolically*.

Elucidation. Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular *within the universal* = philosophy—idea—. Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular *in the particular* = art. The universal content of this representation = mythology. In mythology we thus find the second synthesis already accomplished, that of the indifference of the universal and the particular with the *particular*. This proposition is thus the principle of construction of mythology as such.

The proof of this proposition requires an explication of the *symbolic*, and since this mode of representation is itself the synthesis of two opposing modes,

the schematic and the allegorical, I will also use this opportunity to explain what schematism and allegory are.

Propositions of elucidation

That representation in which the universal means the particular or in which the particular is intuited through the universal is *schematism*.

That representation, however, in which the particular means the universal or in which the universal is intuited through the particular is *allegory*.

The synthesis of these two, where neither the universal means the particular nor the particular the universal, but rather where both are absolutely one, is the *symbolic*.

Although all three different modes of representation are possible only through the imagination and are forms of it, only the third constitutes the absolute form.

We also must distinguish each of these three from the *image*. The image is always concrete, purely particular, and is determined from all sides such that only the definite factor of the space occupied by the original object prevents it from being identical with the object itself. In contrast, the dominating element in the schema is the universal, although the universal in it is intuited as a particular. Hence, Kant could define it in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the sensually intuited rule for the production of an object.[14] To that extent it stands between the concept and the object and as such is a product of the power of imagination. One can see most clearly what a schema is from the example of the mechanical artist who is to create an object with some definite form according to its concept. This concept *schematizes* itself for him; that is, it becomes immediate for him in the imagination in its universality simultaneously as the particular and as an intuition of the particular. The schema is the rule guiding his production, but he intuits in this universal simultaneously the particular itself. First he will produce only a rough outline of the whole according to this intuition; then he develops the individual parts completely until the schema gradually becomes for him a fully concrete image, and the work itself is completed simultaneously with the fully determined image in his imagination.

Hence, only through our own inner intuition can we know what a schema and schematism are. Since, however, our act of thinking the particular is actually always schematization of that particular, we really need only reflect upon that perpetually active schematism at work even in language in order to secure an intuition of it. In language, too, we make use of merely universal designations even for the designation of the particular. To that extent even language itself is nothing more than perpetual schematization.

Now, schematism also exists in art; however, according to the explication we have just given it is clear we cannot assert that simple schematism itself is a complete representation of the absolute in the particular. This is true even though the

schema itself as the universal is also a particular, since as the universal here it merely means or signifies the particular. Hence, it would be impossible to comprehend mythology as such or Greek mythology in particular, which itself is true symbolism, simply as a schematism of nature or of the universe, though it may well appear that individual elements in it can be interpreted in this way. One could comprehend the previously mentioned summary of particular appearances belonging to a certain limited area and the reference of this summary to a specific individual as schematism by taking the individual itself to be the universal element of those phenomena. One could, however, just as easily say in reverse fashion that in these various elements rather, the universal (whole masses of phenomena) is signified by the particular, a statement that would be just as true as the first, since in symbolic representation precisely both are united. The same would hold true if one maintained that mythology is merely a *higher* language, since language itself is, of course, completely schematic.

As regards *allegory*, it is the reverse of the schema and hence also an indifference of the universal and the particular, but an indifference such that the particular here means or signifies the universal or is intuited as the universal. If anywhere, then, it is here that this mode of explanation might be applied to mythology with some semblance of correctness, and, indeed, it has been. Alas, we encounter the same situation as in the case of schematism. In allegory the particular merely *means* or *signifies* the universal; in mythology it itself *is* simultaneously also the universal. For just this reason, however, all symbolism is extremely easy to allegorize, since the symbolic meaning encompasses the allegorical just as the unity of the particular with the universal, and that of the universal with the particular, is contained in the mutual informing of the universal and the particular. In Homer, it is true, and in the representations of the plastic arts, one could not escape the fact that the myths are not meant allegorically, but rather with absolute poetic independence and as reality in and for themselves. That is why in more recent times some people have come up with a different expedient explanation. One has maintained that the myths were originally meant allegorically, but Homer turned them into a kind of epic travesty, took them purely poetically, and came up with these pleasant children's fairy tales he tells in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. This is the well-known explanation that Heyne[15] devised and for which his school then tried to win acceptance. The inner spiritual void of such a notion relieves us of any need to disprove it. One might say that it is the crassest way to destroy the poetic element in Homer. One will not find one trace of this sort of base purposiveness in his works.[16]

The charm of the Homeric poetry and of all mythology does indeed reside also in the fact that it includes the allegorical meaning as a *possibility*; one really can allegorize virtually all of it. This is the source of the infinity of significance in Greek mythology. The universal, however, inheres in it only as possibility. Its essential nature is neither allegorical nor schematic, but rather the absolute indif-

ference of both: the symbolic. This indifference was the *first element* here. Homer did not first render these myths independently poetic and symbolic; they were such from the very beginning. The separation of the allegorical element in them was only something that occurred to a later period, something possible only after all poetic spirit was extinguished. Hence, one can also demonstrate convincingly—and I will do so in what follows—that the Homeric myth, and to that extent Homer himself, was absolutely the first element in and the beginning of Greek poesy. The allegorical poesy and philosopheme, as Heyne calls it, were entirely the work of later periods. The synthesis is first. This is the universal law of Greek culture, which precisely thereby proves its absoluteness. Hence, we also see clearly that mythology concludes as soon as allegory begins. The conclusion of Greek myth is the well-known allegory of Eros and Psyche.

The complete disassociation of the Greek fantasy from the allegorical manifests itself with particular clarity in the fact that even personifications that might easily be taken to be allegorical beings, for example, Eris (strife, discord), are treated not at all as beings that are supposed to mean or signify something but rather as *real* beings that *are* simultaneously that which they signify. (This also shows the contrast to the moderns: Dante is allegorical in the highest style, then Ariosto, Tasso. Example: Voltaire's *Henriade*, in which the allegorical is quite visible and crass.)[17]

The *concept* of the symbolic is now adequately elucidated by means of this contrast. One can view the succession of the three forms of representation also as a succession of potences. To that extent they are also universal categories.[18] One can say that nature merely allegorizes in the corporeal series, since the particular only means or signifies the universal without being it itself; hence, no types occur in this series. In light, in contrast to the corporeal series, nature schematizes, and is symbolic in the realm of the organic, for here the infinite concept is combined with the object itself; the universal is completely the particular and the particular the universal. Similarly, thinking is simple schematization; all action, in contrast, is allegorical (since as a particular it means or signifies a universal); art is symbolic. This distinction can also be applied to the sciences. Arithmetic allegorizes, since it signifies the universal through the particular. Geometry can be said to schematize to the extent that it designates the particular through the universal or general. Finally, philosophy is the symbolic science among these. (We will return to the same concepts during our construction of the individual forms of art. Music is an allegorizing art, painting schematizes, the plastic arts are symbolic. Similarly, in poesy lyric poetry is allegorical, epic poesy demonstrates the necessary inclination to schematization, and drama is symbolic.)

A necessary *corollary* issuing from this entire discussion is then the following: Mythology as such and every poetic rendering of it in particular are to be comprehended neither schematically nor allegorically, but rather *symbolically*.

This is the case because the requirement of absolute artistic representation is: representation with *complete indifference* such that the universal *is* completely the particular and the particular simultaneously the entire universal, and does not merely mean or signify it. The requirement is poetically resolved in mythology, since each figure in it is to be taken as that which it is, for precisely in this way is each also taken as that which it means or signifies. Meaning here is simultaneously being itself, passed over into the object itself and one with it. As soon as we allow these beings to *mean* or *signify* something, they themselves are no longer *anything*. Their reality is one with their ideality (§29); that is, their *idea*, their concept is also destroyed to the extent that they are not conceived as actual. Their ultimate charm resides precisely in the fact that they, by simply *being* as they are without any reference to anything else—absolute within themselves—simultaneously always allow the meaning itself to be dimly visible. I emphasize that we are not satisfied with mere *meaningless being*, such as that given by a mere image. Just as little are we satisfied with mere meaning. Rather, whatever is to be the object of absolute artistic representation should be as concrete and self-identical as the image, and yet as universal and significant as the concept. Hence, the German language renders the word *symbol* excellently with the term *Sinnbild* [sense meaning/image].

Even in natural beings, for example, in plants, we cannot fail to recognize the allegory; it anticipates, as it were, moral beauty. Yet it would offer no charm for fantasy and no satisfaction for intuition if it existed only for the sake of this meaning and not first of all for its own sake. The delight comes precisely when we simultaneously recognize the significant or meaningful element contained within this unintentional, unaffected, and outwardly purposeless existence. Any suspicion that this meaning is intentional would suspend the object itself for us, since that object should be absolute according to its own nature and should not exist for the sake of any purpose external to it.

A great service was performed among the Germans, and actually for the first time anywhere, when Moritz recognized mythology in this, its poetic absoluteness.[19] He never quite completely worked out this point of view and was able to show only that these poetic renderings are indeed of this kind; he was not able to demonstrate its inner necessity and basis. Nonetheless, a fine poetic sensibility characterizes his entire presentation, and perhaps we can recognize here the influence of Goethe, who expresses these views quite clearly in his own works and doubtlessly awakened them in Moritz as well.[20]

A subordinate *corollary proposition* is then that mythology is equally to be comprehended *historically*.

Without doubt the most prosaic view of this poetry is that which maintains that a large part of the stories of the gods actually show traces of great natural revolutions in the primordial world, and that the gods themselves actually were primeval kings and so on. In such a view, however, the relationship of mythology to

an intuition of the universe and of nature would be lost in a manner different than within the historical relationship; that is, the immediately and universally valid element of mythology would be lost. Only as a type or model—as it were, as the archetypal world itself—does mythology possess universal reality for all time. The wondrous interweaving characterizing this divine whole does indeed allow us to expect historical elements to play a part in it. Yet who can separate out the individual elements in this living whole without destroying the context of that whole? Just as this poetry, like a gentle fragrance, allows us to intuit nature through it, so also does it act as a kind of mist through which we recognize distant times in the primordial world and great individual figures moving against its dark background. Everything else persuades us that present human beings are a derived species, that therefore without a doubt everything living in the poetic renderings of mythology really did exist once, and that a race of gods preceded present human beings. Yet the mythological stories themselves are completely independent of such truth and should be viewed quite simply in and for themselves. (You will now no longer wonder why I have made no use of those popular historical-psychological explanations of mythology according to which the origin of mythology is to be found in the attempts made by uncultivated primitives to personify and vivify everything in a manner similar to that of the American Indian, who sticks his hand into a pot of boiling water and believes that there is an animal in it that has bitten him. Mythology is different from this kind of uncultivated natural language, not in principle, but merely as regards the degree of execution. According to other views, mythology is merely an expedient prompted by the poverty of conceptual designations in general or by simple lack of knowledge of causal relationships, for example, the god of thunder, of fire, and so on.)

§40. *The character of true mythology is that of universality and infinity*, for according to §34 it is possible in and for itself only to the extent that it has developed into a totality and represents the archetypal universe itself. Within the latter, however, not only all things, but also all relationships between things inhere as absolute possibilities. Hence, the same must be the case in mythology, and to that extent it must be characterized by universality. Since in the universe in itself, however—in the archetypal world of which mythology is the immediate representation—past and future are one, the same must also be the case in mythology. It must not only represent the present or past, it must also encompass the future. As if by prophetic anticipation it must even now be commensurate with or adequate for future relationships and the infinite developments of time; that is, it must be infinite.

As far as understanding is concerned, this infinity must express itself such that no understanding is capable of developing it entirely, and such that in it there resides the infinite possibility to formulate ever new relationships.

§41. *The poetic renderings of mythology can be understood neither as intentional nor as unintentional*—not intentional, for in that case they would be conceived for the sake of some specific meaning, which is impossible according to §39; not unintentional, since they are not void of meaning. This basically makes the same assertion our preceding discussion made implicitly, namely, that the poetic renderings of mythology are simultaneously meaningful and meaningless—meaningful because they represent a universal in the particular, meaningless because they represent both with absolute indifference, such that the element in which they are different is itself nonetheless absolute and has integrity in and for itself.

§42. *Mythology can be neither the work of an individual person nor of a collectivity nor of the race* (to the extent that the latter is merely a composite of individuals), *but rather exclusively of the collectivity to the extent that it itself constitutes an individual and is the equal of an individual person*. It is not the product of an individual, since mythology must possess absolute objectivity and should be a second *world* that cannot be that of the individual. It cannot be the product of a collectivity or of a race to the extent that these are merely a composite of individuals, since in that case it would lack harmonious agreement and congruity. Hence, its possibility necessarily demands a collectivity that is an individual as *one* person. The incomprehensibility this idea may well present to our own age can detract nothing from its truth. It is the highest idea for *all* history as such. Even nature itself contains analogies and distant allusions to this kind of relationship; the manner in which the formative impulses of animals express themselves is an example, the way in which with several species an entire collectivity acts together, each individual as the whole, and the whole itself as an individual. Such a state of affairs can hardly surprise us in art, particularly since precisely here, at the highest level of production, we see the antithesis of *nature* and *freedom* enter once more, and since Greek mythology, for example, brings *nature itself* back to us in art, as I will show more specifically later. Yet it is precisely only in art that nature is able to effect such concord between the individual and the species (in action nature asserts her rights, though less obviously, more in the whole than in the individual, and in that individual only for certain moments). In Greek mythology nature has presented us with such a work of one common formative impulse that has been extended to include an entire collectivity. The counterculture to the Greeks—modernity—displays nothing of this sort, though it did indeed instinctively intend something similar in its formation of a universal church.

This state of affairs through which we must understand Greek mythology as having been generated—this unique possession of an entire collectivity by a common formative impulse—can be made completely clear only in its juxtaposition with the origin of modern poesy, something I cannot undertake at this time. Let me recall Wolf's hypothesis concerning Homer in which he asserts that

Homer, too, in his original form, was not the work of a single person, but rather of several individuals driven by the same spirit.[21] Wolf as a critic simply views the whole matter too empirically and too narrowly limited to the written work itself that we call Homer—in a word, he views the matter in too subordinated a fashion to present clearly and concretely the quintessence of the matter itself and the universal element residing perhaps in his own conception. I will not contest here the unqualified correctness of Wolf's view of Homer, but I do want, by using this statement, to assert the same for mythology as Wolf does for Homer. Mythology and Homer are one and the same; Homer was already involved in the first poetic products of mythology and was, as it were, potentially present. Since Homer, if I may put it this way, was already spiritually—archetypally—predetermined, and since the fabric of his own poetry was already interwoven with that of mythology, it is easy to see how poets from whose songs Homer might be put together were each able to have a hand in the whole, though completely independently of one another, without suspending its harmony or departing from that initial identity. What they were reciting was a poem that was already there, though perhaps not empirically. The origin of mythology and the origin of Homer thus coincide; it is therefore understandable that their respective beginnings were equally hidden even to the earliest Hellenic historians, and that as early a figure as Herodotus conceives the matter one-sidedly, namely, that Homer was the first to relate stories of the gods to the Hellenes.[22]

The ancients themselves designate mythology and—since it is one with Homer—the Homeric poems as the common source of poesy, history, and philosophy. For poesy it is the primal matter from which all else issued, the ocean, to use an image the ancients themselves used, from which all rivers flow out and to which all flow back.[23] Only gradually does this mythical material become lost itself within the historical, one might say as soon as the idea of the infinite emerges and a relationship to *fate* can develop (Herodotus). In the intervening period, because the infinite is yet completely combined with matter itself and accordingly itself behaves like material reality, that unique divine seed that has been sown in mythology must proliferate for a long period of time in wondrous and great events such as those of the heroic age. The laws of common experience have not yet emerged, and whole masses of phenomena are still concentrated in great individual figures, such as is the case in the *Iliad*.

Since mythology is nothing other than the archetypal world itself and the initial universal intuition of the universe, it was the foundation for philosophy, and it is easy to show that it determined the entire direction and development of Greek philosophy. The first element that wrested itself away from mythology was the oldest philosophy of nature of the Greeks, which was yet purely realistic until first Anaxagoras (νοῦς),[24] and more fully after him Socrates, introduced the idealistic element. Yet it was also the first source of the ethical part of philosophy. The initial views of ethical relationships still have their source in mythology, particularly that feeling common to all Greeks that human beings are indeed subordinate to the gods, a feeling that reached its highest cultivation in Sophocles and in any case deeply characterized all their works. This includes that peculiar sense for limitation and moderation in ethical matters as well, the antipathy toward arrogance or blasphemous violence and so on, and the most sublime ethical aspects of the work of Sophocles.

Hence, Greek mythology is not only infinitely significant in and for itself, but also, because in its *inception* it is the work of a collectivity that is simultaneously an individual; it is the work of a god, just as the Greek anthology itself contains an epigram to Homer:

> If Homer was a god, let temples be erected to him,
> If he was a mortal, let him *nonetheless* be revered as divine.

One more point. We have constructed mythology completely rationally on the basis of artistic demands, beginning with the first of those demands; Greek mythology emerged quite automatically as the solution to all those demands. Here the thorough rationality of Greek art and poesy obliges us to take notice for the first time, so that one can always be certain to find in Greek culture every artistic genre constructed commensurate with this idea, and indeed to encounter in Greek culture virtually the archetypal artistic individual. Modern poesy and art, on the other hand, are irrational and are to that extent the negative side of ancient art, though I do not mean this in a deprecating fashion, since the negative as such can also again acquire that form that is able to encompass perfection.

This brings us to the contrast between *ancient and modern poesy* regarding mythology.

Just as the recurrence in nature of the same antithesis in different potences confuses us if we are not familiar with the general law governing these recurrences, how much more confused are we when we encounter this situation in history and in matters apparently belonging to the realm of freedom? Even in the absence of other evidence, reality itself would prompt us to assume that in art, too—the highest union of nature and freedom—this contrast between nature and freedom, the infinite and the finite will recur. Furthermore, we need a stable norm, a model generated from within reason itself, with which to comprehend the necessity of this recurrence. The mere path of explication will lead us absolutely nowhere as regards genuine knowledge. Science does not explain; unconcerned with the actual results issuing from its purely scientific action, it merely constructs. Alas, at the conclusion of precisely this procedure it is then surprised by the emergence of the complete and self-contained totality. The objects under consideration land directly in their proper place as a result of the construction itself, and this place they receive during the construction is at the same time their only true and correct explication. There is then no further need to deduce from the given phenomenon its cause. It is this particular object precisely because it

occupies this position, and vice versa; it assumes this position precisely because it is this particular object. Only such a procedure yields necessity.

To apply this now to the object under consideration here, we can say that Greek mythology could be viewed from all sides and explained as a given phenomenon taking into consideration all possible factors. Such an explication would doubtlessly lead us to the same conclusions as does our construction (for precisely this is an advantage of construction: it anticipates with reason that to which a correctly executed explication will finally lead). Yet something would always be missing in such a procedure, namely, an understanding of the necessity and of the overall context, a context determining that this particular phenomenon will occupy this particular place for this particular reason. A consideration of Greek mythology and a closer investigation will persuade every person who has a sense for such things that this mythology regenerates nature itself within the sphere of art. Construction, however, will designate beforehand and with necessity this particular position mythology occupies within the overall context.

The principle of construction is in a different and higher sense the same as that of ancient physics, namely, *that nature seeks to fill a vacuum*. Accordingly, wherever there is a void in the universe, nature fills it. Or, expressed less graphically, no possibility is left unrealized in the universe; all that is possible is also real. Since the universe is *one* and indivisible, it cannot flow into anything without flowing in its entirety. There is no universe of poesy without *nature* and *freedom* also being juxtaposed within it. Whoever understands our assertion—regarding Greek mythology as a work of nature—as implying that mythology would be a work of nature in the same blind fashion as are the products of the formative or artistic impulses in animals, would quite frankly have an extremely crude understanding of it. Yet someone who conceived it as a work of absolute poetic freedom would be equally far from the truth.

I have already given the main characteristics through which Greek mythology represents itself within the world of art as organic nature. People have repeatedly pointed out its overwhelming inclination to flee from the formless or boundless. Just as the organic cannot generate itself back into the infinite except from out of the organic itself, so also nothing here exists without procreation or reproduction; nothing issues from the formless or the infinite in and for itself, but rather always from what is already formed. Despite the infinity that Greek mythology does indeed manifest, at least externally its manifestation is totally finite, complete, and, in its whole essence, realistic. The element of the infinite manifests itself here on the higher level—just as in the organism—as being yet wedded directly to material existence. That is why within this whole all form is necessary form, and if one views it as *one* organic being, it possesses internally the same material infinity characteristic of the organic being. Formation issues from formation, not merely divisible into infinity, but actually divided. The infinite appears nowhere as infinite; it is everywhere, but only in the object itself—wedded to matter—

nowhere in the reflection of the poet, for example, in the Homeric poems. Infinite and finite still slumber under a common cloak. Juxtaposed with nature, each of its formations is ideal-infinite, while in relation to art itself they are completely real-limited and finite. This is the reason for the total absence of any ethical concepts in mythology to the extent that they might concern the gods. The latter are organic beings of a higher, absolute, and thoroughly idealistic nature, and they always act as such, always commensurate with their limitations and for that reason absolutely. Even the most moral gods, such as Themis, are not moral simple because of morality itself; rather, in their case even this belongs to their specific limitations. Morality, like sickness and death, only plagues mortals, and within mortals it can express itself in relationship to the gods only as rebellion against them. Prometheus is the archetype of morality that ancient mythology offers to us. He is the universal symbol of that particular relationship morality occupies within mythology. Because freedom expresses itself in him as independence from the gods, he is chained to the rock and eternally tormented by the vulture sent by Jupiter, a vulture that perpetually gnaws at his growing liver. As such he represents the whole human race and suffers in his own person the torments of the entire species. Hence, here the infinite does indeed make an appearance, but in that appearance immediately bound again, held back, and subjected to limitation. The same is the case in ancient tragedy, where the highest morality lies in the recognition of the boundaries and limitations to which human beings are subject.[25]

If all possible antitheses consist merely in the preponderance of one factor or another, and never in the complete exclusion of the opposing factor, the same will necessarily also be true for Greek poesy. Hence, if we assert that finitude and limitation are the fundamental law of all Greek culture, this does not imply that within Greek poesy there is absolutely no sign of the opposing factor, namely, of the infinite.[26] Rather, we can determine quite precisely the point at which the infinite makes a decisive appearance. It was doubtlessly the period of the emergence of republicanism, and with it we can assume the simultaneous emergence particularly of lyric art and of tragedy.[27] Yet precisely this is the most obvious proof that this more decisive stirring of the infinite in Greek culture—one that was able to push its way through to a certain level of actual expression—is totally post-Homeric. This is not to say that earlier in Greece there were not already customs and religious acts that were more immediately concerned with the infinite. As mystery religions they distanced themselves almost immediately from the universally valid nature of mythology. It would not be difficult to prove that all mystical elements—in lieu of a more specific explanation this is how I will for now refer to all concepts that are related directly to the infinite—that all such elements were originally alien to Hellenic culture, and that Greek culture similarly was able to assimilate these elements later only in philosophy.

The initial stirrings of philosophy, whose beginning is everywhere the concept of the infinite, first manifested themselves in mystical poems such as the Orphic songs mentioned by Plato and Aristotle, the poems of Musaeus, and the numerous poems of the seer and philosopher Epimenides.[28] The further the principle of the infinite developed in Greek culture, the more effort was made to give this mystical poesy a more elevated position of age and to push its origins back even beyond the age of Homer. Yet even Herodotus already contradicts this when he says that all poets who one claims are older than Homer and Hesiod are actually younger.[29] Homer knows of no orgies and no enthusiasm in the sense of the priests and the philosophers.

As insignificant as these mystical elements were for the history of Hellenic poesy, they are nonetheless interesting for us as manifestations of the opposite pole in Greek culture. If we designate this contrast in its highest form as that between Christianity and paganism, these elements allude to Christian elements within paganism. We can also trace similar elements of paganism within Christianity.

If one examines the *essence* of Greek poetry, one finds that in it the finite and infinite have so interpenetrated one another that one no longer perceives any symbolism of the one through the other, but rather only the absolute equality of the two. If one examines the *form*, on the other hand, one finds that entire interpenetration of the infinite and finite represented now in the finite or in the particular. In those cases where the imagination did not quite attain complete interpenetration of the two, only two situations could result: either the infinite was symbolized through the finite, or the finite through the infinite. The latter was the case in Oriental art. The Greek did not draw the one-sided element of infinity down into finitude, but rather that element of the infinite that was already permeated with the finite, that is, the entire element of divinity or divinity to the extent that it is allness. Greek poesy is **to that extent** absolute poesy, and has no antithesis as a point of indifference external to itself. The Oriental nowhere really attained interpenetration itself. Hence, not only are figures of genuinely independent poetic life a total impossibility in his mythology, but his entire symbolism is itself one-sided, namely, a symbolism of the finite through the infinite. Hence, his imagination dwells entirely in the supersensible or the intellectual world. Into this world he also transposes nature instead of symbolizing the intellectual world—as that world in which finite and infinite are one—through nature and thus transposing it into the realm of the finite. To that extent one really can say that his poesy is the opposite of that of the Greek.

If by the infinite we understand the absolutely infinite, and accordingly the perfect interpenetration of the infinite and the finite, then the Greek fantasy was directed from the infinite or eternal to the finite. The Oriental fantasy, in contrast, was directed from the finite to the infinite, yet such that within the idea of the infinite the element of disunion was not necessarily suspended. This can be illustrated most clearly perhaps in Persian doctrine to the extent it is known from the *Zend* books and other sources.[30] Among idealistic mythologies, however, the Persian and Indian are doubtlessly the most famous. It would be inappropriate to apply the same standards to Indian mythology that are applied to Greek (realistic) mythology and to demand that one view its figures as being independent and in and for themselves, or as being purely that which they are. On the other hand, one cannot deny that Indian mythology has come closer to poetic significance than has its Persian counterpart. Whereas the latter remains pure schematism in all its creations, the former at least elevates itself to the level of allegory, and the allegorical element is its dominant poetic principle. Hence, this explains the ease with which superficially poetic minds appropriate it. It is never able to elevate itself to the symbolic level. Since, however, it is at least allegorically poetic, the further cultivation of this allegorical side did indeed enable genuine poesy to develop, such that Indian culture does possess works of genuine poetic art. The foundation or basis is unpoetic, though that which cultivated itself for its own sake independently of this basis is poetic. The dominant color of the dramatic poems of the Indians, for example, of the *Shakuntala* and the yearning, voluptuous poem of the *Gita-Govinda*, is the lyric-epic.[31] In and for themselves these poems are not allegorical; even if the love affairs and the changeability of the god Krishna (which is the subject of the latter poem) originally possessed allegorical significance, at least in these poems they have lost such significance. Yet although these works at least as a *whole* are not allegorical, they are constructed internally quite in the spirit of allegory. One cannot, it is true, know just how far the poesy of the Indians would have cultivated itself artistically if their religion had not denied them all formative art specifically as plastic arts. One can best comprehend the spirit of their religion, customs, and poesy by referring to the plant organism as their basic model. Viewed in and for itself, the plant is the allegorical element in the organic world. The quiet language of color and fragrance is the only organ through which it can be recognized. These plant characteristics express themselves in the entire culture, particularly, for example, in architecture (arabesques). Among the plastic arts, architecture is the only one they cultivated to any significant degree. Architecture in itself is yet an allegorical art form, and has as its basis the schema of the plant. This is particularly true of Indian architecture, and one can hardly keep from believing that it furnished the foundation for what has since become known as *Gothic* architecture (something to which we will return later).[32]

No matter how far back we go in the history of human culture, we always find two separate streams of poesy, philosophy, and religion, and in this manner, too, the universal world spirit reveals itself according to two antithetical attributes: the ideal and the real.

Realistic mythology reached its apex in Greek mythology. Idealistic mythology gradually came to dwell entirely in Christianity.

The course of ancient history could never have broken off the way it did, and a really new world could never have begun the way it actually *did* with Christianity, without the occurrence of a kind of backsliding or fall that affected all mankind.

Those who are able to comprehend things only as specifics may also view Christianity that way as well. Viewed from a higher perspective, however, Christianity at its inception was itself merely one individual manifestation of the *universal* spirit that was about to take hold of the entire world. It was not Christianity that one-sidedly generated the spirit of those centuries. It was at first merely an expression *of* this universal spirit; it was the first to *express* this spirit and thereby crystallize it.

We must go back to the historical beginnings of Christianity if we are to understand the poesy that developed out of it, even if that poesy later freed itself as an independent whole. If we are to comprehend this kind of poesy in even a larger sense in its antithetical nature—one that is different from the poesy of antiquity not just in degree but in kind as well—we must try to understand the earliest circumstances preceding the subsequent transfiguration into poesy.

In the first epoch of Christianity we immediately recognize two completely different elements. The first is found where Christianity was still completely within the mother religion—the Jewish—as the faith of an individual sect. Christ himself had not brought it any further than this, though according to what we know of his actual history he was—and to a certain extent had to be—filled with a strong anticipation of the subsequent dissemination of his teaching. Only after the Jewish nation had come into closer contact with foreign peoples through political subjugation did Jewish mythology purify itself by acquiring all its higher ideas, even its philosophical monotheism, from these peoples. At its inception and within itself this mythology was totally realistic. Into this raw material Christ then planted the seed of a higher morality, whether he created this idea completely on his own or not (hypothesis of a relationship between Christ and the Essenes). We cannot evaluate how far Christ's particular influence would have extended without subsequent events. His affair received its greatest impulse from the final catastrophe of his life and from the perhaps unprecedented event of his overcoming death on the cross and his resurrection. Any desire to explain this fact away as, say, an allegory and to deny it as a fact is historically insane, since this *one* event determined the entire history of Christianity. All the miracles people subsequently attributed to this one person could not have accomplished this. From this moment on Christ was the hero of a new world, the lowest became the highest; the cross, the sign of the deepest shame, became the sign of world conquest.

That particular antithesis between the realistic and idealistic principles in Christianity manifests itself already in the first written monuments of the history of Christianity. The author of the gospel of John is inspired by the idea of a higher

knowledge and uses this idea to introduce his simple and quiet story of the life of Christ. The others relate in the Jewish spirit and surround his story with fables that they invented using the Old Testament prophecies as a guide. They are a priori convinced that these stories had to have happened as they did, since they were prophesied of the Messiah in the Old Testament. Hence, they add the words "that the scriptures of the prophets might be fulfilled,"[33] and one can thus say concerning them that Christ was a historical person whose biography was already determined before he was born.

It is important to point out in regard to these initial stirrings of the antitheses within Christianity how the realistic principle was completely dominant and remained thus subsequently as well. This was necessary if Christianity was not to dissolve into philosophy the way all other originally Oriental religions did. Even during the period when the first reports of the life of Jesus were composed, a narrower body of more spiritual knowledge developed within Christianity that was called gnosis. In their seemingly unanimous resistance to the invasion of philosophical systems, those who first spread Christianity demonstrated a strong feeling and a secure consciousness of what they really wanted. With obvious reflection they removed everything that could not become universally historical or the affair of all human beings. Just as Christianity originally drew its adherents from the mass of miserable or despised people, thus demonstrating from the very beginning democratic characteristics, so also did it continue to seek to maintain this popularity.

The first great step in the future development of Christianity was the enthusiasm of the apostle Paul, who first carried the doctrine to the Gentiles. It could develop only in foreign soil; it was necessary that the Oriental ideas be planted in Occidental soil. To be sure, this soil itself was infertile; the ideal principle had to come from the Orient. Yet this principle, too, in and for itself, was the same as in the Oriental religions: pure light, pure aether, formless and even colorless. Only by combining with the opposite element could it generate life. Only where completely different elements come into contact with one another does the chaotic matter first develop that is the beginning of all life. The Christian content could never, however, have formed itself into mythology if Christianity had not become universally historical, for universal content is the first condition of all mythology. The material or content of Greek mythology was nature, the universal intuition of the universe as nature. The material of Christian mythology was the universal intuition of the universe as history, as a world of providence. This is the actual turning point of ancient and modern religion and poesy. The modern world begins when man wrests himself loose from nature. Since he does not yet have a new home, however, he feels abandoned. Wherever such a feeling comes over an entire group, that group turns either voluntarily or compelled by an inner urge to the ideal world in order to find a home. Such a feeling had come over the world when Christianity arose. Greece's beauty was gone; Rome, which had collected

all the world's splendor into itself, lay crushed under its own massive weight. The complete saturation and satisfaction of all objective needs naturally generated boredom and an inclination toward the element of the ideal. Even before Christianity had extended its own power to Rome, even under the first Caesars, this degenerate city was already filled with Oriental superstition; astrologers, magicians, and even the councillors of the head of state, the oracles of the gods, had already lost their esteem before they went completely silent. The universal feeling that a new world must come, since the old one was no longer able to continue, lay like sultry air over the entire world at that time, an atmosphere like that announcing a great movement in nature. General anticipation seemed to draw all thoughts toward the Orient, as if the savior would come from there, something of which we find traces even in the reports of Tacitus and Suetonius.[34]

One might say that in Rome's world domination the world spirit first intuited or viewed history as the universe. From this center all the characteristics of the various peoples developed and came into contact with one another. As if to express its designs for a new *world*, the world spirit brought distant peoples onto the stage of this world domination—just as a great windstorm often blows whole flocks of winged creatures over a land, or a great sea pushes huge masses of water up against *one* single place—in order to combine the elements of all climates and all peoples with the ruins of a dying Rome. Anyone who does not believe in the connection between nature and history would have to if he were merely to comprehend this one point. On the one hand, the world spirit prepares a great and unprecedented event. It reflects upon a new world in the making, and looks angrily at the arrogant greatness of Rome, which by gathering together the splendor of the entire world, simultaneously buried it in itself. The spirit sees that the world at that time is ready for judgment. At the same moment, an impulse inherent in nature, a necessity not unlike those determining the great epochs in the earth's history and guiding the movement of its poles, draws forth great masses of foreign hordes from all quarters toward this one central point, and a necessity of nature executes what the spirit of history has designed in its own plans.

It is clear that I wish to confess my persuasion that all historical explanations of the Germanic migrations are insufficient, and I admit that I would seek that explanation much more specifically in a universal law that also affected nature itself rather than in merely historical factors. This would be a natural law that guides uncultured, barbarian nations much more blindly. That which occurs in nature in a quieter and more limited fashion—according to the law of finitude—manifests itself in history in more colossal epochs and more loudly; what from a physical point of view is the periodic declination of the magnetic needle, viewed historically was the Germanic migrations. Not until this particular point—that of the highest power and of the collapse of the Roman Empire—does what we can call universal history actually begin. On the other side of this history, just as in

that particular part of the universe itself representing the *real* side, the *particular* is the dominant factor. A particular people such as the Greeks, living within narrow boundaries and on only a few islands, represents the species itself. Here, on the other hand, the universal becomes the dominant factor, and the particular collapses within it.

All of ancient history can be viewed as the tragic period of history. Fate, too, is a form of providence, except that it is intuited within the real, just as providence is fate intuited in the ideal. Eternal necessity reveals itself during the time of identity with it as nature. This was the case with the Greeks. After the fall from nature it reveals itself in bitter and violent blows as fate. One can escape fate only in one way: by throwing oneself into the arms of providence. This was the general world feeling in that particular period of the deepest transformation when fate played its final tricks on all that was beautiful and splendid in antiquity. The old gods lost their power, the oracles and celebrations fell silent, and a bottomless abyss full of a wild admixture of all the elements of the past world appeared to open itself up before mankind. Above this dark abyss the only sign of peace and of a balance of forces seemed to be the cross, a kind of rainbow of a second flood, as a Spanish poet calls it—and this at a time when there was no other choice but to believe in this sign. I will now give at least the *basic outline* of the way in which the second world of poesy finally extricated itself from this murky state of affairs, and how this material developed mythical content. (After I have also presented the totality of the mythical content of Christianity, I will be able to present in a few unified primary propositions the results of the entire investigation.)

We may best understand the principle of the mythology of Christianity by returning to the precise point of its antithesis to Greek mythology. In the latter the universe is intuited as nature, in the former as a moral world. The character of nature is unseparated unity of the universe with the finite. The finite predominates, yet within it, as if under a common cover, lies the seed of the absolute, of the entire unity of the infinite and the finite. The character of the moral world—freedom—is *originally* the antithesis of the finite and the infinite accompanied by the absolute demand for the suspension of this antithesis. Yet even this conflict, because it depends on an informing of the finite into the infinite, itself is subject to the conditions of infinity, such that the antithesis can indeed be suspended partially, but never entirely, never in the whole.

Whereas the demand fulfilled in Greek mythology was for a representation of the infinite as such in the finite, and was thus a demand for a symbolic treatment of the infinite, the fundamental demand raised in Christianity was just the opposite, namely, to take up the finite into the infinite, that is, to make it into an allegory of the infinite. In the first case the finite counts for something in and for itself, since it takes up the infinite into itself. In the second case, however, the finite is nothing in and for itself. It counts only to the extent that it means or

signifies the infinite. Subordination of the finite to the infinite is thus characteristic of such a religion.

In paganism, the finite in its own infinitude is able to assert itself against the infinite to the extent that even rebellion against the divine is possible; indeed, such rebellion is even the principle of sublimity. In Christianity, on the other hand, there is only unconditional surrender to the unfathomable, and this even constitutes the sole principle of beauty. This antithesis allows us to understand completely all other possible differences between paganism and Christianity. For example, in the former we find that the heroic virtues predominate, in the latter the mild, gentle virtues. There we find austere bravery; here we find love or at least bravery tempered and moderated by love, such as during the courtly period.[35]

[The absolute relationship is that in Christianity the universe as such is viewed as *history*, as a moral realm, and that this general view constitutes its fundamental character. We can understand this completely only in the antithesis primarily with the religion of Greek antiquity. If I do not mention older religions, and particularly that of India, it is because they do not constitute an antithesis in this respect, though they are not, in my opinion, the unity itself of which we are speaking. The necessary limitations of this investigation do not allow us to present fully this antithesis, and thus we can touch on it or discuss it only in passing.

The mythology of the Greeks was a self-enclosed world of symbols of the ideas, which can be intuited in reality only as gods. Pure limitation on the one hand and undivided absoluteness on the other is the determining law for each individual god, just as for the world of the gods as a whole. The infinite was intuited only in the finite and in this way itself subordinated to finitude. The gods were beings of a higher nature, enduring and immutable figures. Things stand quite differently with a religion that directs itself to the infinite directly in and for itself, and in which the finite is conceived not as a symbol of the infinite, and simultaneously for its own sake, but rather only as an allegory of the former and in complete subordination to it. The whole in which the ideas of such a religion become objective is necessarily infinite, and not a world completed and limited on all sides. Its figures do not endure, but rather appear; they are not eternal beings of nature, but rather historical figures in whom the divine reveals itself only temporarily and whose fleeting appearance can be held fast only through faith, but never transformed into an absolute presence.

Wherever the infinite itself can become finite, it can also become multiplicity. This renders polytheism possible. Wherever it is merely signified through the finite, it necessarily remains one, and no polytheism is possible except as a simultaneity of divine beings. It emerges through a synthesis of absoluteness with limitation such that in that synthesis neither the absoluteness according to form nor limitation is suspended. In a religion such as Christianity this synthesis

cannot be taken from nature, since such a religion does not at all understand the finite as a symbol of the infinite with independent significance. It can only be taken from that which falls into time, and accordingly from *history*, and for this reason Christianity in its innermost spirit and highest sense is historical. Every particular moment of time is a revelation of a particular side of God, and in each he is absolute. What Greek religion possessed as simultaneity, Christianity possesses as succession, even if the time of separation of appearances and with it of form has not yet come.]

One might be led to believe that the idea of Christianity, which asserts that the deity consists of more than one person, might show traces of polytheism. We can see, however, that the Trinity *as such* cannot be understood *as a symbol* of an idea because the three unities in the divine nature itself are conceived as being completely ideal. They are themselves ideas, but not symbols of ideas, and are characterized by philosophical content. The eternal is the father of all things, the father who never ventures out of his own eternity and yet who from all eternity gives birth to himself in two forms equally coeternal with him: the finite, which is the Son of God who is absolute in and for himself and yet becomes man and suffers in his finite manifestation; and then the eternal spirit, the infinite in which all things are one. Above them both is the god in whom all things are resolved.

One can say that if these ideas in and for themselves were capable of acquiring poetic reality, they would have acquired such through their treatment in Christianity. Right from the beginning they were taken to be completely independent of their speculative meaning, completely historical and literal. Yet given their entire initial character, it was impossible for them to develop symbolically. Dante, who in the final song of his *Paradiso* attains to a vision of God, views in the depth of the clear substance of the deity three circles of light of three colors and one diameter.[36] One appeared to be merely reflected by the other as a rainbow by another rainbow, and the third was the burning center breathing equally toward all sides. He compared his own condition, however, to that of a geometer who is totally directed toward the measurement of the circle itself, and yet cannot find the principle he needs.

Only the idea of the *Son* has acquired real contours in Christianity, though it did so only by losing its highest meaning. If in Christianity the Son of God was to have a genuinely symbolic significance, he had such as the symbol of the eternal incarnation of God in the finite. Hence, he would have to signify or mean this and *simultaneously* be an individual person. In Christianity, however, he is *only* an individual person, his relationship is only a historical one, and he has no relationship to nature. Christ was, as it were, the apex of the incarnation of God, and was accordingly God himself become man. Yet how utterly differently does this incarnation of God within Christianity manifest itself when compared with the concept within paganism of the divine that has become finite. In Christianity the finite is not the most important element. Christ comes to mankind in its lowliness

and takes on the form of a servant in order to suffer and to nullify the finite by his own example. Here is no deification of mankind such as that found in Greek mythology. Rather, this incarnation of God is to reconcile with God the finite that has fallen away from God by nullifying it in his own person. It is not the finite that becomes absolute here and a symbol of the infinite. The incarnate God is not an enduring, eternal figure, but rather only a manifestation preordained from eternity but transitory in time. In Christ it is rather the finite that is symbolized by the infinite than the latter by the former. Christ returns to the supersensible world and promises not himself but rather the spirit, and not the principle that will enter into and abide in the finite but the ideal principle that is to lead all of the finite into and to the infinite. It is as if Christ, as the infinite that has entered finitude and sacrificed it to God *in* his own human form, constituted the conclusion of the time of *antiquity*. He is there merely to draw the boundary—the last god.[37] After him comes the spirit, the ideal principle, the predominating soul of the new era. Inasmuch as the gods of antiquity were, in a sense, the infinite within the finite, yet with full reality, the true infinite—the true god—had to become finite in order to demonstrate in himself the nullification of the finite. To that extent Christ was simultaneously the apex and the end of the world of the gods of antiquity. This proves that the appearance of Christ, far from being the beginning of a new polytheism, was rather the absolute conclusion of this world of the gods.

It is not easy to say to what extent Christ is actually a poetic person. He cannot be such purely as god, for he is in his humanity not god at all in the way the Greek gods were in spite of their finitude. He was rather truly human, and was even subject to the sufferings of humanity. Nor can he be such as man, for neither is he fully limited on all sides as a human being. The synthesis of these contradictions resides only in the idea of a *voluntarily suffering* god. Yet precisely here he is the antipode of the gods of antiquity. The latter do not suffer, but rather are blessed in their finitude. Even Prometheus, himself a god, does not suffer, since his suffering is simultaneously activity and even rebellion. Pure suffering can never be the subject matter of art. Even considered as a human being, Christ can never be taken except as one who endures, since for him humanity is an accepted *burden*, and not nature as is the case with the Greek gods. By means of its own participation in the divine nature his human nature becomes even more receptive to the suffering of the world. It is certainly obvious enough that genuine painting prefers to depict Christ—and does so most frequently—as a child, as if the problem of this miraculous admixture (not indifference) of the divine and human natures were, as someone has remarked quite correctly, fully solved only in the indefiniteness or vagueness of the child.

This same suffering and humility also characterizes the image of the *Mother of God*. Through its own inner necessity, even if perhaps not in the understanding of the *church*, it possesses symbolic meaning. It is the symbol of universal nature or of the maternal principle of all things that blooms eternally virgin. Yet in the

mythology of Christianity this figure, too, has no relationship to matter (and hence no symbolic significance); only the moral reference remains. Mary designates as archetype the feminine personage characterizing all of Christianity. The predominating factor in antiquity is the sublime, the masculine, that of modernity the beautiful and hence the feminine.

All this shows us quite clearly what we are to understand as the overriding principle of Christianity: that it has no perfected symbols but rather only symbolic *acts*. The entire spirit of Christianity is that of action. The infinite *is* no longer within the finite; the finite can only pass over into the infinite. Only within the latter can the two become one. The unity of the finite and the infinite is thus an act in Christianity. Christ's first symbolic act is *baptism*, where heaven allies itself with him and the spirit descends in a visible form. The other is his *death*, where he commends his spirit to the Father once again, gives it back, nullifies the finite within his own person and becomes a sacrifice for the world. These symbolic acts are continued in Christianity by means of the *eucharist* and *baptism*. The eucharist itself has two sides from which it can be viewed: the ideal, to the extent that it functions as the subject that creates God for itself and into which falls that mysterious union of the infinite and the finite; and the symbolic. To the extent that the act through which the finite here simultaneously becomes the infinite occurs as devotion or prayer within the receiving subject itself, this act is not symbolic but rather *mystic*. To the extent that it is an external act, however, it is symbolic. (We will return later to this extremely important difference between the mystic and the symbolic.)

To the extent that the *church* viewed itself as the visible body of God of which all individuals are the members, it constituted itself through acts. The public life of the church was thus alone able to be symbolic, and its cult a living work of art, a kind of spiritual drama in which each member had a part. The popular impulse in Christianity, the principle of the church to take up *everything* into itself as if into an ocean, not even to exclude from itself the destitute and despised—in a word, its striving to be catholic and universal—of necessity soon compelled it to give to itself an external totality or a kind of body. Thus the church itself in the totality of its manifestation was symbolic and was the symbol of the constitution of the Kingdom of Heaven itself.[38]

[We have already indicated that nature and history are related to one another as the real and ideal unities. Yet the religion of the Greek world is related to that of the Christian world in just the same way. In the latter, the divine has ceased to reveal itself in nature and is perceivable only in history. Nature is generally the sphere of the self-enclosed being of things, a sphere in which the latter, by virtue of the informing of the infinite into their finite qualities, possess as symbols of the ideas a life independent of their significance or meaning. Hence, one might say that God becomes exoteric in nature; the ideal appears through an other as itself, through a being. Yet only insofar as this being is taken for the essence, the

symbol taken independent of the idea, is the divine genuinely exoteric, and esoteric according to its idea. In the ideal world, and thus primarily in history, the divine casts off its outer covering and is the revealed mystery of the divine realm.

Just as in the symbolic images of nature, the intellectual world lay within the Greek literary works as if enclosed in a bud, concealed in the object and unspoken in the subject. In contrast, Christianity is the revealed mystery; just as paganism is essentially exoteric, Christianity is essentially esoteric.

For just this reason Christianity also prompted a reversal of the entire relationship between nature and the ideal world. Whereas in paganism the former was revealed and the latter in contrast withdrew as mystery, in Christianity nature had to withdraw as a mystery to the extent that the ideal world was revealed. For the Greeks nature was immediately and of itself divine because their gods were also neither super- nor supranatural. For the newer age, however, nature was closed, since that world comprehended it not in and for itself, but rather only as an allegory of the invisible and spiritual world. The liveliest manifestations of nature, such as those of electricity and of bodies when they change chemically, were hardly known to the ancients, or at the least did not awaken in them the general enthusiasm with which they have been greeted in the contemporary world. (The same development that made absolute estrangement into the principle of philosophy also determined the manner of viewing nature that predominates in the contemporary age. The relationship which the science of antiquity had with nature also expressed that as yet unsuspended identity. That science restricted itself to observation, since nature encompasses only objects in their integrity and inseparability. The isolation of art and the observation of nature under artificially conducted combinations and separations is an invention of later cultures. Yet even if the lowly activity of empirical observation is totally blind, the first ray that awakened it in a more general sense and that supported the more noble impulse to investigate nature was actually that deeply imprinted instinct in the feelings of the later world to summon that lost life back into nature. The enthusiasm with which all living phenomena of universal nature, those either hardly known or little noticed by antiquity, which have been greeted by contemporary men as so many witnesses to that element of life concealed in nature, shows on the one hand the original crudeness of the latter in contrast to the culture of the former, yet at the same time also the irresistible necessity with which this inclination was urged upon the human spirit.) The highest religiosity expressed in Christian mysticism considered the mystery of nature and that of the incarnation of God to be one and the same.]

Christianity, as a world of ideas expressed in acts, was a visible realm and necessarily developed into a *hierarchy* whose archetype lay in the realm of ideas. It was now demanded of human beings, and no longer of nature, that they be a symbol of the realm of ideas; it was demanded of acts, and no longer of being. The hierarchy was the only institution of its kind representing a magnitude of

thought that is usually understood much too one-sidedly. It will remain eternally peculiar that it was precisely during the period of the downfall of the Roman Empire, which had united most of the known world into a totality, that Christianity progressed in such rapid steps to universal dominance. It is not merely that this occurred in an age of misfortune and of a decaying empire whose power was merely temporal, an empire containing nothing to which people in such a condition might have fled, and one in which all courage and even enthusiasm of purpose had been lost. I repeat, it is not merely that in *such* an age Christianity opened up a universal asylum in a religion that preached and even made a virtue of renunciation. It accomplished even more. As soon as it developed into a hierarchy, it united all parts of the cultured world and from the very beginning was like a universal republic, yet one seeking spiritual conquests. (Proselytizing, conversion of the pagans, expulsion of the Saracens and Turks from Europe, missions in later periods.)

Because of this tremendous universal character of the church, nothing could remain alien to it. It excluded from itself nothing that had existed in the world, and was able to unite everything with itself. Particularly as regards the cult, the one aspect in which it could be symbolic, it also allowed entry for pagans again. The catholic cult united the religious customs of the earliest peoples with those of the latest, except that for most of them the key has subsequently been lost again. The initial founders of those symbolic customs—the great minds that produced the first ideas and outline for this totality and that continued to live on in that totality as if in a living work of art—were doubtlessly not so simpleminded that they should be overlooked by our imbecilic representatives of the Enlightenment, representatives who, if one were to unite them all and let them work a hundred years, would come up with nothing but sandpiles.

The most important thing here is to see how the universal character of subjectivity and ideality within Christianity caused the element of the symbolic to flee completely into the act (actions). Just as the basic worldview of Christianity is historical, so also is it necessary that Christianity contain a mythological history of the world. The incarnation of Christ is itself plausible only within a context including a universal view of *human history*. Christianity has no real cosmogony, and what the Old Testament offers in this regard is only extremely incomplete attempts. Action and history are found only where there is multiplicity. Hence, to the extent that action is found in the divine world, there must also be multiplicity there. The spirit of Christianity, however, does not allow such multiplicity to be conceived *polytheistically*, and it is thus rendered with the aid of mediating agents that inhere in the most immediate vision or intuition of the deity. They are the first creations, the first products of the divine substance. Such beings are in Christianity the *angels*.

One might be tempted to view these angels as the substitute for polytheism in Christianity, particularly since they are, by virtue of their peculiar origin in the

Orient, just as definitely personifications of the ideas as are the gods of Greek mythology. It is also well known what extensive use contemporary Christian poets such as Milton, Klopstock,[39] and others have thought necessary to make of these mediating agents; indeed, they have been almost as bad as Wieland in his use of the Graces.[40] The difference, however, is merely that the Greek gods are the ideas intuited in actuality, in *reality*, whereas the corporeality itself of angels is still somewhat in question, and they are for that reason yet supersensual beings. If one insisted on understanding the angels as personifications of God's *effects* on the world of the senses, they would, as such, nonetheless be a mere schematism as a result of that vagueness and would thus be useless for poesy. Both the angels and their concept or constitution first acquired a body, as it were, only within the church itself, whose hierarchy was supposed to be a direct reflection of the heavenly kingdom. That is why only the church itself is symbolic in Christianity. The angels are not natural beings. They totally lack contours, and even the highest among them almost merge together; the entire mass of them recalls the halo of certain great Italian painters, halos that, when viewed very carefully up close, consist of nothing but tiny angel heads, almost like a blanket. It is as if one wished to express this deliquescence in Christianity by means of the most monotonous activity one could attribute to them, namely, their eternal singing and music making.

The history of the angels taken in and for itself thus contains no mythological aspects at all except to the extent that it includes the story of the rebellion and expulsion of Lucifer, a figure who already demonstrates much more decisive individuality and a much more realistic nature. This story constitutes a genuinely mythological view of the history of the world, though admittedly a bit in the colossal Oriental style.

The realm of the angels on the one hand and of the devil on the other shows the complete separation of the principles of good and evil that are combined in all concrete things. The fall of Lucifer, who simultaneously corrupted the world itself and introduced death into it, is thus a mythological explanation of the concrete world and of the admixture of the infinite and finite principles within physical things. For the Oriental mind the finite is characterized in general by evil and stands in no relationship whatever—not even that of the idea—to good. This mythology extends to the end of the world, where the separation of good and evil will occur anew and each of the two will return to its pure quality, whereby the concrete will necessarily come to an end, and fire, as the symbol of the resolution of this struggle within the concrete, will consume the world. Until then, however, the principle of evil has, as a matter of fact, a *considerable* share in God's rule over the world, although the incarnation of Christ constituted the initial steps toward establishing a realm opposed to evil on earth. (We will discuss this Oriental mask more fully later, during our examination of modern comedy. In subsequent periods Lucifer generally assumes the role of the comic in the universe,

the one who constantly makes new plans, plans that as a rule are always foiled. Yet he is so hungry for souls that he resorts to the most base tricks, and yet still, even when he seems most sure of his own success, usually must withdraw with his tail between his legs because of the constant availability of grace and of the church. We Germans owe him a particular debt, since we have acquired from him our most important mythological figure: Doctor Faust. Whereas we share other mythological figures with other nations, this one is ours alone, since he is cut straight from the middle of the German character and its basic physiognomy.)

Among a people whose poesy is characterized by limitation and finiteness, mythology and religion are matters of the collectivity itself. The individual is able to constitute itself in a collective fashion and genuinely become one with that larger whole. In contrast, wherever the infinite or the universal predominates, the individual can never simultaneously become the collectivity itself; he is rather the negation of the larger group. For this reason, religion can spread here only through the influence of individuals of superior wisdom who are only personally, not collectively, filled with the universal and the infinite, and who, therefore, are prophets, seers, and divinely inspired people. Religion in this case necessarily assumes the character of a *revealed religion* and is for that reason historical at its very foundation. Greek religion, as a poetic religion living through the collectivity itself, had no need of a historical foundation, as little as does nature, which is always open. The manifestations and figures of the gods here were eternal. In Christianity, on the other hand, the divine was only a fleeting appearance and had to be held fast in this appearance. In Greece, religion had no history of its own, unique and separate from that of the state. In Christianity, there is a separate history of religion and of the church.

The concept of the *miracle* is inseparable from that of revelation. Whereas Greek sensibility demanded pure, beautiful limitation on all sides in order to elevate the entire world, taken by itself, to a world of fantasy, Oriental sensibility demanded the unlimited and supernatural on all sides, and did so with a certain absoluteness in order never to be awakened from its supersensual dreams. The concept of the miracle is impossible in Greek mythology, since its gods are themselves not extra- or supernatural. There are not two worlds here, a sensual and a supersensual, but rather only *one* world. Christianity, which is possible only within absolute disunion, is at its very inception already founded on miracles. A miracle is an absolute viewed from the empirical perspective, an absolute occurring within the finite realm without for that reason having any relationship to time.

The *element of the miraculous* within *historical relationships* is the only mythological material in Christianity. It spreads from the story of Christ and of the apostles down through the legends, the stories of the martyrs and saints, to the miraculous of the romantic sort, which was generated by the contact between Christianity and bravery.

It is impossible for us to develop fully this historicomythological material. In general let me remark merely that this mythology of Christianity is indeed based originally on the intuition of the universe as the Kingdom of God. The stories of the saints are at the same time also a history of heaven itself, and even the histories of the kings are woven into this universal history of the Kingdom of God. Only in this area has Christianity developed its own mythology. This is the way it was expressed in Dante's work, which portrays the universe under three basic visions of the *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, and *Paradiso*. Yet the material of all his poetic work in these three potences is always historical. In France and Spain the historico-Christian material developed primarily into the mythology of knighthood. The poetic apex of this development is Ariosto,[41] whose poetic work would be the only epic work if in modern poesy up to the present an epic were possible at all.

In subsequent periods, after the taste for knighthood was dulled, the Spaniards employed the lives of the saints primarily for dramatic performances. The high point of this poesy is the Spaniard Calderón de la Barca,[42] of whom perhaps one cannot even say too much if one equates him with Shakespeare.

Later on we can present more fully the poetic development of Christian mythology in the works of the plastic or formative arts, particularly of painting, and in the lyric, romantic-epic, and dramatic works of more contemporary culture.

Yet precisely *this* is also the subject of the modern world, namely, that all that is finite in it is transient, and that the absolute is infinitely removed. Here everything is subordinated to the law of the infinite. According to this law a new mass has thrown itself between the world of art in Catholicism on the one hand, and the present age on the other: Protestantism was born and was historically necessary. Praise to the heroes who at that time, at least for certain parts of the world, eternally secured freedom of thought and of invention! The principle they awakened was indeed a fresh inspiration. Combined with the spirit of classical antiquity, it was able to generate infinite effects precisely because it really was infinite by *nature* and recognized no boundaries, though it was hindered anew by the misfortune of the age itself. The quickly appearing consequence of the Reformation, however, was that a new, prosaic, literal authority replaced the old one. Even the first Reformers themselves were surprised by the effects of the freedom they had preached. This slavery to the letter was even less able to endure, yet Protestantism was never really able to give itself an external and genuinely objective and finite form. Not only did it degenerate into sects, but what had been the retrieval of the eternal rights of the human spirit became a totally destructive principle both for religion and, indirectly, for poesy. What transpired was that peculiar elevation of common human understanding, the tool of merely worldly matters, to a position of judgment over spiritual matters. The highest representative of such human understanding: Voltaire. An even gloomier and more cheerless Deism developed in England.[43] German theologians effected the synthesis. Without wanting to ruin their relationship either with Christianity or with the Enlightenment, they created a partnership between the two whereby the Enlightenment promised to keep religion if the latter would but make itself useful.

One need only recall that the Freethinkers and the Enlightenment cannot claim even the smallest poetic accomplishments in order to see that they are, both of them, fundamentally nothing more than the prose of the new age, applied to religion. Accompanied by the complete absence of symbolism and genuine mythology (concerning symbolism: in Christianity in general; concerning mythology: at least in Protestantism), later poets nonetheless stepped onto the field of battle to compete—in *their* opinion—even with the *epic* poets of antiquity. This applies particularly to Milton and Klopstock. The work of the former cannot be purely Christian if for no other reason than its content and subject matter lie in the Old Testament, and because as a whole it lacks the necessary limitation to the modern and Christian element. Klopstock, on the other hand, has the tendency to effect a sublime posture within Christianity and inflates the inner hollowness with an unnatural tension to the point of boundlessness. Milton's figures are in part at least real figures with definite contours and outlines, so that one might believe, for example, that his Satan, whom he treats as a giant or titan, were taken from a painting. With Klopstock, however, everything floats without essence or form, solidity or contours. Milton spent a long time in Italy, where he saw works of art and also conceived the plan for his poetic work, and where his erudition cultivated itself. Klopstock completely lacked any real sensibility for nature or art (it goes without saying that this does not belittle his achievements as regards language). We can see just how little even Klopstock knew what he wanted regarding his own plan to write a Christian-epic poem by the fact that he later also wanted to recommend to us the Nordic-barbarian mythology of the ancient Germans and Scandinavians. His primary striving concerns his struggle with the infinite—not that it should become finite for him, but rather that it should become finite for him against his will and against his continual struggles against it, whereby he ends up with such contradictions as we find in the well-known beginning to one of his odes:

> The seraphim stutters it and Infinity
> Quakes it in response through the *circumference* of its fields.[44]

There is no need to prove further that the modern world has no real *epic* and that, since mythology becomes established only in the epic as such, it also has no self-enclosed mythology. I must, however, yet mention the contemporary attempt to lead mythology back into the circle of Catholic mythology. In my preceding discussion I think I have said everything that can be said about the necessity of a definite mythological circle for poesy. Similarly, I must leave you to judge for yourselves from that discussion just what source of poesy within the limitations

previously set for the modern world might be found within Catholicism. It is, however, an essential part of Christianity to pay attention to the revelations of the world spirit and not to forget that it is part of its plan to render *this* world as well—the one modern mythology has constructed for itself—a part of the past. It is also essential to Christianity to consider nothing in history only partially. Catholicism is a necessary element of all modern poesy and mythology, but it is not the whole of it, and as regards the intentions of the world spirit it itself doubtlessly constitutes only a part. When one considers what enormous historical material is involved in the collapse of the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire and indeed of all modern history, what *simultaneous* multiplicity of customs and cultures—among individual nations and humanity as a whole—and what *sequential* variety within the various centuries, if one considers that modern poesy is no longer a poesy merely for one particular people that has developed into a collective whole, but rather must be the poesy for the entire species and be generated out of the material of the entire history of this species with all its multifarious colors and tones—if one considers all these circumstances together one will have no doubt that the mythology of Christianity, too, in the thoughts of the world spirit, is always merely a part of the larger whole this spirit doubtlessly is preparing. We can see that the mythology of Christianity was not universal and that one side of it was the limited one for whose sake the spirit of the new world—a spirit totally dedicated to the destruction of all purely finite forms—allowed the whole to collapse in on itself, by the fact that this did indeed happen. We can see from this that it will only be within the larger whole, of which it is then a part, that Christianity can function again as universally valid poetic material; any use made of it in poesy should be made even now in the sense of this larger whole that one may well surmise now but not yet express. Such use could be least poetic where this religion of poesy expresses itself only as subjectivity or individuality. Only where it genuinely passes over into the object can it be called poetic, for the essence of Christianity is mysticism, itself merely an inner light or inner intuition. The unity of the infinite and the finite occurs here only within the subject itself. This inner mysticism can, however, itself acquire a moral person as its objective symbol and in this way be brought to poetic intuition, but not if one allows it to express itself only subjectively. Mysticism is related to the purest and most beautiful morality, just as in a reverse fashion there can be mysticism even within sin. Wherever such mysticism genuinely expresses itself in action and manifests itself through an objective person, an art form such as modern tragedy, for example, can entirely achieve the sublime and symbolic morality of the Sophoclean works, just as Calderón can in this respect be compared with no one but Sophocles.

Only Catholicism lived in a mythological world. This accounts for the brightness of those poetic works indigenous to Catholicism, the lightness and freedom of treatment of this material—material natural to them—which almost recalls the

Greeks' approach to their own mythology. Outside of Catholicism one can almost expect *only* subordination to content, forced movement without serenity, and mere subjective usage. In general, whenever mythology degenerates into an object for *use*—for example, the use of ancient mythology in modernity—this usage constitutes, precisely because it *is* only usage, a mere formality. It is not a matter of its having to fit the body, such as clothes do; it must rather itself be the body. Even consummate poetry in the sense of pure mystic poesy would presuppose an isolation both in the poet and in those for whom he writes. It would never be cast purely or from the wholeness of the world and of one's disposition.

The fundamental demand made of all poesy is not universal effect, but rather universality both internally and externally. Partialities are of no use whatever here. In every age there have been only a few in whom the whole age and the universe, to the extent that the latter is intuited in this age, have concentrated themselves; these are the naturally appointed poets. We are not referring here to the age to the extent that it is itself a partiality, but rather to the extent that it is the universe, a revelation of *one* entire side of the world spirit. Whoever is able to subdue and digest poetically the entire material or content of his own age, to the extent that the age as present also encompasses the past, would be the epic poet of his time. Universality, the necessary requirement of all poesy, is in our contemporary age possible only for the person who is himself able to create from his own limited condition a mythology, a self-enclosed circle of poesy.

In general, one can call the modern world the world of individuals, and the world of antiquity the world of the collective. In the latter the universal *is* the particular, the collective the individual. Hence, that world is a world of the collective even though the particular is the predominating element in it. In the former, the particular merely means or signifies the universal, and for precisely that reason—because the universal *rules* within it—the modern world is that of individuals and of degeneration or collapse. In the world of antiquity everything is eternal, enduring, imperishable; number has, in a sense, no power because the universal concept of the collective and of the individual coincide. Here, in the modern world, change and transformation are the reigning law. All that is finite passes away here, since it does not exist in and for itself, but rather only for the sake of signifying the infinite.

The universal world spirit, which has also manifested the infinity of history both in nature and in the world system itself—concretely, as it were—has presented the same contrast, that of ancient and modern time, within the solar system and the system of comets.[45] The ancients are the planets of the world of art, limited to a few individuals who are simultaneously the collective and who nonetheless even in the highest freedom of movement remove themselves the least from their identity with that collective. Taken as a group themselves, these planet analogies are also characterized by definite subtypes. Those with the most depth are the rhythmic ones. Those more distant—where the mass structures

itself as a totality, where everything positions itself concentrically in rings and moons around the center, like the petals of a blossom—are the dramatic ones. Boundless space belongs to the comets. When they appear, they come directly from infinite space, and though they well may draw near to the sun, just as certainly do they also distance themselves from it again. They are, we might say, merely general beings, since they possess no real substance. They are like air and light. The planets, on the other hand, the plastic, symbolic figures, are all of them dominating individuals with no limitation by number.

This being the case, we can assert that until that time in the yet undetermined and distant future when the world spirit itself has completed the great poem upon which it now reflects, and when the succession of the modern world has transformed itself into a ***simultaneity***—until that point, every great poet is called to structure from this evolving (mythological) world, a world of which his *own age* can reveal to him only a part. I repeat: from this world he is to structure into a whole that particular part revealed to him, and to create from the content and substance of that world *his* mythology.[46] To make this perfectly clear, let us consider the example of the greatest individual of the modern world: Dante created both his own mythology and with it his divine poem from the barbarianism and even more barbaric erudition of his age, from the horrors of the history he himself had experienced, and from the content of the existing hierarchy of the age.[47] The historical persons Dante used in the poem will forever count as mythological persons, such as Ugolino. Even if the memory of the hierarchical system could ever disappear, one could reconstruct it using the rendering his poem has given of it. Shakespeare, too, created his own mythological circle, not only from the historical material of his own national history, but also from the customs of his age and of his people.[48] In spite of the enormous variety in his works, we nonetheless encounter *one* world in Shakespeare. One sees him everywhere as one and the same person, and if one has penetrated to the fundamental view of his character, one finds oneself transported in every one of his works onto the same familiar, uniquely Shakespearean ground (the Falstaff plays, *King Lear*, *Macbeth*). From the material of his own age Cervantes fashioned the story of Don Quixote, who, just as Sancho Panza, has maintained the reputation of a mythological person up to this very moment. We are dealing here with eternal myths.

To the extent that we can evaluate Goethe's *Faust* from the fragment now before us,[49] we must say that this poem displays quite simply the purest, most inward essence of our own age: content and form created from that which is contained in the whole age, and even from that which the age carried or is still carrying in its womb. Hence, we can call it a genuinely mythological poem.

We have often heard of late that it might well be possible to acquire the content of a new mythology from *physics*—naturally to the extent that we mean speculative physics.[50] Let me make the following remarks concerning this.

First of all, according to what I have just proved, the fundamental law of modern poesy is *originality* (in the art of antiquity this was by no means the case in just this sense).[51] Every truly creative individual must himself create his own mythology, and this can occur using virtually any material or content, thus also from that of a higher physics. This mythology, however, will quite definitely be *created*, and is not allowed to be designed simply according to the instructions of certain ideas of philosophy, since in the latter case it would likely be impossible to give it independent poetic life.

If it were only a matter of symbolizing the ideas of philosophy or of higher physics through mythological figures, all these ideas can already be found in Greek mythology, such that I would promise to present the entire philosophy of nature in the symbols of mythology. Such an undertaking, however, would itself merely be *usage* (as is the case with Darwin).[52] The prerequisite of a mythology, however, is precisely *not* that its symbols merely signify ideas, but rather that they are significant in and for themselves and are independent beings. For the time being, then, one would only have to look at the world in which these beings were able to move about independently. If such a world were given to us through *history*, these beings would doubtlessly be self-evident within it. Let one give us first the Trojan battlefield on which the gods and goddesses themselves are able to participate in the battle. Thus, until *history* returns mythology to us as a universally valid form, the case will remain that the individual will have to create his own poetic circle for himself, and since the universal element of modernity is originality, the law will continue to obtain that the more original someone is, the more universal will he also be, whereby one must, of course, distinguish originality from mere particularity.[53] Every originally treated material or content is precisely thereby also universally poetic. Whoever knows how to use the content of higher physics in this *original* fashion, for that person that content can become genuinely and universally poetic.

Yet another relationship between the philosophy of nature and modern culture is of importance here. The inclination unique to Christianity is that from the finite to the infinite. I have shown how this inclination suspends all symbolic intuition and comprehends the finite only as the allegory of the infinite. The tendency pushing to the surface within this general inclination, namely, to intuit the infinite within the finite, was a symbolic striving that because of the lack of objectivity—since the unity fell back to the subject—was able to express itself only as mysticism. Mystics within Christianity have invariably been viewed within Christianity itself as ones who have gone astray, or even as apostates. The church allowed mysticism only within action (acts), since here it was simultaneously objective and universal, whereas any particular subjective mysticism was a separation from the whole, and a genuine heresy. The philosophy of nature is equally the intuition of the infinite within the finite, but in a universally valid and scientifically objective fashion. All speculative philosophy is necessarily charac-

terized by the same general tendency, one quite the opposite of the tendency within Christianity. This is particularly true to the extent that one takes Christianity in the empirical-historical appearance in which it manifests itself as antithesis, and does not view it in this antithetical manifestation as a *transition*. Christianity, however, is already portrayed through the course of time and through the activity of the world spirit merely as a transition and as an element of or perhaps merely one part of the new world, that part in which the element of succession in the modern era will finally be manifested as a totality. Although the world spirit at this time allows us only to surmise its distant intentions, it does ensure that we do not mistake those intentions. Anyone who recognizes the universal design according to which everything is ordered and happens, will not doubt that this integral part of modern culture is the other unity that Christianity excluded from itself as its opposite. This unity—which constitutes an intuition of the infinite within the finite[54]—will have to be taken up into the whole of that culture even if, of course, subordinated to its particular unity. What follows will serve to clarify my view of this.

The realistic mythology of the Greeks did not exclude the historical dimension. On the contrary, it only really became mythology within that historical dimension—as epic. Its gods were originally *natural beings*. These nature gods had to extricate themselves from their origin and become historical beings in order to become truly independent, poetic beings. Only here do they become gods; before, they were idols. The dominant factor in Greek mythology thus always remained the realistic or finite principle. Precisely the opposite will be the case in modern culture. It views the universe only as *history*, as a moral realm, and to that extent it manifests itself as antithesis. The polytheism possible within it is possible only through delimitation in *time*, through historical delimitation. Its gods are gods of history. *They* will not be able to become truly gods, living, independent, and poetic, until they have taken possession of nature, or until they have become nature gods. One must not seek to force the realistic mythology of the Greeks onto Christian culture; one must rather, in quite the reverse fashion, seek to plant its idealistic deities into nature itself, just as the Greeks place their realistic gods into history. This seems to me to be the final destiny of all modern poesy, such that this antithesis, too, just like every other, consists only in what we may call nonabsoluteness, and such that each of the antithetical elements comes into harmony in its own absoluteness with the other. Neither do I hide my conviction that in the philosophy of nature, as it has developed from the idealistic principle, the first, distant foundation has been laid for that future symbolism and mythology that will be created not by an individual but rather by the entire age.

It is not *we* who want to give the idealist culture its gods through *physics*.[55] We rather await its gods, gods for which we are already holding the symbols ready perhaps even before they have developed in the culture itself independently from physics.

This is what I meant when I asserted that the possibility of a future mythology and symbolism might be found in higher speculative physics.

In any case, such determination must be left to providence, since that point in history yet appears to be indiscernibly distant when its element of succession will transform itself into one of simultaneity. What is possible now is merely that which we have already discussed, namely, that each dominating force can form its own mythological circle from each specific material or content, hence also from that of nature, an operation that in its own turn will not be possible without a synthesis of history and nature.[56] The latter constitutes the unadulterated Homeros.[57]

Since ancient mythology everywhere relates to nature and actually constitutes a symbolism of nature, it must be of interest to us to see how in modern mythology, with its total antithesis to that of antiquity, such a relationship to *nature* will manifest itself. In general, we can determine this from what has already been presented.

The principle of Christianity was the absolute predominance of the ideal over the real, of the spiritual over the corporeal. Hence, this accounted for the direct intervention of the supersensible into concrete reality in *miracles*. This same predominance of the spirit over nature is also expressed in *magic* to the extent that it encompassed the activities of conjuring or enchantment. The magical view of things or the understanding of natural occurrences as magic was merely an incomplete suspicion of the higher and absolute unity of all things in which nothing posits or effects anything directly in the other, but rather only through preestablished harmony by means of the absolute identity of all things. For just this reason, every effect that things have on one another solely through the medium of their concepts, and not in a natural fashion, is called magical, for example, the assertion that movements or certain signs purely as such can have a detrimental effect on someone. The belief in magic also expresses the inkling of the existence of various orders or systems of nature, of mechanism as such, chemism, the organism. We all know what effect the first acquaintance with chemical reactions had on the minds of our contemporary age. In a larger sense the retreat of nature as a mystery gave the contemporary world a general inclination toward penetrating the secrets of nature. The mysterious language of the stars, manifesting itself in their various movements and relationships, acquired immediate historical significance. Their course, their changes, their relationships alluded to various aspects of the destiny of the world as a whole and indirectly of each individual. Here, too, lay the correct assumption that since the earth is a universe in and for itself, the elements of all the stars must inhere within it, and that their various positions and distances from the earth necessarily have an effect very early, particularly on the more delicate constructions or configurations on earth such as those of human beings.

In the philosophy of nature it is proved that similar organizations in the heavens correspond to the various organizations of metals, such as gold, silver, and so on, just as we really do possess a complete image of the entire solar system in the organization or construction of the earth, in and for itself, according to its four different directions. The idea of the animation of the stars, and the idea that they are guided in their orbits by internal souls, were opinions that had been preserved from the days even of Plato and Aristotle. Until Copernicus, the earth was viewed as the center of the universe. That was also the basis of that particular Aristotelian astronomy that is very much in evidence behind the poetic work of Dante. One can easily imagine what consequences the Copernican theory had to have for Christianity, that is, for the Catholic system; it was certainly not only because of the passages in Joshua that the Roman church so vehemently opposed this doctrine in its pure form.[58]

In the Orient people generally accepted the existence of mysterious forces in stones and plants. This belief, like the art of medicine, came to Europe with the Arabs. This applies equally to the use of the talisman and amulets, with which people in the Orient have protected themselves since the earliest times against poisonous snakes and evil spirits. Many of the mythological views of the animal world were not unique to modernity.

To facilitate an overview, I will now summarize in a few sentences what I have said up to now about modern mythology. For the sake of the overall context, we must first recall an earlier proposition (§28) containing the principle for the entire investigation. It established in general that the ideas can be viewed objectively or in reality and as gods, and that the world of ideas can accordingly be viewed as a world of the gods. This world is the content or material of all poesy. Wherever it generates itself, it produces the highest indifference of the absolute with the particular within the real world. The following proposition now follows appropriately:

§43. *In the content or material of art the only conceivable antithesis is a formal one*. Essentially that material is always and eternally *one*, always and necessarily absolute identity of the universal and the particular. If, therefore, any antithesis at all occurs as regards that material or content itself, it must be a merely formal one, and as such it must also manifest itself objectively as a mere temporal antithesis.

§44. *The antithesis will manifest itself such that the unity of the absolute and the finite (particular) appears in the material of art on the one hand as a product of nature, on the other as a product of freedom*.

In the material in and for itself the unity of the infinite and the finite is always and necessarily posited. This unity is possible, however, only in the double fashion whereby the universe is portrayed within the finite or the finite within the universe. The first instance represents that unity upon which nature itself is based, the second that upon which the ideal world or the world of freedom is

based. Hence, to the extent that the unity appears as productive and separated according to the opposing sides, it will be able to appear on the one hand as a product of nature, on the other as a product of freedom.

Annotation. That this antithesis is present precisely in Greek or ancient poesy on the one hand, and modern poesy on the other, can be proved empirically only from the facts that have been presented in the previous discussion.

§45. *The unity in the first case* (that of necessity) *will appear as the unity of the universe with the finite, in the other case* (that of freedom) *as the unity of the finite with the infinite*.

As the proof of the foregoing discussion shows, this proposition is merely another expression of that discussion. Nonetheless, we can still present the following specific proof. The antithetical elements behave (according to §44) as nature and freedom. Now, the character of nature (according to §18) is that of unseparated unity of the infinite and the finite that *is still effective before separation*. The finite predominates within nature, though the seed of the infinite resides within it. Wherever that unity is sundered, the finite is posited as finite; the only possible direction is that from the finite to the infinite, and the unity is that of the finite with the infinite.

§46. *In the first instance the finite is posited as a symbol of the infinite, in the other as an allegory of the infinite*. This follows from the explanations given in §39.

Annotation. This can also be expressed in the following way. In the first case the finite is simultaneously the infinite itself, and does not merely signify it. Hence, it is also significant in and for itself even independently of its meaning or signifying character. In the second case it is actually nothing in and for itself, but is significant only in its relationship to the infinite.

Corollary proposition. The character of art in the first case is on the whole *symbolic*, in the second case on the whole *allegorical*. (That this is the case in modern art will be proved in detail in the following discussion. In the meantime we will concentrate quite naturally here on that pure antithesis—hence, on modernity—not as it might be in its own absoluteness, but rather as it manifests itself in its nonabsoluteness and therefore as it has manifested itself up until now. In any case, everything persuades us that the phenomenon of modern poesy up to this point is not yet the *consummate* antithesis in which, for precisely that reason, the two antithetical elements might become one again.)

§47. *In the mythology of the first kind the universe is intuited as nature, in the second kind as a world of providence or as history*. This is a necessary corollary, since the unity that lies behind the latter is = action, providence, as opposed to *destiny*: destiny = difference (transition), a falling away from the identity with nature, providence = reconstruction.

Addendum. The antithesis of the finite with the universe must manifest itself in the first case as rebellion, in the second as unconditional surrender to the uni-

verse. The former can be characterized as *sublimity* (basic character of antiquity), the latter as *beauty* in the narrower sense.

§48. *In the poetic world of the first sort the collective will cultivate itself or develop into the individual or particular, in the second case the individual will strive by itself to express the universal*. This is a necessary corollary, since in the former case the universal inheres in the particular as such; in the latter the particular within the universal means or signifies the universal.

§49. *The mythology of the first sort will cultivate itself or develop into a self-enclosed world of the gods; for the other sort, the whole in which its ideas become objective will itself be an infinite totality again*. This is a necessary corollary, since in the former instance we find limitation and finitude predominating, in the latter infinity. Furthermore, in the former instance we encounter *being*, in the latter *becoming*. The figures of the first world will be enduring ones, eternal, the natural beings of a higher order, while those of the second will be transient appearances.

§50. *In the former case polytheism will be possible by means of natural limitation* (acquired from that which exists within the parameters of space); *in the latter it will be possible only by means of limitation in time*.

This follows of itself. All intuition of God is possible only in history.

Annotation. To the extent that the infinite here enters into the finite, it will do so only in order to annihilate the latter in and for itself and through the example of the infinite, and thus to establish the boundary between the two worlds. This generates the necessary idea of the later world: incarnation and death of God.

§51. *In the first sort of mythology nature is that which is revealed, the ideal world is that which is hidden; in the second sort the ideal world is revealed, and nature retreats into mystery*. This follows of itself.

§52. *In the former case religion is based on mythology, in the latter mythology on religion*. For religion: Poesy again = subjective: objective. The finite is intuited in the infinite through *religion*, whereby the finite first becomes a reflex of the infinite for me, and, on the other hand, the infinite within the finite becomes symbolic and to that extent mythological.

Elucidation. Greek mythology as such was not religion. In itself it can be comprehended really only as *poesy*. It first became religion only within that relationship to the gods (to the infinite) that man created for himself in religious acts and so on. In Christianity this relationship is the first one, and every possible form of symbolism of the infinite, and thus all mythology, is made dependent on that relationship.

Addendum 1. In the former instance, religion had to become more a nature religion, in the latter more a revealed religion. This follows from §47 and §48.

Addendum 2. Mythology could issue directly from such a nature religion because that religion was founded on tradition.

Addendum 3. The ideas of Christianity in and for themselves were not capable of becoming mythological, since they are completely nonsensual. This proof could be demonstrated using the examples of the Trinity, angels, and so on.

Addendum 4. Only in historical material could such a religion become mythological material itself, since only thereby do the ideas acquire independence from their meaning.

§53. *Just as in the former case the ideas become objective primarily in being itself, so do they here become objective in action*, for every idea = unity of the infinite and finite, though here only through acts, whereas in Greek mythology through the opposite, or being.

§54. *The basic view of all symbolism of the latter sort was necessarily the* ***church***, for in the mythology of that sort the universe or god is intuited in history (cf. §47). The model or form of history, however, is separation in the particular and unity within the whole (this is *presupposed* here, though it is something whose proof is to be given in general philosophy). Hence, in the former type of symbolism God could become objective only as the unifying principle of the unity within the whole and of the separation in the particular. This could only occur, however, in the *church* (where we also encounter the immediate intuition of *God*), for in the objective world there was no other synthesis of this sort. (For example, in the larger structure of the state or in history itself this synthesis might become objective again only *within the whole or totality itself*, that is, in infinite time, but not in the present.)

Addendum. The church is to be viewed as a work of art.

§55. *The external act in which the unity of the infinite and the finite is expressed is symbolic*, for it is the manifestation of the unity of the infinite and the finite in the *finite* or particular.

§56. *To the extent that this same act is merely inward, it is mystic*. This is the concept we are defining as mystic, and which as an explanation needs no proof.

Addendum 1. Mysticism thus = subjective symbolism.

Addendum 2. Mysticism in and for itself is unpoetic, for it is the opposite pole of poesy, which itself is the unity of the infinite and the finite in the *finite*. Of course, we are speaking about mysticism in and for itself, not to the extent that it can itself become objective, for example, in an ethical or moral disposition and so on.

§57. *The law of the first type of art is unchangeability within itself, that of the other type, progress within change*. This follows already from the juxtaposition of both as nature and freedom.

§58. *In the first type, the exemplary or archetypal predominates, in the latter, originality*, for in the first type the universal appears as the particular, the collective as individual. In the latter, in contrast, the individual should appear as the collective, the particular as the universal. In the first type the point of departure is identical (ὅμηρος), *one*, namely, the universal itself. In the latter, however, the

point of departure is always and necessarily different, since it resides within the particular.

The difference between *originality* on the one hand, and *particularity* on the other, consists in the fact that the former cultivates itself or develops from the particular to the general or universal.[59]

§59. *The latter type of art is possible only as a transition or as characterized by nonabsoluteness in contrast to the former*, for the complete informing of the finite into the infinite will also effect the informing of the universe into the finite.

Addendum. Within this transition, where originality predominates, it is necessary that the individual create for himself the universal content or material from particularity.

§60. *The requirement of absoluteness regarding the latter type of mythology would involve the transformation of the sequential nature of its divine manifestations into a simultaneity* (explained in §50).

Addendum. This is possible only through an integration by means of the opposing unity. In nature we find in simultaneity that which in history is characterized by sequence: absolute identity of nature and history.

§61. *Just as in the mythology of the first type the gods of nature developed into gods of history, so must in the second type the gods make the transition from history to nature and thus develop from gods of history into gods of nature*, for only that would constitute absoluteness according to §60.

Addendum. To the extent that this first mutual interpenetration of the two unities—of nature with history and of history with nature—takes place in the epic, the epic itself—the *Homeros* (literally the unifying one, the identity)—which was the initial element in the first type, will be the final element in the second type and will fulfill the complete destiny of the new art.

3
Construction of the Particular, or of the Form of Art

With the completed construction of the material or content of art, content that lies in mythology, we encounter a new antithesis. We began with the construction of art as the *real* manifestation or presentation of the absolute. Such presentation could not be designated as real unless it rendered the absolute by means of individual finite things. We reconstructed the synthesis of the absolute with limitation, and the result was the world of ideas of art. Yet as regards the manifestation or presentation of which we are speaking, this world itself is merely content or universal material to which is now juxtaposed the element of form or of the particular.

How does this universal content make the transition into the particularity of form and actually become the true material of a particular work of art?

Referring to the principle presented at the beginning, we already can see that the resolution here will involve synthesizing the two opposing elements and presenting content and form in indifference by means of a new synthesis. The following propositions refer to this process and will begin our construction of the work of art as such.

§62. *The immediately productive element or force of the work of art or of the individual, real thing through which the absolute becomes real-objective in the ideal world, is the eternal concept or idea of man in God, a concept that is one with the soul itself and is united with it.*[1]

Proof. The proof is to be provided on the basis of §23, according to which the formal or absolute cause of all art is God. God, however, produces directly and from within himself only the ideas of things, and produces real or particular

things only indirectly or mediately in the reflected world. Hence, to the extent that this principle of divine informing, that is, God himself, becomes objective through particular things, *God* directly and viewed in himself is not that which actually produces particular things, but rather only God as the essence of a particular and in relationship to a particular thing. Now, God is related to the particular, however, only through that wherein it is one with its own universal, that is, through its idea or its eternal concept. In the case under discussion here, this idea is that of the absolute itself. This idea acquires an immediate relationship to a particular or is produced objectively only in the organism or in the faculty of reason, both conceived as one (for only the former is the real reflection, the latter the ideal reflection of the absolute in the real or created world, according to §17 and §18). The indifference of the organism and of reason, however, or the *one* in which the absolute becomes equally real and ideal in its objectivity, is the human being. It is thus God to the extent that he acquires a relationship to the human being by means of an idea or an eternal concept; that is, it is the eternal concept in God of the human being himself through which the work of art is produced. The idea of the human being, however, is nothing other than the *essence* or *essential nature* of the human being himself that becomes objective in the soul and in the body, and which accordingly is directly united with the soul.

Elucidation. All things are in God only through their idea, and this idea becomes objective where in the reflex as well, the unity of the infinite within the finite is produced in the form. Since this is indeed the case in human beings, inasmuch as here the finite—the body—as well as the soul is the entire unity itself, the idea as idea becomes objective here; since it is its essence or nature to produce, it becomes productive in the larger sense.

§63. *This eternal concept of the human being in God as the immediate cause of his productions is that which one calls* ***genius****,* as it were the *daemon*, the indwelling element of divinity in human beings. It is, so to speak, a piece of the absoluteness of God. Each artist can thus produce only as much as is united or allied with the eternal concept of his own essence in God. The more within that essence in and for itself the universe is intuited, the more organic he is; the more he links finitude to infinitude, the more productive will he be.

Elucidations. (1) God produces nothing from within himself that does not in its own turn contain and express his entire essence, and hence nothing that is not productive in its own turn and is itself a universe. This is the state of affairs within the *essential nature* itself. That this productiveness of God, that is, the idea as idea, might also emerge within the phenomenal world depends on factors inherent in that world, factors which to that extent appear to us to be accidental, although, viewed from a higher perspective, even the appearance of the genius is always a necessary occurrence.

(2) The productiveness of God is an eternal act of self-affirmation having absolutely no relationship to time, and itself contains both a real and ideal side.

In the former he begets his own infinitude into finitude and is *nature*; in the latter he takes finitude back again into his infinitude. Yet precisely this is also contained in the idea of genius, namely, that it is conceived on the one hand just as much as a natural principle as from the other as an ideal principle. It is accordingly the entire absolute idea viewed in the phenomenal realm or in relationship to a particular. It is one and the same relationship through which in the original act of cognition the world in and for itself is produced on the one hand, and through which in the activity of genius the world of art—as the same world in and for itself, but simply now in the phenomenal world—is produced. (Genius distinguishes itself from everything that is merely talent by the fact that the latter possesses merely an empirical necessity that is itself accidental, while the former possesses absolute necessity. Every true work of art is an absolutely necessary one; one that might equally be or not be does not deserve this name.)[2]

§64. *Explication. The real side of genius, or that unity that constitutes the informing of the infinite into the finite, can be called* ***poesy*** *in the narrower sense; the ideal side, or that unity that constitutes the informing of the finite into the infinite, can be called the* ***art*** *within art.*

Elucidation. By poesy in the narrower sense—if we stay close to the original meaning of the word—we understand the immediate or direct production or creation of something *real*, or *invention* in and for itself. All immediate production or creation, however, is always and necessarily the representation of something infinite, a concept, within something finite or real. Most of us refer the idea of art more to the opposite unity, that of the informing of a particular into the universal. In invention the quality of genius expands or pours itself into the particular. In form it takes the particular back into the infinite. Only in the perfected informing of the infinite into the finite does the latter become something that exists and endures on its own power, a being *in itself* that does not merely mean or signify something else. Thus does the absolute give to the ideas of things within itself an independent life, by informing them into finitude in an eternal fashion. Through this process they acquire a life within themselves, and only to the extent that they are absolute within themselves are they *in the absolute*. Poesy and art are thus like the two unities: poesy is that whereby a thing possesses life and reality within itself; art is that whereby it is within the one producing.

§65. *Explication. The first of the two unities, that which constitutes the informing of the infinite into the finite, expresses itself within the work of art primarily as* ***sublimity****; the other, that which constitutes the informing of the finite into the infinite, as* ***beauty****.*

We cannot prove this except by showing that that which according to common agreement is the prerequisite of sublimity and beauty is precisely that which is expressed by our own explication. The point is actually this: wherever we encounter the infinite being taken up into the finite as such—whenever we distinguish the infinite within the finite—we judge that the object in which this takes

place is sublime. All sublimity is either nature or inner disposition (in the following reflections we will find that the being or substance of the sublime is always one and the same, and that only the form changes).

Sublimity within nature takes place in one of two ways: "We refer it either to our *power of apprehension* and are defeated in our attempt to form an image of its concept; or we refer it to our *vital power* and view it as a power against which our own dwindles to nothing." Examples of the first case would be colossal masses of mountains or cliffs whose peaks our vision cannot reach; the wide ocean that is surrounded only by the vault of heaven; the immensity of the earth itself in its boundlessness, for which every possible human standard is found to be inadequate.[3]

The usual reaction to this boundlessness of nature is to view it as the infinite itself. Yet such a view has nothing of that feeling of sublimity, but rather only of depressing inferiority. Colossal size as such contains absolutely nothing of infinity, but rather contains only the reflection of *true* infinity. The intuition of the sublime enters only when the sensual, concrete intuition is found to be inadequate for the greatness of the concrete object, and then the truly infinite appears for which the merely concretely infinite is the symbol. The sublime is to that extent a subjugation by the truly infinite of the finite that is merely *affecting* infinity. There can be no more complete intuition of the infinite than where the symbol in which it is intuited itself feigns or affects infinity. To draw from Schiller again, "So long as man was merely a slave of physical necessity, had not yet found an egress from the narrow sphere of his wants, and still did not suspect the lofty *daemonic* freedom in his breast, he was reminded by *inscrutable* nature only of the inadequacy of his conceptual faculties and by *destructive* nature only of his physical incapacity. The first he was obliged humbly to acknowledge and from the second he turned in revulsion. But no sooner has free contemplation set him at a distance from the blind assault of natural forces—no sooner does he discover in the flood of appearances something abiding in his own being—than the savage bulk of nature about him begins to speak quite another language to his heart; and the relative grandeur outside him is the mirror in which he perceives the absolute grandeur within himself. Fearlessly and with a terrible delight he now approaches these ghastly visions of his imagination and deliberately deploys the whole force of this faculty in order to represent the sensuously infinite, so that even if it should fail in this attempt he will experience all the more vividly the superiority of his ideas over the highest of which sensuousness is capable."[4]

This intuition of the sublime, in spite of its kinship with the element of the ideal and the ethical, is an aesthetic intuition, to use this word here finally. The infinite is the predominating element within it, yet it predominates only to the extent that it is intuited within the physically infinite, which to that extent is itself merely finite.

This intuition of the truly infinite within the infinite element of nature is the poesy that any human being can practice, since the one who is himself intuiting is the one for whom the relatively colossal element within nature becomes the sublime, and this occurs when he makes it into the symbol of the absolutely colossal.

Moral and intellectual flaccidity, weakness, and cowardice of disposition invariably shy away from these great perspectives that hold up to them a terrible image of their own nothingness and contemptibility. The sublime in nature, just as that of tragedy and of art in general, cleanses the soul by liberating it from mere suffering.

At the very moment when all the hostile forces of nature and of fate simultaneously close in upon a person, at the moment of highest suffering itself, the courageous person is able to make the transition to the ultimate liberation and otherworldly pleasure transcending all the limitations of suffering. Similarly, the person who bears the countenance of nature in all its terror and destruction, nature's ultimate offering of its own most destructive forces, is granted that absolute vision that is like the sun itself that finally breaks through dark storm clouds.

In an age of petty resolve and of crippled sensibility I doubt one could find a more appropriate means of preserving and cleansing oneself from such pettiness than such acquaintance with the greatness of nature. I doubt also that there is a richer source of great thoughts and of heroic resolve than the ever renewed pleasure in the vision of that which is concretely and physically terrible and great.

Our previous discussion has dealt with the sublime in its two forms. In the first, the dimensions of nature itself become absolute in the confrontation with our powers of comprehension. In the other, the power of nature in comparison with our own physical strength becomes absolute and infinite. In both cases, however, nature is only relatively great or relatively infinite in relation to the truly infinite. We now must determine more specifically than earlier the *form* of this vision of the sublime.

Here, too, form, as always, is the finite element, except that here the condition has been added that it must appear relatively infinite, and from the physical perspective must appear absolutely colossal. This, however, negates the *form* of the finite, and we now see how it is precisely formlessness that most immediately acquires the character of *sublimity* for us, that is, that most immediately becomes the symbol of the infinite as such.

That particular form that is distinguished *as* form posits thereby the finite as a particular. The finite that is to accommodate the infinite must, however, be appropriate as a symbol for the infinite. This can take place in two ways. Either it is absolutely formless or absolutely formed, for both are one and the same. Absolute formlessness is precisely the highest or absolute form; the infinite forms itself within something finite without being subject to its limitations. For just this reason, however, the genuinely absolute form in which all limitations are

suspended—such as in the figures of the gods Jupiter, Juno, and so on—has the same effect on us as absolute formlessness.

Nature is sublime not only in its greatness to the extent that it is inaccessible to our powers of comprehension, and not only in its power to the extent that it remains absolutely impervious to our own physical strength. It is also sublime in a general fashion within chaos, or, as Schiller puts it, in the *confusion* of its own appearances at large.[5]

Chaos is the fundamental intuition of the sublime, for our vision perceives as chaos even the great mass that transcends our sensuous vision, as well as the sum of all the blind forces too powerful for our mere physical strength. Only to that extent do these things become symbols of the infinite for us.

The fundamental intuition of chaos itself lies within the vision or intuition of the absolute. The inner essence of the absolute, that in which all resides as one and one as all, is primal chaos itself. Yet precisely here we encounter that identity of absolute form with formlessness, for that chaos within the absolute is not *mere* negation of form, but rather formlessness within the highest and absolute form, and, in a reverse fashion, absolute form within formlessness. We speak of absolute form, because all form is posited into every form, and every form into all form. We speak of formlessness, because precisely within this unity of all forms no individual form is distinguished as such.[6]

What I would like to say is that through this vision of chaos, the understanding passes over to the perception of the absolute, be it in art or in science. After unsuccessful attempts to exhaust the chaos of the phenomena in nature and in history by means of the understanding, ordinary perception or knowledge resolves to take "the incomprehensibility itself," as Schiller says,[7] "as a principle of judgment." This appears to be the first step toward philosophy, or at least toward an aesthetic view of the world. Understanding can recognize the world as the true symbol of reason itself only within such an unbounded condition, one appearing to common understanding as lawlessness, or only within such independence and freedom from restrictive conditions. These would be the conditions under which every natural phenomenon normally appears to ordinary understanding, since the latter can never comprehend one manifestation fully on the basis of another and necessarily must attribute an absolute quality to each. I repeat, only within such a condition of the independence of each individual phenomenon, a condition thus putting an end to understanding itself (again: since understanding depends on given conditions and determinate being), can understanding recognize the world as the true symbol of reason. Since it is a condition in which everything is unqualified and unconditional, it is also a symbol of the absolute itself, in which everything is free and unconstrained.

From this perspective we also encounter now the sublimity of *disposition* or of *character*, particularly to the extent that the person in whom it manifests itself can simultaneously serve as a symbol of all of history. The same world that as

nature still controls itself through barriers of law that are drawn broadly enough to allow yet at least the appearance of lawlessness, as history appears to have cast aside all adherence to law. The element of the real revenges itself here, and returns in all its strict necessity in order rather to destroy all laws that the free or unrestrained element has given itself, and to present itself to that freedom as itself being free. The laws and plans of men are not laws for nature. The latter, to use a passage from Schiller yet again, "treads into the dust the creations of wisdom and of chance with equal indifference . . . [nature] drags down with her in a *single* collapse both the important and the trivial . . . she often wastes in a wanton hour the most tediously won achievements, while often working for centuries on some inane labor—in a word, this disregard by nature as a whole of the laws of science (which she obeys in individual cases) renders obvious the absolute impossibility of explaining *nature herself* by means of *natural laws*, and of imputing *to* her domain what holds *in* her domain, and thus the mind is irresistibly driven out of the world of phenomena into the world of ideas, out of the conditioned into the unconditioned."[8]

The hero of tragedy, one who nonetheless calmly bears all the severity and capriciousness of fate heaped upon his head, represents for just that reason that particular *essential nature* or unconditioned and absolute itself in his person. Secure in his own plan, one that no time executes, but also none destroys, he gazes down serenely at the course of the world. The misfortune that *physically* casts down and destroys the tragic person is as necessary an element of the ethically sublime as the conflict of natural forces and the superiority of nature over the mere physical capacity for comprehension is for the *physically* sublime. Only in misfortune is virtue tested, only in danger is bravery tested. The courageous person engaged in a struggle with misfortune, a struggle in which he neither wins a physical victory nor capitulates morally, is only the symbol of the infinite, of that which *transcends all suffering*. Only within the maximum of suffering can that principle be revealed in which there is *no* suffering, just as everywhere things are revealed only in their opposites. The genuinely tragically sublime depends for just this reason on two conditions, namely, that the moral person capitulate to the forces of nature and simultaneously be victorious through his *inner character*. It is essential that the hero be victorious only through that which is not an effect of nature or of chance, and hence only through inner character or disposition, as is always the case with Sophocles. It is inappropriate that something extraneous or external apparently mitigates the bitterness of his fate, as is often the case with Euripides. *False* indulgence, something embraced by limpid taste that cannot bear the hard sight of necessity, is itself not only despicable but also completely abrogates the actual artistic effect it intends.

We have now adequately elucidated to what extent the sublime constitutes the informing of the infinite into the finite, except that the finite itself always appears as something relatively infinite (for only in this case is the *truly infinite* as such

thrown into relief)—be it as regards one's powers of comprehension, one's own physical power, or one's inner disposition. Such is the case in tragedy, where it is defeated by the infinite quality of one's moral character.

I would like to make just one more comment regarding the sublime, something actually following from our previous presentation, namely, that only in *art* is the object itself sublime. Nature is not sublime in itself, since here the disposition or the principle by which the finite is reduced to a symbol of the infinite is actually found in the subject.

In the sublime, we said, the physically infinite is coerced or subdued by the truly infinite. Within *beauty* the finite is allowed to show itself once again by appearing within the beautiful as already informed into the infinite. There (within the sublime) the finite still manifests itself as it were in a condition of revolt against the infinite, although in this very relationship it becomes a symbol of it. Here (in the beautiful) it is reconciled with the infinite from the very start. That the relationship between the beautiful and the sublime really must be this way *to the extent* that the two are juxtaposed, emerges in an antithetical fashion from what has already been proved concerning the sublime. On the basis of precisely this juxtaposition we can then assert the following.

§66. *The sublime in its absoluteness encompasses the beautiful, just as the beautiful in its absoluteness encompasses the sublime.*

In a general sense this is already self-evident in the fact that the relationship of the two resembles that of the two unities, each of which, however, in its own absoluteness equally encompasses the other. The sublime, to the extent that it is not *beautiful*, will for this reason also not be *sublime*, but rather only monstrous or adventurous. Similarly, absolute beauty always must be more or less simultaneously awesome or frightening beauty. Since in any case beauty always and necessarily requires *limitation*, the absence of limitation itself thus constitutes form within the figure of Jupiter, where there is no limitation at all except what is necessary for rendering an image at all, for all other limitation is suspended; for example, he is neither young nor old. Similarly, Juno is limited only as much as is necessary for her to be a female figure. The less limitation within which an image actually constitutes beauty, the more does it incline toward the sublime, though without ceasing to be beauty. The beauty of Apollo involves more limitation than that of Jupiter—he is *youthfully* beautiful. In his case the limitations have not been expanded so far—as is the case with Jupiter—that in a general sense the infinite appears within the finite, but rather the finite is of value in and for itself as being informed into the infinite. The example of male and female beauty is an even more striking example. In the former, nature only shows as much limitation as is necessary; in the latter, it is generous with that limitation.

It follows from this that there obtains not a qualitative and essential antithesis between sublimity and beauty, but rather only a quantitative one. The more or less of beauty or of sublimity belongs (serves) in its own turn as limitation: Juno = sublime beauty, Minerva = beautiful sublimity. The more the element of limitation reconciles itself with the infinite, however, the more purely beautiful it is.

Hence, precisely because of this indifference between the sublime and the beautiful, the determination itself becomes relative. That which is perceived as sublimity in one instance, for example, the image of Juno, may well appear in another relationship as beauty in contrast to sublimity (such as Juno in comparison with Jupiter). This suggests to us that in general there is no sphere in which something can be called beautiful that in a different situation might not also be sublime, and that for just this reason both qualities appear inextricably interwoven in everything that in a broader sense is absolute in and for itself. This is the case, for example, with Juno, not compared with anything else, but rather viewed in and for herself. Or, to take examples from another sphere, Sophocles in comparison with Aeschylus appears beautiful; viewed in and for himself, however, or absolutely, he appears as an indissoluble combination of the beautiful and the sublime.

If as regards the sublime one were to limit oneself, say, to the mere concept of the absence of limitation and the formlessness normally associated with it, these qualities are, as has already been shown, very much a necessary condition of the sublime, yet not such that they, too, would not be possible within strictly circumscribed forms, but rather such that precisely the highest form (where form no longer is recognized within form) becomes formlessness, just as in other cases formlessness itself becomes form. The former is the case, as mentioned, in the figure of Jupiter and in the head of the so-called Juno Ludovisi, where the sublime is so interwoven with the beautiful that it cannot be differentiated.[9] Winckelmann assumes the existence of what he called high grace, and the ancients themselves praised the fearful Eumenides of Aeschylus.[10]

Within a work of art itself as something objective, sublimity and beauty are related as they are within the subjective elements of poesy and art. Yet within poesy taken by itself just as within art taken by itself, the same antithesis is possible, in the former as naïve and sentimental, in the latter as style and mannerism. Thus:

§67. *The same antithesis of the two unities expresses itself in poesy viewed in and for itself through the antithesis of the naïve and the sentimental.*

General remarks. Regarding all these antitheses one must always keep in mind that they cease being antitheses when taken absolutely. Now, it happens to be the case that the first unity—the one in which the infinite is informed into the finite—always and necessarily appears as the *perfected* one, such that the point of departure and that of completion coincide. In contrast, the absolute expression may very well be missing for the other member of the antithesis, precisely because it appears only in a nonabsolute condition of juxtaposition. This is the case, for example, with the sentimental and the naïve. The poetic and the inspired elements are always and necessarily naïve; the sentimental is thus the opposing ele-

ment only in its imperfection. Thus we postulate not only the naïve and the sentimental within poesy, but also *two directions* in general within poesy. In the one, the universal appears informed into the particular; in the other, the particular appears informed into the universal. In an absolute condition, both would have to be one; that is, since naïve is the only expression we have for absoluteness, both would have to be naïve. Sentimental is thus merely the expression or designation for the other direction in its imperfection. To this extent, the relationship between naïve and sentimental is by no means the same as that just discussed between sublimity and beauty, where each in and for itself designates an absolute.

It is well known that Schiller made currency of this antithesis first in his essay entitled *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, an essay that is in any case quite rich with fertile ideas. I will cite here the following propositions from this essay that will serve best to make this antithesis clear.[11]

"Naive can be explained as nature or the appearance of nature to the extent that it puts art to shame."[12] (This explication encompasses both the meaning of the word in normal usage *and* the higher meaning it acquires here in relationship to art. The fundamental character of the naïve—namely, that it be *nature*—already shows that it originally corresponds to the first of the two antitheses.)

"The naive *is* nature, the sentimental *seeks* nature."[13]

"The naive sensibility feels naturally, the sentimental feels *the* natural."[14]

This antithesis is most striking in the comparison of antiquity with modernity, as Schiller quite nicely shows. The Greek view of sublimity within nature, for example, is by no means an overly sensitive one that merely responds to the emotional element involved while never progressing to free and objective reflection. In contrast, mere subjective interest in nature, interest without any objectivity of view or thought, is the basic character trait of modernity, and it is itself removed from nature to the extent it merely perceives nature in an emotional sense and does not really view or portray it.

One can summarize the entire difference between the naïve and the sentimental poet by stating that in the former only the *object* holds sway; in the latter, the subject steps forward *as* subject. The former *appears* unconscious concerning his object; the latter constantly accompanies his object with his own consciousness and makes us aware of this consciousness. The former is cold and without feeling regarding his object, just as is nature; the latter presents his feeling to us so that we may participate in it as well. The former displays no intimacy with us; only the object is related to us, the poet himself flees us. The latter, by portraying the object, simultaneously makes himself its reflex. Just as is the case with poesy itself, this contrast also enters into judgment, and it is equally a part of the modern sensibility that as a rule the lack of feeling on the part of the poet leaves it cold (the object must already have gone through the filter of reflection if it is to have an effect on that sensibility). Indeed, that which is actually the ultimate

strength of all poesy, namely, that the poet allow the object itself to hold sway, rouses modern sensibility to indignation.

It is clear from Schiller's essay that the basic character of modernity in contrast to antiquity can be expressed as sentimentality. The single exception of Shakespeare, which Schiller himself also makes, shows, however, that this assertion does need at least some qualification. It may be that the case of Shakespeare is the same as that regarding the earlier contrast between the conscious and unconscious aspects. Perhaps no modern, Shakespeare included, has attained the perfect indifference of the naïve and the sentimental (for, as I have already remarked, the naïve actually appears naïve only from the perspective of the sentimental). The basis or point of departure here is always the juxtaposition of the subject and the object, that is, the element of the sentimental, except that in the object itself it is reduced to naïveté. In Ariosto the elements of the sentimental and the naïve lie quite distinguishably next to one another. One might say of him that he is sentimental in a naïve fashion, whereas Shakespeare is totally naïve within the sentimental.

As far as the external manifestation of the naïve is concerned, we might yet remark that it is always characterized as much by simplicity and ease of treatment as by strict necessity. Just as the beautiful is sublime to the extent that only the absolutely *necessary* is required for its portrayal, there is no greater sign of genius than that it brings the object into full view with only a few strict and necessary strokes (Dante). There is no *choice* for genius, since it both knows and desires only what is necessary. The sentimental poet is in a totally different situation. He reflects, and he touches emotionally and is emotionally touched himself only to the extent that he reflects. The character of naïve genius is total—not so much *imitation* of nature, as Schiller puts it, as *attainment* of reality.[15] His object is independent of him and exists in and for itself. The sentimental poet strives for something infinite, something that, because it cannot be attained in this direction, also never manifests itself.

§68. *Poesy in its absoluteness is in itself neither naïve nor sentimental.* It is not naïve, since this is a qualification that itself is made only through contrast (the absolute appears naïve only to him who is sentimental). The sentimental, however, is in and for itself a nonabsolute condition. Accordingly, our proposition is correct.

Annotation. This entire antithesis is thus subjective, a mere antithesis or contrast in appearance; this can even be proved as a fact. No one is tempted to say that Sophocles, for example, is sentimental, but neither that he is naïve. He is, in a word, completely absolute without any further qualification. Schiller took his examples regarding antiquity primarily from the epic. One might want to add, however, that it is a part of the limitations or particular *character* of the epic that it *appear* naïve, just as, for example, the Homeric epic does in most of the characteristics of its heroes. If one were to allow the sentimental also to assume legit-

imacy here, then if it were to count anything at all one might equate it with the element of the lyrical. For just this reason, however, the dramatic work can appear neither naïve nor sentimental; precisely the fact that Shakespeare, for example, is able to appear naïve characterizes him in this respect as a modern.

§69. *This contrast of the two unities within art viewed in and for itself can express itself only as style and mannerism.*[16]

Annotation. The same remarks I just made concerning the previous antithesis obtain here to an even greater extent. Of the two juxtaposed elements, *style* is the absolute, mannerism the nonabsolute and to that extent objectionable. Language has only one expression for the absoluteness in both directions. The absoluteness within art always consists in the fact that the *universal* within art and the *particular* that it assumes in the artist as an individual are absolutely one, that this particular is the entire universal, and vice versa. Now, we can well imagine that this indifference might also be achieved from the perspective of the particular, or that the artist might be able to form the particularity of *his* form, to the extent that it is his, into the universality of the absolute. Similarly, it might also be imagined that the universal form within the artist in-form[17] itself to the point of indifference with the particular form that the artist as an individual *must* have. In the first case, one might then call style absolute mannerism, just as in the opposite (where that is not attained), mannerism would have to be called the nonabsolute, missed, or unattained style.

In general one must remark that this contrast or antithesis yet issues from the *first* one we postulated in this investigation, namely, since art can manifest itself only in the individual, and since it is always absolute, it is primarily always a matter of the synthesis of the absolute with the particular.

The merely empirical theoreticians find themselves rather embarrassed when they must explain the difference between style and mannerism, and we can see here perhaps most clearly that general relationship or general state of affairs concerning antitheses in art as such. The one antithesis is always the absolute one, the other *appears* as an antithesis only insofar as it is not yet complete, and only to the extent that it is taken up, as it were, halfway to completion. That is, particularity can be absolute without detriment to its particularity, just as the absolute can be particular without detriment to its absoluteness.

The particular form *should* itself be the absolute form; only then does it reside within indifference with the essence and allow this essence to be free.

Style thus does not exclude particularity, but constitutes rather the *indifference* between the universal and absolute art form on the one hand, and the particular form of the artist on the other; indifference is so necessary to style that art can express itself only within the individual. Style would thus always and necessarily be the true form and to that extent the absolute, mannerism only the relative. This assumed indifference does not, however, determine that it be posited through the informing of the universal into the particular or, vice versa, through the informing of the particular form into the universal form. It is a matter here, as I said, of what we have already seen, namely, that the informing of the absolute into the particular is always the perfected or completed condition, and thus only within the present case appears as style. The antithetical unity as *antithetical* can appear only in a nonabsolute condition. If it is absolute, then *it, too*, is called style. If it is not absolute, then it is mannerism.

We certainly will not deny that *style* is also attainable in the other direction, namely, the direction taking particularity as its point of departure, although a trace of this formal difference will always remain, and the style achieved from this direction can always be called ***absolute** mannerism*. In this sense, style will mean an *absolute particularity* (one elevated to absoluteness), just as in its initial meaning it designates a particular absoluteness (one formed into particularity). On the whole, the style of modernity must in general be of the first sort, since (according to §58) particularity is always the point of departure here, just as in contrast only the ancients possess style in the first sense. This can be asserted without detriment to modernity, since we do recognize its capacity for style. It is in any case obvious that in the final perfection of modern art, this antithesis, too, must disappear.

One can say also that nature possesses mannerism in this sense, or a dual style. It possesses mannerism in everything directed toward informing the particular into the universal, for example, in the coloring of bodies, particularly within the organic world, where in the male form it obviously possesses style. In feminine beauty, on the other hand, where so many particularities had to be taken into consideration of the form itself, it is in a certain sense affected. Yet precisely this proves that beauty and thus style is also possible in this direction. Hence, someone could say most appropriately that if Shakespeare, for example, possessed mannerism, then God himself would also have to possess it. One cannot change the fact that modernity possesses style only in the direction from the particular to the universal.

Just as little, however, can one deny that modernity really has achieved style *in this direction* and is certainly capable of achieving it, so much so that even within modern art itself the two directions are again discernible. In this sense, the modern who in the formative and plastic arts possesses style above all others is doubtlessly Michelangelo.[18] His counterpart among the great masters is doubtlessly Correggio.[19] It would certainly be incorrect to attribute mannerism to this artist in an unqualified fashion, yet it is equally impossible to attribute to him any other style than that of the second type. He is perhaps the most vivid example that style is also possible in the direction from the particular to the universal.

In general we can now accordingly explain mannerism in the objectionable sense, and accordingly as *affectation*, as an assertion of the particular form instead of the universal one. Since in general the artist only has form at his disposal, such that he expresses or achieves the essence only through form, and

since only absolute form itself fully corresponds to that essence, mannerism in this sense directly suspends the very essence of art itself as well. Affectation manifests itself most often as a striving for superficial elegance that bedazzles only unpracticed eyes, and toward insipid beauty, and in the pale, washed-over element of some works whose only or main virtue is at least cleanliness. There is also, however, a raw and crude kind of mannerism, where the artist intentionally seeks the exaggerated, the forced. Mannerism is always a limiting element and manifests itself in the inability to overcome certain particularities of form, be it within the whole of the figures (the best examples come from the formative plastic arts) or in individual parts. Thus we find some painters who are able to create only short, stumpy figures, and others who are able to create only tall, thin, haggard figures, and yet others who either create fat or thin legs, or obstinately paint, again and again, heads with exactly the same shape.

Affectation manifests itself further in the relationship the individual figures have to one another, particularly in the obstinacy of pose or position, but even in the initial concept and the unyielding habit of viewing all subjects in a certain way, for example, emotionally, cleverly, or even humorously. Anything that is merely clever, or is merely a witticism, can belong only to the sentimental direction in art, since art in great style, even in the work of Aristophanes, is never actually witty but rather always only great.

Finally, it must be noted that the element of particularity that in style is added to the element of generality can also be the particularity of *time*, and not merely that of the particular individual. In this sense we speak about the different style of different epochs.

The particular style an individual artist cultivates for himself is for him that which a system of thought is for the philosopher within the realm of knowledge, or what action is for an individual person. Winckelmann accordingly and justifiably calls such style a system of art, and asserts that the older style was built on a system.[20]

Much could be said about the difficulties involved in distinguishing between style and mannerism in certain cases, or in identifying the transition from the one to the other. But it is not our place to do that here, and does not concern the general science of art.

General Comments on the Antitheses Dealt with up to This Point in §64-§69

These antitheses all belong to one and the same family and arise from that initial relationship of art, as absolute form, to the particular form posited by the individuals through which it expresses itself. That is why they of necessity appeared precisely at this juncture of our investigation.

Already the first antithesis (from the perspective of reflection) of poesy and art shows us the former as absolute form, the latter as particular form. That

which in genius is in itself absolutely one, separates itself into these two modes of manifestation. Furthermore, these manifestations in their own turn are one and the same when taken in their absoluteness. Similarly, that which in beauty in and for itself is a simple, unified element, separates itself within the particular object, the individual work of art, into the two modes of manifestation of the sublime and the beautiful. They in turn are different when taken in their nonabsoluteness such that just as in the perfect artist poesy and art are inextricably interwoven, so also in the highest works are sublimity and beauty. Sublimity appears everywhere as the absolute and universal form of art in which the particular is there only for the sake of taking up the entire element of infinity into itself. Especially as beauty, the particular form appears reconciled with the absolute form and completely taken up into it, completely one with it.

These antitheses are not to be equated with the following ones, which take place either in poesy taken by itself or in art taken by itself, and which in the first case — where they appear as the qualities *naïve* and *sentimental* — are merely subjective (since it already constitutes subjectivity when one conceives the absolute merely as naïve, and the sentimental as such as absolutely objectionable). Similarly, in the other case only one of the two elements designates the absolute, although to be sure the difference in direction is a factor determining just where the absolute, or style, can be attained.

Within this merely subjective and formal juxtaposition, however, the naïve and style do indeed constitute absolute form, just as the sentimental and mannerism constitute particular form. One can also compare these antitheses to each other and remark, for example, that mannerism can never be naïve, just as the sentimental is always and necessarily affected. One can further say that mannerism is always mere art without poesy, that is, nonabsolute art, and that neither sublimity nor, for just that reason, beauty in the absolute sense is compatible with mannerism. One can say further that the sentimental is always able to appear more as *art* than as poesy, and for that reason lacks absoluteness.

Our previous discussion, however, has still not led us as far as the construction of the particular work of art. The absolute relates here (according to the proofs in §62) to the producing individual by means of the eternal concept of him that itself inheres in the absolute. This eternal concept, the essential nature of the soul, separates itself in *appearance* or *phenomenally* into poesy and art and into the other antitheses, or rather it is the absolute point of identity of these antitheses, which in fact are antitheses only from the perspective of reflection.

We have not discussed these antitheses for their own sake but rather for the sake of recognizing or identifying genius. All these antitheses are either the one-sided modes of manifestation or qualification of that which is the absolute principle of art, that element of the divine that is informed into the artist, or the *essential nature* of art. In the work of art in and for itself these juxtapositions should never be in evidence as such; only the absolute should become objective.

Our previous discussion was thus concerned merely with presenting *genius* as the absolute indifference of all possible antitheses between the universal and the particular, antitheses that can manifest *themselves in the relationship of the idea or the eternal concept to an individual*. Genius is itself precisely that in which the universal of the idea and the particular of the individual are equated. Yet this principle of art is to correspond exactly to that whose immediate emanation it actually is—the eternal.[21] As such it must thereby grant to the ideas within that eternal an existence independent of their own principle by letting them exist as the concepts of individual real things and by forming them into actual bodies. The proof of this is given in §62 and §63. We must now demonstrate the possibility of just this objective rendering. Only then will the entire system of art unfold itself to us completely.

We must remind ourselves here that the philosophy of art is actually general philosophy itself, except presented in the potence of art. Thus we will understand the way in which art lends objectivity to its own ideas in the same way we understand how the ideas of individual real things become objective in the phenomenal realm. Or we might put it thus: our present task, which is to understand the transition of the aesthetic idea into the concrete work of art, is the same as the general task of philosophy as such, namely, to understand the manifestation of the ideas through particular things. Of course, we can assume here only certain propositions as being given by general philosophy, and not prove them ourselves. In this respect we preface our discussion with the following borrowed proposition:

§70. (*Borrowed proposition.*) *The absolute becomes objective in the phenomenal realm by means of the three unities to the extent that the latter are not taken in their absoluteness, but rather in their relative difference as potences, thereby becoming symbols of the idea*. This proposition needs only *elucidation* here, since it is merely a borrowed proposition from general philosophy.

Content and form are one within the absolute. The latter has no other content of production than itself in the all-encompassing allness of its forms. It cannot *appear*, however, unless each of these unities as a *particular* unity becomes a symbol of it. Within absoluteness itself, these unities are not differentiated from one another. Here we find only content, pure infinity, and idea. The new unities can become objective as the primal ideas only to the extent that each *as a particular unity* takes itself as a body or reflected image. As far as the phenomenal realm is concerned, this directly posits the differentiation of that which is actually one within the absolute itself. Hence, the first of the two unities in its absoluteness is idea. Insofar as it as a potence—as a particular unity—takes itself as a symbol, it is matter. Everything within the phenomenal realm is a mixture of essence and potence (or particularity). The essence of all particularity *is* within the absolute itself, but this essence manifests itself through the particular.

Presupposing this, it follows necessarily that the absolute as the principle of art becomes objective in the sphere of appearances or differentiation only if

either the real *or* the ideal unity becomes its symbol. Hence, it becomes objective only in separate manifestations: on the one hand symbolized by the appearance of a relative-real world, on the other by the appearance of a relative-ideal world.

§71. (*Borrowed proposition.*) *To the extent that its symbol is the real unity as particular unity, the idea is matter*.[22]

The proof of this proposition is given in general philosophy. Matter that actually appears is the idea, but from the perspective of the simple informing of the infinite into the finite such that this informing itself is only relative, not absolute. Matter as it appears is not the essence, it is only form, symbol; yet it *is—only as form, as relative difference*—in its own turn the same as that of which it is the symbol and which is the idea as the absolute informing of the infinite into the finite.

§72. *Hence, insofar as art takes up the form of the informing of the infinite into the finite as particular form, it acquires matter as its body or symbol*. This follows automatically.

Addendum 1. In this respect, art is = the general formative or plastic arts. Normally this designation is used in the narrower sense, namely, for the formative arts that express themselves through corporeal objects. This designation as formative arts, however, does not exclude the possibility that within this general unity all potences recur that are encompassed by matter itself in the larger sense; it is precisely on this recurrence that the distinction within the individual formative arts is based.

Addendum 2. *The formative* arts constitute the *real* side of the world of art.

§73. *The ideal unity, as the resolution of the particular into the universal, of the concrete into the concept, becomes objective in* ***speech*** *or* ***language***. The proof of this proposition also belongs in general philosophy.

Viewed from the real perspective, language constitutes the same resolution of the concrete into the universal, of being into knowledge, which, viewed from the ideal perspective, is thinking. Viewed from the one side, language is the direct expression of something *ideal*—knowledge, thought, feeling, will, and so on—in something *real*, and is to that extent itself a work of art. Yet viewed from the other side it is just as definitely a work of nature, since it is the one necessary form of art that cannot be conceived as being invented or generated by art. Hence, it is a natural work of art, just as more or less everything produced by nature is.

The most convincing proof of this proposition can be given only within a larger context, particularly, however, by the juxtaposition of language and the other form of art, matter.

The significance of language can be understood best on the basis of the following relationships.

The absolute is by nature an eternal act of producing. This producing is its

essence. Its producing is an absolute act of affirming or of knowing, whose two sides constitute the two postulated unities.

Wherever this absolute cognitive act becomes objective only by the *one* side as a particular unity becoming form, there it appears necessarily transformed into an other, namely, into a being. The absolute informing of the infinite into the finite, which is the *real* side of this act, is in itself not a being. In its absoluteness it is the entire idea, the entire infinite self-affirmation. Only when taken in its relativity, and thus only *as a particular unity*, does it no longer appear as idea or as self-affirmation, but rather as something itself affirmed, as matter. The real side as a particular unity becomes the symbol of the absolute idea here, which only through this husk or covering first becomes recognized as such.

Wherever the ideal unity itself, as a particular unity, functions as the form for the idea—in the ideal world—it is not distorted into something else. It remains ideal, yet such that it leaves the other side behind and thus does not appear as something absolutely ideal, but rather merely as something relatively ideal that possesses the real outside of itself—standing over against it. As purely ideal, however, it does not become objective, but rather returns to the subjective and is itself the subjective. Thus it necessarily strives *yet again* toward a covering, a body, through which it may become objective without detriment to its ideality. It integrates itself again through something real. In this integration the most appropriate symbol of the absolute or infinite affirmation of God arises, since this affirmation *here* represents itself through something real without ceasing to be ideal (which is precisely the highest requirement), and *this* symbol is language, as one can easily see.

For this reason, language and reason (which is precisely absolute knowledge, the knowing of the ideas) have one and the same expression in most languages. Furthermore, in most philosophical and religious systems, particularly those of the Orient, the eternal and absolute act of self-affirmation in God—his eternal act of creating—is designated as the *speaking word* of God, the *logos*, which is simultaneously God himself.

One views the word or speaking of God as the outflow of the divine science, as the creating, multifarious, and yet congruous harmony of the divine act of creation.

Considering this sublime significance of language, namely, that it is not merely the relative act of knowledge, but rather the act that is simultaneously integrated with its counterpart and is *to that extent* absolute, we will not juxtapose absolutely the formative arts with the verbal arts as do most authors (which is why, for example, they have difficulty counting music as one of the formative arts and thus grant it a special position). Just as knowledge still grasps or renders itself symbolically in language, so also does divine knowledge apprehend itself symbolically in the world such that also the **whole** of that real world (whole inasmuch as it is itself the unity of the real and the ideal) is itself a primal act of

speaking. Yet the *real* world is no longer the living word, the speech of God himself, but rather only the spoken—or expended—word.

In this way the formative arts are only the dead word, and yet nonetheless *word*, the act of speaking; the more completely this speaking dies—as far as the utterance that has turned to stone on the lips of Niobe—the more sublime is formative art in its own fashion. In contrast, on the lower level, in music, that living element that has passed over into death—the word *spoken* into the finite—is still perceptible only as sonority.

Hence, in the formative arts, too, the absolute cognitive act, the idea, is conceived only from the real perspective instead of being *originally* conceived, as ideal, as is the case in speech or in the verbal arts, without ceasing to be ideal even in the transparent covering it assumes.

Language as the infinite affirmation that expresses itself in a *living* fashion is the ultimate symbol of chaos eternally residing in absolute knowledge. Everything resides as one in language, regardless of the perspective from which one views it. From the perspective of tone or of voice, all tones, all sonorities reside within it according to their qualitative differences. Those differences are all blended in human language, which accordingly does not particularly resemble any one sonority or tone, since all reside within it. Absolute identity is expressed in language to an even greater extent when one views language from the perspective of its designations. Concrete and nonconcrete elements are one here; the most palpable element may become the sign for the most abstract or the one most firmly grounded in the intellect. Everything becomes the symbol or image for everything, and language itself thereby becomes the symbol for the identity of all things. Within the inner structure of language itself all individual elements are determined by the whole. There is not one form or one individual unit of speech that does not require the whole.

Language viewed absolutely or in itself is unified or *one*, just as reason is unified or *one*. Yet just as actual different things emerge from within absolute identity, so also do the different languages emerge from within this unity of language. Each language is a universe if taken by itself, and is absolutely separate from the others—which nonetheless are *essentially* one, not merely according to the inner expression of reason, but also as regards the elements that, except for a few nuances, are similar in all languages. That is, this external body is itself soul and body. The vowels are, we might say, the immediate breath of the spirit, the forming form (the affirmative). The consonants are the body of language or the formed form (that which is affirmed).

Hence, the more vowels a language possesses—yet such that the limitation by consonants, at least to a certain extent, does not disappear—the more inspired or animated. And vice versa, the more overwhelmed a language is by consonants, the more spiritless it is.

At this point I would like to make some brief remarks concerning the variously posed question concerning why reasonable beings opted specifically for language or voice as the immediate body of the inner soul, since one also could have used other external signs, for example, facial expressions. After all, not only can deaf-mutes make themselves understood, but to a certain extent so do all wild or uncultivated nations that speak with the entire body. Yet even the question itself views language as an arbitrary choice or invention. As an explanation, some have suggested that these external signs had to be such that the person using them could himself also evaluate them, and hence had to be a system of signs based on sound and voice so that the speaker could simultaneously hear himself—something that,as we all know, is indeed a great pleasure for some speakers. Yet language is not that accidental. There is a higher necessity in the fact that sound and voice must be the organ that expresses the inner thoughts and movements of the soul. One might well ask those who offer the preceding explanation just why birds have song and animals a voice.

As is well known, the question regarding the initial source of language has greatly concerned philosophers and historians, particularly in recent times. They thought it possible to understand language from the perspective of psychologically isolated human nature, whereas it is to be understood only from within the whole of the universe. One therefore should not seek to find the absolute idea of language in their theories. The whole question concerning the origin of language, at least as it has been treated until now, is merely an empirical one with which the philosopher accordingly has nothing to do. He is interested only in learning about the origin of language within the idea itself, and in this sense language, just as the universe itself, still emerges in an unconditional fashion through the eternal effect of the absolute cognitive act, an act that in a being possessing reason encounters the possibility of expressing itself.[23] [*Marginal note*: Language in general = artistic impulse in human beings, and just as the guide of instinct is the ethical element, so also of language. Both assertions—that it arises as an invention of human beings, through freedom, and by divine instruction—are false.]

An exposition of the particular model of reason and reflection within the structure and inner conditions of language belongs to a different sphere of science than the one with which we are here concerned and in which language itself functions merely as a medium.

§74. *Art insofar as it assumes the ideal unity as its potence and form is verbal art*. This follows directly.

Addendum. *Verbal* art is the *ideal* side of the world of art.

General addendum (to this particular construction of the antithesis between verbal and formative art).

Since according to §24 the forms of art are the forms of things as they are in God, the real side of the universe itself constitutes the plastic arts, the ideal side

constitutes the poetic or verbal arts, and all particular forms that recur within these basic forms will in their own turn merely express the manner in which particular things inhere within the absolute.

§75. *In each of the two primal forms of art all unities necessarily recur, the real, the ideal, and the one in which the two are equal*, for each of the two primal forms is *in itself* absolute; each is the entire idea.

Addendum. If we call the first unity or potence that of reflection, the other that of subsumption, and the third that of reason, then the system of art is determined by *reflection*, *subsumption*, and *reason*.

All potences of nature and of the ideal world recur here—except in the highest potence—and it becomes quite clear how the philosophy of art is the construction of the universe in the form of art.

In the following construction I had two choices: either to juxtapose directly the parallel potences of the real and ideal world of art, for example, to treat lyric poetry simultaneously with music; or to view separately each of the two sides and their respective potences. I have chosen the latter of the two possibilities because I believe it makes the exposition clearer, and because in any case the relationship between the ideal and the real forms of art would have to be referenced continually. Hence, I will first construe within the formative arts the three basic forms of music, painting, and the plastic arts as well as all the transitions between them. Each of these forms will be construed within its own context and in its own place. For that reason I am including no preface concerning the general division within the arts of the kind one normally finds in textbooks. As a historical note I will mention only that until now music has generally been separated from the formative arts. Kant suggests three kinds: verbal art, formative art, and that of the play of feelings.[24] Very vague. Here the plastic arts and painting, there rhetoric and the poetic arts. Under the rubric of the third: music, which I find to be an extremely subjective explanation of the latter, almost like that of Sulzer,[25] who says that the purpose of music is to awaken the emotions—something that could just as easily be applied to many other things, such as concerts of fragrances or tastes.

Part II
Specific Section of the Philosophy of Art

4
Construction of the Forms of Art in the Juxtaposition of the Real and Ideal Series

The immediately preceding proposition proved that each of the two primal forms *in itself* differentiates itself ever anew into all other forms. Expressed in another way: each of the two primal forms takes up all other forms or unities as potence and makes them into its symbol or particular. This will be presupposed here.

The Real Side of the World of Art; or, Formative Art[1]

§76. *The indifference of the informing of the infinite into the finite, taken purely as indifference, is* ***sonority****. Or*, within the informing of the infinite into the finite, indifference as indifference can emerge only as *sonority*.

This is clarified in the following way. The implantation of the infinite into the finite as such expresses itself in matter (this is the common unity) through the first dimension, or through that whereby it (as difference) is self-identical (indifference). That first dimension in matter, however, is not posited purely as such, but rather simultaneously with the second, and accordingly synthesized through the third. Thus the informing of the infinite into the finite cannot represent itself *purely as such* within the actual being of matter. This is the negative side of the proof. That it is *sonority*, however, through which the indifference within the implantation of the infinite into the finite purely as such expresses itself, can be seen from the following.

(1) The act of implantation itself is expressed in corporeal reality as magnetism (this proof is found in the Philosophy of Nature).[2] Yet magnetism is itself bound to the particular body, as is the first dimension, and is thus not the inform-

ing itself, not pure as such, but is rather difference. It is pure as such and is *indifference* only to the extent that it is separated from the body and is a form unto itself, as an absolute form. The latter is found only in sonority, for sonority is on the one hand living and active—in and for itself—and on the other hand a mere dimension in time, though not in space.

(2) I merely want to point out that the sonority of bodies stands in a direct relationship with their coherence. Experience has proved that their capacity for conducting resonance is determined by their coherence. All resonance, however, is conduction, and no body resounds except inasmuch as it simultaneously conducts sound. In coherence or magnetism in and for themselves, however, the ideal principle passed over completely into the corporeal. The demand, however, was that the informing of unity into multiplicity appear purely as such, as form in and for itself. This occurs only in sonority, for sonority = magnetism, though detached from corporeality, as it were the essential nature itself of magnetism, the substance.

Annotation 1. There is no need to discuss exhaustively the distinction between sonority, on the one hand, and *resonance* and *sound*, on the other. Resonance is the generic term. Sound is resonance, though interrupted. Sonority is resonance that is comprehended as continuity, as an uninterrupted flow of resonance. The higher difference of the two, however, is that mere resonance or sound does not allow the unity in the multiplicity to be recognized clearly, something sonority, on the other hand, does. The latter is accordingly resonance combined with totality. Within sonority we do not merely hear the simple tone itself. Rather, we hear clothed, as it were, or imbedded in it a whole array of tones, and we hear them such that the consonant ones predominate, instead of the dissonant ones, as in the other case. The practiced ear even *differentiates* among them and hears besides the *unisonus* or fundamental tone also its octave, the octave of the fifth and so on. The multiplicity that is combined in the coherence as such with the unity thus becomes a living multiplicity within sonority, a multiplicity that affirms itself.

Annotation 2. Since the sonority of bodies is posited through coherence, resonance itself is simply the reestablishment or affirmation, that is, the identity within that coherence whereby the body—posited outside of identity—reestablishes its own condition of rest and of self-contained being.

Sonority itself is simply the intuition of the soul of the body itself or of the concept immediately associated with it in its immediate relationship to this particular finite element. The prerequisite of sonority is differentiation between concept and being, between soul and body within the corporeal being; the act of indifferentiation itself is that in which the ideal within the reinforming into the real becomes perceptible as sonority.

The prerequisite of resonance is thus that the body be posited outside of indifference. This occurs through contact with another body.

Annotation 3. We must add to this view of sonority that of the *sense of hearing*. The root of the sense of hearing resides within anorganic nature, within magnetism. The hearing organ itself is merely magnetism that has developed to organic perfection. Nature integrates universally within organic nature the anorganic through its opposite unity. The latter—the anorganic unity—is merely the element of the infinite within the finite. This is, for example, sonority or resonance. Integrated with its opposite it becomes = sense of hearing. The hearing organ consists externally of rigid and sonorous bodies, except that the antithetical unity of the reassumption of difference within resonance into indifference is combined with this first unity. The body that we call dead possesses the one unity from hearing, and now lacks only the other.

§77. *The art form in which the real unity purely as such becomes potence and symbol is* ***music***. This follows directly from the two preceding propositions.

Annotation. The nature of music can be determined from various perspectives. The construction given here, however, is that issuing from our earlier fundamental principles. The various other determinations of music issue as immediate conclusions from this one.

Corollary proposition 1. Music as art is originally attributed to the *first dimension* (it has only *one* dimension).

Corollary proposition 2. The necessary form of music is *succession*, for time is the universal form of the informing of the infinite into the finite and to that extent is intuited as form, abstracted from the real. The principle of time within the subject is self-consciousness, which is precisely the informing, within the ideal, of the unity of consciousness into multiplicity. This also enables us to comprehend better the close relationship between the sense of hearing in general and music and speech in particular with self-consciousness. It also enables us to comprehend in a preliminary fashion—until we have demonstrated its even higher significance—the arithmetical side of music. Music is the real self-numbering of the soul—Pythagoras already compared the soul to a number—yet for precisely that reason it is also an unconscious, self-forgetting numbering or counting. Hence, Leibniz could say: *Musica est raptus numerare se nescientis animae*.[3] (The other determination of the character of music can be developed only within its relationship to the other arts.)

§78. *Music as the form in which the real unity becomes its own symbol encompasses necessarily all other unities within itself*, for the real unity takes *itself* (within *art*) as potence merely in order to represent *itself, through itself, absolutely* as form. Each unity in its own absoluteness, however, encompasses all others as well; hence, music also encompasses all others.

§79. *Within music itself, that particular informing of unity into multiplicity, an informing that is itself encompassed as a particular unity—in this case the real unity—is rhythm.*

If for the sake of this proof I may employ the most general concept of rhythm, then rhythm in this sense is nothing more than the periodic subdivision of homogeneity whereby the uniformity of the latter is combined with variety and thus unity with multiplicity. For example, the emotion that a piece of music arouses as a whole is a completely homogeneous, uniform one. It is, for example, cheerful or sad. Through the various rhythmic subdivisions, however, this single feeling that alone would have been completely homogeneous acquires variety and diversity. Rhythm is one of the most wonderful mysteries of nature and art, and no human invention appears to be more immediately or directly inspired by nature.

The ancients roundly attributed to rhythm the greatest aesthetic power. Neither can one easily deny that everything one can call truly beautiful in music or dance actually has to do with the rhythm. In order to comprehend rhythm most purely, however, we must separate out everything else in music that is stimulating or exciting. Tones, for example, are also significant in themselves. They can be cheerful, gentle, sad, or painful. Yet when we view rhythm we must completely abstract from them. Its beauty is not material and it does not require the merely natural affectations residing within tones in and for themselves in order to be absolutely pleasing and to enchant a receptive soul. To see this more clearly, imagine first the elements of rhythm as being completely indifferent, as are, for example, the individual tones of a string by themselves, or the beat of a drum. How can a series of such beats become significant, exciting, or pleasing? Beats or tones that succeed one another without the slightest order have no effect on us. Though these tones may be completely meaningless and not even modestly pleasing by themselves or as simple physical sounds, as soon as they acquire regularity such that they continually recur in equal intervals and collectively constitute a unit, we already encounter something of rhythm, albeit only a very distant beginning—and we are irresistibly called to attentiveness. The human being, however, driven by an impulse of nature, seeks through rhythm to impose variety or diversity onto everything that in and for itself constitutes a *pure identity* of activity. In every activity that is by nature meaningless, such as counting, we do not endure long within that uniformity. We divide it into units. Most mechanical workers make their work easier this way. The inner pleasure of that—not really conscious, but rather unconscious—counting enables them to forget the work, and the individual comes in at his appointed place with a kind of pleasure, since it would pain him to see the rhythm interrupted.

Until now, we have described only the most imperfect kind of rhythm, in which the entire unity within a particular multiplicity depends only on the uniformity of the intervals within the sequence. An image of this might be equally large, equally separated points. That is the lowest level of rhythm.

A higher kind of unity within multiplicity is acquired first of all if the individual tones or beats are not sounded with equal strength, but rather alternate according to a certain regularity as strong and weak ones. With this the necessary

element of *tact* enters into rhythm. This, too, is sought wherever something identical is to become different or varied, and it is capable of numerous variations itself whereby an even greater variety enters into the uniformity of the sequence.

In general, rhythm is viewed as the transformation of an essentially meaningless succession into a meaningful one. Succession or sequence purely as such possesses the character of chance. The transformation of the accidental nature of a sequence into necessity = rhythm, whereby the whole is no longer subjected to time but rather possesses time *within itself*. Articulation within music is the forming of units into a series such that several tones together constitute yet another unit, one that is not accidentally or arbitrarily separated from others.

This as yet merely *simple* rhythm—consisting of a tonal sequence divided into units of equal length, each of which is distinguished perceptibly from the other—can nonetheless display a wide variety of types. For example, it can be even or uneven, and so on. Yet several tacts together can be further combined into units that then constitute a higher potence of rhythm—complex rhythm (in poesy: the couplet). Finally, larger units (phrases) can be made from these complex units (in poesy: the stanza), and so on until this entire structure and composition still remains comprehensible to the inner poetic sense. The final perfection of rhythm, however, is illuminated for us by the following propositions.

Addendum. Rhythm is the music within music, for the particularity of music is based precisely on its character as the informing of unity into multiplicity. Since according to §79 rhythm is nothing more than this informing ***within*** music itself, it is thus the music within music, and, according to the nature of this art form, is the predominating feature within it.

Only if we remember this proposition will we be able to comprehend scientifically particularly the contrast between ancient and modern music.

§80. *Rhythm in its completed state necessarily encompasses the other unity within itself, which in this subdivision is modulation* (in the most general meaning of the term). The first part of this proposition is self-evident and can be comprehended quite generally. Regarding the second, we need only explain what modulation is.

The first prerequisite of rhythm is unity within multiplicity. This multiplicity, however, does not inhere merely in the simple difference between the various units insofar as they take place arbitrarily or nonessentially, that is, simply within time, but rather insofar as they are simultaneously based on something real, essential, and qualitative. This quality resides only within the musical variability of the tones themselves. In this respect modulation is the art of maintaining the identity of the one tone that is the predominating one within the whole of a musical work, to maintain it in the *qualitative* difference just as through rhythm itself the same identity is observed in the quantitative difference.

I must express myself in generalities here because modulation has so many different meanings in the language of art, and I do not want any of that particular

meaning that modulation possesses only within modern music to suggest itself here. That artificial method of guiding song and harmony through several tones by means of so-called modulation and cadences, and of finally returning to the main tone, belongs totally to the modern art of music.

Since it is impossible for me to go into all these technical considerations that belong to the theory of music and not to a general construction, you must note merely in *general* that the two unities designated by rhythm and modulation are to be conceived as quantitative and qualitative unities, respectively. The former, however, must in its own absolute state also encompass the latter such that the independence of the latter unity from the first would necessarily suspend the first in that absoluteness, and yields as its product a music based only on harmony. This will become clearer in the following discussion.

Rhythm in this sense, that is, *to the extent that it already encompasses the other unity*, is thus music in its entirety. This also generates for us the idea of a distinction arising from the fact that in the first case music in its entirety is subordinated to the first unity, rhythm, in the second case to the second unity, modulation, whereby two equally absolute yet different genres of music emerge.

§81. *The third unity in which the first two are posited as equal is melody*. Since this proposition is actually merely an explication, and since none will doubt that the union of rhythm and modulation is *melody*, it needs no proof. For the sake of illustrating the relationship among the three unities within music itself, we wish rather to qualify them further according to different standards.

One can thus say: rhythm = first dimension, modulation = second, melody = third. The first determines or qualifies music for reflection and self-consciousness, the second for feeling and judgment, and the third for intuition and the power of imagination. We can also see already that if the three basic forms or categories of art are music, painting, and the plastic arts, then rhythm is the musical element within music, modulation is the element of painting (not to be confused with *musical painting*, which only a completely degenerate and sunken sense of taste can find good in music, such as that contemporary sensibility that finds edification in the bleating of the sheep in Haydn's creation music),[4] and melody is the plastic element. We can now see quite easily from the proof given in the preceding proposition that rhythm in this sense (namely, as encompassing the opposite unity) and melody are themselves one and the same.

Addendum. Rhythm conceived in absoluteness is the entirety of music, or vice versa: the entirety of music is rhythm in its absoluteness, for rhythm directly encompasses the other unity and constitutes melody through itself, and is thus the entirety.

Rhythm in the larger sense is the predominating potence in music. Insofar as the entirety of music—hence rhythm, modulation, and melody—might be subordinated collectively to rhythm, we have rhythmic music. Such was the music of antiquity. Virtually anyone can see how precisely in this construction all relationships and qualifications recur, and that here, too, rhythm as the informing of the infinite into the finite resides on the side of antiquity, whereas the opposite unity, as we will see, is the predominating element of modernity.

We do not, it is true, have access to *concrete* examples of the music of antiquity. I refer the reader to Rousseau's *Dictionnaire de Musique*[5] (still the most intelligent work on this art form), where one will find how little we can think of rendering even moderately accessible the music of antiquity by means of performance. Since the Greeks were enormously successful in all the arts, they were certainly also successful in music. As little as we admittedly know about that music, we do know that here, too, the realistic, plastic, heroic principle predominated, and it predominated solely by subordinating everything else to rhythm. The predominating element in contemporary music is harmony, which is precisely the opposite of the rhythmic melody of antiquity, as I will show more specifically.

The only trace—and a highly distorted one at that—of the music of antiquity still resides in the *chorale*. It is true, as Rousseau says, that by the time the Christians began to sing hymns and psalms in their own churches, music had already lost virtually all of its emphasis. The Christians took it as they found it, and in addition robbed it of its most powerful energy: tempo and rhythm. Yet in those early times the chorale always remained monophonic, and this is actually what Canto Firmo means. In later times it was always set in four voices, and the complex art of harmony also spread into church hymns. The Christians took music first from verse and set it to the prose of the scriptures or to a totally barbaric poesy. Thus arose that form of song that now is dragged along without tact and with perpetually identical steps; along with its rhythmic pace it also lost all its energy. Only in a few hymns did one still sense the rise and fall of the verse, since the tempo of the syllables and the meter were maintained. Yet in spite of all these deficiencies, Rousseau, too, finds in the chorale that the priests in the Roman church have preserved in its original character, extremely valuable remnants of the music of antiquity and of its various keys to the extent it was possible to preserve them without tact and rhythm.

§82. *Melody, which is the subordination of the three unities of music to the first unity, can be juxtaposed to its opposite: harmony as the subordination of the three unities to the other*. The merely empirical theoreticians also generally recognize harmony as the opposite of melody. Melody is in music the absolute informing of the infinite into the finite, and thus is the entire unity. Harmony is similarly music, and to that extent is no less the informing of identity into difference; yet this unity is symbolized here by the opposing one—the ideal unity. In common language usage one says of a musician that he understands melody if he can compose a monophonic piece distinguished by both rhythm and modulation. Similarly, he understands harmony if he also is able to lend broadness (expansion of the second dimension) to that identity that is taken up into difference within

rhythm, and hence when he is able to unite several voices, each of which has its own melody, into a pleasant sounding—harmonious—whole. In the first case we are obviously dealing with unity within multiplicity, in the second with multiplicity within unity; in the first case with succession, in the second with coexistence.

Harmony also inheres in the melody, but only in subordination to rhythm (the plastic element). We are speaking here of harmony to the extent that it excludes such subordination to rhythm, to the extent that it is itself the *whole*, subordinated to the second dimension.

Harmony does indeed acquire various meanings from the various theoreticians, such that it may signify, for example, the union of many simultaneously sounded tones into one single sonority. Here we are thus taking harmony in its highest simplicity in which, for example, it is also a characteristic of an individual sonority, since in the latter several tones different from it also resound, but which are united so perfectly that one thinks one is hearing only a single tone. If we now apply this same concept of multiplicity within unity to the larger units of an entire musical piece, then harmony consists of different tonal relationships within each of these units nonetheless being brought into a unity within the whole. Similarly, that same unity as regards the tonal piece as a whole means the resumption of all possible particular unities and of all complexities of tones—not different as regards rhythm, but as regards modulation—into the absolute unity of the whole. This general concept shows us adequately that harmony is related to rhythm and to that extent also to melody, since melody is nothing but integrated rhythm—I repeat: harmony is related to melody just as the ideal unity is to the real or as the informing of multiplicity into unity is to the opposite informing of unity into multiplicity—which was what we wanted to prove.

It is important to remember here that harmony, to the extent that it is juxtaposed to melody, is in its own turn the *whole*, and is thus the *one* of the two unities insofar as one reflects only on the *form*, but not insofar as one reflects on the *essence*. In the latter case harmony is itself identity *in itself* and thus the identity of all three unities, yet expressed here in the ideal unity. Only to this extent can harmony and melody really be juxtaposed antithetically to one another.

If one now asks about the precedence of harmony or melody in this sense, we find ourselves in the same situation as if one were to ask in general about the precedence of the art of antiquity over that of modernity. If we consider the essence, then admittedly each of the two constitutes the undivided entirety of music. If we consider the form, however, then our judgment will have to be the same as that regarding the art of antiquity and modernity in the larger sense. The antithesis of the two is that the former represents in general the real, the essential, the necessary; the latter represents also the ideal, nonessential, and accidental elements in identity with the essential and necessary. Applied to the case at hand, rhythmic music in general presents itself as an expansion of the infinite within the finite such that the latter (the finite) counts for something by itself, whereas in harmonic music finitude or difference appears only as an allegory of the infinite or of the unity. The former remains, one might say, more faithful to the natural character of music, which is to be an art of succession. Hence, it is realistic. The latter would like to anticipate in the deeper sphere the higher ideal unity, to suspend the element of succession from an ideal vantage point, as it were, and portray the multiplicity of the moment as unity. Rhythmic music, which represents the infinite within the finite, will be more the expression of satisfaction and of vigorous passion. Harmonic music will be more the expression of striving and of yearning. Within the church, whose basic vision is based on the yearning and striving of difference back to unity, it was thus necessary for that element of communal striving that actually began from each individual, a striving to view oneself within the absolute as one with everyone else—that this striving necessarily had to express itself through harmonic, rhythmless music. In contrast, an association such as that within the Greek states—one in which a pure collectivity, the species or type itself, had developed completely into a particular unto itself and *was* that particular—had to be rhythmic in its music just as it was rhythmic in its manifestation as a state.

If a person does not possess a closer or more specific acquaintance with music, and nonetheless wishes to see the relationship between rhythm and rhythmic melody to harmony, let him imagine a comparison between a play by Sophocles and one by Shakespeare. A work by Sophocles possesses pure rhythm, and presents only what is necessary. It has no superfluous dimensions. Shakespeare, on the other hand, is the greatest harmonic artist and the master of dramatic counterpoint. We are presented not with the simple rhythm of a single event but rather simultaneously with its entire accompaniment and its reflex from various sides. Compare, for example, *Oedipus* and *King Lear*. In the former we encounter nothing but the pure melody of the event. In the latter, in contrast, the fate of Lear, expelled by his daughters, is juxtaposed to the story of a son who is expelled by his father, such that to each individual moment of the whole another moment is juxtaposed that both accompanies and reflects it.

The differences in judgment concerning the superiority of harmony or melody can as little be resolved as those concerning ancient and modern art as such. Rousseau calls the former a Gothic, barbaric invention. On the other hand, there are those who are enthusiastic about harmony who consider true music to have come into being only with the invention of counterpoint. Such a view, of course, is adequately refuted by the simple fact that the ancients possessed a music of great strength without any knowledge of harmony, or at least without any employment of it. Most people are of the opinion that polyphonic singing was, in fact, invented only in the twelfth century.

§83. *The forms of music are the forms of the eternal things insofar as they are viewed from the real perspective*, for the real side of the eternal things is that side

from which the infinite is formed into the finite. Yet this same informing of the infinite into the finite is also the form of music, and since the forms of art in general are the essential forms of things, the forms of music are necessarily the forms of things in themselves or of the ideas viewed completely from their real side.

Since this has been proved in the larger sense, it is also true of the particular forms of music—of rhythm and harmony—namely, that they express the forms of the eternal things insofar as the latter are viewed entirely from the perspective of their particularity. Furthermore, to the extent that the eternal things or the ideas are revealed from the real side within the cosmic bodies, the forms of music as the forms of ideas viewed concretely are also the forms of the being and life of the cosmic bodies as such; hence, music is nothing other than the perceived rhythm and the harmony of the visible universe itself.[6]

Various annotations

(1) In general, philosophy, like art, is not concerned with things themselves, but rather only with their forms or eternal essence. The thing itself, however, is precisely nothing other than this particular mode or form of being, and through these forms one possesses the things. In its plastic works, for example, art does not strive to compete with similar products of nature as regards actual concrete elements. It seeks rather the pure form, the ideal, of which the thing itself, of course, is simply the other perspective. Applied to the case at hand, in rhythm and harmony music portrays the form of the movements of the cosmic bodies, the pure *form* as such, liberated from the object or from matter. To that extent, music is the art form that divests itself to the highest degree of corporeality by portraying *pure* movement as such, separated from the object, and by being carried by invisible, almost spiritual wings.

(2) As is well known, the first advocate of this view of the heavenly movements as rhythm and music was Pythagoras. It is equally well known, however, how little his ideas have been understood, and one can easily guess in what distorted form they have come down to us. People have usually understood Pythagoras's doctrine of the music of the spheres quite crassly, namely, to the effect that the fast movements of such large bodies must *cause resonance*. Because these bodies rotate with different yet measured velocity and in increasingly expanded circles, this resonance generates a consonant harmony organized according to the tonal relationships of music, such that the solar system resembles a seven-stringed lyre. This view takes the whole affair empirically. Pythagoras does not say that these movements *cause* music, but rather that they themselves *are* music.[7] This indwelling movement needed no external medium through which to become music. It was music within itself, or inherently. Later, when people assumed that the space between the cosmic bodies was empty, or

when at most they would admit only a very slight, delicate medium to be present there within which no friction could occur and no resonance elicited or transmitted, they believed they had done away with Pythagoras's theory, one they actually had never understood. The usual explanation was that Pythagoras himself had said that one could not perceive that music because of its enormous power and its continuity, similar to the situation of people who live in a mill. We are probably supposed to understand this in quite the opposite fashion, namely, that people do indeed live in a mill, but they are unable to perceive that heavenly music because of the physical sounds around them. Our lack of perception of this music simply shows this to be the case. In Plato, Socrates says: That person is a musician who progresses beyond physically perceived harmonies to the suprasensible, cerebral harmonies and *their* proportions.[8]

Philosophy still has an even greater problem to solve: the law of the number and the distances of the planets. Only then can one expect to gain insight into the inner tonal system, which until now has remained a totally closed subject. We can see how little our present tonal system is based on insight and science by the fact that many intervals and types of musical progression customary within ancient music are impossible according to our divisions or even incomprehensible to us.

(3) Only now can we establish the ultimate significance of rhythm, harmony, and melody. They are the first and purest forms of movement in the universe and, viewed from the real perspective, are the mode in which material things are equal to the ideas. The cosmic bodies float on the wings of harmony and rhythm.[9] That which one calls centripetal and centrifugal force is nothing other than harmony and rhythm, respectively.[10] Elevated by the same wings, music floats in space to weave an audible universe from the transparent body of sound and tone.

The entire system of music also manifests itself in the solar system. Kepler already attributed major tonality to the aphelion, minor tonality to the perihelion. To the various planets he attributes the distinguishing characteristics that in music are attributed to the bass, tenor, alto, and soprano.

Even more, however, we find in the solar system an expression of the *contrast* between melody and harmony, a contrast that appeared sequentially in art.

In the realm of planets, rhythm is the predominating element; their movements are *pure melody*. In the realm of comets, harmony predominates. Just as the entire modern world is generally subject to centripetal force against the universe—the yearning toward the center—so also the comets, whose movements therefore express mere harmonic confusion without any rhythm. And just as, on the other hand, the life and works of antiquity were expansive like their art—centrifugal, that is, absolute within itself and rhythmic—so also does centrifugal force predominate in the movements of the planets, the expansion of the infinite within the finite.

(4) The position of music within the general system of arts is also determined according to this evidence. The general world structure operates completely independently from the other potences of nature. Depending on the perspective, it can be the highest and most universal element, the sphere in which the confusion of concrete reality directly suspends or dissolves itself into purest reason. Or it is also the deepest potence. So also music, which viewed from the one perspective is the most universal or general of the real arts and closest to that dissolution into language and reason, even though from the other perspective it is merely the first potence of the real arts.

The cosmic bodies in nature are the first unities that emerge from eternal matter. They also encompass everything within themselves, even though they must contract into themselves and withdraw into narrower and more particular spheres in order to portray the highest organization within themselves in which the unity of nature attains perfect self-intuition. The type of reason inherent within them thus expresses itself in their general movements only for the first potence. Music, which from the one perspective is the most closed of all arts, the one that comprehends forms still within chaos and without differentiation, and that expresses only the pure form of these movements separated from corporeality, similarly takes up the absolute model or figure only as rhythm, harmony, and melody, that is, for the first potence, even though within this sphere it is the most boundless of all arts.

This concludes the construction of music, since all construction of art can only intend to present its forms as the essential forms of things. This has been accomplished as regards music.

Before proceeding further, let me recall the following general points.

Our present task is the construction of the *particular forms of art*. Since substance and form are one in the absolute and therefore also within the principle of art, then only that which is within matter, content, or essence can also become form. The differentiation between substance and form, however, can be based only on the premise that whatever is posited as absolute identity within substance, be posited as relative identity within form.

Now, within the absolute in and for itself the universal and the particular are one such that in it the particular unities or forms of unity are posited as absolute. Yet for precisely this reason, because within it they are absolute and as regards each thus the form is also the essence, and the essence the form—for precisely this reason, I repeat, they are indistinguishable and undifferentiated within it; those unities or eternal ideas as such can become truly objective by becoming their own symbol *in their particularity*, as particular forms. That which appears *through them* is merely the absolute unity, the idea in and for itself. The form is only the body with which it clothes itself and in which it becomes objective.

The first unity within the absolute essence is in general the one whereby it bears its subjectivity and eternal unity into objectivity or multiplicity, and this

unity, conceived in its absoluteness or as the one side of the absolute act of production, is eternal matter or substance or eternal nature itself. Without this the absolute would be and remain a self-enclosed subjectivity without being discerned or distinguished. Only through subject-objectivation does it manifest itself within objectivity and then as a recognized object guide itself back from this objectivity into its own self-recognition.[11] This reverse development of objectivity into itself is the other unity that within it is inseparable from the first. Just as we see the perfected informing of subjectivity into objectivity within the organism immediately change into reason as the absolute ideal, so also within the absolute. There, where the informing is always absolute, the objective element of that subject-objectivation immediately transfigures itself into the aether of absolute ideality, such that the absolutely real element is always simultaneously the absolutely ideal element, and both are essentially one and the same. The absolute, insofar as it manifests itself in the phenomenal world through the first of the two unities, is the essence of matter; all art, insofar as it takes the same unity as its form, is plastic or formative art. Within such art, just as within matter itself, all unities are encompassed and express themselves through the particular art forms. The first of these, which takes the informing of unity into multiplicity as its form in order to portray the universe within it, is, as we just proved, music. We now move on to the other unity and must construe the art form corresponding to it. For this purpose we also need several borrowed propositions from general philosophy, propositions I will now use as a preface.

§84. *Borrowed proposition. The infinite concept of all finite things, insofar as it is contained in the real unity, is light.*[12] Since this proof is a part of general philosophy, I will offer only the main points here.

For now, let us note the following points: (a) Light = concept, *ideal* unity, (b) but ideal unity within the real unity. The proof is given most expediently by the juxtaposition with the other unity. In the latter, the identity of eternal matter as such is formed into difference and therefore into differentiated and particular things. Here, difference or particularity is the predominating element; identity can be comprehended only as unity within *multiplicity*. In the opposing unity, identity, the essence, the universal is the predominating element. Reality dissolves or suspends itself again into ideality. Yet this ideality must in the larger sense be subordinated to reality and to difference, since it is the ideal unity within the real unity. Since the universal form of the real within difference is space, it must thus appear as an ideal element of or within space. Hence, it must describe space without filling it, and as the ideal unity of matter it must everywhere display in an ideal fashion all the attributes which matter displays in a real fashion. All these conditions, however, are met only by light; thus light is the infinite idea, *within* the real unity, of all difference, which is precisely what was to be proved.

The relationship of light to matter can also be clarified in the following fashion.

The idea in its dual aspects repeats itself within both individuality and the whole. In its real aspect, where it forms its subjectivity into an objectivity, it is still fully idea even though it does not appear as such, but rather as *being*. Within the real element of appearance, the idea leaves only one of its characteristics behind. In the ideal element of appearance, it manifests itself as something ideal, but for just that reason does so only in opposition or juxtaposition to that real element, and thus as something *relatively* ideal. The *essential nature* is precisely that wherein the two sides are one. Applied to the case at hand, we can say that the element of corporeality is the one side of the idea in its objectivity, the real side. The other side, where the idea appears as something *ideal*, is light, but it appears *as* something ideal only inasmuch as it leaves behind the other side, or the real side; we can already anticipate here that the higher element in nature, too, will be that in which matter and light are again one.

Light is the element of the ideal that is manifested in nature, the first breakthrough of idealism. The *idea itself* is *light*, but *absolute* light. In phenomenal light, the idea appears *as* something ideal, as light, but only as *relative* light, as something relatively ideal. It casts off its outer covering with which it clothes itself in *matter*, yet in order to *appear as* something ideal it must appear in contrast to the real.

It is not possible for me to discuss this view of light in all its ramifications, and I therefore refer to its treatment in general philosophy. Here I must discuss further first the relationship of light to sonority, and second the sense of sight as the necessary condition for the existence of light for art.

(a) Concerning the *relationship of light to sonority*, it is well known how many comparisons have been made, even though the true identity and distinction concerning the two has, to my knowledge, not yet been determined.

We remarked that essence or identity gives itself form within matter. In light, on the other hand, form or particularity is transfigured again into essence. This set of circumstances must also give us some insight into the relationship between light and sonority. As we know, sonority is not posited absolutely. It is posited only under the condition of a movement transmitted to the body itself whereby it is set out of indifference with itself. Sonority itself is nothing other than the indifference of soul and body. It constitutes this indifference, however, only insofar as it resides in the first dimension. Wherever the eternal concept is combined absolutely with the thing itself, as is the case with what we may call the cosmic body, which as finite is also infinite, there emerges that inner music of the movements of the stars. Wherever that eternal concept is combined in a merely relative fashion with the thing, sonority emerges, which is nothing other than the act of the reinforming of the ideal into the real, and thus the manifestation of indifference after both have been wrested from indifference.

The element of the ideal is not essentially *sonority*, just as the concept of a thing is not essentially soul. The concept of the human being becomes *soul* precisely only in its relationship to the body or corporeality, just as the body is only body in its relationship to the soul. Similarly, what we call the sonority of a body is precisely that ideal element posited in relationship to its body. Hence, if that which reveals itself in sonority is only the concept of the thing, then we in contrast will equate light with the *idea* of things, or with that wherein the finite is truly joined to the infinite. Sonority is thus the indwelling or finite light of corporeal things, and light is the infinite soul of all corporeal things.

Absolute light itself, however, light as genuinely absolute suspension or resolution of difference into identity, would never of itself fall into the sphere of objectivity as an actual phenomenon. Only as something relatively ideal and thus simultaneously in both opposition and relative unity with corporeality can it *appear as* light.

The question is, how can one conceive of such a unity between light and body? Our fundamental presuppositions do not allow us to admit any direct effect of one upon the other. As little as we can assume that the soul is able to become the immediate *cause* of an effect within the body, or the body within the soul, just as little can we allow light to have an immediate effect on corporeality or in a reverse fashion the latter to have an immediate effect on light. Light and body can thus, if at all, be one only through preestablished harmony, and only through that wherein they *are* one, and not affect one another through some one-sided causal relationship. It is gravity that reappears here in the higher potence, the absolute identity that, be it in reflection or in refraction, unites light and corporeality. The general expression of such light synthesized with corporeality is *obscured* light, or color. Hence, as an *addendum* to §84 we may state the following:

Light can appear as light only in opposition or contrast to nonlight, and hence only as color.

The body in general is nonlight, just as light in contrast is nonbody. As certainly as absolute light appears within empirical light only as something relatively ideal, just as certainly can it appear in general only in contrast to the element of the real. Light combined with nonlight is in general obscured light, that is, color.

Theories concerning the origin of colors are by no means unimportant for the theory of art, though it is well known that no contemporary artist who has reflected on his art ever made use of the *Newtonian* theory of colors. Yet this very fact would suffice to prove how totally unfounded this theory is in nature, since nature and art are one. The instinct of artists taught them to recognize the general contrast of colors—which they expressed as the polarity of coldness and warmth—quite independently of the Newtonian ideas. Goethe's new views of this theory are based equally on both the natural and artistic effects of colors.[13] In them one sees the innermost harmony between nature and art, whereas in the

Newtonian theory there was absolutely no way of combining the theory itself with the actual practice of the artist.

The principle upon which a true understanding of color must be based is the *absolute identity and simplicity of light*. Newton's theory refutes itself for anyone who has elevated himself at all above the perspective of one-sided causal relationships, at the very least because regarding the phenomenon of color production in the refraction of light through transparent bodies Newton considers *these* bodies themselves completely accidental and ignores them. Thus he was forced to locate all multiplicity and variety of color within light itself, and to assume it was an inherent, mechanically united, and mechanically separable variety. As is well known, according to Newton light is composed of seven rays of differing refractability, such that each simple ray is actually a bundle of seven colored rays. This conception is refuted adequately by the higher perspective of the nature of light itself, so that we need not bother ourselves with additional refutation.

In order to comprehend fully the phenomenon of color, we must first have some understanding of the relationship between *transparent* and *nontransparent bodies* and light.

A body is obscured as regards light to the extent that it separates itself from the allness of other bodies and emerges as an independent body, for light is the identity of all bodies. So to the extent that it separates itself from that totality, it also separates itself from light, for it has more or less taken up that identity *into itself* as a particular. This is true to the extent that the least transparent bodies, the metals, are also precisely those in which there inheres that inner light, *sonority*. *Relative self-identity* is that quality whereby a body emerges from identity with all other bodies. This relative identity (= cohesion, magnetism), however, is based on a relative indifference between its particular aspect on the one hand, and its universal aspect or concept on the other. The obscuring effect regarding light will thus cease only where this relative identity is suspended to the point that either the purely universal element or the purely particular element predominates—and thus at the ends of the cohesion series—or where both are reduced to absolute indifference. The latter is the case in water, whose universal element is completely the particular, the particular the entire universal. The same holds true where the struggle between absolute cohesion (whereby the body is self-contained) and relative cohesion (whereby it belongs to light) is perfectly balanced, and the body is totally earth and totally sun. Further elucidations of these propositions, as is obvious, belong to a different sphere of the investigation.

Such a body in perfect identity with light (it would be an absolutely transparent body) would no longer be in opposition to light anywhere. Only insofar as the body remains a particular body or is relatively—in part—in opposition to light, does absolute identity, which enters here as the force of gravity in the higher potence, synthesize light with that body. (That, in fact, it is not the *body* that refracts the light follows from the Newtonian experience that the refraction does

not occur immediately, but rather at some distance from the surface of the body itself, for which Newton assumes an *actio in distans*, something I—in the Newtonian sense—reject not only here but everywhere.) This synthesis of light and body is equally the case with both transparent and nontransparent bodies, except that the latter reflect the light, whereas the transparent body takes it into itself and permeates itself with it. Since, however, transparency is nowhere perfect, and since in those transparent bodies that refract light most there also obtains the largest preponderance of particularity, light or the identity within light itself is synthesized with particularity or difference and thus obscured. (All our transparent bodies are obscuring agents.) Again, however, neither light by itself nor the body by itself, but rather that wherein both are one, produces color. In this process, light is thus neither divided nor split in any way, neither chemically nor mechanically decomposed. Rather, it itself remains as the one factor of the process in its absolute simplicity. All difference is posited or affected through nonlight or the body. Color is = light + nonlight, positive + negative.

The most important point in understanding the artistic effects of colors is an understanding of the totality of colors. That whereby a totality is possible at all is multiplicity in unity, and thus a contrast that must manifest itself in all color manifestations. In order to portray this contrast, we do not necessarily have to proceed directly to the image of a prism, something in itself already a complex and complicated phenomenon. No wonder Newton arrived at no other conclusion, since he took precisely this phenomenon to be primary, and no wonder it took no less an intuition that that of Goethe to find the true thread of this phenomenon, which Newton had concealed so artificially in the tangle he called his theory. Even today physicists consider the prismatic phenomenon to be the most basic. Artists, too, throw themselves at its feet even though it leaves a great deal unexplained that really does have an effect on their art. We can already find the contrast of colors in much simpler cases. This includes the phenomena of colored glasses or colored liquids, which Newton tried to explain on the basis of a difference between reflected and restringent light. If, for example, a blue-colored glass is held against a dark surface and the eye is situated between the light and the body, that color progresses into the deepest blue. The same body, held such that it is between the eye and the light, gives off the most beautiful yellow red or even intense red. Here the red color emerges immediately through a diminution of the obscuring effect, whereas in the first case the darker color emerges through a simple increase of that same effect. The two color poles still exclude one another here. They do not appear simultaneously, but rather sequentially. Through a connected series of different lenses through which one allows the light to pass, the first of which yet allows the light to pass as perfectly white, one can, in a dark room, finally obscure that first white light to a *red* light. Through a further series one would drive it into the color blue. According to this law, the sky colors itself blue for us, and the rising sun red in contrast. *These* phenomena, in

which a simple increase or decrease of the obscuring effect generates color, are the simple ones we should use as our point of departure. All kinds of prismatic manifestations depend on much more accidental conditions. One can generally say that they depend on a double image being seen. We *see* light and nonlight at the same time (a subjective synthesis of light and nonlight takes place in the eye). The effect of refraction thus distorts the perceived image, yet no change occurs if it is led across a different, relatively dark or illuminated space such that the distorted image is seen simultaneously with another. Depending on whether this space is relatively light or dark compared to the other, the image appears variously colored on the edges. If, for instance, a lighter space against a dark background is distorted through the refraction, such that—with a reverse angle of refraction—the dark space is led from above into light, and the light space is led from below into darkness, then the warmer colors appear in the former place, the cold ones in the latter.

In the Newtonian experiments with a light falling onto a prism in a dark room, the sun does indeed appear as nothing but a light spot on a dark background. It has an effect with the completely general quality of an image of intense brightness against a completely dark background, outer space. The prismatic phenomenon, insofar as it is generated with that sunlight, is thus only one instance among all possible prismatic phenomena, the one where a bright space is seen against a dark background.

Here it is more important that we understand the completely secondary position of these phenomena.

The various colors taken together constitute a system just as do the various tones, and are for that reason essentially far more primal in nature than they appear within the prismatic image, whose conditions are accidental and derivative. The appearance of precisely these and no other colors under these conditions is necessary, since they are the only ones possible in the first place. Viewed by itself, the totality or system of colors thus indeed possesses a kind of necessity. It is not accidental, yet it must not necessarily be abstracted from just these prismatic phenomena, nor must the latter be considered to be the primary phenomenon in which colors generate themselves.

The contrast manifesting itself in the prismatic image between cold and warm colors juxtaposed in polarity is indeed a necessary one and is an essential part of the totality that colors constitute as a self-enclosed system. Yet this contrast is for just that reason also more primary than the derivative and complex phenomenon of the color spectrum. The polarity of colors is not to be conceived as one already at hand, but rather as one that is produced, one that generates itself everywhere light and nonlight are set in conflict. The color phenomenon is the emerging bud of light. The identity within light is combined into a totality with the difference posited into it by nonlight. The necessity of this polarity and inner totality of colors appears in a much higher context within the demands our sense of sight

makes, which are as important for art as they are interesting for scientific investigation.

Let us now turn our attention to the *sense of sight*.

(b)[14] The two sides that in the corporeal series and in light we encounter asunder—the real and ideal sides—are still together and one within the organism.[15] The relatively ideal element in light is integrated here by the real element. The essence of the organism is to *combine light with gravity*. The organism is wholly form and wholly matter, wholly activity and wholly being. The same light that in nature at large constitutes the intuitive activity of the universe is in the organism wedded to matter itself. It is no longer merely purely ideal activity as in nature at large, but rather ideal activity that, combined with matter, is the attribute of an existing entity. One and the same thing is simultaneously both the real and the ideal activity. Every element affecting the organism from outside constitutes for that organism a certain dimension. So also light, and if sensibility in general = third dimension, and if sight itself, on the other hand, is the blossom of sensibility, then the demand light makes on the organism is the product of the third organic dimension, perfect indifference between light and matter. Yet what is sight if not precisely this?

The ideal principle in and for itself would be pure thought, the real principle pure being. The organism's externally solicited capacity for indifference, however, again and again posits thinking and being as equal. Thought synthesized with being, however, is *intuition*. Intuitive intellectual activity is identity itself, which here in the reflected world represents the indifference of the ideal and the real. It is the essence, the substance of the organism—yet for just that reason simultaneously the *absolutely* ideal element, not just the mere relatively ideal element (as in light)—the producing element, the intuiting element. It is the feeling, hearing, seeing principle in the animal. It is the absolute light. The universal condition of *intuition* of this light is the indifference of A^2 and $A = B$.[16] Depending on the various ways in which or the circumstances under which both are equated, it is, for example, a hearing, seeing, or feeling principle. Every sense organ manifests this kind of indifference between the ideal and the real, light and gravity. In each such indifference, the essence or essential nature of the organism becomes productive, intuitive. Even considered from the physical perspective, the organic being does not view the object outside itself; it views only the indifference between the ideal and the real posited within that object. This indifference takes the place of the object. By virtue of the preestablished harmony between universal and organic nature, the same system inheres in the intuitions of the latter as is found in the corresponding forms of the external world. The harmony of the triad is something objective, and yet it is demanded by our sense of hearing. The same is the case with our sense of sight, whose demands deserve the deepest reflection from the artist who seeks to affect this, the most delicate of all organs. In everything intended to be pleasing to it, the eye demands the harmony of colors

according to the same necessity and laws according to which it is produced in external appearances. The ultimate delight for the eye is to be taken out of monotonous identity, then in the condition of highest difference to be placed by the element of totality into a perfect balance again. For this reason, the eye in general demands totality of colors in every painting; only a small amount of reflection and awareness is needed to see how perfect a sensibility for this demand has guided the greatest masters. Quite often one finds this demand satisfied in great compositions not merely insofar as the totality of colors was *necessary* for it. Often one finds the demand for a certain color that had no place in the main object satisfied by a secondary object, for example, the demand for yellow or some other color satisfied by fruit, flowers, and so on, introduced into the painting.

Yet even in those cases when the eye does not demand such perfect totality, it still nonetheless insists on the corresponding colors. This is particularly obvious in the manifestation of the so-called physiological colors. The eye, for example, which is fatigued by the stimulus of the color red, freely produces, after this stimulus is removed, the color green, or, more specifically, from blue and yellow as colors it produces that which is more directly opposed to them, namely, indifference. Green and purple exclude one another in the color picture, yet precisely because they do exclude one another, the eye demands them. Fatigued by green, the eye demands purple or the corresponding totality of violet and red, and through purple the most perfect green. This is also the case in art. The combination of purple and green in clothes, for example, produces the highest splendor.

I will now present another proposition, but will preface it with the following general statement.

From the idea of light it follows immediately that as the *particular* unity it can only appear under the condition of contrast. It is the ideal unity emerging within the real. If it is to appear *as this* unity, it must appear as the reforming of difference into identity, but not *as absolute identity* (for in absoluteness unity is not distinguished as particular) and accordingly merely in relative identity. Now, the particular, however, or difference, is *in and for itself* nothing but the negation of the universal or of identity. Only insofar as the universal or identity itself is transformed into the particular is it *real* (for this reason, the informing of unity into multiplicity is the *real* unity). If, then, in the ideal unity or in the reforming of the particular into the absolute the particular is still to be distinguished as such, it can be distinguished only *as negation*. Accordingly, the universal and the particular in the manifestation of the ideal unity will relate only as reality and privation, and thus, since the universal is light, only as light and nonlight. Or particularity can be represented in the universal only as privation or limitation of reality.

§85. *The art form that takes the ideal unity in its discernibleness as its symbol is painting*. This follows directly from the preceding propositions, since the ideal unity in its relativity appears within nature through the contrast of light and nonlight. Yet painting employs precisely the same thing as the *medium* of its portrayal.

Annotation. The further determinations of painting follow automatically from this initial concept.

§86. *The necessary form of painting is suspended succession*. This proposition follows immediately from the concept of time already proved in §77. The informing of unity into multiplicity is time. Since painting is based rather on the opposing unity, the informing of multiplicity into unity, its necessary form is suspended succession.

Painting, by suspending time, nonetheless needs space, and needs it such that it is forced to add space to the object itself. The painter can paint not a single flower, not a single figure, in fact, he can portray nothing without simultaneously *portraying in the painting itself* the space in which the object is found. The products of painting thus cannot yet function as universes with self-contained internal space and yet no external space at all. In what follows we will return to this point and show how painting approaches the highest art form by treating space as a necessary element and by portraying it, as it were, fused with the objects of its portrayal. In the perfect or complete painting, space in and for itself must possess meaning and significance, quite independent of the inner or qualitative circumstances obtaining in the painting.

There is yet another way to make this state of affairs clear. According to the previous discussions, the two arts of music and painting can be compared to the two sciences of arithmetic and geometry. The *geometrical figure* needs space external to it, since it makes no claim to reality and only portrays the *ideal* in space. A body possessing real external dimensions or extension also possesses space within itself and can be comprehended independently from any space external to it. Painting, which portrays only the ideal elements of reality, and no really corporeal figures at all, but rather only the schemata of such figures, necessarily needs space external to itself, just as geometrical figures are possible only through limitation of a given space.

Corollary proposition 1. Painting as an art form is primarily subordinated to *surface*. It portrays only surfaces, and *within* this limitation is able to elicit only the appearance of corporeality.

Corollary proposition 2. Painting is the first art form that portrays actual figures. Painting as such portrays the particular within the universal or within identity. The particular, however, can be differentiated from the universal only by means of limitation or negation. The limitation of identity, however, is precisely that which we call outline or contour (music lacks physical contours or actual form in this sense).

Corollary proposition 3. In addition to portraying objects themselves, painting must also portray space as such.

Corollary proposition 4. Just as music on the whole is subordinated to reflection, so also is painting to subsumption. General philosophy provides the proof that the factor determining outline and contour in a body is precisely that whereby it is characterized by subsumption. Simply through its very limitation it suspends itself as a particular and *as such* is capable of being subsumed under the universal. People long ago saw that painting is particularly an art of taste and of judgment, and is so necessarily, since it removes itself furthest from reality and is completely ideal. The element of the real is an object only of reflection or of intuition. Viewing or intuiting the real within the ideal, however, is an object of judgment.

Corollary proposition 5. Painting on the whole is a qualitative art, just as music on the whole is a quantitative art, for the former is based on the purely qualitative antitheses of reality and negation.

§87. *In painting, all the forms of unity recur: the real, the ideal, and the indifference of the two*. This follows from the universal principle that each particular art form in its own turn constitutes the entirety of art.

Addendum. The particular forms of unity insofar as they recur in painting are *drawing*, *chiaroscuro*, and *coloring*.

These three forms thus constitute what we might call the universal categories of painting. I will explain both the significance of each of these particular forms by itself and their union and cooperation within the whole. I remind you that I am not concerned with the technical aspect here, but rather with the absolute significance of each category.

Within painting as the ideal art form, *drawing* is the real form, the first framing of identity into particularity. The merging of this particularity in its own turn as difference into identity, and its suspension as difference, is the real art of chiaroscuro, which accordingly is the painting within painting. Yet since all art forms as such are only particular forms, and since it must be their goal to be absolute art within a particular form, it is easy to see that if painting were to fulfill all the demands as a particular art without doing justice to those of art in general, it would be thoroughly deficient and as yet incomplete. The formative arts as such are subordinated to the real unity. The real form is thus the first prerequisite of formative art, just as, for example, rhythm is of music. Drawing is the rhythm of painting. The contradictions among art connoisseurs and art critics concerning the greater or lesser importance of drawing or of coloring rest on a misunderstanding no less serious than that regarding whether rhythm or melody is more important in music. Some people maintain that there are paintings that, although only mediocre as regards drawing, nonetheless deserve a place among the masterpieces because of their excellence as regards the treatment of color. One cannot doubt that there really are such works prompting such judgments among connoisseurs, and one certainly cannot doubt the actual admiration for such art. One can, however, doubt the pleasant effect that a well-colored painting might

have regardless of any excellence in drawing. The tendency of art, however, is not toward sense reality, but rather always toward *beauty elevated above all sensuality*. The expression of absolute knowledge in things is their form. Only by means of form do they elevate themselves into the realm of light. Form is accordingly the primary element in all things whereby they also are adapted for art. Color is merely that through which the material side of things becomes form. It is merely the higher potence of form. All form, however, depends on drawing. Hence, only through drawing is painting actually art, just as only through color is painting actually painting. Painting as such focuses on the purely ideal side of things, but its main goal is by no means that kind of crass deception one usually insists upon in order to make us mistake the painted object for a real one.[17] *Such* a deception in its perfection would be impossible to attain without the additional verity of colors and the resulting living element arising from them, and if we were to demand it, we would sooner overlook considerable deficiencies in the drawing than in the coloring. Art as such, however, and painting as well, is so far removed from deception that in its highest works it must rather *destroy* that particular appearance of reality in the sense just discussed. Anyone who views the idealistic constructions of Greek artists must be smitten immediately by the impression of their nonreality. He must recognize that here something is portrayed that is elevated above all reality even though it is *made real* in this sublimity precisely through art. Anyone who needs deception in order to enjoy art, who has to forget that he actually has a work of art before him, is without a shadow of a doubt totally incapable of any artistic enjoyment whatever. At most, he may amuse himself with the most uncouth productions of Dutch painting, whereby, of course, neither higher satisfaction is given nor higher demands made than those that already can be found in the senses. It is a triviality generated by French art critics if one maintains that Raphael, for example, is superior in drawing but only mediocre in the treatment of color, or that Correggio, on the other hand, is inferior in drawing to the same extent that he is superior in the treatment of color. This statement is straightaway false. In many of his works, Raphael treated color quite as excellently as did Correggio, and in the overwhelming majority of his own works, Correggio drew just as excellently as did Raphael. Precisely in the case of Correggio, whom some art critics value less highly as regards drawing, we can see how deep and hidden this side of art is, since through the magic of chiaroscuro and coloring he was able to withdraw this side from common view.[18] Without the deeper foundation of his excellent drawing even the greatest beauty of colors would be unable to charm the connoisseur.

I will now briefly mention the main demands made on drawing.

The first demand is the observance of *perspective*. Explanation of the concept of perspective. Antithetical distinction between linear perspective and aerial perspective.[19]

It is particularly important that I explain the boundaries *within* which the observance of perspective is *necessary*, and *outside* which it becomes a free art or an end in itself.

As is everywhere the case, here, too, we encounter a contrast between ancient and modern art. The former was inclined entirely toward the necessary, the strictly essential, whereas the latter cultivated the accidental and gave it independent existence. There has been much discussion concerning whether the ancients were acquainted with linear perspective. We would doubtlessly be equally in error if we denied that the ancients knew and observed enough of perspective as is required for *correctness*, or if on the other hand we assumed that they employed perspective for deception, as do the moderns. To deny that they were acquainted with perspective to the extent it is required for general correctness without illusion is to attribute to them the greatest improprieties in painting, or to assert that they created monstrous figures. For example, if we see a person with outstretched arms from the side, but in proximity to him, such that one hand is farther from the eye than the other, then as regards perspective it is necessary that the farther hand appear smaller to the eye. Because we know, however, that in nature one hand is the same size as the other, in our intuition we find both of equal size. Considering this, if a painter were not to take perspective into consideration and nonetheless wished to make both hands really of equal size, he would thereby make a grave mistake, since a trained eye would *now* really perceive the closer hand as being smaller than the farther one. It would be a total absurdity to attribute such monstrosities to the ancients, monstrosities emerging from the neglect of perspective within the essential elements of the painting. On the other hand, the ancients were never able to make illusion an end in itself, to cultivate something that possesses worth only as a standard of correctness into an independent art, as the moderns have done with the treatment of perspective.

Perspective serves to avoid all harsh or unvaried monotony in the hands of someone who with facility and ease can make a square, for example, appear as a trapezoid, a circle as an ellipse. In general it aids in showing precisely the most beautiful parts of objects and their larger masses, and in concealing the less pleasing or petty elements. On the other hand, this free employment must never be expanded so far that through perspective only the pleasing elements are sought, while the strictness of necessity, that wherein the most sublime art of drawing must manifest itself, is circumvented.

Since drawing and painting first of all intend the presentation of *forms*, and since the condition of beauty—even though, to be sure, not the perfection of beauty itself—is to be pleasing, then the latter must be sought in drawing at least to the extent that it does not abrogate the higher demands of truth and correctness. The most worthy, indeed, the virtually only worthy object of formative art is the human figure. Just as the organism, inwardly and essentially, is self-generated and self-repeating succession, it also expresses this form externally

through the predominance of elliptical, parabolic, and other forms that best express difference within identity. In drawing one must avoid unvaried, continually recurring forms even in lesser objects; that is, here, too, the artist must have the symbol of organic form before him. Continually recurring forms are, for example, four-sided ones, since they consist of four lines of which two and two are always parallel, and equally the perfectly round ones, since viewed from all sides they are always the same. The oval and ellipse, however, still express difference and variety within identity. Among the regular figures, and for the same reason, the triangle is the least displeasing, since the angles are unequal as regards number and the lines form no parallels. One prerequisite of drawing is thus to avoid as much as possible any repetition of forms, every parallel, angles of equal degree, and particularly right angles, since in the latter there is no possibility at all of variety. Straight lines must be transformed as far as possible into wavy lines such that within the figure as a whole a balance that is as perfect and as proportionate as possible is observed between concave and convex shapes, those curved in and those curved out. Merely with this simple device one is able to lend the various members greater or lesser lightness, since a preponderance of outward curves suggests weight, of inward curves lightness.

These principles, however, all of which are based on the symbolic significance of the particular forms themselves, are by no means to be understood as the so-called elegant painters understand them. In their attempt to avoid as much as possible any square or angular forms, they fall into the error of nullity and of complete shallowness. One is, indeed, well advised to avoid abbreviations in figures whose nature it is to appear attractive or enticing, since here the muscles are variously interrupted by the fact that the sublime forms conceal the sinuous ones. In this case, a kind of section necessarily creates an angle. Hence, everywhere the character is to be hard, the expression strong, one should not shy away from these forms. Otherwise the slavery of pleasantness suppresses the truly great style that aims for a much higher truth than that which flatters through the senses. All the rules that the theoreticians offer concerning *forms* are of value only insofar as these forms are conceived in their absolute state, namely, in their symbolic quality. One cannot deny that for the eye, too, the straight line is the symbol of hardness, of inflexible dimensions, just as the bent line is a symbol of flexibility, the elliptical one—placed horizontally—of gentleness and transiency, the wavy line of life, and so on.

I now arrive at the primary demand that must be made of drawing, namely, *truth*, which admittedly would not be saying much if one were to understand by it only that particular kind of truth attainable through faithful imitation of nature.[20] The artist who wishes to attain it in the true sense must seek it at a deeper level than even nature has suggested and than the mere surface features of figures show. He should unveil the interior of nature, and thus particularly as regards the most worthy object, the human form, not satisfy himself merely with

the usual appearance of that form, but bring the more deeply concealed truth to the surface. Hence, he must penetrate into the deepest connections, into the play and patterns of sinews and muscles; in a broader sense he must show the human form not as it actually appears, but as it is in the design and idea of nature, which no real form fully expresses.

The truth of form includes observance of the relationship between individual parts, or proportion, which, again, the artist is to portray not according to the accidental appearances of truth in common reality, but freely, and according to the archetype of his own intuition. Everywhere in nature we notice the consistency in the formation of parts; for example, we expect to see just such feet and hands corresponding to a certain kind of face. Since the human figure is complex, and the symbolic significance possessed by the whole is distributed to the individual parts, the main point of proportion consists in observing the appropriate balance of parts such that each in particular expresses the meaning of the whole insofar as is appropriate. Here the famous torso of Hercules can serve as an example. "I see," Winckelmann says, "in the powerful contours of this body the undefeated energy of the victor over the powerful giants who rebelled against the gods, and who were defeated by him in the Phlegraean Fields. At the same time, the gentle features of these contours, which make the structure of this body light and flexible, represent for me the quick movements of the same person in his battle with the Achelous, which in spite of all its polymorphous metamorphoses was unable to escape his hands. *In every part of the body the entire hero reveals himself*, as if in a painting, *performing a particular deed*, and just as one correctly perceives the intentions within the rational structure of a palace, so also does one *here* see the use and deed for which each and every part served."[21]

Here in this passage Winckelmann expresses the ultimate mystery of the drawing arts. It is, first, to conceive the portrayal or representation as a whole *symbolically*, and thus not empirically as the object of a single, individual moment, but rather in the wholeness of its existence, and in so doing to use the individual component parts of the body themselves as representatives of the individual moments of this particular existence. Just as the life of a person is unified in its idea, and all his deeds and acts are intuited simultaneously in that idea, so also in the painting. It should portray that object in its absoluteness by taking it out of time, exhaust the infinite element of its concept and of its meaning completely by means of the finite, and portray the whole within the part, just as all parts, in their own turn, within the unity of the whole.

The final and ultimate demand made on drawing is that it apprehend only the beautiful, the necessary, and the essential, and that it avoid the accidental and superfluous. Within the human figure it will thus focus the greatest energy into the essential parts. It will allow the bones to show through more clearly than the small folds of flesh, the sinews of the muscles more than the flesh, the active muscles more than the stationary ones. Besides those things that directly destroy

beauty, such as something disgusting in itself, there are things that, without actually being ugly, nonetheless ruin beauty; the most prominent among these is the portrayal of the superfluous, particularly in that which is accidental, for example, the surroundings that are to be depicted simultaneously with an act. For example, in a historical painting the architecture and so on may not be worked out as thoroughly as the main figures themselves, since in that case the observer's eye would necessarily be distracted from what is essential. Clothing stands in a closer relationship to the object and stands fully in identity with what is essential, namely, the figure itself, which that clothing is sometimes to conceal, sometimes to reveal, and sometimes to elevate. If, however, clothing is made into an end in itself, one may well find oneself in the same situation as that painter who asked Apelles[22] to evaluate his painting of Helen and received the answer: because you did not know how to make her beautiful, you at least tried to make her rich.

Something standing in an even closer relationship to the essential elements of a painting, but to that extent even more detrimental to the portrayal itself, is the observance of the various details of the figure, of skin, hair, and so on. The works of some Dutch masters are particularly good examples of this. They are executed as if for the sense of smell, since in order to recognize precisely that whereby they intend to be pleasing, one must bring them as close to one's own face as one does flowers. Their attention was directed toward strict imitation of the smallest detail, and they shied away from depicting even the smallest hair differently than they actually found it. In this way they sought to present to the sharpest eye, indeed, even to the best magnifying glasses, the most imperceptible details of nature, every skin pore, every nuance of a beard. This kind of artistic ability might be advantageous for insect painting, or desirable for the physicist or naturalist.

To the extent that the drawing turns its attention away from the accidental and depicts only the essential, it approaches ever closer to the ideal element, for the idea is the necessity and absoluteness of a thing. In general one can say that with the removal of that which does not belong to the essence, beauty emerges automatically, since beauty is the absolute first element of a thing, its substance and essence whose appearance is only disturbed by empirical conditions. Formative art, however, should everywhere depict the object not in its empirical, but rather in its absolute truth, liberated from the conditions of time, in its *essential nature*.

Expression and composition are usually also counted as part of drawing. *Expression* is in general the portrayal of the inner substance by means of the external elements. One sees, however, that this portrayal has two sides, that of invention and that of execution. Only the latter is part of drawing. When the question is *what* mode of expression should be given to the object, the answer can only be given within a higher investigation into the poetic aspect of painting—an investigation that cannot yet be conducted here, since we are speaking

only of the technical conditions of art (insofar as they are of absolute significance).

Under *composition* one understands either the poetic configuration of a painting, which also cannot be discussed here, or the technical configuration. In this case the main goal of drawing must be *to lend significance to the space in the painting in and for itself*, and to employ it for the sake of a pleasing effect, grace and beauty as regards the larger whole. In this respect the two main constituent parts of the art of a painting would be symmetry and grouping. *Symmetry* refers primarily to the two halves of a painting. Identity is the predominating element of painting. Identity is suspended if, for example, one side of the painting is filled with figures, while the other is left relatively empty. This disturbs the symmetrical balance. This kind of balance without any real antithesis is an enduring norm of all products of nature. All antithesis is expurgated in the individual. There is no more true polarity, but rather balance, for example, in the dual nature of the primary appendages. Wherever there are two sides, however, there is also a middle, and the middle of the painting is the point into which necessarily the essential element falls. We have already remarked, however, that formative art, particularly insofar as it portrays something living, acts just as does nature by avoiding geometrical regularity in its organic products. This becomes the case only where it has transcended the boundaries of the organic. For this reason the rule is by no means that the main figure be placed into the true middle of the painting—the point of intersection of the two diagonals—but rather that it be placed a bit to one side or the other. For just this reason, symmetry is not really to be sought in the perfect geometrical equality of the two halves, but rather more in a relative and inner balance of the two.

The *grouping* already constitutes a higher synthesis. The unification of parts into an organic body is not really grouping in the true sense. Grouping can actually be only the collectivity of parts, each of which is in and for itself independent, an independent whole and yet simultaneously a member of the higher whole. This is the highest relationship between things; thus a large part of the excellence of a painting depends on its observance. The ordering of figures into individual groups produces clarity and conceptual simplicity. It puts the eye temporarily at ease by not forcing it first to bring the figures together itself and in that synthesizing activity to make a decision concerning various possibilities. Since the best form of grouping is triplicity, even the greatest variety of figures is thus thereby reduced again to three unities such that in the first viewing the group itself can be seen as an individual figure. In this way, the *whole* precedes the parts even in that viewing itself, just as it must precede them in the original conception. Grouping is even more important from the standpoint of simultaneously expressing the autonomous nature of each individual and its independence from the whole as well as the position it occupies within that whole. The artist expresses his own intention completely by not leaving any doubt about the significance he has attributed to each individual part.

The final function of grouping, and the one most difficult to attain, is the synthesis of the object with space. Since the variety within the grouping is possible primarily only through the different sizes of the objects in question, which they possess either through their natural form or their position, the pyramidal form is the one that best unites all the advantages. Although antiquity more or less alludes to this form, its most excellent advocate is Correggio, who also employed it such that both individual groups, each viewed in and for itself, as well as the whole resemble this form.

The significance of numbers is also unmistakable in the composition of the groups themselves. Even though one is free to compose them from both even and uneven numbers, the double even ones, for example, 4, 8, 12, and so on, are excluded; only those composed of uneven ones are tolerable, for example, 6, 10, 14, and so on, even though the uneven ones are always the most appropriate.

An additional rule of grouping asserts that the group possess the appropriate *depth*, and that thus the figures not be placed in a single row, or at least that the extremities such as the heads not meet in straight, horizontal, vertical, or diagonal lines. Yet this rule pertains most eminently to the play and accidentals of chiaroscuro, serving to emphasize these with more facility. In drawing in and for itself, which is the real form of art[23] and does not rely on illusion, this rule is merely of secondary importance (examples from antiquity, Raphael).[24]

To illustrate each of these particular forms, let me choose that individual who has attained the highest excellence in each.

When one speaks of drawing purely as such, one must mention Michelangelo. He showed his profound awareness already in one of his earliest works, a cartoon, which one only knows now through Benvenuto (description of an attack of naked warriors in Arno).[25] Michelangelo's style is great, indeed even frightful in its truth. The profound sensibility of a rich and completely independent spirit, the proud confidence in himself, the taciturn seriousness of his disposition, the inclination toward solitude—all this is imprinted on his works. They witness equally well his profound study of anatomy, which he pursued for twelve years and to which he returned again and again even in his old age, whereby he penetrated into the most hidden mechanism of the human body. His figures are not gentle and weak, but rather energetic, strong, and defiant (as are those of Dante), for example, his *Last Judgment*.[26]

This concludes our discussion of drawing as the real form within painting as the ideal art form.

The *completely ideal* form of painting[27] is *chiaroscuro*. Here art seizes the entire appearance of corporeality and portrays it, removed from matter, as appearance and in and for itself.

Chiaroscuro makes the body appear as body, since it is light and shadow that instruct us concerning thickness. The most natural example is the sphere. In order to elicit artistic effect, however, it must be transformed into *surfaces* so that the various parts of the shadow and light separate themselves out more individually. This is illustrated most completely by the cube. Of its three visible sides, one separates out light, the other the partial shading, and the third shade itself. Together, they display these sides in juxtaposition and thus as a surface. Even this simple example shows us that chiaroscuro does not consist only of black and white, but rather that its effect is also attainable through lighter and darker colors. Yet even this does not yet suffice to give us a complete understanding, since it is precisely the *employment* of these colors that constitutes chiaroscuro.

I now want to say a few words about *natural* chiaroscuro, that is, about that which even a cursory look at natural bodies teaches us about chiaroscuro.

Our eye makes an initial distinction between *surface* and *depth* simply because the elevated parts of a surface appear to reflect light in a completely different fashion, namely, at a different angle, than the flat and deep parts. Thus if the eye is led quickly from a larger to a smaller angle, or vice versa, the object will appear interrupted or truncated, and that imperceptible gradation of light and shadow that constitutes chiaroscuro would appear disrupted. It is the effect of natural chiaroscuro that in nature itself there are almost no perfect angles, and most angles are actually small, crooked lines that disperse in two lines branching out. It is the effect of natural chiaroscuro that the contour of bodies rarely appears with a genuinely light color, but rather with a medium color, for if the contour were highly illuminated the actual illumination of the object itself would be destroyed. A general law of natural chiaroscuro as well is that light and dark colors cannot stand next to one another unaltered and without having an effect on one another. One color really should both elevate and temper the other—even augment it (expand and contract it). The most magical effect of chiaroscuro arises through what we may call reflexes. The shadow in the reflex of a light body is often neither completely shadow nor truly illuminated. In the same fashion, a body whose primary color actually makes it light may be affected quite differently by the shadow a different body casts upon it. For example, it may be white or yellow, but when a shadow falls on it, it is now neither the one nor the other.

One of the most eminent parts of chiaroscuro is the aerial perspective. It distinguishes itself from linear perspective in that the latter merely informs us how an image presents itself from a certain standpoint, whereas aerial perspective reveals to us the degree of lighting in proportion to distance. The farther away a body is, the more liveliness its colors lose. The smaller gradations of tints and shading within it melt away such that it becomes not only monochromatic but also flat, since all visible elevation depends on chiaroscuro (all relief disappears). Finally, when farthest away, its natural color disappears entirely, and all objects,

no matter how differently they may be colored, assume a general color caused by that distance. The decrease of chiaroscuro with distance occurs according to definite laws. If, for example, among several figures placed according to a certain perspective there is the same degree of difference from the first to the second figure, this difference will already become less from the second to the third, just as the decrease in size within linear perspective also takes place in increasingly smaller degrees with increasing distance. An object near to me is indeed quite different as regards the intensity of chiaroscuro than an object one or several hours away. If, however, I compare with that second object yet a third that is one or several hours even farther away than the second, the difference regarding these two will be *almost* imperceptible, such that the decrease in chiaroscuro does not keep up with the increase in distance.

I think this suffices to give us an idea of chiaroscuro, whose successive decrease with distance illuminates aerial perspective for us. All these matters, however, must be the most serious concern of the artist. Intuition must perform the main work in these matters, and without such intuition even the clearest description will not be able to instruct a person adequately.

I now must speak of the *significance* of chiaroscuro in art.

Chiaroscuro is really the magical part of painting in that it intensifies illusion in the positive sense. Through chiaroscuro one can produce not only sublime figures standing apart from one another, between which the eye moves to and fro without encountering resistance, but also all kinds of lighting effects. Through the art of chiaroscuro it has even become possible to make pictures *completely* independent, namely, by putting the source of light into the picture itself, as in that famous painting by Correggio in which an immortal light, emanating from a child, mystically and mysteriously illuminates the dark night.[28] No rule reaches the heights of this art. It is attainable only by a soul sensitive to the most delicate perceptions of light and colors, a soul that as it were is itself light and in whose inner vision all the recalcitrant, repugnant, hard elements of form melt away. Things, being particular, can in contrast to absolute ideality appear only as negations. The magic of painting, however, consists in allowing negation to appear as reality, darkness as light, and on the other hand reality as negation, brightness as darkness, and through the infinity of gradations to allow the one to blend into the other such that they remain distinguishable in their individual effects without, however, being distinguishable in themselves.

The material of the painter, as it were the body in which he apprehends the most fleeting soul of light, is darkness, and even the mechanical elements of art force him toward this material, since the black colors he is able to use come much closer to the effects of darkness itself than the whites to that of light. Even Leonardo da Vinci, the precursor of the heavenly genius Correggio, said: painter, if you desire the splendor of fame, do not fear the darkness of shadows.

That identity into which light and darkness are to be fused such that they are *one* body and *one* soul, automatically demands that they, united into a great mass, be as if poured from one mold. This identical mass, one admitting of gradations only within itself, lends to the whole an expression of profound peace and puts both the eye and that inner sense that neither light alone nor darkness alone satisfies, into a condition of indifference that has been produced from difference, a condition that must be the truest and most genuine effect of all art.

If we are to illustrate the highest peak in the attainment of the art of chiaroscuro, then this is possible only by naming Correggio.[29] I have already mentioned the vacuous prejudice that denigrates this artist as regards drawing. If one understands this to be true of the objects themselves in his drawings, then it is true that he did not choose the simple forms of antiquity. In him the genuinely romantic principle of painting expresses itself; in him the element of the ideal thoroughly dominates his art, whereas in the art of antiquity, in the plastic arts and surely also in painting, the element of the real predominated. If the point is that he did not, like Michelangelo, penetrate into the depths of the art of drawing, and did not, like Michelangelo, portray the developed interior of the organism, and was not as daring in his treatment of nudes as was Michelangelo, then this, too, can be supported. Yet in none of his original works is there anything that might contradict the true art of drawing. This is even the judgment of Mengs, although he otherwise views Correggio as an antithesis, and constitutes an eclectic in art himself.[30]

In and for itself, chiaroscuro is inseparable from the art of drawing, since a drawing without light and shadow can never express the true form of a thing. We will leave unanswered the question of whether an intensive study of chiaroscuro also taught Correggio the perfection of forms that we admire in his works, whether *this* taught him that the edifice of the human figure consists neither in purely straight lines nor in *variations* of crooked and straight lines, but rather in varying curvatures. Or whether in a reverse fashion through drawing itself, and a deep knowledge and precise imitation of truth he penetrated into the mysteries of chiaroscuro. Be that as it may, he unified both these forms of art equally in his works, just as they are united in nature itself.

Correggio, however, attained the ultimate as regards chiaroscuro not only from the perspective of forms and of corporealities as such, but also in the more general realm encompassing the distribution of light and shadow. By virtue of his unique fusion and gradation, both the light of each individual figure as well as the light of the entire picture is *one* light for him. The same is true of the shading. Just as nature never shows us different objects with one and the same emphasis as regards illumination, and just as the various positions and gestures of bodies produce different light effects, so also Correggio—in the interior of his pictures and in the highest identity of the whole—nevertheless rendered the greatest variety of lighting effects and never repeated the same strength or intensity, be it in light or

shadow. In the case mentioned earlier, in which a body, through its own shadow, alters the illumination of a different body, it is not inconsequential which particular color the shading body possesses. This, too, Correggio observes in his works with the highest reflection. Besides these aspects of chiaroscuro he particularly employed his knowledge of the diminution both of chiaroscuro as well as of colors as a result of distance, that is, the aerial perspective. In this regard he can be viewed as the first initiator in art itself, even though before him the thoughtful Leonardo da Vinci had disclosed the initial principles of this theory, and the full cultivation of the aerial perspective was first possible only by being treated independently from the other aspects, particularly those of drawing, within landscape painting. In this regard one can say that Titian laid the first foundation.

We still have to speak about the necessity of chiaroscuro as the *one* form of painting and about the limitations of this necessity.

Immediate viewing teaches us all that chiaroscuro is the only possible way without color to attain the appearance of corporeality in drawing. This does not prevent one, however, from treating this form more or less independently, and from subordinating truth more to appearance or appearance to truth. The point is this: painting is the art in which appearance and truth must be one, in which appearance must be truth and truth appearance. One can, however, either merely desire appearance insofar as by virtue of the nature of this art it is required for truth, or one can simply love it for its own sake. To be sure, in painting there could never be appearance that was not simultaneously truth. Whatever is not truth is also not appearance here. Yet either truth can be portrayed as the condition of appearance, or appearance as the condition of truth, and the one subordinated to the other. This will generate two completely different kinds of style. Correggio, whom we just presented as the master of chiaroscuro, possesses the first kind. In his art there is nothing but the most profound truth, but appearance is treated as the primary element, or appearance counts further than is required for truth in and for itself.

Here, too, we cannot explicate this better than through the relationship between antiquity and modernity. The former aims for the necessary, and employs the ideal only insofar as it is required for this. The latter makes the ideal itself into an independent and necessary element. It does not thereby transcend the boundaries of art, but it does proceed into a different sphere of art. No absolute requirement exists in art stipulating that there must be *deception* or *illusion*, which enters as soon as appearance is taken further than truth *in and for itself*, thus when it is taken as far as *empirical*, physical truth. There is no categorical imperative of illusion, but neither is there one against it. Precisely this, that art is free in the production of illusion or of appearance up to the point of empirical truth, proves that here art steps beyond the boundaries of strict regularity—into the realm of freedom, of individuality, where the individual becomes a law unto

himself. This is in general the sphere of modernity, and that is why Correggio is to be considered the first modern in this sense. The style in this sphere is that of grace and charm, for which no categorical demand exists even though it is never *superfluous*. Similarly, this style is limited to certain subjects, and for that reason it is beautiful only in Correggio. The style of the other kind is the sublime, strict style, since for this one there exists an absolute demand, and appearance is merely the condition for truth.

This shows that there is an extremely sublime, indeed in its own sphere an absolute kind of art in painting without the use of chiaroscuro (except insofar as it is required for truth, but not for deception or illusion). Without a doubt the first style of ancient painting was of this kind in comparison with that of Parrhasius and Apelles, who was known particularly as the painter of the graces.[31] In more contemporary times, this is the style not only of Michelangelo but also of Raphael, whose strictly rendered forms have appeared to some people to be hard and stiff compared to the soft outlines and gently rounded forms of Correggio. This recalls Winckelmann's comparison, in which Pindaric rhythm or the strictness of Lucretius might sound rough or neglected compared with the charm of Horace or the gentleness of Tibullus.[32] I do not say this to deprecate Correggio. He is the first and only in his own sphere (indeed, this divine man is actually the painter of all painters), just as Michelangelo is the first in the sphere of drawing, although the highest and genuinely absolute essence of art appeared only in Raphael.[33]

It is a necessary and much more general view that each particular form is in its own turn absolute when taken by itself, and is able to cultivate or develop itself for itself into a cosmos, just as this has indeed been the case historically, as we will find out later. None, however, can cultivate itself within particularity into absoluteness without encompassing the others as well, albeit in a subordination within the whole. It is, as we have seen in music, that this entire art form throws itself into harmony, which in itself is only *one form* of music, though in the degeneration from rhythm it has even made itself independent. In painting, however, the particular case occurs that in it, as an ideal art, the ideal element must necessarily strive for predominance. If one thus looks for painting within painting, then it is chiaroscuro, and if this is viewed as a particular art itself, then to that extent Correggio, as we have already said, is the real painter κατ' ἐξοχήν ["in particular, especially"; here it carries the sense of *par excellence*—Trans.]

We have already explained that *empirical* truth is the *last* demand made of art, since, first and foremost, art is to portray a truth that is elevated above the senses. Thus, if chiaroscuro by itself is a necessary form without which painting cannot be conceived as art at all, then on the other hand aerial perspective, insofar as it concerns itself with empirical truth, cannot be reckoned as an essential part of art; employed in any other way except in complete subordination, as with Correggio, it constitutes misuse. The diminution of colors at a distance depends on

empirical and therefore accidental circumstances, namely, that a transparent, obscuring medium lies between us and the objects. (Linear perspective, which is not concerned with colors, is based on universal laws of space and is concerned with size, figure, and thus with general determinations of bodies.) It is indeed true that a picture in which aerial perspective is observed will remind us less that it is a work of art we are viewing than will one in which it is not observed. Yet if one were to universalize this principle, there would be no art at all; since it cannot be universalized, then illusion—that is, identification of truth with appearance up to the point of the truth of sense reality—cannot possibly be the purpose of art. In addition, from all we know of them the ancients did not observe aerial perspective, nor did the painters in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, for example, Pietro Perugino, Raphael's teacher (paintings in Dresden).[34] Even Raphael's paintings observe aerial perspective only moderately.

Chiaroscuro concerns itself with the surface effects of light in general that produce the appearance of corporeality. Within chiaroscuro light is still only the element *illuminating* the body and generating the particular *effect* of the body without really being the body itself. The *third* form, here as always, is thus the one that determines the third dimension or embodies light, and thus portrays light and body as truly one. This form is *coloring*. The treatment of color concerns itself not with the general—brighter or darker—light of the whole. Its foundation is the local or specific colors of objects themselves, even though as we have already mentioned in our discussion of chiaroscuro, these colors have an effect themselves on the overall light and have a determining influence on the manifestations of chiaroscuro.

Since in what follows we will have to determine more exactly the stages in which light weds itself to a body, I here want to present merely the general elements of importance.

For the most part, the most primal, simple, and pure colors are found in the inorganic bodies, the *minerals*. The most general coloring medium in nature appears to be the metals. Yet wherever the metallic character disappears most completely, it reemerges as total transparency. Specific and unique coloring and living colors appear first in blossoms and some fruits of *plants*, then in the feathers of *birds*, which feathers are themselves a plantlike growth, then in the colored covering of *animals*, and so on. As simple as the art of coloring in monochromatic bodies may appear, the production of that coloring with all possible determinations of individuality is extremely difficult, since besides the color itself other specific effects must also be expressed, such as dullness and luster.

The ultimate union of light with matter, such that the essence itself becomes completely matter and completely light, occurs in the production of *flesh*. Flesh is the true chaos of all colors and for just that reason resembles none in particular, but is rather the most indissoluble and beautiful admixture of them all. Yet even this completely unique kind of color is in addition not immovable, as are the

other kinds of color, but rather living and flexible. The inner stirrings of anger, of shame, of yearning, and so on move, in a sense, that sea of color and cause it to pulse in sometimes more gentle, sometimes more violent waves.[35]

This is thus the ultimate task of coloring.

(I recall the following here. Every art form corresponds to a dimension, and in every art form that particular element is its essence, its substance, which corresponds most closely to its dimension. Hence, we found that in music, rhythm is the actual substance of this art, since music itself is subordinated to the first dimension. Thus in painting it will be chiaroscuro, and coloring is, to be sure, the third dimension insofar as in it light and body are not merely apparently but genuinely one. Chiaroscuro, however, is as it were the substance of painting as such, since painting itself belongs only to the second dimension.)

Whoever has seen the paintings of Titian, who in this respect is to be called the best, has himself acquired the insight and feeling that a more perfect identification of light and matter than he attained is inconceivable.[36]

The art of coloring acquires a broader distribution in larger compositions, where its highest accomplishment *within the whole* is that which one can call the harmony of colors. The demand is here not only that each individual element be treated appropriately as regards color, but also that the whole itself produce a harmonious impression and hold the soul hovering, as it were, in the highest pleasure, between disturbed and recreated balance, both in activity and rest.

This already shows us that neither the mere mode of illumination nor the uniform dampening of colors by the atmosphere generates harmony in a painting. Harmony and harmonious effect by no means depend on the *degree*, as many imagine, but rather on the *mode* and *quality* of colors. By means of the latter, painters are capable of producing a far more sublime kind of agreement than through any balance resulting from gradations. Only quality renders possible the highest contrast and accordingly also the highest mode of identity. The foundations of harmony must thus be sought in the original system of colors themselves and in the demands of the eye of which we spoke earlier.

Light is the positive pole of beauty and an emanation of eternal beauty in nature. It is revealed, however, and actually appears only in the struggle against night, which itself, as the eternal ground of all existence, does not itself *exist*, even though it manifests itself as power through its perpetual antithetical effect. Insofar as they participate in this night or density, things have a threefold relationship to light. The first is that they separate themselves from light purely as negations and manifest themselves within that light as such. This is general *outline* or *contour*. The second is that from the action and reaction of light and shade themselves the higher *appearance of corporeality* is produced. The eye does not actually see the bodies themselves, but rather only their ideal design within the illumination. Hence, the natural appearance of the body by means of illumination depends on chiaroscuro. The third relationship is that of absolute indifferentiation of matter and light, where, however, for that reason the *highest beauty* is ignited in that matter, and the element of the immortal conceives itself completely within the mortal. The three necessary forms of art correspond to these three relationships, forms that portray things only in and through light: drawing, which designates only the negation, the outline, whereby the thing extracts itself as a particular thing; chiaroscuro, which shows the body *as such* nonetheless within light and accordingly within identity; and finally coloring, which in its ultimate employment transforms matter not only superficially but completely into the interior as well, into light, and light into matter.

The relationships of form already suggest also the higher relationships of subjects that painting can choose.

Painting is the first art form that has figures and accordingly also genuine objects. Music in its highest significance expresses only the evolution or development of things, the eternal informing of unity into multiplicity. Painting portrays fully formed things, and for precisely that reason we must speak particularly of *objects* when discussing it, for the object simultaneously designates here the stage of art itself.

All the stages can be determined by the various relationships of light to corporeal things. There are three opposing categories or determinations of light as regards things. Either it is external, inflexible, and inorganic, or it is internal, flexible, and organic. All possible relationships of light fall between these two extremes.

The lowest stage is that where completely inorganic objects without inner life and without movable color are represented. The principle of painting here can at most reveal itself in the ordering or position by virtue of which things, without being in disorder, nonetheless find themselves in a pleasant but accidental and unordered position, which offers the opportunity to portray them in all their nuances by means of abbreviations, mutually concealing one another, by means of shading and mutual reflexive effects. We call such portrayal *still life*, and as subordinated a form as this may be, I am not sure whether one should not view it as a kind of symbolic painting, since it alludes to something higher by expressing the traces of activity and existence that are not portrayed along with it. At least the unique charm and the poetic element of this kind of picture may consist in the fact that it allows us a glimpse into the spirit of the person who produced this particular positioning of objects.

One scene from Goethe's *Faust* expresses a kind of poetic still life. Faust is in Gretchen's room and describes the spirit of order, satisfaction, and the paradoxical fullness of poverty.[37]

The second stage of portrayal would be that of such objects in which the colors are external and organic, but inflexible or rigid. This is *flower* or *fruit painting*. One cannot deny that flowers and fruits appear bright and lively when fresh, and that concrete painting is certainly possible with them. On the other

hand, however, this kind of portrayal can have value only in an allegorical or symbolic usage. Colors in and for themselves are symbolic; a natural instinct has elevated them into symbols of hope, yearning, love, and so on. Insofar as flowers display these colors in natural simplicity, they are already capable of acquiring such character, and in the positioning of those flowers a simple, uncluttered disposition can express its peaceful inner life. To the extent that it were possible to express enough significance through the positioning of flowers such that an inner condition or disposition really were recognizable there, this kind of picture would be suitable for allegory.

The third stage would be the portrayal of color insofar as it is flexible, organic, and yet merely external. This is the case with *animal painting*. This form is flexible partly insofar as living creatures do possess within themselves the capacity of self-movement and of variation, partly insofar as the uncovered parts of animals, for example, the eye, really do possess a flexible, living fire. Yet here color still always remains external, since in animals flesh as such does not really appear, and the portrayal thus must limit itself to the reproduction of their colorful coverings, their movements, and, in the case of the more powerful among the animals, to the reproduction of the fire of their eyes and the disposition it expresses.

Animal nature itself and individual animal bodies are of symbolic significance taken just by themselves. Nature itself becomes symbolic in them. Hence, animal paintings can acquire artistic value either through the emphasis of the symbolic significance of the figures themselves through *energetic*, *strong* portrayal, or through higher associations. Some Dutch painters have even sunk so low as to paint chicken yards. If such depiction is still tolerated to a certain extent, it is because even a chicken yard can allow us to experience something of the inner disposition of a house, the poverty or wealth of its owner. Animal paintings acquire higher associations where animals are portrayed in real activities and in struggles either with one another or with human beings. The most basic level of historical painting is the *hunting painting*.

The following artistic stage is that where light is externally inorganic, yet flexible and to that extent living. This is *landscape painting*. In this type, light itself as such becomes an object in addition to the normal object or body in the painting. This type not only needs space for the painting; it also concerns itself specifically with the portrayal of space as such. The subjects of the previously mentioned types, as secondary as they may be in other respects, nonetheless are indeed significant in and for themselves, and a genuinely objective portrayal of them is possible. In landscape painting, only subjective portrayal is possible, since the landscape itself possesses reality only in the eye of the observer. Landscape painting necessarily concerns itself with empirical truth, and the ultimate of which it is capable is to use precisely *this* empirical truth itself as a covering through which it allows a higher kind of truth to manifest itself. Yet only this

external covering is actually depicted. The true object, the idea, remains formless, and it is up to the observer to discover it from within the fragrant, formless essence before him. One cannot deny that certain relationships of normal light to a palette of objects before us evoke certain dispositions of the soul according to whether that light lies over nature more brightly or buffered, more strongly and distinguishably or more weakly and diffusely. In an indirect fashion it can awaken ideas, or rather the spirits of ideas, and often, before our very eyes, it lifts the *veil* that conceals the invisible world from us.

Yet all intuition of this sort reverts back to the subject. We see that the more paltry the poesy of a nation, the more it is inclined to such formless essence. What opportunity there is in Homer for depicting landscapes, and yet not a trace! In contrast, the songs of Ossian are full of descriptions of the misty world and the formless nature surrounding him.[38] The beauty of a landscape depends on so many accidental elements that it is difficult, indeed impossible to attribute to it the necessity within art that inheres, for example, in every organic form. External and powerful factors, not internal ones, determine the form, the declivity of mountains and the curves of valleys. Assuming an artist possesses such profound knowledge of the earth itself that within the landscape that he portrays before us in a panoramic view, he is simultaneously able to present the grounds and laws of its structure, the course of the river forming those mountains and valleys, or the power of the subterranean fire that simultaneously pours out over the area both destruction and streams of luxuriant growth—assuming he is able to portray all this, nevertheless that particular moment of light he chooses, the degree of illumination or dampening lying over the whole remains an accidental factor. Since *this* is precisely what he is portraying and taking as his actual object (in the other types it appears expressly only as an accidental of the object itself), since he is treating independently and portraying autonomously something that merely is part of appearance, he is himself thereby subjected to an insurmountable accidental and, in a manner of speaking, reverts back as regards painting to the lower level, formless art.

Drawing actually cannot be found at all in landscape painting as such. Everything in it depends on the arts of aerial perspective and thus on the completely empirical character of chiaroscuro.

Landscape painting is thus to be viewed as a completely empirical art form. The unity that may well inhere in a work of this kind reverts back to the subject. It is the unity of a mood that the power of light and of its miraculous struggle with shadow and night in nature at large elicits in us.

The feeling of *objective* meaninglessness of landscapes prompted painters to give this form a more objective meaning by enlivening it with people. It is self-evident that this is always the subordinated element, just as in the higher forms of art the true artist will scorn the impulse to lend his picture more charm by the addition of a landscape, since the completely adequate object for him is the

human figure in its sublime meaning and infinite significance. In the case before us, where landscape painting enlivens its descriptions with people, an element of necessity must yet be brought into its relationship to those people. Even the sight of a landscape, particularly, however, the color of the sky, instructs us concerning the climate—since the northern world broods as if in dull night compared to the gaiety of the southern sky—and allows the trained eye to make conclusions about the people who inhabit the landscape. Hence, the people in a landscape either must be portrayed as indigenous, as autochthonous, or they must be portrayed as strangers or wanderers recognizable as such by their general disposition, appearance, or even clothing, all of which is alien in relationship to the landscape itself. In this way proximity and distance yet allow themselves to be combined in the landscape in a different sense, and the unique feelings attendant on our conceptions of such juxtaposition can be elicited.

The final, highest stage of the manifestation of colors is that upon which they appear internal, organic, living, and flexible. Since this is fully the case only in the *human figure*, this is the final and most perfect object of painting. Here art steps into a realm in which for the first time its absolute products begin, and its true world unfolds itself.

Here, too, the lowest stage is mere imitation of nature, and wherever this is the goal and the full agreement of the picture with the object is intended, the *portrait* emerges. People have argued from time to time about the portrait's artistic worth or lack of it. It appears, however, that one need only agree on its concept in order to come to an agreement concerning the portrait itself. A portrait, they say, is slavish imitation of nature, and to be sure, if one does not wish to equate art as such with mere imitation or to declare the microscopic painters who overlook not one skin pore as the greatest artists, there can be no doubt according to this understanding of portraiture that it must make do with an extremely low status. If, however, one understands under portraiture a portrayal that, by imitating nature, simultaneously becomes the translator of its significance, turns the interior of a figure toward the outside and renders it visible, then one must no doubt recognize the significant artistic value of a portrait. Portraiture as art would then admittedly have to be limited primarily to such subjects in which symbolic significance is seen to inhere, and in which one can see that nature has followed a reasonable design and, as it were, the goal of expressing an idea. The true art of portraiture would consist in embracing the idea of a person that has dispersed into the individual gestures and moments of life, to collect the composite of this idea into *one* moment and in this way make the portrait itself, which on the one hand is ennobled by art, on the other more like the person himself, that is, the idea of the person, than he himself is in any one of the individual moments. Pliny the Elder tells us that Euphranor painted a picture of Paris (which admittedly was not a portrait) such that in it one could see simultaneously the judge of the three goddesses, the abductor of Helen, and the person who defeated

Achilles.[39] This portrayal of the *entire* person in his individual manifestations would be the ultimate, although as one can easily see, also the most difficult task of portraiture.

Regarding the question of whether the person should be portrayed at rest or in some activity, it is clear that as a rule the highest possible condition of rest is preferable, since every possible activity suspends the comprehensive character of a picture and fixes the person in the *moment*. The only exception allowed occurs where the activity itself is so much a part of the essence of the person that it is characteristic of him. For example, to conceive a musician engaged in his art would thus be preferable than a poet, say, with quill in hand, since musical talent is more isolated and more tightly interwoven with the nature of the person possessing it. Otherwise the requirement the portrait necessarily must fulfill is the highest truth, except that such truth not be sought in detail and *merely* in empirical reality.[40] The pictures of the older painters are of this sort, particularly of our German painters such as Holbein. Certainly no one can view without being moved that one picture on display in Dresden that portrays a mayor of Basel with his family by having him worship the Blessed Virgin.[41] This is true (to mention this in passing) because in this as in other similar pictures the viewer can recognize the genuine, older German style, which is by far closer to the Italian than to the Dutch and carries within it the germ of something more sublime, a style that without the particular unfortunate fate of Germany doubtlessly would have developed further. In addition, this picture has *ethical* significance and, just as all others cast in the same style, recalls for the viewer that better time, the strict discipline and the seriousness and piety of that period.[42]

I note in addition that the most excellent historical painters—Leonardo da Vinci, Correggio, Raphael—all painted portraits. Indeed, it is well known that in some of his independent compositions Raphael introduced real portraits.

We now come to the final artistic stage of painting.

The ultimate aspiration of the spirit is to produce *ideas* that are elevated above the material and finite. "The idea of beauty," Winckelmann says, "is like a spirit drawn from matter through fire that seeks to beget a creation according to the image of the first reasoning creature designed within the understanding of the deity."[43]

We must now determine which means are available in painting to do justice to this striving and to portray the ideas.

Since formative art as such is the representation of the universal through the particular, it has only two possibilities through which it can attain the ideas and present them in actual, visible form. Either it allows the universal to be signified by the particular, or the particular, by signifying the universal, is *itself* simultaneously *that universal*. The first mode of representation is the *allegorical*, the other the *symbolic* (according to the explanations already given earlier).

I will recall some major points concerning allegory in general here and then speak specifically about allegory in painting.

Allegory in the broader sense can be compared to a *universal* language, one that does not rest, as do the particular languages, on arbitrary, but rather on natural and objectively valid signs. It constitutes a signification of the ideas by means of real, concrete images, and is accordingly the language of art and of formative art in particular. Since formative art is, to cite the words of an ancient, a silent form of poetry, it must allow its thoughts to be presented personally, as it were, by means of figures. The strict concept of allegory, however, which we are here presupposing, asserts that what is actually portrayed signifies or means something other than itself, and suggests something different from itself.

Just as it is different from language, allegory is also different from *hieroglyphics*, for the latter, too, are not only arbitrary in the larger sense and not necessarily tied to the essential context of that which is to be signified and of that whereby it is signified; beyond this they are also more a matter of need than of that higher intent that is directed toward beauty in and for itself. Hence, for the hieroglyphic it is enough if it alludes to the thing at all, regardless of whether it does so in a beautiful or repulsive fashion. Of allegory, on the other hand, one requires that every sign or image not be connected with the object merely in an allegorical fashion, but rather that it be designed and executed with freedom and intent with an eye on beauty. Nature is even allegorical in all those beings in which it has embodied their own infinite concept not as the principle of life and of independence. Hence, the flower whose color merely alludes to its inner nature or to the intention of nature or to the *idea*—which amounts to the same thing—is truly allegorical. Otherwise the instinct for allegory has also manifested itself in the fact that the foundation of all languages, particularly those of the most ancient peoples, is allegorical. To give a very broad and general example: How did it ever occur to people to categorize things in language according to gender (a categorization that permeates all not particularly unpoetic languages) without having allegorical and, for all practical purposes, personal prototypes of these things?

The reason painting in particular, however, is allegorical inheres in its very nature itself, since it is not yet the *genuinely* symbolic art form; if it does not raise itself to this level, as is the case in the highest art genre, it can *signify* the universal only through the particular. Regarding allegory in painting, however, two cases must be sharply distinguished. Allegory is either used as an *addition* to an otherwise historical painting, or the entire conception and composition is itself allegorical. The first is always in error unless the allegorical beings themselves that are mixed in can possess *historical* significance in the painting. When, for example, in a picture of the so-called repose during the flight to Egypt, where the Holy Virgin is resting under a tree with her child and simultaneously looking at and fanning the child—when in this picture angels are portrayed on the branches,

they really are to be viewed as historical objects.[44] Or when in Albani's painting portraying the abduction of Helen, Venus is leading Helen by the hand out of the house of Menelaus, and gods of love, who delight in the event, are portrayed in the background, they, too, emerge here as historical beings.[45] On the other hand, in a picture portraying the death of a modern king on whose death bed perhaps even the royal insignia appears, if a spirit with a lowered torch were to stand on one side, this would be an extremely low use of allegory, since the spirit can in no way be taken historically into the painting. Or when Poussin, in a painting showing the exposure of Moses in Egypt,[46] portrays the Nile as a river god who is hiding his head in the reeds, this latter stroke is a very beautiful allegory insofar as it suggests that the source of the Nile is unknown. When, however, little Moses is further laid into the arms of this river god, this allegory automatically suspends the sense of the painting because no one will take this to mean danger, since the child is given over to the care of a judicious god rather than the blind power of the unreasoning elements.

Thus in my opinion there can be no partial allegory in a painting, since this introduces dissonance into the painting; wherever a being that in another context must be conceived allegorically appears in a historical painting, it must itself assume historical significance there such that the whole then acquires the character of a mythological representation.

The field of the allegory is all the wider in a painting insofar as it is used without any restrictions or qualifications. The allegory here has no other limitations than the *universal* limitations of art itself, namely, that superfluity be avoided and the idea be represented as simply as possible. "Simplicity," Winckelmann says, "is in allegories like unalloyed gold and is the proof of the verity of that gold, since it then can explain much with little. Wherever the opposite is the case, it is usually a sign of vague and immature concepts."[47] Simultaneous with simplicity comes clarity, which admittedly is relative and in which one must not demand base popularity, as is the case when one finds Guido Reni giving a pair of white turnips to an otherwise very beautiful penitent Magdalene in order to allude to her strict life-style.[48] Why does the artist find it at all necessary to remind us that the penitent Magdalene partakes of earthly nourishment? The ultimate rule, however, is that of all art, namely, beauty, and that the purely horrible, repulsive, and disgusting be avoided. Raging necessity, as Horace calls it, the rage of war in Virgil, or the deviltry of Milton could be executed in painting only with poor success. Thus in Saint Peter's Cathedral in Rome there is an allegorical painting that portrays heresy at the feet of the saints in the ugliest form, as if it would not have a much better effect portrayed in a beautiful female figure in such subjection and humility.

Allegory in paintings can in addition be either physical and refer to objects of nature, or moral, or historical. An allegorical image of *nature* would be the picture of Diana with the many breasts; on the other hand, nature is portrayed in the

well-known apotheosis of Homer quite simply in the image of a small child. Night is portrayed with a flying garment full of stars, summer running and with two burning torches held straight up. The Nile and its overflow of up to sixteen feet, which according to common opinion means the greatest fertility, was portrayed by a corresponding number of children who are grasping onto the colossal figure of the river.

I would like to mention that the most excellent allegories of formative art, considering that the fate of time has robbed us of the treasures of ancient painting, have come to us through the lesser monuments of sculpture in carved stones. The plastic arts do not simply cast off the limitations of painting all at once. In several genres they yet maintain space as a necessary addition; for that reason, as is the case with painting, they can only signify in most of their productions, but not be truly symbolic.

Regarding *moral* allegories, we must note that those from antiquity cannot be judged according to our understanding of morality, since only the heroic virtues or those that elevate the dignity of human beings were valued, while others were neither taught nor sought. In the place of patience and subordination the ancients valued courage and manly, magnanimous virtue, which scorns petty aims and even life itself. In any case, the ancients had no concept of Christian humility, and all these passive virtues such as the repentance of the Magdalene can be found only in Christian pictures. On the other hand, even in antiquity works of art could not be dedicated to depravity or vice, and allegorical representations of it were possible only within very tight parameters. The most famous example of this is a painting of Slander by Apelles, whose description we have from Lucian.[49] Apelles painted Slander because he himself had been falsely accused of being a coconspirator in treason by one of his artistic colleagues to Ptolemaeus Philostratus. "On the right of it sits a man with very large ears . . . extending his hand to Slander. . . . Near him, on one side, stand . . . Ignorance . . . and Suspicion. On the other side, Slander is coming up, a woman beautiful beyond measure, but full of passion and excitement . . . carrying in her left hand a blazing torch and with the other dragging by the hair a young man who stretches out his hands to heaven and calls the gods to witness his innocence. She is conducted by a pale ugly man . . . [who] looks as if he had wasted away in long illness; he may be supposed to be Envy. Besides, there are two women in attendance on Slander, egging her on . . . one was Treachery and the other Deceit. They were followed by a woman dressed in deep mourning, with black clothes all in tatters—Repentance, I think, her name was. At all events, she was turning back with tears in her eyes and casting a stealthy glance, full of shame, at Truth, who was approaching."

Other moral characteristics were indicated by more distant references, such as, for example, discretion by the rose, since the latter is the flower of love, which itself values discretion, or, as an old epigram suggests, because love gave a rose to Harpocrates, the god of silence, so that he might pass over the excesses of Venus in silence.[50] Hence, in antiquity a rose was hung over the table during festivities as a sign that whatever was spoken should remain among friends.

Among the *moral* allegories I include all those that indicated universal human relationships. Hence, fate was represented by Lachesis, who while turning a spindle sits on a comical mask with the tragic mask standing before her, thus indicating the mixed games on the stage of life.[51] A premature death was represented by the image of Aurora carrying away a child in her arms.

By means of allegory as well as emblematic elements painting can elevate itself into the region of the suprasensible. The animation of the body by the infusing of the spirit is doubtlessly one of the most detached concepts, yet it has been rendered tangible or perceptible to the senses in an allegorical-poetic fashion. Prometheus constructs a human being from clay, and Minerva holds a butterfly over its head as an image of the soul, an act simultaneously summarizing all the various ideas evoked by the metamorphosis of this creature. The *historical* allegory has been employed particularly by contemporary artists, for example, the French (Rubens) to glorify the deeds of their kings.[52] An example is the rejuvenation of a city by the patronage of a prince depicted on old coins, on which a female figure is elevated above the earth by a male figure. The picture of Aristides exemplified the highest style. He portrayed the Athenian people in its entire character simultaneously as lighthearted and serious, courageous and cowardly, wise and unwise, though one must admit that it is somewhat difficult to understand just how he did this.[53]

Now we must speak about the *symbolic* painting. Since, however, we will speak more at length about this in the discussion of the plastic arts, I will limit myself here to the most general comments. A picture is symbolic whose subject not only signifies or means the idea, but *is itself the idea*. You can see yourself that in this way the symbolic painting coincides completely with the so-called historical painting and actually designates the higher potence of the latter. Here again we encounter distinctions according to the object, which can either be something *universally human* that perpetually recurs and renews itself in life, or refer to completely spiritual and intellectual *ideas*. The latter is represented by Raphael's *Parnassus* and *The School of Athens*, which symbolically portray the entirety of philosophy.[54]

The most perfect symbolic representation, however, is offered by the enduring and independent poetic figures of a specific *mythology*. Hence, Saint Mary Magdalene does not merely *signify* or *mean* repentance; she is living repentance itself. Thus, the picture of Saint Cecelia, the patron saint of music, is not an allegorical but rather a symbolic picture, since it possesses an existence independent of the meaning without losing that meaning. So also is the image of Christ, since it visibly portrays the completely unique identity of divine and human nature. Similarly, the image of the Madonna with child is symbolic. The symbolic image

presupposes that an idea precedes it, an idea that becomes symbolic by becoming historico-objectively and independently visible. Just as the *idea* becomes symbolic by acquiring *historical* significance, so in a reverse fashion does the historical element become symbolic only by being combined with the idea and becoming the expression of the idea. This accordingly brings us to the actual, ultimate concept of the *historical painting*, by which one is generally wont to refer to everything we previously designated as allegorical and symbolic. According to our explanation, the historical is itself merely one particular mode of the symbolic.

History is doubtlessly the most appropriate subject of painting, since here the elements distinguishing gods and men, the worthiest subjects of painting, are recognized simultaneously in activity. Yet the mere representation of an action or event in and for itself would never elevate painting to the level the tragedy or heroic epic occupies in poesy. Every possible historical event is in and for itself an individual fact that accordingly is elevated to the level of artistic representation only by becoming simultaneously significant and wherever possible the expression of ideas, that is, universally significant. Aristotle says that Homer preferred to portray the impossible that is probable rather than the merely possible.[55] One can justifiably require the same of painting, namely, that it elevate itself above what is generally possible and take a higher and absolute possibility as the standard for its portrayal.

The historical painting, we said, can be the representation of ideas, and thus symbolic, partly in the expression given to the individual figures, and partly in the way in which the portrayed event takes place. Regarding the first statement, nothing satisfies that merely touches the senses and does not penetrate into the interior of the spirit. Mere beauty of outline does not complete the significance without a deeper background that is not apparent at first sight. A seriously beautiful object never lets us go away completely sated and satisfied, because we always believe we are able to discover something yet more beautiful and more profound in it. Such are the beauties of Raphael and of the old masters, "not playful and charming," as Winckelmann says, "but well formed and filled with true and original beauty."[56] Through charms of this kind Cleopatra has become famous for all time, and the ancients even infused this dignified seriousness into the busts of Antonius.

There is thus a dignity and loftiness of expression that goes beyond the beauty of outline, or that first makes the latter really significant. One demands of the portraitist that he ennoble the everyday nature of a person; he can attain this without abrogating the similarity, that is, without ceasing to imitate. That which is always and necessarily invented is the idea, and if this is expressed in the picture, it can even render the portrait symbolic by means of a higher charm.

As regards the manner of portraying the *events* themselves, the *highest* norm, as is the case everywhere, is that art should portray for us the forms of a higher

world and portray things as they occur in that world. The realm of ideas is the realm of authentic and clear conceptions, just as the phenomenal realm is that of false, dark, and confused conceptions. In the phenomenal realm, form and content, activity and being are sundered. In the realm of the absolute, both are one; the condition of highest rest is that of highest activity, and vice versa. All these characteristics must be transferred into that which is to be the impression of the absolute. We would have difficulty describing them differently than Winckelmann—the father of all science of art, whose views are still the ultimate and will always remain so—already did some time ago. The authenticity and perfection of conceptions expresses itself in the object through that which Winckelmann calls *noble simplicity*, and through that quiet power which, in order to appear as power, does not need to withdraw from the equipoise and balance of its existence—this is what Winckelmann has called quiet greatness.[57] Here, too, the Greeks serve as archetypes for us. Just as the depths of the sea always remain peaceful no matter how impetuous and agitated the surface may be, so also does the expression of Greek figures demonstrate a peaceful and stable soul in the midst of passion. In the expression of pain and of physical torpidity itself we see the soul triumph and arise as a divine light of incorruptible serenity above the figure. Such a soul is expressed both in the face and in the entire body of Laocoön[58] (for appropriate examples of the highest symbolic style can only be taken from the plastic arts). As Winckelmann says in his splendid description of this work, "The pain that discloses itself in all the muscles and sinews of this body, and that one almost experiences and feels himself in the painfully withdrawn lower body without even looking at the face and other parts, this pain nonetheless expresses itself without any rage either in the face or the body position as a whole. He raises no terrible cry, as Virgil describes his Laocoön. The opening of the mouth does not allow this; it is only a fearful and oppressed sigh. The pain of the body and the greatness of the soul are equally distributed and, as it were, balanced by the entire structure of the figure. Laocoön suffers, but he suffers as does Sophocles' Philoctetes. His misery moves our very soul, but we ourselves wish the ability to endure pain as does this great man."[59] This description suffices to show that *this* expression of the soul is no longer something taken from experience. It is an idea transcending nature that the artist had to possess within himself in order to imprint it into the marble. A similar image is that of Niobe with her daughters.[60] The latter, at whom Diana aims her deadly arrows, are depicted in indescribable fear with stunned reactions, where numbness itself brings back peace and that high indifference that agrees best with beauty and does not change any features of the figure or form.

After these observations we can reduce all the exigencies of painting in the symbolic style to the single requirement that everything be subordinated to beauty, for beauty is always symbolic. As regards his subjects the formative artist is completely dependent on the figure itself, since this is the only thing he can

express. The poet, who does not offer figures for our viewing, does not necessarily offend beauty even if he progresses to the point of violent passions. The formative artist, however, who is dependent on actual viewing, finds himself in the position of necessarily offending beauty if he does not limit himself to a certain degree in the expression of passion. This is, of course, even more the case with the plastic artist than with the painter, since the latter has access to many means of mitigation through light and shade to which the former does not, in part because on the other hand all plastic constitutes a greater power of reality. As regards painting, the limitations of those strict requirements that must be made on the plastic arts already emerge, by the way, from the fact that painting, even when merely allegorical, does not cease to be art, and that once it has joined forces with illusion it can combine itself with the empirical more boldly than can sculpture and has more room for play.

In all more violent movements of the soul both the body's characteristics as well as its position, on the one hand, and all forms of beauty, on the other, become distorted. Serenity is the condition unique to beauty, just as peace is that of the undisturbed sea. Only at peace and rest can the human figure as such, and the human countenance in particular, be the mirror of the idea. Here, too, beauty points to unity and indifference as its true essence.

The ancients called the opposite of this peaceful and grand style *parenthyrsos*,[61] which generates a base style satisfied only by unusual positions and actions, audacious fire, and violent, fleeting, shrieking antitheses. Most of the artistic rules of contemporary theoreticians concerning composition and that which they call contramatter have been invented for the sake of producing this kind of confusing representation. The result is that in the works of this style everything is in flux, and one finds oneself, as Winckelmann says, among the objects as if at a party at which everyone wants to talk at once.

Above all other contemporary masters, Raphael has attained the serenity within greatness and that higher symbolic element of historical painting that such painting acquires as the expression of the ideas. Only to him who has cultivated the appropriate inner sensibility will the highest beauty reveal itself in the peace and serenity of the main figures in his painting, figures that may appear lifeless to others. Such is his picture of Attila, in which that particular moment is portrayed when the Bishop of Rome convinces this conqueror to retreat.[62] Everything in this picture that is of a sublime nature—the Pope and his entourage, as well as the two apostles, Peter and Paul, coming down from heaven—has been conceived in this sense of serenity. The Pope appears with the quiet confidence of a venerable man who calms a disturbance by his mere presence. The apostles appear threatening and frightening without any violent gestures. In Attila we can perceive fright, and that peace and serenity of the more dignified portion of the painting is countered by the unrest and movement on the other side where departure is being trumpeted and everything prepares for retreat with much confusion and alarm.

In the larger sense, as regards the *sublimity* of invention Raphael is the absolute master; if in the preceding discussions we have designated an artist as the most excellent as regards each of the particular art forms—in drawing Michelangelo, in chiaroscuro Correggio, in the treatment of color Titian[63]—we must now assert of Raphael that he possessed all these forms in balance, and is accordingly the truly divine priest of contemporary art. The power of his own spirit drove Michelangelo in his drawing irresistibly and almost exclusively into the realm of the violent, powerful, and frightful; only in such subjects could the true depth of his art become visible. His own great mastery of chiaroscuro limited Correggio within the realm of the delicate, gentle, and pleasing as regards his subjects; he needed those which particularly favor the execution of delicacy and which allowed soft outlines and the flattery of forms. Finally, Titian, as the highest master in the treatment of color, was thereby limited most to truth and imitation. In the soul of Raphael all these forms rested in equal balance, measure, and intent; since he was bound to none in particular, his spirit remained free for higher invention as well as for the true recognition and appreciation of the character of the ancients, whom he, the only one among the moderns, did indeed equal up to a certain point. Yet his richness never leads him beyond the boundary of the necessary, and within all the mildness of his disposition there yet endures the austerity of his spirit. He scorns the superfluous, achieves the greatest effects with the simplest elements, and thereby breathes into his works such objective life that they appear to exist entirely within themselves, to develop from within, and to generate themselves with a kind of necessity. This is the source of the probability of his works even though he elevates himself above what is usually possible. Hence, precisely *in* their supranatural aspects we find the highest naturalness, one transforming itself into innocence and one that is the ultimate signature of art.

Until now we have spoken about the art of historical painting purely as such. Now, however, it is necessary that we discuss the *subject matter* of historical painting. One question in particular demands attention, one of interest not only to the friend of art in general, but to connoisseurs as well: through what means inherent within art itself is it possible to portray an object pictorially such that it is recognized as that object? This question presupposes that the main point in historical painting is the real, *empirical* recognition of the subject matter. Yet this cannot, at least not arbitrarily, be made into a requirement, since as soon as it is conceived universally, the requirement itself is nonsensical. In the painting of Raphael just discussed, for example, anyone who wanted to have the Bishop of Rome portrayed not merely such that he be recognizable as this *general* character, but also such that he be recognizable personally and named as this or that *specific* Bishop of Rome, such a person would have to declare as most purposeful that custom of early painters whereby they had notes coming out of the mouths of their figures on which their meaning stood. Thus the requirement of conceiving

a painting to the point of empirical reality must always be qualified, and the symbolic nature of the historical painting automatically elevates us above this point of view. We would lose nothing of the sublime beauty of the group of Laocoön even if we were not instructed by Pliny and Virgil regarding the name of the person suffering. The basic requirement is only that the subject matter in and for itself be completely and clearly recognizable. If the painting is symbolic by virtue of its primary subject matter, then it is of itself already part of a certain mythological context the knowledge of which is generally presupposed. If its primary intent is historical, then enough artistic devices of pictorial representation are available to specify the epoch and nation, and not merely through what we call the observance of costume as regards clothing, something which, however, may not for that reason be transgressed in the case of subject matter from antiquity, since it is part of that beauty. Yet even in a painting portraying contemporary subject matter there must be enough means to characterize the epoch independently of clothing even in the case of naked figures or of costumes uncharacteristic of the time. In *The Battle of Constantine* by Raphael,[64] even without any other indicators, the sign of the cross would suffice to tell us that an event is being portrayed from the history of Christianity. Of that subject matter unable to be designated by genuinely artistic means we can say ahead of time and with certainty that it is completely unworthy of artistic representation. When, for example, artists of a contemporary state are instructed to portray primarily noble events from the history of the fatherland, the required nationality (= nonuniversality) is just as peculiar as the requirement of painting the morality of the actions—and do not forget that the soldiers nonetheless are still to be painted in Prussian uniforms! We must remind ourselves here of the remarks made in our investigation of mythology: since we lack a universal mythology, every artist can create a special mythology from the material of his own age. That he not use anything from history that does not already inhere within that particular circle of history which one can assume as universally valid, is something to which he is limited by far higher reasons than merely the possibility that he may not be understood.

Besides the general conditions of comprehensibility of historical painting, however, the more specific qualification can be added that one event is determined by an earlier one that is necessarily required for its comprehensibility. In the first place, one can also doubt in this respect whether an event worthy of artistic portrayal does not already—in its own inherent richness—enable us to see at least the immediate past even in the present. In the group of Laocoön, for example, no one can have any doubts about that immediate past. To anyone who feels incapable of this let us recommend another device of earlier painters who depicted earlier moments in history in the background and allowed the heroes of these moments to appear several times in the same picture. Yet another case would be when the event to be portrayed necessarily refers back to several events

in the distant past and requires them in order to be understood. Here, too, I have my doubts, even though if this requirement could really exist one indeed would have to return to the suggestion in the *Propyläen*, namely, that of a cycle of historical portrayals, a series of pictures establishing the various moments of a connected history.[65] One should not, of course, take this too literally, as some have done, and require actual absolute continuity, for which even an infinite series of pictures would not suffice.

The principle from which this entire investigation of the comprehensibility of historical paintings is to be decided is *doubtlessly* the following: the historical knowledge of the event portrayed, in all its present and past conditions, contributes to the enjoyment of the work of art; yet this kind of enjoyment itself lies outside the artist's sphere of intention. His work must not first borrow its attractiveness from this alien interest. Many portrayals in old works of art were incomprehensible and were subsequently deciphered through scholarly industriousness. Many are still incomprehensible and yet lose nothing thereby of their true artistic beauty.

It is equally incorrect to demand that in the painting itself all necessary guidance be given concerning the empirical-historical comprehensibility of the painting, and that the painter become, as it were, our instructor in history, or on the other hand to free the painting itself from this task while demanding scholarly learning from the observer. The latter is incorrect because (a) one does not know where one should begin with such scholarly knowledge and where one should end, and (b) one thereby causes empirical-historical comprehensibility to become the essential element, and yet puts its very condition into something accidental, namely, the knowledge possessed by the observer.

The painting is to fulfill only the inner requirements of being true, beautiful, expressive, and *universally* significant such that in any case it can do without that accidental attractiveness resulting from the knowledge of the particular empirical event portrayed. It is equally erroneous for art to flatter either learnedness or the lack of it. A person who feels driven really to enjoy art and not to surrender this higher participation of his own disposition in a well-known event may himself see just how he puts himself into the position to understand historically, too, this silent poetic art that always and necessarily remains either allegorical or symbolic. His disposition or mood will become more moved by such attempts, yet the artistic intuition itself will gain nothing not already attainable without such knowledge.

We have accompanied painting to the ultimate heights of historical-symbolic representation. Yet just as all that is human, as soon as it has reached the summit in one direction, immediately begins to slide down on the other side, painting, too, has not escaped this fate. Shortly after attainment of the highest art, and in the very arena itself of the most splendid monuments of that art, there emerged that most strange degeneration of taste in the genre that pulls historical painting

to the basest and most common levels: the Bambocciade. It originated with the Dutchman Pieter van Laer, called *il Bamboccio*, who at the beginning of the seventeenth century went to Rome and distinguished himself with his farces, which displayed brilliant treatment of color and audacious brushwork. He gained such enormous applause that these farces soon became generally preferred and were patronized by the great men of the city as much as real art had been patronized earlier. One must admit that the first Bambocciants did not lack fine artistic treatment; they contrasted with the serious yet base Dutch paintings in that the former viewed themselves merely as parodies of great art. The necessary requirement of him who would jest with his art is that he possess a high degree of mastery. The aberration is admittedly still not as great as in the present age, where Bambocciades in poesy and other arts are quite popular even while lacking all energy, authenticity, and talent. The stories of these spiritual epidemics mutually elucidate one another; admittedly, however, what our own age has been able to produce in this lowly affair, at least compared to similar products of that earlier age, reflects the way our entire age distinguishes itself negatively as regards art in general in such a comparison. Those earlier painters were at least masters in the lowly genre; those today have not yet reached the first level of mastery even in the lowliest baseness—hence, the objectionableness of Hogarth.[66]

In this fashion we have traversed the entire circle of pictorial representation from the initial, mere imitation of lifeless objects up to the apex, and from there to the other side, where it sinks back down to baseness.

Let me now briefly recall those propositions regarding painting. The last one (Addendum to §87) was: "The particular forms of unity insofar as they recur in painting are drawing, chiaroscuro, and coloring."[67] Nothing was needed for the elucidation of this statement other than the universal concept of the three unities themselves. Drawing is adequately characterized by designating it as the real form, chiaroscuro as the completely ideal form of painting. All conditions and qualifications of each of these forms as well as their relationship to each other can be extracted directly from this designation. Regarding coloring in particular, it is that which makes appearance and truth, the ideal and the real completely indifferentiated[68] and one. Hence, I will now add merely those propositions that concern the *subjects* of painting.

§88. *Painting is to portray its subjects as forms of things as they are prefigured in the ideal unity.* Music is to portray the real forms; painting is to portray things as they are in the purely ideal unity as such, since it comprehends only the purely ideal element of things and separates it from the real element.

Addendum 1. Painting is thus primarily concerned with the representation of ideas from the ideal side. Every idea, just as the absolute itself, has two sides, a real and an ideal one. Or: It is with complete equality both real and ideal, but within the real as an other, as a being, not as *idea*. Hence, painting, by portraying

objects primarily from the ideal side, necessarily aims at the portrayal or representation of ideas as such.

Addendum 2. Insofar as painting signifies all objects in general not directly and in and for themselves, but rather only through their universal or ideal element, it is generally schematic. Taken by itself, or within itself, however, it is necessarily allegorical and symbolic.

Annotation. The schematic element is the universal principle of modern religion. That is why painting predominates in the contemporary world. (Why not the plastic arts?) The Mother of God by Michelangelo = Juno.

§89. *Painting is merely allegorical in those subjects that are not portrayed for their own sake*, for whatever exists not for its own sake, but merely for the sake of something else, *signifies* or *means* that other.

Annotation. This includes the subordinated genres of still life, flower, fruit, as well as, on the whole, animal paintings. All these types are either not really artistic genres at all, or they are of allegorical significance. Concerning animal paintings in particular, nature itself is to a certain extent allegorical in the production of animals; it alludes to a higher element, the human figure. These are incomplete attempts to produce the highest totality. Even the character which nature really has given to the animal does not express itself in it completely, but is rather merely suggested and surmised. Yet even the well-known character of the animal is only a one-sided manifestation of the total character of the earth and—insofar as this is most completely expressed in human beings—of human beings.

§90. *Painting is merely schematic in landscapes*, for here it is not the truly formed and limited element that is portrayed, and not the unlimited by means of it, but rather vice versa: the limited element here is alluded to by the unlimited and formless. The formed element is symbolized by form itself, which is itself formless. Hence, it is schematic.

§91. *Painting within its own parameters elevates itself to the symbolic insofar as the object portrayed does not merely signify or mean the idea, but rather is it itself.*

§92. *The lowest level of the symbolic is where it is content with* ***that*** *symbolic element which the natural object possesses in and for itself, that is, where it merely imitates.*

Addendum. Since no natural object besides the human figure possesses truly symbolic significance, this is the case of the *portrait*.

§93. *The higher level of the symbolic is where the symbolic element in nature is itself made into the condition of a yet higher symbolic element.* This is self-evident.

§94. *If the symbolic element in nature is made only into an allegory of the higher idea, an allegory of the higher sort emerges.*

Please note here that this transcends the first level of the symbolic insofar as the latter is already made into a condition or form and not into the object of por-

trayal. An allegorical painting in this sense is in the lower sense symbolic insofar as it makes the human figure in its beauty into the condition of the allegory, while in the higher sense or according to its higher intention it is allegorical.

§95. *Painting is directly symbolic when it expresses absolute ideas within the particular such that the former and latter are one.*

§96. *Explication. Painting as directly symbolic can in general be called historical insofar as the symbolic element, by signifying or meaning something else, is* ***itself*** *simultaneously* ***that other,*** *thereby possessing in itself a historical existence independent of the idea.*

§97. *The historical painting is symbolic-historical where the idea is the first element and the symbol is conceived in order to represent it.*

Examples: *The Last Judgment* by Michelangelo, *The School of Athens* and the *Parnassus* by Raphael.

§98. *The painting is historical-symbolic where the symbol or the history is the first element* and is made to express the idea. This is the historical painting in the usual sense.

§99. *Symbolism in painting occurs to the extent that the expression of the absolute is attained.*

§100. *The first requirement of symbolic painting is thus the appropriateness of the ideas and the elimination of any confusion within the concrete.* Winckelmann called this high simplicity.

(Please note that this applies only to symbolic painting in the highest style, not to painting as such or viewed at large.)

§101. *From this requirement it follows of itself that being and activity be one in the object*, for whenever being is confused by the activity in the object, or essence by form, the appropriateness of the conception and representation is abrogated. Hence, this necessitates moderate activity that does not suspend or abrogate the being and balance of the essential nature. This Winckelmann called quiet greatness.

§102. *Since beauty is the absolutely symbolic in and for itself, beauty is the highest law of the pictorial representation.*

§103. *Painting can portray baseness only insofar as that baseness, as the antithesis of the idea, is nonetheless in its own turn the reflex of the idea and thus constitutes the reverse symbolic.* This proposition is universally valid for the representation of the fine arts as such, which can enter the sphere of the lowly or base only insofar as here, too, they attain the ideal and completely reverse it. This reversal is the entire essence of the *comic*, and in this sense the ancients, too, produced comical or low works. This state of affairs is the same as that general view of the world according to which the wisdom of God becomes most objective in human foolishness. In this way the highest wisdom and inner beauty of the artist can be reflected in the foolishness or ugliness of that which he portrays, and only in this sense can the ugly become the object of art, namely, by ceasing to be ugly, as it were, because of this reflex.

I will now proceed to the third form of formative art and will construe it just as I have construed the previous two.

§104. *Borrowed proposition. The perfect informing or indifference of the two unities, now expressed within the real, is matter itself viewed from the perspective of essence.* According to §71, matter, viewed as a *potence*, is the real unity. Insofar as it encompasses all unities within itself, however, that is, viewed from the perspective of essence, it = indifference = third unity.

Addendum. Let me clarify the connection with the previous material by making the following remarks. The construction of matter is based on three potences, yet these are general categories such that just as matter individually, so also is nature as a whole based on them. By means of the first potence matter is anorganic and subordinated to the schema of the straight line; by means of the second it is organic, and by means of the third it is the expression of reason. The same potences, however, recur yet again in regards to *the whole* of matter. Matter as a whole is anorganic, organic, and only in the third potence—in the human organism—the expression of reason. Applied to the present case, music is the anorganic art, painting the organic, since in its highest level the latter expresses the identity of matter and light. Not until the third art form does matter become the absolute expression of reason.

We now assert that the perfect indifference of the two unities, now expressed within the real, is matter viewed from the perspective of *essence*. The *essence* of matter is reason, whose immediate expression within the material world is the organism, just as the organism, as the essence of anorganic matter, symbolizes itself in the latter. The first potence is the merely *anorganic*, the straightforward element of cohesion. Hence, the art form of the *first* potence, which merely takes the first potence as the means of its representation, acquires cohesion within *sonority* as its body. The second potence is based on the equality of light and corporeality through different stages: *organic*. Finally, the third potence is the *essence*, the *essential nature* of the first and second potences. The different potences differentiate themselves from one another merely in the following way. In the first the whole appears, though subordinated to finitude; in the second, it also appears, though subordinated to infinity or identity. The *essence* or *essential nature* is thus the same in all potences.

§105. *The art form that takes the indifference of the two unities or the essence of matter as its body is the* ***plastic arts*** *in the most general sense of the word*, for the plastic arts portray their ideas through real corporeal objects, whereas music portrays merely the anorganic element of matter (the form, the accidental element) and painting the purely organic element as such, the essence, the purely ideal element of the object. The plastic arts portray within the real form simul-

taneously the essence and the ideal of things, and accordingly the highest indifference of essence and form.

Corollary proposition 1. The plastic arts as art are originally subordinated to the *third dimension*.

Corollary proposition 2. Just as music on the whole is the art of reflection or of self-consciousness and painting that of subsumption or of perception, the plastic arts are primarily the expression of reason or intuition.

Corollary proposition 3. I can also express myself as follows concerning the relationship between the three basic forms of art. Music portrays the essence within the form, and to that extent it takes up the pure form, the accidental element of things as substance, and uses it as its medium. Painting, on the other hand, portrays the form within the essence and, insofar as the ideal is also the essence, constructs things within the essence. Music is thus quantitative, painting qualitative. The plastic arts, on the other hand, portray substance and accidentals, cause and effect, possibility and actuality as one. Thus they express the forms of relation (quantity and quality as one).

Corollary proposition 4. The plastic arts are essentially symbolic. This follows immediately from the fact that they portray neither the form alone (in which case they would be schematic) nor the essence or ideal alone (in which case they would be allegorical), but rather both in indifference, such that neither the real signifies the ideal nor the ideal the real, since both are absolutely one.

§106. *The plastic arts in and for themselves encompass all other art forms as particulars within themselves, or they are within themselves in separate forms music, painting, and the plastic arts.*

This follows from the fact that the plastic arts portray the *essential nature* of the other forms, that from which the others emerge as particular forms. Music and painting themselves, each in its own turn, also encompass all unities. In music, for example, rhythm is music, harmony is painting, and melody is the plastic constituent. Yet music encompasses these forms not as separate art forms but rather as its own unities. The same is true of painting. The point here is that the plastic arts as the totality of all formative art forms contain the other forms *separated* from one another.

Elucidation. Music, as we said, takes as its form the informing of unity into multiplicity purely as such. Yet precisely this is itself a potence of matter viewed from the perspective of essence, and can thus also be expressed corporeally. Music does not portray this unity by means of bodies, but rather only as an act and to that extent ideally. Yet as soon as this same unity is portrayed within matter from the perspective of the real, namely, in the corporeal series itself, it can and must be expressed within the plastic arts, not *merely* through form, but rather essentially at the same time, and thus also corporeally, since essence and form taken together constitute *body*. The same can be shown as regards painting, which also takes the *ideal* unity only as a potence and to that extent as form. Yet

this same unity must also be able to be expressed actually, and accordingly corporeally and through the plastic arts.

Let me remark ahead of time that the three art forms, music, painting, and the plastic arts, insofar as they all recur within the plastic arts as separate forms, are *architecture*, *bas-relief*, and the *plastic arts*, the latter now in the more narrow sense insofar as they portray rounded figures from all sides. I will now also present the construction of the three forms according to the given order.

§107. *The anorganic art form or the music within the plastic arts is architecture.* The proof is based on several middle terms, which are the following.

That architecture in the larger sense is a form of the plastic arts is self-evident, since it portrays its objects through corporeal things. That it constitutes the music within those plastic arts, however, can be seen from the following. The plastic arts must in some way include an art form through which it moves back toward the anorganic. Since, however, at its deepest level architecture is essentially organic itself, this reversion can occur according to no other basis or law except the same one according to which the organism in nature reverts to the production of the anorganic. The organism itself, however, reverts to the anorganic only within the productions of the artistic impulses of animals (this proposition is proved in the philosophy of nature and is taken up here only as a borrowed proposition). The anorganic form can thus take place within the plastic arts only according to the law and basis of artistic impulses. Hence, we now must determine this law.

In the philosophy of nature we proved that the so-called artistic impulse of animals is nothing other than a specific direction or modification of the general formative impulse; the most eminent proof I can provide here is that the artistic impulse in most species emerges as the equivalent of the reproductive instinct. Hence, it is the genderless bees that produce the anorganic masses of their cells externally. In other species the manifestations of the artistic impulse accompany the manifestations of the metamorphosis or sexual development, such that the artistic impulse also disappears with developed sexuality. In other species the expressions of the artistic impulse precede the time of mating.

The previous observations already lead us to recognize in all cases of the artistic impulse a certain identity between the products and the producing agent. The bee produces the material of its edifice from within itself; the spider and the silkworm draw the threads of their webs from within themselves. Indeed, if we go even deeper, the artistic impulse merges completely with anorganic external deposits that remain in cohesion with the producing agent or animal. Such are the products of the polyps inhabiting coral, the shells of mollusks and oysters, indeed even the stonelike and hard coverings of some insects as well as of crabs, which therefore lack the artistic instinct, which in their case is lost completely in the production of that covering. The identity between the producing agent and that which is produced takes place here to the extent that, as Steffens has shown,[69] we

can view these productions as the externally reverted skeleton of the lower animal forms. Only at the higher levels of organization does nature succeed in coercing this anorganic mass back toward the inside and subjecting it to the laws of the organism. As soon as this has been attained to some degree, for example, in birds (whose skeleton, by the way, is yet very incompletely developed), the anorganic mass no long appears in direct identity with the producing agent, but it emerges nonetheless not completely out of coherence with that agent. The artistic instinct expresses itself more freely in the nest building of birds; there is apparently a choice made here, and the product receives the impression of a higher inner life.

This apparent freedom in construction of a product independent of, yet belonging to, an organic being goes even further in the constructions of the beaver.

If we summarize all these relationships we automatically arrive at the law that the organic everywhere produces the anorganic only in identity or in reference to itself. If we apply this to the higher case of the production of the anorganic through human art, we find that *the anorganic, because it can have no symbolic significance in and for itself, must acquire it in production through human art, through the reference to the human being and the identity with him*. Furthermore, in the perfection of human nature within itself this relationship and potential identity cannot be immediate, direct, or corporeal, but rather only an indirect relationship conceptually mediated. For this reason, the plastic arts, insofar as they produce within the anorganic, must produce something external that stands in *reference* to the human being and his needs, and yet something equally independent of him and beautiful in and for itself. Since this can be the case only in architecture, it follows that the plastic arts in this case must accordingly be architecture.

Various annotations

(1) The assertion that architecture = music follows in a preliminary fashion from the common concept of the anorganic, since music is generally the anorganic art form.

(2) A question this construction of architecture automatically begs is, To what extent can an art form that is subordinated to need and serves a purpose external to itself be counted among the fine arts? Fine art is absolute in itself, and thus without any external purpose; it is not a matter of need. For this reason many people have actually excluded architecture. The following, however, is the solution to this apparent contradiction.

That art as fine art cannot be subordinated to a purpose is an axiom of the correct view of art, and to the extent that it really is subordinated, it is also really no fine art. Architecture, for example, would not be fine art if it addressed

merely need and utility. For architecture as fine art, however, utility and the reference to need are themselves only *condition*, not principle. Every mode of art is bound to a specific form of appearance existing more or less independently of it, and only the fact *that* art puts into this form the impression and image of beauty elevates it to fine art. Hence, as regards architecture, precisely the *expediency* is the *form* of the appearance, but not the essence. To the extent art makes form and essence one, and makes this particular form—one designed for utility—simultaneously into the form of beauty, architecture elevates itself to a fine art. All beauty as such is the indifference of essence and form—the representation of the absolute in a particular.

The particular, the form, is now itself the reference to need. Yet if art now puts the imprint of the absolute essence into this form, it pays attention only to this indifference of form and essence, and by no means to that form *in and for itself*; the particular relationship or the particular reference of this form to utility and need falls completely by the side, since it in any case is intuited or perceived only in identity with essence. Architecture as fine art is thus completely external to the reference to need, which is merely the form (in the following discussion we will determine how and in what relationship). Form, however, is not at all viewed in and for itself, but rather only in the indifference with essence.

Other additional *annotations* serving to illuminate this point:

(a) Fine art is never suspended or rendered impossible by external conditions and limitations, for example, with alfresco paintings, where a certain space is prescribed not only of a specific size but also of a specific form.

(b) There are certain kinds of architecture where need and utility fall completely by the wayside, and its works are themselves the expression of absolute ideas that are independent of need. Indeed, often they even become symbolic, for example, in temples (the temple of Vesta according to the image of the heavenly dome).

(c) That which in architecture actually refers to need is the inner element, and in this the requirement of beauty is made far more accidental than in the external elements.

Corollary proposition. Architecture necessarily proceeds in its constructions according to arithmetical or, since it is music in *space*, geometric relationships. The proof is contained in the following.

(1) It was earlier proved that nature, science, and art in their various stages observe the sequence from the schematic to the allegorical and from there to the symbolic. The most primal schematism is numbers, where the formed or particular is symbolized through form itself or the universal. Hence, whatever lies in the realm of schematism is subject to arithmetical determination in nature and art. Architecture, as the music of the plastic arts, thus necessarily follows arithmetical relationships. Since it is music in space, however, in a sense, solidified music,[70] these relationships are simultaneously geometric relationships.

(2) In the deeper levels of art as well as of nature, arithmetical and geometric relationships predominate. Painting, too, is also completely subject to these in its linear perspective. In the higher levels of nature, and of art as well, where nature becomes genuinely symbolic, it casts off the limitations of a merely finite regularity. A higher principle or law steps in that is irrational as far as the understanding is concerned and is comprehended and understood only by reason: in science, for example, that of higher relationships, which only philosophy understands, the symbolic science among the three basic sciences; in nature, the beauty of form and figure, which only the power of imagination comprehends. Nature is no longer concerned here with the expression of a merely finite regularity of form. It becomes the image of absolute identity, the chaos within the absolute. Geometric regularity disappears and the regularity of a higher order enters. The same is the case within art in the plastic arts in the narrower sense, which are most independent of geometric relationships and consider and portray with complete freedom only the relationships of beauty in and for themselves. Since, however, architecture is nothing other than a *reversion* of the plastic arts to the anorganic, geometric regularity must yet assert its rights in it before being cast off at the higher levels.

This proof, by the way, leads us no further than to the understanding of the dependence of architecture on geometric regularity. We thereby comprehend it only from its natural side, and not yet as an independent and autonomous art form.

Architecture can appear as free and beautiful art only insofar as it becomes the expression of *ideas*, an image of the universe and of the absolute. Yet a real image of the absolute and accordingly an immediate expression of the ideas is, according to §62, everywhere only the organic form in its perfection. Music, to which architecture corresponds among the various forms of the plastic arts, is freed from the requirement of portraying actual forms or figures, since it portrays the universe in the forms of the first and purest movement, separated from matter. Architecture, however, is a form of the plastic arts, and if it is music, then it is *concrete* music. It cannot portray the universe merely through form; it must portray it simultaneously in essence and form.

The organic figure possesses an immediate relationship to reason, for it is its most immediate manifestation and is itself merely reason perceived in the real sphere. Reason has only an indirect relationship to the anorganic, namely, through the organism that is its immediate body. Hence, the first relationship of architecture, too, to reason always remains only an indirect one; since it can be mediated only through the concept of the organism, it is in general a relationship mediated through the *concept*. If, however, it wishes to be absolute art, it must in itself and without mediation be in identity with reason. This cannot occur *simply* by having a concept of purpose expressed in the material itself, since even in the case of perfect expression the concept of purpose is not transmitted into the

object, just as it does not *emerge* from the object. It is not the immediate concept of the object itself, but rather that of something external to it. In the organism, in contrast, the concept is transmitted completely into the object such that the subjective and objective elements, the infinite and finite are genuinely one within it, and it thereby becomes in and through itself an image of reason. If architecture could become fine art *directly* through the expression of a concept of purpose, then there seems to be no reason why this could not also be the case with the other arts as well, and why, for example, there are no clothing artists as well as architectural artists. It must thus be a more internal identity coming apparently from within the object itself, a genuine fusion with the concept, that makes architecture into fine art. In the merely mechanical work of art this connection is always only subjective. (This constitutes the final answer to that first question.)

It was doubtlessly the feeling for this relationship that gave rise to the dominant opinion concerning architecture. That is, as long as architecture panders to mere need and is merely useful itself, it is indeed *only* useful and cannot simultaneously be beautiful. It is beautiful only when it becomes independent of need. Yet since it cannot be absolutely independent—considering that it again and again touches on need by virtue of its ultimate reference—it thus becomes beautiful only by simultaneously becoming independent *of itself*, as it were, the *potence* and the free imitation *of itself*. As soon as it attains through appearance both actuality and utility without intending these *as* utility and *as* actuality, it becomes free and independent art. Furthermore, by making the object already associated with the concept of purpose into its artistic object—thus making the concept of purpose itself with the object into that artistic object—the latter is *for it* as higher art an objective identity between the subjective and the objective, the concept and the thing, and is accordingly something that possesses reality *in itself*.

Even though the usual understanding of architecture as the art of perpetual imitation, and of the building arts as the art of need, is not normally derived in this fashion, this reasoning must be the basis if such an understanding is to have any foundation at all.

In what follows I will explicate this view in more detail. For now it suffices to be acquainted with it in a general sense. In a word, all allegedly free forms of architecture, those no one denies are characterized by a kind of straightforward beauty, are according to this view imitations of the forms of the cruder building arts and particularly of the building arts with wood as the simplest and the one requiring the least treatment. For example, the columns or pillars of the fine building arts are modeled after tree trunks, which were placed on the earth to support the roofs of the first dwellings. In its inception this form was a matter of need. Afterward, since it was imitated by free art and cultivation, it elevated itself to an art form. The triglyphs of the Doric columnar order, it is said, were

originally the protruding heads of the crossbeams. Later the appearance was kept without the reality, whereby this form, too, became a free art form.

This should sufficiently acquaint us with this view in a general sense.

What is valid in this opinion is immediately evident, namely, that architecture as a fine art must be the potence of itself as an art of need, or must take itself as such as its own form or body in order to be an independent art form. We have, of course, already asserted this. Yet precisely how this form, which the building arts as a trade did indeed need, was itself able to become a beautiful form in and for itself through free imitation or parody—*through* this transition from the real to the ideal—the answer to this question lies much deeper, and certainly no one will want to assert that every necessitous form might become a beautiful form simply by being imitated without actually needing to be. Likewise it is completely impossible to derive all the forms of architecture as a fine art from this mere idea of imitation. This thus requires a higher principle, one we must now derive. To this purpose let me offer the following prefatory propositions.

§108. *Architecture, in order to be fine art, must portray the purposiveness within itself as an objective purposiveness, that is, as the objective identity between concept and thing, the subjective and objective.*

Proof. According to §19, art as such is merely the objective or real portrayal or representation of the identity of the universal and the particular, of the subjective and the objective such that these appear as one in the portrayed object itself.

§109. *Borrowed proposition. Objective purposiveness* or objective identity between the subjective and objective *obtains originally*, that is, independently of art, *only in the organism*. This follows from something also proved earlier (§17).

§110. *Architecture as fine art must portray the organism as the essence of the anorganic, and accordingly the organic forms as preformed within the anorganic.* This is that higher principle according to which the forms of architecture must be evaluated. The first part of the proposition is proved thus: architecture is the anorganic form of the plastic arts according to §107. The plastic arts, however, according to §105, Corollary Proposition 2, are the expression of reason as the essence of matter. The immediate real image of reason, however, as was already proved in §18, is expressed in the organism. The anorganic can thus have no immediate and absolute relationship to reason, that is, a relationship that is *not* based on the mediation of the concept of purpose but rather on the immediate identity with reason itself. This is true except to the extent that just as reason as the essence or *essential nature* of the organism is represented directly in the latter, so also the organism itself as the essence or the origin of the anorganic is represented in the latter. Hence, architecture, too, cannot be plastic art, that is, the immediate expression of reason as the absolute indifference of the subjective and objective, without portraying or representing the organism as the essence or essential nature of the anorganic.

The second part of the proposition now follows automatically from the proof of the first. Since architecture is not to transcend the boundaries of the anorganic, considering that it is the anorganic art form, it can thus portray the organism as the essence of the anorganic only by portraying that organism as encompassed within the latter and accordingly by portraying the organic forms as preformed within the anorganic.

The further explication of the way architecture fulfills these requirements will be given automatically in what follows.

Addendum. The same thing can be expressed thus: *architecture as fine art must portray the anorganic as allegory of the organic*, for it is to portray the former as the essence of the latter and yet nonetheless within the anorganic, that is, such that the latter is not itself organic but rather merely signifies or means the organic. Yet precisely this is the nature of allegory.

§111. *Architecture, to be fine art, must be the potence or imitation of itself as the art of need.*

Proof. In its ultimate principle architecture remains subordinated to the reference to purpose, since the anorganic as such can have only an indirect relationship to reason and thus can never possess symbolic significance. Hence, in order on the one hand to obey necessity, and on the other to elevate itself above it and to render objective that subjective purposiveness, it must become its own object or imitate itself.

Annotation. It goes without saying that this imitation extends only as far as is needed to posit actual purposiveness in the *object* itself.

The proof can also be drawn in the following way. According to §110 architecture must express the organism as the *idea* and the essence of the anorganic. In consequence of the *Addendum* this means that it must allude to the organic through the anorganic, and must make the latter into the allegory of the organic, not into the organic itself. Hence, it does indeed demand, on the one hand, an *objective* identity between the concept and the thing, yet, on the other, not an absolute identity such as that found within the organic being itself (for in that case it would be sculpture). By imitating only itself as a mechanical art, the forms of the latter become the forms of architecture as an art of necessity, for the former are, as it were, natural objects that are already there independently of art as such; since they are designed according to a specific purpose, they express an objective identity between the concept and the thing that to that extent (through that objectivity) is similar to the identity of the organic natural product. On the other hand, however, since that identity was nonetheless not originally an *absolute* one (but rather merely one generated by mechanical art), it is only an allusion, an allegory of the organic.

Hence, when architecture imitates itself as mechanical art, it simultaneously fulfills the requirements of art, precisely *by* satisfying the requirements of necessity. It remains independent of need and yet simultaneously is the satisfaction of

need; in this way it attains the perfect synthesis of its form or of its particular (which consists in being an originally purposive art) and the universal or absolute of art, which itself consists in an *objective identity* between the subjective and the objective. Hence, it fulfills the requirement we made of it right from the outset (§107, Annotation 2).

Corollary proposition. All those forms of architecture are beautiful in themselves in which an allegory of the organic is expressed through the anorganic, be it that the latter emerges through the imitation of the forms of this art as an art of necessity or through free production.

This proposition can now serve as the general principle of the construction and evaluation of all architectonic forms. On the one hand, the statement limits the principle that architecture be a parody of the mechanical building arts to the condition that through this objectivation the forms of the latter become allegorical for the organic. By doing so, it liberates this art in another respect to transcend this imitation insofar as it fulfills only the general requirement of representing or portraying the organic as preformed within the anorganic.

It can be noted generally here that in other contexts, too, art can imitate the anorganic only in this particular relationship to the organic. Not the least portion of the plastic arts is the art of *drapery* and clothing, which can be viewed as the most perfect and most beautiful architectonic. Yet the portrayal of clothing concretely for its own sake would not be a task of art. Only as an allegory of the organic, as suggestive of the higher forms of the organic body, is it one of the most beautiful parts of art.

§112. *Architecture must take particularly the plant organism as its model*, for according to the addendum to §110 it is an allegory of the organic insofar as the latter constitutes the objective identity of the universal and the particular. The organism κατ' ἐξοχήν, however, can only be that of the animal, and within these parameters the human organism, to which that of the plant stands only in an allegorical relationship. Accordingly, architecture is cultivated best according to the model of the plant organism.

Annotation. The plant as an allegory of the animal can be comprehended best by noting that particularity predominates within it, the universal thus being prefigured or preformed through particularity. (This is the greatest similarity between the human organism and the plant organism.)

Elucidation. We can follow this close kinship between architecture and the plant world from the deepest levels of even the crudest art onward, where it manifests what we might call a merely instinctive inclination toward this model. The so-called *Gothic* building arts still show us this instinct in an extremely crude form, considering that in them even the plant world itself, unchanged through art, becomes the model. One need only look at the genuine works of Gothic architecture to see in all its forms the unchanged forms of plants. Regarding its main characteristics, namely, the narrow base relative to circumference and

height, we can imagine a Gothic building, for example, a tower such as that of the cathedral in Strasbourg among others, as an enormous tree that from a relatively narrow trunk spreads out into an immeasurable crown that stretches its boughs and branches in all directions into the air. The large number of smaller buildings assembled on the main trunk, the secondary towers, and so on, through which the building expands out from all sides, are only representations of these boughs and branches, representations of what amounts to a tree that itself has become a city, just as the foliage added and amassed everywhere alludes more directly to this archetype. The secondary buildings that are added to the genuinely Gothic works more closely to the ground, such as the secondary chapels on the churches, allude to the roots that this great tree spreads out below and around itself. All the characteristics of Gothic architecture express this relationship, for example, the so-called cloister galleries in monasteries, which depict a row of trees whose branches are inclined toward one another above and are intergrown, thus forming a vault or arch.

Regarding the history of Gothic architecture let me remark only that it is an obvious error to consider the Goths the originators of this artistic sensibility and to designate them as those who brought this form of architecture to Italy. The Goths, as a completely bellicose people, brought neither architects nor other artists with them to Italy; when they settled there, they employed the indigenous artists. Yet even among the latter, artistic sensibility was already in decline, and the Goths even tried to prevent this in that their princes apparently encouraged artistic talent and patronized the practice of the arts. The usual opinion today is that the Saracens brought this architecture to the Occident, first to Spain, from where it then spread across Europe. People normally assert that this architecture must have been that of an extremely hot climate in which one had to seek shade and coolness. Yet one could also reverse this reasoning and consider Gothic architecture to be much more indigenous. When Tacitus[71] says of the ancient Germans that they had no temples, but rather venerated the gods outdoors beneath trees, and if in the earliest times Germany was completely covered with forests, one can imagine that at the inception of civilization of the building arts, particularly of temples, the Germans imitated the old model of their own forests, and that in this way Gothic architecture was originally indigenous to Germany. From there it spread, particularly to Holland and England, where, for example, the castle in Windsor is built in this style. There we find its purest works, whereas elsewhere, for example, in Italy, it existed only in a form mixed with the more recent Italian style. These various possibilities can be evaluated only on the basis of historical evidence. Such evidence is actually available, I think, since the origins of Gothic architecture extend back even further. Namely, there is a remarkable and rather obvious similarity between Indian and Gothic architecture. Certainly no one can miss this who has seen the drawings of Indian landscapes and buildings by Hodges.[72] The architecture of the temples and pagodas is com-

pletely in the Gothic style; even secular buildings do not lack the Gothic columns and pointed towers. Foliage as architectonic decoration is in any case of Oriental origin. The extravagant taste of the Orientals, which everywhere avoids limitations and aims for the unbounded, peers unmistakably through Gothic architecture, which itself is surpassed in the realm of the colossal by Indian architecture, which exhibits buildings individually resembling the scope of a large city as well as the most gigantic vegetation on earth. I must let the historian answer the question of just how this originally Indian artistic sensibility later spread across Europe.

This colossal sensibility expressed itself in a different fashion in Egyptian architecture. The eternally immutable form of the heavens and sky, the uniform movements of nature drove the people toward the stable, immutable elements of life and art, a sensibility that has immortalized itself in their pyramids. From all we know about them, this same sensibility, directed toward the immutable, prevented the Egyptians from ever building with anything but stone—hence, the cubic form of all their works. The Egyptians could not develop the lighter, more rounded form, whose model architecture borrowed from the trees and tree trunks first employed by the building arts that used wood.

Let us now move on to the higher reproduction of the plant form in more noble architecture.

Gothic architecture is completely naturalistic and crude, a mere direct imitation of nature in which nothing recalls intentional, free art. The first, still rather crude Doric column depicting a hewed tree trunk already elevates one into the realm of art by imitating the mechanical treatment through free art, thus presenting the latter as being elevated above need and necessity and directed toward only that which is beautiful and significant in itself. The form itself expresses the suggested origin of the Doric column and the reversal of that taste that imitated crude nature. Gothic sensibility, because it portrays the tree yet unformed, must make the base narrow and expand the upper parts. The Doric column, like the hewed trunk, is broader toward the bottom and tapers toward the top. Here the plant is made into an allegory of the animal realm precisely because the crude mold of nature in it is suspended, thereby suggesting that the plant is not there for its own sake, but rather in order to signify something else. Art articulates nature more completely here and, in a sense, improves it. It removes the superfluous and that which merely belongs to individuality and allows only the significant elements to remain. Both for itself and within itself the tree becomes an allegory of the higher organic sphere, since, like the latter, it is closed off both toward the top and toward the bottom by means of a head and feet. It also constitutes such an allegory in reference to the whole, where it signifies the column of an organic whole whereby the latter elevates itself above the earth into the higher region of the aether. Just as in nature the plant constitutes merely the prelude and to that extent the ground of the higher developments within the animal realm, so also does it

manifest itself here. The column is the support or perhaps the step leading up to the higher structures already prefigured more completely by the physical forms of animal organization. Only at its highest level, where it touches on and passes over into a higher stage of organization, may it show its own richness and, as in the case of the Corinthian column, proliferate in leaves that themselves carry a more sublime structure, and by their lightness and delicacy suggest the higher nature of that style. They allow us to forget that it is yet subject to the laws of gravity.

We must now identify more specifically the allegory of the higher levels of the organic within the individual forms of architecture.

§113. *The allegory of the higher levels of the organic is found partly in the symmetry of the whole, partly in the perfection of the individual and the whole toward the top and bottom, whereby it becomes a self-enclosed world.*

We have already remarked in our discussion of painting that nature, wherever it attains the highest indifference and totality, assumes a double polarity within the realm of the organic and particularly within the animal body. This polarity constitutes an east-west polarity (from top to bottom a status of difference obtains, *real* polarity, and to the sides merely ideal polarity). It thus produces in pairs the most noble organs, that is, those in which it has attained most perfectly that final indifference, and makes the organic structure into two symmetrical halves that, in the design of nature, are more or less equal. This *symmetry*, which is more or less required in the architectonic part of painting, is required even more emphatically in architecture; indeed, for the complete coincidence with the structure of the *human* body it is required such that the line dividing the two symmetrical halves proceed not horizontally, but rather perpendicularly, from the top to the bottom. This symmetry is required as decisively from all architectural works claiming to be beautiful as it is from the human figure itself, and the transgression against this requirement is tolerated as little as is a distorted face or a face that appears to be constructed out of two completely disparate halves.

The second form alluding to organic relationships is the *completion* of both the whole and the individual *toward the top and the bottom*.

Nature closes off its structures only by means of an extremely decisive suspension of succession or of pure length, which suggests itself through a concentric position. The plant would sprout linearly into infinity and produce joint after joint in its stems—and indeed, any plant really can be maintained continually in this sprouting condition through the excessive supply of raw liquids—if nature did not reach a point where it began producing simultaneously that which it previously produced successively. This is how it proceeds when producing the blossom in that plant. It builds a head, a significant and definite end. In the animal realm, too, it follows this law and closes off the animal toward the top by means of a head, a brain; this end, too, emerges only when nature produces simultaneously that which it previously produced successively (in the successive nerve

nodules) and gives it a concentric position. The same thing can be pointed out more or less in architecture as well.

We have already recalled that in architecture the column, which is constructed primarily according to the schema of the plant, alludes expressly to the plant itself as the mere foreboding and foundation of the higher realm of the organic. Yet just as nature, higher science, and art itself everywhere seek to make into a whole that which is merely a part, and to absolutize it in and for itself as a part within this whole, so also architecture. Hence, the column, too, is closed off within itself in a significant fashion. Toward the bottom it acquires a foot, and the architectonic structure is thereby completely wrested out of its coherency with the earth and stands free upon it as does the animal. If the column were not closed off in such a decisive fashion toward the bottom, then by virtue of appearing to be sunk into the earth itself or at least of sinking its roots into the earth the whole would revert back to a plant structure. Toward the top the column is closed off in various ways by means of the head, by the simple capital of the Doric order, by the snail volute of the Ionic order, where the higher prelude of the animal realm begins as if on the edge, and in the concentric leaf-positioning of the Corinthian order.

The same thing occurs within the whole, which toward the bottom is closed off by means of the feet. The middle part of the structure signifies the middle part of the body, where externally the greatest symmetry must obtain and where, just as in the animal body, the truly internal realm begins that in its own turn constitutes an autonomous whole. (We have already noted that here as elsewhere regarding the interior one can pay more attention to the element of need than to symmetry without detriment to beauty.) The closer one gets to the highest point, the more significant do all forms become. Etymologically the designation fronton already means the forehead of the building. This is the location of the more eminent decorations of bas-relief, which allude to the forehead externally as the seat of thought. Toward the inside the whole is closed off by means of the entablature, which by virtue of its inner construction has a concentric position and constitutes a self-supporting and self-maintaining whole. The upper structure where this takes place can be viewed as the external, organically indifferent covering. The most perfect and significant closure of the whole, however, is a perfectly vaulted or arched top, that is, the cupola. Here the concentric position is most perfect, and by virtue of the fact that the individual parts mutually carry and support one another, the most perfect totality emerges, an image of the universal all-supporting organism and of the vault of heaven.

§114. *Architecture, as the music of the plastic arts, has, just as does music, a rhythmic, harmonic, and melodic element.* This follows automatically from §107.

§115. *Architectonic rhythm expresses itself in the periodic subdivision of equal elements*, and thus primarily in the following characteristics: decrease and

tapering of columns both toward the top and the bottom; distance between columns; in the Doric order particularly through the combination of members into entablatures; number of triglyphs in the separation between columns; and so on.

Elucidation. The tapering of the column occurs in the Doric order toward the top in a straight line, whereas in the Ionic and Corinthian the line according to which they decrease is a curve. Regarding the separation between columns, according to Vitruvius[73] five methods were employed in antiquity, of which neither the excessively small nor the excessively large was the most beautiful, but rather the balance between the two. The smaller separation made the whole look too thick, the large separation too thin. In order to comprehend the rhythmic element in all this, we must recall our assertion that it consists in a periodic subdivision or arrangement of equal elements. In music, these separations are temporal distances, in architecture spatial distances. The number of triglyphs depends on the column separation in that the two outermost triglyphs in an intercolumniation must always come to stand exactly over a column. The members of the entablatures are the various larger and smaller parts out of which the entablatures are then constructed. The main requirement is that they be rhythmically ordered, that is, neither that the number and variety of constituent parts confuse the eye, nor on the other hand that excessive uniformity predominate in regard to the form and size of those parts. Hence, two parts of the same type and size are not allowed to lie directly under or over one another, and the whole must in a certain manner regroup on a higher level, just as in music larger units are structured from rhythmic units already there.

Addendum. Regarding this rhythmic aspect one can generally maintain that what constitutes the beautiful also constitutes the useful and necessary, since beauty in architecture is based precisely on the synthesis of the universal with the particular of this art, which is its reference to purpose or use. Thus the rule concerning the tapering of the column toward the top, for example, is indeed also the rule of security and stability.

§116. *The three column orders constitute in their own turn a relationship based on rhythm, harmony, and melody*, or they are constructed partially according to rhythmic, partially according to harmonic, and, finally, partially according to melodic principles. (The necessary and essential particularity is maintained in the explication of the individual forms.)

Addendum. The *Doric* type of column is primarily the rhythmic one. Rhythm in music is the real form, the essential and necessary element of music. So also the Doric order, which possesses the highest degree of necessity and the smallest degree of arbitrary elements. Among the three orders it is the strict, realistic, masculine one lacking development of width. Hence, here one can best demonstrate the realistic origin emerging from the imitation of the building arts as the art of necessity. The usual explanation or construction of the Doric order in its individual forms is the following one from the well-known principle. In the ini-

tial period of the simple building arts people were satisfied with a mere roof protecting them from sun, rain, and cold. The simplest way of achieving this was doubtlessly to place four or more stakes into the earth, onto which, from the front and back, crossbeams were then laid in order to connect the beams standing in a straight line and simultaneously to provide the foundations for the main beams. The crossbeam constituted the architrave. Onto these crossbeams one now laid the main beams that connect the building from front to back; they were laid at some distance so that later they might be overlaid with boards. The extensions or heads of these main beams naturally had to be visible above the crossbeams, which one initially sawed off straight, whereas later, for the sake of decoration, boards with the subsequent form of the triglyphs were nailed in front of them. Hence, the triglyphs are still an ideal rendering of the heads of the main beams. The interstices between these beams initially remained empty in the cruder building methods. Afterward, in order to eliminate this eyesore, they, too, were covered with boards. These boards later became the occasion for the *metopes* in the imitation of artistic architecture, whereby the excessively large space between the crossbeams and the uppermost extending boards (whose extension constituted the cornice and was to ward off the rain) became an identical surface that then constituted the zoophorus or frieze.

In general, I have already indicated what I think of this kind of explanation. It is admittedly necessary that architecture, if it is to be a fine art, make itself ideal, thereby casting off the attention to need. But there is no necessity in the assertion that art, when it does elevate itself above mere need, maintain the cruder forms if these are not already beautiful in themselves. Hence, the Doric column is admittedly apparently the hewed tree trunk. It tapers toward the top for that reason, yet it would not constitute a form within artistic architecture or be maintained within it if it were not significant in itself such as has already been demonstrated, namely, that it depicts a tree that has cast off its particular nature and has become the prefiguration of something higher. Hence, it is certain that one finds the oldest columns of this order without capitals and pedestal, and they thus still depict that particular building method where one supported the hewed tree trunks directly under the roof and on the flat ground. One can say that the pedestal and the plinth at the bottom and the capital at the top depict nothing other than the following: the former, the several boards placed underneath so that the trunks did not sink under the weight above or suffer from dampness; the latter, the boards laid on top of one another so that the trunk could provide a larger surface for the weight it had to carry. Yet the capital as well as the pedestal has been preserved in artistic architecture for a much higher reason than that of imitation, namely, in order to complete the column in the fashion of an organic being both at the top and at the bottom. This is particularly the case regarding the triglyphs. One cannot imagine how this specific form could emerge from the beam heads, and one must, I think, admit a kind of invention by deducing them

first from the boards that—in the form later imitated by the triglyphs—were set in front of the protruding heads.[74] Thus the triglyphs have a more or less independent and autonomous significance.

My understanding of all this is the following.

If architecture is indeed solidified music—an idea that was not alien even to the poetry of the Greeks, as can be seen from the well-known myth of the lyre of Amphion, who by means of his instrument's tones moved the *stones* to assemble themselves into the walls of the city of Thebes[75]—I repeat: if architecture is indeed concrete music, and if the ancients also viewed it as such, then the most rhythmic architecture—the Doric or that of the ancient Greeks—can particularly be characterized as such (for Doric was the general designation for everything from ancient Greece). The ancients, too, had to view it primarily from this perspective. It was thus impossible that the general notion not occur to them to express this rhythmic character emblematically through a form resembling that of a lyre itself. The so-called triglyphs are such a form. I am not asserting that they are an allusion to the lyre of Amphion, but in any case they are an allusion to the ancient Greek lyre, the tetrachord, whose invention some attribute to Apollo, others to Mercury. The oldest musical system of the Greeks contains not more than four tones in a single octave—that is, the fundamental tone, the *tonus major*, the fifth and the octave. Without being able to view actual examples one cannot show clearly that such a tonal system really is expressed in these triglyphs, for which reason I must leave it to each person to convince himself. I can confirm this suspicion by referring to the so-called raindrops of the triglyphs. The usual understanding is that originally vertical slits or glyphs were built into the beam heads *so that* the water would run off more easily, and hence one refers to the drops hanging down. Yet the number of drops is completely disproportionate to the number of grooves or channels, which is what one must consider these glyphs to be. Since in the system of four tones only six different combinations of tones or consonants are possible, the number six here would signify precisely the confluence of the four tones into six consonants.

The exact agreement of the relationships of the Doric order with musical relationships is also apparent from another perspective. Vitruvius gives the relationship between width and height of the triglyphs as 1:1 1/2 or 2:3, which is the relationship of one of the most beautiful consonants, the fifth, whereas the other relationship he mentions, that of 3:4, corresponds to the fourth in music, which is far less pleasing than the fifth. Whether such ideas impose too much intentionality and purposiveness onto the architectonic forms of the Greeks should be decided by those who are otherwise capable of recognizing the clarity and consciousness predominating in all their works.

§117. *The harmonic part of architecture refers primarily to proportions or relationships and is the ideal form of this art.*

Proportions obtain in architecture primarily because of the allusion to the human body, whose beauty is based precisely on proportions. Architecture, which in the observance of rhythm yet preserves high and strict form and has truth as its goal, approaches organic beauty through the observance of the harmonious aspects; since in this regard it can only be allegorical, harmony is actually the ideal element of this art. (Concerning harmony in architecture one should read particularly Vitruvius.) Here, too, architecture conforms to music, such that a beautiful building is indeed nothing other than music perceived by the eye, a concert composed not in a temporal, but rather in a (simultaneous) spatial sequence of harmonies and harmonic combinations.

Addendum 1. Harmony is the predominating part of architecture, for it is essentially ideal and allegorical, and as spatial music approaches painting as the ideal art form. Within painting, it approaches that genre that is concerned primarily with harmony (as opposed to drawing): landscape. Harmony as the ideal form is thus necessarily the dominant form in architecture, which itself is essentially ideal.

Addendum 2. The *Ionic* column constitutes the primarily harmonic order. The proof lies in the beauty of all its proportions. It constitutes the true point of indifference between the yet strict style of the Doric order and the overflowing richness of the Corinthian. Vitruvius[76] reports that when the Ionic Greeks decided to build the temple of Diana in Ephesus, they did not find the relationships of the ancient Greek or Doric order, which they had used until then, graceful or beautiful enough, since they were designed more according to the proportions of the masculine form. That is, the column with its capital (without pedestal) was six times higher than the girth at the lowest end. Thus they gave to their own type of column a more beautiful set of proportions by making it (*with* pedestal) eight times higher than the girth of the column itself, which then demonstrated the proportions of the feminine figure. For the same reason they also invented the *volutes* after the model of the feminine hairstyle and the sides of the face, and made the channelization suggest the folds of feminine clothes.

It is obvious that the proportions of the Doric and Ionic orders really do resemble more the proportions of the compact masculine body on the one hand, the feminine body on the other (since masculine beauty really is rhythmic, feminine beauty harmonic), though Vitruvius expands this analogy too far. Thus in my opinion the snail volutes of the Ionic capitals possess a more general inner necessity than that of imitating an arbitrary hairstyle, which is doubtlessly a mere guess on the part of Vitruvius. Apparently these volutes express the preformation of the organic within the anorganic. Just like the petrifications or fossilizations of the earth, they are allusions to the organic. Furthermore, just as those same petrifications—to the extent that they become more analogous to the animal form—are found more in the younger mountain ranges and closer to the surface, so also does the anorganic mass of the column, precisely on the boundary it shares with

the higher structures, structure itself into forms that are the prefiguration of life forms.

The Doric column, as already mentioned, tapers toward the top in a straight line; here we find length, rigidity, and rhythm predominating. The Ionic tapers according to a curve, which is also the harmonic form in painting. Hence, even in the rhythmic part it is more harmonic.

From the infinitely beautiful proportions of this order, which in its own way is as perfect as the others are in theirs—such that one cannot hold it against a German architect who considered it impossible that they were human inventions at all and therefore believed them to be directly inspired by God—from these proportions of the Ionic order let me mention only those of its pedestal or the so-called Attic base. This base, through the height of its members as described by Vitruvius, expresses the most perfect harmony, namely, the harmonic triad.

§118. *The melodic element of architecture emerges from the combination of the rhythmic and harmonic elements.* This follows from the concept of melody in §81. Visually, however, it can be demonstrated in the third type of column, the Corinthian.

Addendum. The *Corinthian* column is primarily the melodic type. Vitruvius, whose report about the origin of the Ionic order has already been presented (that it constituted the transition from the proportions of the masculine to those of the feminine figure), says that in the Corinthian order one proceeded from the proportions of the feminine body to those of the maiden; even if this is not the last word concerning the origin of this type of column, it does serve quite well to elucidate our own ideas. The Corinthian order unites the rhythmic forms of the Doric with the harmonic softness of the Ionic, just as the body of the maiden unites the greater acerbity and strictness of the forms of youth with the general softness of feminine forms. The greater degree of slenderness in the Corinthian column already serves to make the element of rhythm more noticeable. The story Vitruvius relates concerning the origin of its invention is well known.[77] "A free-born maiden of Corinth, just of marriageable age, was attacked by an illness and passed away. After her burial, her nurse, collecting a few little things which used to give the girl pleasure while she was alive, put them in a basket, carried it to the tomb, and laid it on top thereof, covering it with a roof-tile so that the things might last longer in the open air. This basket happened to be placed just above the root of an acanthus. The acanthus root, pressed down meanwhile though it was by the weight, when springtime came round put forth leaves and stalks in the middle, and the stalks, growing up along the sides of the basket, and pressed out by the corners of the tile through the compulsion of its weight, were forced to bend into volutes at the outer edges. Just then Callimachus . . . passed by this tomb and observed the basket with the tender young leaves growing round it. Delighted with the novel style and form, he built some columns after that pattern for the Corinthians." The characteristic element in the Corinthian column is, of

course, a high capital with three layered rows of acanthus leaves and various stalks and stems that fold over at the top into snail volutes. Although it is not impossible that an incident such as that related by Vitruvius might have provided the initial impetus for such an invention in an attentive artist, and although his story is in any case if not true at least pleasantly conceived, we probably should attribute to this leaf decoration a more universal necessity. It is the necessity of allusion to the forms of organic nature.

The greater strictness characterizing the rhythmic part of the Corinthian order allows it on the other hand more to seek natural beauty, just as natural trimming or adornments (such as flowers and so on) are more appropriate to the beautiful figure of the maiden, while conventional ornamentation is more appropriate to the more mature feminine age. The ultimate union of opposing elements in the Corinthian order, of the linear with the rounded, the flat with the bent, the simple with the ornamented, lends it that melodic richness that sets it off from the other types.

We still need to speak about the particular *ornamentation* or *embellishments* of architecture, of the works of the higher plastic arts that as bas-reliefs decorate, for example, the fronton, or that as statues decorate the entrances or individual apexes of buildings. Since, however, our previous discussion has already indicated the extent to which higher organic forms can be anticipated in architecture, the main points here have already been made. Architecture also needs its lesser forms as ornamentation, for example, shields or even steer heads, with which to fill out the metopes. This probably came about as an imitation of shields that really were hung out, such as those on the temple of Apollo in Delphi acquired from the spoils of Marathon.

It would be equally superfluous to discuss further the lesser forms of architecture insofar as they express themselves in vases, beakers, candelabras, and so on. Thus I will move on to the second form of the plastic arts.

§119. *The painting in the plastic arts is bas-relief*, for the bas-relief portrays its objects on the one hand corporeally, yet on the other only apparently (not in actuality), and thus needs a background or the addition of space as does painting.

The limitation thereby imposed on painting such that, in addition to the objects themselves, it must also portray the space in which they appear, has not yet been overcome here, or, if you will, the plastic arts return voluntarily into these boundaries. Both for this reason and because it only portrays appearance as opposed to actuality, the bas-relief is to be viewed as the painting in the plastic arts.

Annotation. Something needs to be said about the distinction between *alto-relief* and *bas-relief*. The distinction is that in the former, the higher relief, the figures protrude or extend out strongly from their background, by more than half of their thickness; in the latter, they do not extend out from the background by even half their own thickness. Since these two types do not differentiate themselves essentially from one another, the actual bas-relief or the flat-raised work can be taken as that which represents the particular characteristic of the genre more clearly, or can be taken as the representative of the genre.

§120. *Within the plastic arts themselves, the bas-relief is to be viewed as a completely ideal art form*. This follows already from the equation with painting. We will exhaust its nature completely by presenting this ideal character according to its individual determinations.

From the very outset we can suspect that the bas-relief must in its own fashion be even more ideal than painting itself, since it reverts back from the higher art form—the plastic arts—to the lower. To be sure, it possesses a foundation in nature itself both in its portrayal of only half the figures—and not, as in the case of sculpture, whole, rounded figures—and also in its surface elevation. If we do not walk all the way around a figure, we see only the half turned toward us, even if the figure is standing out in the open, or at least before the uniform background of air. The figures are worked out not with raised but rather with *surface* elevation, we might say, because bodies that are actually seen at a distance do not stand out with their entire rounded character, since this depends on chiaroscuro, which itself decreases through the air.

Yet to make the *contours* or *outlines* equally indeterminate would in part transgress completely against the character of the plastic arts themselves, which would then subject themselves to aerial perspective and in part cause the figure itself to disperse against the homogeneity of the background.

Hence, up to this point the bas-relief has its foundation in nature. For the rest, however, it is, with regard to most rules, a quite conventional art form that expressly conceals something from the observer (just as in a game one allows oneself to be given a handicap) in order to attain the required effect through false means. It represents a mutual understanding between artist and connoisseur.

From those who require illusion from painting and consider it to be perfected to the degree to which it causes us to take empirical appearance for reality—or deceives us—one ought to demand an artistic development of bas-relief according to this principle.

Let us now mention something of the element of the *conventional* in art.

(a) As much as possible should be portrayed in profile. Abbreviations should be avoided as much as possible, since they are accompanied by insoluble difficulties, difficulties whose discussion would be too extensive here. Hence, the bas-reliefs of antiquity usually portray such objects whose nature allows them to be positioned in profile, such as lines of warriors, priests, sacrificial animals—all of which are going in *one* direction.

(b) Since with complicated objects it is impossible to avoid positions whereby individual members extend either outward or inward, and groupings become necessary, bas-relief takes the liberty of portraying such objects separated, thus alluding to the whole through the individual. On the palace in Dresden, one of

the most splendid monuments of ancient, austere, and strict art form, the subduing of the centaurs by Minerva is depicted in a strip extending along the length of the wall in twelve different fields in miniature. In this characteristic, too, bas-relief thus makes a continual claim on the presence of mind of the observer and on his higher artistic sensibility, a sensibility not demanding crude deception.

(c) Our previous discussion has already alluded to the fact that bas-relief does not take linear perspective into consideration. It does not even intend the degree of deception that painting does. It also shows itself to be a completely free, ideal art form in that it requires the observer to imagine himself opposite the individual figure and to evaluate it from its center. If figures really are depicted as being at various distances, the conception itself is elevated somewhat and the figures are reduced a bit and kept flatter, all of which express the shading reduced by distance.

(d) The background bas-relief shares with painting requires of it much less care in execution than in painting. Usually such background is only suggested and never executed in full perspective.

§121. *Bas-relief has a necessary inclination to combine with other art forms, particularly with architecture.* Since it is the completely ideal form, it necessarily seeks to integrate itself with the real form, which is architecture, just as architecture itself is inclined to idealize itself as much as possible.

Annotation. Bas-relief beautifies not only the greater, colossal works of the building arts but also the lesser forms, the sarcophagi, urns, beakers, and so on. The oldest example is the shield of Achilles in Homer. Architecture integrates itself much more directly with bas-relief than with painting, integration with the latter being a much more pronounced μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος ["transition into a new kind or type"—Trans.]. Bas-relief is thus more closely related to architecture because it is part of its nature to have a uniform background, which painting accepts voluntarily only for the sake of uniting itself with architecture.

Addendum. Coins and *cut stones* also constitute a kind of bas-relief, both deeply cut stones and cameos. In this regard it suffices to indicate the general category to which they belong.

Now let us proceed to the plastic art κατ' ἐξοχήν, sculpture.[78]

§122. *The plastic art* κατ' ἐξοχήν *is sculpture, insofar as it portrays its ideas by means of organic and thoroughly independent, and thus absolute, objects*, for by means of the first it distinguishes itself from architecture, by means of the second from bas-relief, which portrays its objects within the context of some background.

Addendum 1. Sculpture as such is an image of the universe, which possesses its space within itself and has none external to it.

Addendum 2. In sculpture all limitation is eliminated up to a certain point, and sculpture thereby elevates itself to an autonomous status that painting lacks.

§123. *Sculpture, as the immediate expression of reason, expresses its ideas particularly or even primarily by means of the human figure.*

Proof. According to §105, sculpture[79] constitutes that art form that takes the essence of matter as its body. The essence of matter, however, is reason, and its most direct, real reflection is the most perfect organism; since the latter exists only in the human figure, it is the human figure.

Annotation. If, in the first place, sculpture sought to express itself through anorganic forms, either it would imitate these forms exactly, or it would treat them specifically as a mere allegory of the organic. In the first case there would be no reason for imitation, since in anorganic nature there are no true individuals, and any imitation would thus produce nothing really different from that which it imitates. This would be a futile attempt to possess what the imitation already possesses just as perfectly through nature itself without the aid of art, and to possess it only in a secondary copy through art. Otherwise it would coincide with architecture. If, in the second place, sculpture sought to portray organic beings, but in this case, for example, *plants*, it thereby would sink back to a level below architecture. Since plants, too, are characterized not by individuals but only by type or species, there would be just as little reason for concrete imitation as is the case with the anorganic (ideal imitation in painting is another matter, since with light and shadow it reproduces actual colors). If sculpture sought to portray the plant as an allegory of the higher element of organization represented by animals, then it would merely coincide with architecture. If, finally, sculpture imitates the higher animal species, here, too, its capabilities are extremely limited by the object itself, for in the animal realm, too, each animal possesses only the character of its species, but no *individual* character. If, then, sculpture does reproduce animal figures, it does so only for the following reasons.

(a) The most general reason considers that even though the animal itself possesses no individual character, the species itself may constitute the individual. All the various characteristics of animals, which are always common to whole species, are negations or limitations of the absolute character of the earth. They appear as particular precisely because they do not express the totality, which appears only in human beings. Hence, each species is here an individual, just as on the other hand, among human beings, each individual is more or less the species itself, or at least must be if it is to become the object of artistic portrayal. The lion, for example, is only courageous, that is, the entire species possesses the character of an individual. The fox is only clever and cowardly, the tiger terrible. Just as the individual among human beings is portrayed because he as an individual is simultaneously the species, the sculptural portrayal of an animal can always portray only the species itself, yet is able to do this precisely because the species in and for itself is actually an individual. This state of affairs concerning animal characteristics is, for example, the basis of its use in fables, in which the

animal never appears as an individual, but rather only as the species. The fable does not say: *a* fox, but rather *the* fox; not *a* lion, but rather *the* lion.

(b) Another consideration recognized when sculpture reproduces animal figures is the relationship of animals to human beings. Here the animals appear in sculptural representation in connection with other similar works, for example, architecture, just as the former lions on the *Piazza San Marco* in Venice or other animal figures are placed at the entrances of palaces or churches as guards, so to speak, a situation that also includes the even more symbolic and significant figure of the Sphinx. The same holds true of the horses of a quadriga as architectonic ornamentation at the top of a building, temple, portal, and so on.

Sculpture can, of course, reproduce animal figures insofar as they are a part of the portrayal of the primary object itself, such as, for example, in bas-reliefs portraying sacrificial celebrations, or the snakes in the group of Laocoön.

(c) Sculpture occasionally portrays animals as attributes or secondary designations, such as the eagle at the feet of Jupiter, which also was often placed on the top of his temples, or the tiger in the procession of Bacchus, the horses on the sun chariot, and so on.

Let me now elucidate the *symbolic significance of the human figure*.

First: The vertical stance coupled with complete independence from the earth. Within the organic realm of nature such vertical positioning occurs only in plants, yet it occurs in cohesion with the earth. Within the realm of animals, which constitutes the transition from plants to human beings, the horizontal stance emerges quite significantly (a gradual reversal of the plant). This horizontal positioning suggests or alludes to independence from the earth. That part of the body encompassing the tools for nourishment constitutes a formidable weight, whereby the entire body is pulled downward. The significance of the vertical figure is thus actually that which is already mentioned in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*:

> Os homini sublime dedit caelumque tueri
> Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere voltus.[80]

Second: Symmetrical structure, such that the line dividing the two halves is already positioned perpendicular to the earth. It is the expression of the elimination of east-west polarity, and the more autonomous an organ is, the more certain is this antithesis attained without actual opposition. There is a sphere of metamorphosis where the eye, for example (as the organ of light, the highest expression of east-west indifference), is produced only simply or yet disorganized and in plurality without definite symmetry. It is similarly noteworthy that in those organs that stand in direct relationship to the general east-west polarity, for example, organs of respiration and heart, liver, and spleen, this particular antithesis manifests itself in actual opposition.

Third: Decisive subordination of the two systems of nourishment and reproduction on the one hand, and of free movement on the other, to the highest, whose locale is the head. Although these various systems possess in themselves symbolic significance, they acquire such significance completely only in subordination, such as that of the human figure. The latter is related to the animal figure as an archetype, of which the animal figure shows merely the variously altered reflection.

The significance of the *individual* systems is this: the human being, just as all organic beings, is a mediating agent insofar as he originally was placed between fluid and hard elements. The other species live only on the *bottom* of the sea of air, the human being elevates himself more freely within that sea. Just as the nature of the human being in and for itself expresses a connection between heaven and earth, so also does his form express this connection simultaneously with the transition from the one to the other. The *head* signifies the heavens and particularly the sun. Just as heaven rules the earth through its influence, so also does the head rule the entire body through its influence; what the sun is in the solar system, the head is among the other body parts.[81] The *breast* and the accompanying organs designate the transition from heaven to earth, and to that extent signify the air. Breathing, during which the breast alternately rises and sinks, shows the first mutual relationship between heaven and earth. In the *heart* that rigidity of merely self-centered impulses dissolves into relative cohesion, and for that reason the heart is the seat of passion, of inclination and desire, and of the hearth of the life flame. In order that this fire be felt, a fire that is ignited by the contact between opposing elements, as the Platonic Timaeus[82] puts it, the lungs or tools of breathing are added. The *cavity* of the body signifies the vault that heaven forms over the earth, just as the actual *lower body* signifies the reproductive energy at work in the interior of the earth, whereby it perpetually consumes its own material and prepares it for higher developments that emerge nearer to the surface and to the view of the sun.

These three systems are the foundation and the essential elements of the human body. In addition, however, other organs were necessary as aids, by which I understand the *feet* and *hands*. The feet express the complete independence from the earth itself, and since they connect nearness and distance, they designate the human being as the visible image of the deity for which nothing is near or far. Homer describes the gait of Juno as being as fast as the thoughts of a man who in a single moment journeys through the many distant lands he has already traveled, and who says: Here I have been, and there I was.[83] Atalanta runs so fast that she leaves no trace in the sand over which her foot has traveled. (Vatican Apollo.)[84] The arms and hands signify the artistic instinct of the universe and the omnipotence of nature that forms and transforms everything. We will later find that sculpture takes just this significance into consideration when treating artistically the individual parts of the human body.

Fourth: Even when at rest the human figure alludes to a self-enclosed and completely balanced system of movements. Even in its resting position one sees that if it does move, it will do so with the most perfect balance within the whole. Here, too, the symbolic significance of the human figure as an image of the universe is apparent. Just as the universe manifests externally only perfect harmony, the balance of its form and the rhythm of its movements, whereas the secret dynamics of life are hidden, and the workshop of preparation and production is placed in the interior—so also in the human body.

The *muscle system* allows the body to be perceived externally only as a self-enclosed system of movements, and is thereby a symbol of the general structure of the cosmos. The tools of assimilation, however, and the main mechanism of movement in this system, are concealed. Indeed, in the sculptural renderings of the gods all trace of veins and nerves is eliminated. This relationship is the basis of the significance of the muscle system in painting, and particularly in sculpture. Even if one compares the muscle system to the system of general movement in the cosmic bodies, or, as Winckelmann does once, to a landscape, or perhaps with simultaneous rest and movement perpetually displayed by the quiet surface of the sea, the same relationship always remains. When we view a beautiful landscape, too, we recognize only the effects without perceiving the inner causes and the perpetually active inner dynamics of change and structuring. We delight in the externally presented balance of inner forces. The same holds true for the muscle system. In his description of the beautiful torso of Hercules, Winckelmann says, "I see here the most excellent structure of the legs of this body, the origin of the muscles and the basis of their position and movement, and all this shows itself like a landscape discovered from the peaks of a mountain, a landscape over which nature has poured out the manifold wealth of its beauties. Just as the cheerful heights dip downward with a gentle incline into sunken valleys, valleys that here get narrower, there wider: just as diversely, splendidly, and beautifully do swelling hills of muscles rise up, muscles around which often unnoticeable depths bend like the stream of Meander, streams revealed less to vision than to feeling."[85] Elsewhere he compares the play of muscles in the same figure to the just commencing movement of the sea, when one cannot yet quite perceive the depths. "Just as when the sea begins to stir," he says, "when the previously quiet surface swells in a foamy restlessness with playing waves, where one is engulfed by the other and is then generated anew from the same wave, just as gently swelled and hovering does one muscle here flow into the next, and a third, which rises up between these two and appears to strengthen their movement, flows into them, and our gaze seems to be engulfed along with it."[86] In a word: The human form is eminently a reduced image of the earth and of the universe in that life as a product of inner dynamics concentrates itself on the surface and distributes itself over it as pure beauty. Here there is nothing more recalling need and necessity; it is the freest fruit of inner, concealed necessity and

independent play no longer recalling its own foundation, but rather one pleasing in and for itself. This also necessarily results in the human figure lacking the alien covering given to animals, such that on the surface, too, it is only an *organ*, constituting direct receptivity with direct response capacity. Some philosophers consider the original nakedness of human beings to be a deficiency, a regression of nature. This discussion shows us with what justification they make such assertions.

The external manifestations of life include the sense organs, and among these particularly the *eye*, through which, in a manner of speaking, the innermost light of nature looks out, and which on the head—the seat of the most noble organs—is the most significant feature along with the forehead.

The human figure is in and for itself already an image of the universe, and is such without adding the possible additional point that it can be set into motion, that its inner movements of disposition can be reflected externally. By means of its initial design it has been made into a perfect conducting medium of the expressions of the soul, and since art as such, and sculpture in particular, must portray ideas that are in fact elevated above matter, and yet must do so through external appearance, there is thus no object better suited to the formative arts than the human figure, the direct impression or copy of the soul and of reason.[87]

§124. *Sculpture can be evaluated according to three categories. The first is truth or pure necessity, which individually is concerned with the representation of forms. The second is grace, which depends on measured dimensions and proportional relationships. The third, as the synthesis of the first two, is consummate beauty.*

Annotation. Necessity or the beauty of *forms* can in general be conceived as the real form, and accordingly as the purely rhythmic or as the drawing within sculpture. Grace or beauty of proportional relationships is the ideal, and corresponds to chiaroscuro in painting (although quite different from it) and to harmony in music. *Consummate* beauty or the beauty of forms and proportional relationships together is in sculpture the purely plastic element.

The *elucidation* I offer for these propositions will have to be almost completely historical. These suggested categories are in fact precisely those which the cultivation of art really has traversed (in Greek art). The oldest style, as Winckelmann points out, was in drawing emphatic but hard, powerful yet without grace, such that this strong expression diminished beauty itself. This description itself, and even more the sight of such works, for example, of cut stones from this period, makes clear that in them pure necessity, austerity, and truth were the *dominant* factors. Such severity and exactitude must in all artistic endeavors precede actual grace. We can see that this was the case in painting, and that the masters who founded the age of Raphael executed their own works with the utmost severity and with patience extending to the smallest detail. Hence, in sculpture, too, that severe style had to prepare the ground before the sweet fruits

of art could ripen. It was the path Michelangelo took in sculpture, a path that was, however, not followed. The beginning of an art with light, floating, hardly discernible features suggests a superficial artistic impulse. Only through masculine, albeit harsh and severely circumscribed features can drawing attain truth and beauty of form. (Aeschylus.) Well-structured states begin with strict laws and become great through them. That oldest style of Greek art was founded on an actual system of rules, and for that reason it was, like everything that occurs according to rules, still hard and rigid. The first step in elevating oneself to art and above nature is that one no longer must have direct recourse to the latter through imitation, and that instead of taking the individual, empirical example as a model, one concerns oneself with the model of regularity, as it were, which even nature itself used as the basis for its production. Such a system of rules is, in a manner of speaking, the spiritual archetype, which is comprehended only by *pure* understanding. Since, however, it is only a system that has been *made*, art thereby distances itself from the kind of truth nature lends to its own productions.

Only from this oldest, severe style did the *grand* style emerge. According to Winckelmann's presentation, this style did indeed eliminate the rigidity of the first, transform the harshness and abrupt jumps of form into fluid outlines, and make the violent positions and actions more mature and peaceful. Yet it still deserves to be called great because necessity and truth remained the dominant elements within it. Only that inherited, and to that extent ideal, system of the earlier productions was eliminated. For the rest, in comparison with the softness and grace of later works it maintained the linear, rhythmic element, so that even the ancients themselves still called it the angular style. The works of Phidias and Polyclitus[88] are conceived in this style. A certain degree of beauty was still sacrificed to the correctness and truth of the forms themselves, and for just that reason the majesty and greatness of forms must appear harsh when juxtaposed with the wavelike contours of the graceful style, just as in painting even Raphael can appear harsh when juxtaposed with Correggio or Guido Reni. According to Winckelmann, the group of Niobe is particularly a monument of this high style, and not so much because of that particular element of harshness as because of its uncreated concept of beauty and of the high simplicity predominating within it. Let me here quote Winckelmann's own words as proof of the degree to which this most learned of all connoisseurs recognized that higher element in art. "This beauty," he says, "is like an idea not received through the aid of the senses, an idea that would be conceived in a sublime understanding and in a fortunate imagination if that imagination could elevate itself, in visionary intuition, to the level of divine beauty; it would be conceived in such great simplicity of form and contour that it would not appear to be structured or cultivated with effort, but rather awakened like a thought, and animated with a *breath*."[89]

The purely necessary or rhythmic element of sculpture refers to the beauty of forms and of figure. The harmonic element refers to dimensions and proportional

relationships. The observance of these factors in art introduces the graceful or sensually beautiful style, which, wherever it simultaneously encompasses rhythmic beauty, elevates itself directly to consummate beauty. Here, too, I follow completely the presentation of Winckelmann, since I consider it quite impossible to attain higher principles in those aspects of art that he treated. The most characteristic element of this style in comparison with high style is charm or *grace*, the sensually beautiful. This required that in drawing all angularity be avoided, something that was still dominant in the works of Polyclitus and the great masters. "The masters of the high style," Winckelmann writes, "sought beauty only in a perfect agreement of parts and in a sublime expression, and sought more the genuinely beautiful [by which Winckelmann understands the spiritually beautiful] than the charming [the sensually beautiful—F. W. J. S.]."[90]

The highest beauty, however, like the absolute itself, is always self-identical and absolutely one. All conceptions designed in the vision or intuition of that beauty had, more or less, to approximate this *unity* and thereby become identical and uniform among themselves, just as one notices in the heads of Niobe and her daughters, which appear different merely quantitatively, that is, according to age and degree, but not according to the mode of beauty. In general, wherever only the element of the grand or powerful was sought—not the charming, but rather that which is sublime *in itself*, the inner balance of the soul, the elimination of any indignation of feeling and passion—that sensual kind of beauty we call grace could be neither sought nor introduced. This does not imply that the works of the older artists lacked grace. This could be said only of the oldest, severest style. Yet regarding grace we must allow a differentiation between the more spiritual and the more sensual types. The first followers of the great artists of the high style knew only the first kind and attained it merely by moderating the high beauty in the statues of their *masters*, which, as Winckelmann says, were like ideas abstracted from nature or forms constructed according to a schoolbook. By means of such moderation the successors in their own turn acquired greater variety.

This is the case because the concept of every individual thing is unified, one; whatever is not made according to nature—whose character is difference—but rather according to the concept itself, is necessarily just as unified and one as that concept.

Winckelmann says that the two kinds of grace are like Venus, who also has a dual nature.[91] The one is like the heavenly Venus, characterized by higher birth and by harmony, perpetual and immutable like the eternal laws of harmony. The second is like the Venus born of Diana, more subject to matter, a daughter of time and merely a consort of the first. She comes down from her loftiness without debasing herself, and introduces herself gently to those who are alert to her. The former one, however, is self-sufficient and does not offer herself, but wants rather to be sought, and is too sublime to make herself very physical or sensual.

This higher and more spiritual grace is what we find in the works of the higher and older artists, in the Olympic Jupiter of Phidias, in the group of Niobe, and others.

The second style of art now joined the first; to spiritual grace there now came sensual grace, which in mythology is signified by the girdle of Venus. This occurred first in painting (with Parrhasius), as is understandable, since this art is more immediately inclined to her. The first to express her in marble and metals was Praxiteles,[92] who just as Apelles, the painter of grace, was born in Ionia, the fatherland of Homer in poesy and of the harmonic type of column in architecture.

The preceding discussion already suggests that the real masters of the beautiful style proceeded directly from high, rhythmic beauty to consummate beauty, which combines the truth of forms with the grace of proportion. Merely physical grace, robbed of beauty, made its appearance after art, which had traversed those first two stages, had arrived at its point of culmination, and again began to sink in the opposite direction. At least we must say that if there are works of genuine art that appear to be dedicated primarily to sensual grace, the reason is to be sought more in the object itself than in the art. Hence, if the Jupiter of Phidias is a work of the high style, then the Venus of Praxiteles was indeed a work characterized by sensual grace. A perfect example of the union of high and spiritual beauty—in which no passion, but rather only greatness of soul appears—with sensual grace, is the *group of Laocoön*. Regarding this work Winckelmann pointed out particularly the dominating moderation of expression.[93] In an essay in the *Propyläen*,[94] Goethe has shown that it is equally excellent from the perspective of a certain sensual grace, which it displays both in details and in the whole.

Until now we have viewed the two categories of sculpture—the element of the real or necessary, and of the ideal or grace—only in a general sense. Now we must show how each manifests itself individually.

The element of the real or necessary, as our proposition already indicates, is based on truth and correctness of *forms*. By this truth we by no means understand empirical truth, but rather that higher one based on abstract concepts separated from nature and particularity, the truth comprehended only by pure understanding[95] (this should be remembered as an *annotation*) such as that truth found in the works of the oldest style. Truth in the highest sense is the essence of things themselves, which, however, in nature is structured or posited into form itself and rendered more or less confused and unrecognizable by particularity. Thus this higher kind of truth cannot emerge directly from imitation of nature, but rather only from a system of concepts that initially constitutes a harsh, angular style, until this system of rules itself also becomes second nature and grace emerges, since the sign of grace is ease and facility. Yet everything that occurs through nature, a wise man once said, occurs with facility. As already proved in §20, that highest kind of truth in itself is one with beauty; thus the masters of the high style, simply by aspiring to this kind of truth, were nonetheless able to attain spiritual beauty for just that reason. They did not imitate the individual, in which, more or less, forms can always be found that could be more perfect, but rather a universal concept, with which no individual or particular object could be commensurate. Just as science must cast off the element of the personal—inclination and interest—in order to attain truth in and for itself, so also did these masters attain it by eliminating from their pictures all elements that addressed personal inclination.

If we now look at this in more detail, we find that this abstract truth in the rendering of the individual forms of the human body was based primarily on expressing the predominance of the spirit corporeally as well, and thus on emphasizing those organs that have spiritual or intellectual reference over those possessing more a sensual or physical purpose. This is the basis of the so-called Greek profile, which indicates nothing other than an emphasis of the more noble parts of the head over the less noble. This is the basis of the unique emphasis of the eyes in works of the *high* style, something achieved by always rendering them with more actual depth than is normally the case in nature. This was done according to an actual, though quite abstract, concept in order to elicit more light and shadow in this particular body part and thereby to render the eye itself more animated and effective, which particularly in extremely large figures became unrecognizable. Furthermore, in earlier times one did not intend an actual imitation of the eye, but rather only a symbolic gesture or allusion to nature (which proves what was just presented); from this it follows that the pupils of the eye, for example, were first indicated only in a later period of art. For the rest, as mentioned, the beauty of forms consisted individually particularly in the moderation of all parts that possessed a closer reference to nourishment and in general to the animalistic elements or to desire, for example, the preponderance of female breasts, which even in nature Greek women tried to moderate by artificial means. In contrast, the masculine breast was rendered particularly arched, and even in a reverse relationship to the sublimity of the head and forehead. The heads of Neptune, to whom the breast was consecrated, are found on all cut stones rendered to a point below the breast, whereas the heads of other deities are rendered thus much less often. On the nobler deities, the lower body appeared without any actual stomach, which was given only to the Sileni and fauns. Besides the general moderation of particular parts, Greek artists also sought to imitate artistically those natures combining masculine and feminine beings that Asiatic effeminacy brought forth by castrating delicate boys, and thus to represent to a certain extent a condition of nonseparation of the identity of the genders. This condition—achieved in a kind of balance that is not simply nullity, but rather actual fusion of the two opposing characters—is one of the highest achievements of art.

Regarding the second aspect of sculpture, namely, dimensions and proportional relationships between the parts, this is one of the most difficult areas, and

the one least determined by theory. It is apparent that the Greek artists had their own definite rules for the relationships both within the whole and between individual parts. Only through such a definite system of proportions can we comprehend the agreement and coincidence in the works of antiquity, almost all of which appear to be from a single school. (The theorists of antiquity have been lost to us.) More contemporary theorists, to be sure, have made empirical abstractions from the works of antiquity concerning these features. Yet universal laws or a deduction of these relationships from such laws is still completely lacking; Winckelmann himself introduced into his own history of art an introduction by Mengs[96] concerning this subject, an introduction even artists find virtually incomprehensible. Hence, concerning the practice of art itself, until now one could only direct the *apprentice* of art to the empirical observation of the relationships obtaining in the most beautiful works of antiquity, since in our own contemporary world no true artistic school or system of art has emerged as it did in antiquity. Yet theory has a gap here, one that will require much more extensive and higher investigation to fill, an investigation that must not limit itself merely to this particular subject, the proportions of the human figure, but rather must encompass a universal law of all proportions in nature.

Final, consummate beauty emerges from the combination of the first two kinds, from the beauty of forms and the beauty of proportional relationships. The highest representative of this beauty among the works remaining to us from antiquity is the *statue of Apollo*, which Winckelmann calls the highest ideal of art of them all. "The artist," he says, "crafted this work completely according to the ideal, and he used only as much material as was necessary to execute his intentions and render them visible. His product is elevated above mankind, and his position witnesses to the greatness filling him. An eternal springtime, like that in blessed Elysium, clothes this charming masculinity of mature years with pleasing youthfulness and plays on the proud edifice of his limbs."[97]

In all works of this kind, nobility and greatness manifest themselves to be *moderated* by *grace*, but *not* humbled, and vice versa: grace, inspired by that higher spiritual beauty, is simultaneously sublime and austere.

§125. *Sculpture is the perfected informing of the infinite into the finite*, for *every* unity in its perfection—for example, that of the informing of the infinite into the finite—encompasses the other within itself. Yet sculpture among the real art forms is that which alone perfectly equates the real unity, that of form, and the ideal, that of essence (according to §105). Accordingly, it is also the perfected informing of the infinite into the finite.

Annotation. (Music is the informing of unity into multiplicity *as such* as *form*, and is thus real. Painting is the informing of form into essence as such, and is thus purely *ideal*.)

Addendum 1. Sublimity is particularly suitable or appropriate for sculpture (according to the concept of sublimity in §65), for sublimity is actually the true

universe intuited or perceived within the relative universe. Yet this informing of the infinite into the finite in sculpture cannot actually be perfected or completed without the finite itself as such being simultaneously relatively infinite. Hence, in sculpture particularly the relatively or sensually (physically) infinite becomes the symbol of the infinite in the absolute sense or in itself.

The human figure, the most eminent object of sculpture, if it is to be the real, visible expression of reason, must already be infinite and constitute a universe by virtue of its own purely finite element, just as has been proved in the previous discussion.

Annotation. The most eminent effect of art and particularly of sculpture is for the element of the absolutely great, that which is infinite *in itself*, to be rendered in and through the finite and be measured as if with *one* sweeping gaze. This is the means whereby the informing of the infinite into the finite expresses or manifests itself for sense perception. That which is absolutely great in itself, apprehended and rendered through finitude, is not thereby *limited* and loses none of its greatness by appearing to the spirit in the entire comprehensibility of something finite. Rather, precisely through this finite rendering and resulting comprehensibility the whole measure of its greatness is first revealed to us. For the most part, this encompasses what Winckelmann calls *high simplicity* in art. One could say that this simplicity within greatness, with which a high work of art presents itself to us, is the external expression of that inner informing of the infinite into the finite that constitutes the *essence* of the work of art. Everything great appears executed or rendered with simplicity, just as in contrast all that is fragmentary, and that which must be viewed as separated, leaves us with the impression of smallness, and in the case of complete saturation, of pettiness.

Addendum 2. The first proposition can also be expressed in this way: sculpture portrays the highest contact between life and death, for the infinite is the principle of all life and lives in and for itself, whereas the finite or form is dead. Since both enter into the greatest unity in sculptural works, life and death thus encounter one another here, so to speak, at the highest point of their confluence. The universe, like the human being, is a mixture of the immortal and the mortal, of life and death. In the eternal idea, however, that which appears mortal there has been brought to absolute identity with the immortal and is only the form of that which is infinite in itself. It portrays itself as such in sculpture, just as Winckelmann says in the passage cited, where the sculptor used only as much material for this work as was necessary to express his spiritual intention. The material and the concept are truly one here. The material is merely the concept transformed into objectivity, and is thus the concept itself, only viewed from a different side.

§126. *In sculpture geometric regularity ceases to predominate*, for here we no longer are dealing with finite regularity that can be comprehended by mere understanding, but rather with an infinite regularity, one that can be comprehended

only by reason, yet a regularity that is simultaneously freedom. As regards finite regularity, all sculpture is transcendent.

Painting is still subject to geometric regularity in that it portrays a finite, limited truth. Painting must observe linear perspective only because it is limited to a finite perspective. Sculpture concerns itself with a truth covering all perspectives, and therefore with an infinite truth. The forms of sculpture can as little be determined by that finite regularity as can the forms of the human body in and for itself. Whenever one wishes to express the forms of a beautiful body in lines, these lines are such that they perpetually change their center, and if carried through never describe a regular figure such as a circle. This posits simultaneously both greater variety and greater unity: greater variety, for the circle, for example, is always self-identical; greater unity, for assuming that the edifice of the body consists in forms similar to those of a circle, one would exclude the other, and none would flow from the other with any consistency or constancy. In contrast, in a beautiful organic body every form appears as the direct emanation of the other precisely because *none* in particular is limited.

§127. *Sculpture is particularly able to work with the element of the colossal.* This is in fact the case in comparison with painting and bas-relief, since sculpture operates completely independently of such spatial elements that painting and bas-relief must additionally portray along with the object itself. If painting wanted to work with colossal elements, it would either have to enlarge equally the space given the object, or not. In the first case the relationship would remain unchanged; in the second only unwieldy shapelessness, and by no means greatness, would emerge, since the relation itself has not actually been suspended. Since all estimation of size is based on relationships with a given empirical space, art can operate with colossal elements without digressing into unwieldy shapelessness only insofar as within its own portrayals it is liberated from the limitations of that space that is actually different from the object itself.

Annotation. This is true because the larger or smaller space accidentally present outside the object itself has no influence on the assessment or appreciation of its size. Regarding the colossal Jupiter of Phidias, contemporary critics have objected that if he had raised himself (considering that he is portrayed sitting) from his throne, he would have smashed the temple roof, and they have considered this to be inappropriate. This is a completely inartistic evaluation and judgment. Every sculptural work is a world in itself possessing its space within, as does the universe, and must be evaluated and judged only from within itself. External space is accidental to it and can contribute nothing to its evaluation.

§128. *Sculpture portrays its subjects as the forms of things as they are conceived and encompassed in the absolute informing of the real and the ideal into unity.*

We proved that the forms of music are the forms of things as they exist within the real unity (§83), those of painting the forms of things as they are prefigured

in the ideal unity (§88). Since (according to §105) sculpture is the art form in which the absolute informing of the two unities into a single unity becomes objective, it thus portrays its subjects as the forms of things as they are conceived and encompassed in the absolute informing of the real and the ideal into unity.

Elucidation. In Addendum I to §88 we proved that painting is concerned primarily with the portrayal of ideas as such. That is, every idea, as the perfect and equal image of the absolute, has two sides, as does the absolute itself, a real and an ideal side. Viewed from the real side ideas appear as things; only from the ideal side do they appear as *ideas*, even though that in which both sides are one is itself *the* idea. Hence, painting portrays the ideas primarily *as ideas*, that is, from the ideal side. Sculpture, however, portrays them such that they are at once completely idea and completely thing. Painting in no way offers its objects as being real, but rather expressly wishes that they be viewed as ideal. Sculpture, by portraying its objects as *ideas*, nonetheless simultaneously offers them as things, and vice versa. Thus it really does portray the *absolutely ideal simultaneously as the absolutely real*; this is doubtlessly the pinnacle of the formative arts, whereby they turn back into the *source* of all art and of all ideas, of all truth and of all beauty: namely, into the deity.

§129. *Sculpture can do justice to its own highest requirements only through the portrayal of the gods*, for it portrays primarily the absolute ideas, which as ideal are simultaneously real; yet the ideas viewed within the real are the gods (§28), and sculpture, therefore, requires primarily the divine natures.

Elucidation. This is not meant as an empirical assertion such that sculpture would never have achieved its true heights without portraying gods. It is, to be sure, true that the necessity in which the Greek artists found themselves, namely, that of having to design images of the gods, forced them with more immediacy to raise themselves above matter itself and to penetrate into the realm of the abstract and incorporeal, and to seek the unearthly or spiritual and that which is separated from deficient, dependent nature. The assertion, however, is that sculpture in and for itself, seeking to do justice only *to itself* and to its own particular requirements, must portray gods, for its particular task is precisely to portray the absolutely ideal simultaneously as the real, and accordingly to portray an indifference that in and for itself can be found only in divine natures.

One can thus say that every higher work of sculpture in and for itself is a deity, even if no name yet exists for that deity. Furthermore, sculpture, if left only to itself, would have portrayed as realities all the possibilities residing in that highest and absolute indifference, and thereby quite independently would have filled the entire circle of divine figures and even invented the gods if they had not already existed. On the other hand, since the essence of Greek polytheism (according to the proof in §30) consisted of pure limitation on the one hand and undivided absoluteness on the other, and since further this divine world in its own turn constituted a totality or self-enclosed system, we must say that the possibil-

ity for sculpture was thereby precisely determined. That is, it would limit itself very early to conceiving and rendering its objects in strictly separated forms and to designing a system of divinities just as self-enclosed as that which earlier was available in mythology. For just this reason, the sculpture of the Greeks constitutes a world in itself, one that lacks nothing externally just as it is perfected internally, and one in which all possibilities are fulfilled and all forms separated and strictly determined. The appearance of Jupiter, of Neptune, and of all masculine deities was fixed forever, just as was that of the female deities. (We see this in the complete similarity of the heads on all coins.) Art thereby became, in a sense, canonical and exemplary. There was no longer any choice within it; necessity predominated.

§130. *The works of sculpture will manifest primarily the character of the ideas in their absoluteness*. This follows directly from the preceding discussion.

Elucidation. The essence of the ideas is that in them possibility and reality are always (or rather atemporally) one, and that they are in every moment and simultaneously everything they can be. This generates the highest satisfaction and—since in this condition no deficiency or lack is conceivable, and thus nothing is present whereby it might slip from this condition of rest—the highest balance and the deepest rest in the highest activity.

This character, as presented here, is the character of the plastic renderings of the gods, that is, each in its own fashion. Each is perfected; each rests in the highest satisfaction without for that reason appearing inactive. Only that *one* activity has disappeared from their countenance, the one that destroys the equipoise of the soul, the seriousness and labor that furrow the foreheads of mortals, as well as desire and lust that draw them out of themselves. In this sublime apathy no possibility can precede reality. Hence, "along with inclination, every trace of the will which is not at once both deed and satisfaction is extinguished in them."[98] They appear as beings that are there absolutely for their own sake and completely within themselves. They appear unlimited externally, for they are, in a manner of speaking, not in space at all, but rather carry that space itself in themselves as a self-enclosed creation. Removed from every alien contact, that which in them is actually limitation appears as their perfection and absoluteness. Precisely through the latter do they exist completely within themselves.

§131. *The highest law of all plastic renderings is indifference, absolute balance of possibility and reality*. This follows directly from the preceding discussion. This law is universal, for the higher plastic work is already a god in and for itself, even if it is to portray a mortal. Even the human being, when he suffers, should do so as a god would if he were capable of suffering. The concept of the gods itself already determines that they appear released from all suffering; only Prometheus, the archetype of all tragic art, suffers as a god. Thus in the figures of the gods in and for themselves there can be no expression that might show that inner equipoise of the soul disrupted.

In the construction of painting we asserted (§87) that in its portrayals, too, the expressions must be tempered. Yet in painting this is not as directly the case as in sculpture. Painting must temper that expression so that it does not detract from beauty, by which we understand here *ideal* beauty, grace, to which painting, as the ideal form, primarily strives. In sculpture, on the other hand, the tempered expression and an appearance allowing us to recognize an internally balanced condition of the soul is necessary in itself because it seeks to be an image of the divine nature and of the indifference dwelling within it. This is the primary consideration, and beauty is its necessary and immediate effect or manifestation. Thus beauty and truth in their absoluteness have a common ground: indifference.

Let me introduce here some examples from Greek works of this peaceful expression elevated above passion and violence. Some examples depict gods, others mortals.

The highest archetype of rest and indifference is the father of the gods. Hence, he is portrayed in eternal serenity, seemingly untouched by feelings. A greater animation may be attributed to Apollo, since he is the *ideal* god among the gods. This greater animation is expressed by the sublimity of his gait, the daring swing of his body on which eternal beauty plays. In him, too, the highest beauty is rendered in the deepest peacefulness. "Neither veins nor sinews," Winckelmann says, "inflame or excite this body; rather, a heavenly spirit, one appearing to be poured out like a gentle stream, seems to have filled the entire outline of this figure."[99] He is portrayed pursuing the Python, against which he uses his bow; with powerful strides he reaches and slays him. Yet he is not riveted by his object. "From the height of his contentedness his sublime gaze looks out as if into the infinite, far beyond his victory. Contempt sits on his lips, and the displeasure he draws back into himself swells his nostrils and rises up into his proud forehead. But the peace hovering in divine stillness on that forehead remains undisturbed . . ."

In our presentation of painting we already spoke about the most eminent examples of tempered expression in the portrayal of human action and suffering: Laocoön and Niobe. Concerning *Niobe*, however, I want to remark additionally that it already belongs to the highest works by virtue of the subject itself. In a sense, sculpture portrays itself in her, and she is the archetype of sculpture, perhaps in the same way Prometheus is that of tragedy. All life is based on the joining of something infinite in itself with something finite, and life as such appears only in the juxtaposition or opposition of these two. Wherever its highest or absolute unity is, we also find, viewed relatively, death, and yet for just that reason also the highest degree of life. Since it is indeed the task of sculpture to portray that highest unity, then the absolute life of which it shows reflections already appears in and for itself—also compared with the appearance itself—as death. In Niobe, however, art itself has uttered this mystery by portraying the highest beauty in death. Furthermore, it allows that *particular* peace—the one inhering

only within the divine nature itself and completely unattainable to *mortals*—to be gained in death itself, as if to suggest that the transition to the highest life of beauty, at least as far as that which is mortal is concerned, must appear as death. Art is thus doubly symbolic here: it becomes additionally the interpreter of itself such that that which all art seeks stands before our very eyes here, expressed in Niobe.

Annotation concerning the relationship with painting. Painting is the purely ideal art form. The essence of the ideal = activity. Hence, in painting, more activity and more expression of passion is allowed. Only *one* condition must be kept, namely, that sensual beauty, charm, and grace not be suspended or destroyed. Only sculpture is able to portray that final beauty that is sublimity, and that originally, as the total indifference of the infinite and the finite, dwells only in God.

Now I will present a few more characteristics of sculpture.

Because of the infinite repetition of everything in everything, we can expect that in the plastic arts κατ' ἐξοχήν the other plastic forms also recur, though with extremely limited validity. The following propositions refer to this condition.

§132. *The architectonic part of sculpture, to the extent it takes place within sculpture in a subordinated fashion, is drapery or clothing*.

Drapery is architectonic because it constitutes more or less only an allegory or allusion (echo) of the forms of the organic figure. This allusion is based primarily on the contrast between the folds, on the one hand, and the smooth areas without folds, on the other. A raised member from which a free garment hangs down on both sides is never without folds in nature, and these folds fall within a hollow or concave area.

In works of the old style the folds are *usually* straight. In the most beautiful and perfect artistic style of art they occur more in sweeping curves; for the sake of variety they were broken, yet such that they extended out like branches from a common stem and with an extremely gentle swing. Indeed, there can be no more splendid and beautiful architectonic than that of the perfected drapery in the Greek works. The art of portraying the nude raises itself here on its own, as it were, to a higher power by allowing the organic form to be perceived through a heterogeneous medium; the less directly and more indirectly it renders its subject here, the more beautiful does this part of art become. Nonetheless, drapery always remains subordinated to the nude, which is the true and first love of art. Art scorns concealment insofar as such concealment is merely a means and is not itself made into an allegory of beauty, since beauty is cultivated completely for the highest sensibility and scorns that lower one, even when nude. Just as no people possessed a higher sensibility for beauty than the Greeks, so also none was further removed from that false and unchaste shame that calls itself decency.[100] Hence, drapery in artworks could have no function external to art,

and even then could be cultivated only for the sake of beauty itself, not for any so-called moral purpose. Therefore, only Greek clothing can be called beautiful.

§133. *The aspect of painting in sculpture, insofar as it might occur there, would have to refer to grouping* or to the arrangement of several figures into a common activity. Since in a larger composition it could not be avoided that individual figures were concealed by others, and that for the viewing of the whole a certain, definite perspective would become necessary, sculpture would thereby subject itself to a limitation similar to that in painting. Yet one already can see from the circumstances themselves how sculpture necessarily must limit itself to only a few figures as far as overall composition is concerned; it is able to do this with all the more ease since it is the only formative art for which the figure in and for itself suffices and which needs nothing external to that figure. Painting must at least portray the background, and thus is less satisfied with only *one* figure, since it must lend significance to such space. Precisely because painting must add the background to its objects, it already possesses the connecting link between them, whereas if sculpture, where every figure is self-enclosed both within itself and from all sides, tried to connect too many figures through an external medium—for example, the ground onto which they are placed—it would thereby lend the nonessential too much significance.

One can thus assert that it is precisely in the absoluteness of sculpture that we find the reason why it does not expand itself into complex compositions, since its entire greatness lies enclosed in one or a few figures, a greatness that is based not on extension in space but rather only on the inner perfection and self-enclosure of the object itself. Hence, it involves dimensions that are not evaluated or appreciated empirically, but rather according to the idea. Just as nature achieves the completion of every individual organic work by suspending length and width and structuring everything concentrically, so also do the formative arts in sculpture as their highest form close their own circle by drawing in everything toward the center and, while *apparently* limiting themselves, actually expand into a totality.

I shall now conclude my construction of the plastic arts with a few general considerations concerning the formative arts as such

At the very outset of our inquiry we construed the formative arts as such as the real side of the world of art, the side whose underlying unity is accordingly the informing of identity into difference. This informing is doubtlessly complete where the universal *is* the entire particular, the particular the entire universal. This is essentially the case only in sculpture. Hence, we can now be certain of having completed our construction of the formative arts, that is, of having brought that construction back to its point of departure. The general parameters within which the forms of those arts fall are those of real unity, a unity that, represented in its essential nature, is itself indifference. By means of differentiation the real and ideal forms emerge from it: the former as music, the latter as paint-

ing. Only in the plastic arts, however, does that unity first fully manifest itself as indifference.

One might counter our own postulated sequence of the three basic arts with the following alternative proposal. If we admit, one might say, and presuppose that formative art corresponds to precisely that real unity, and that in its own forms it must thus be construed according to the forms of that unity, then in a system of the arts the plastic arts will necessarily correspond to the material side of nature, and will constitute the first potence of the formative arts. The essential nature of art clothes itself here, as does the pure essence of nature, completely in matter and body. That matter becomes ideal through the second potence: in nature through light, in art through painting. Finally, in the third potence, the real and ideal potences become one. That which is bound to or informed into the real or into matter becomes sonority or sound; within art it becomes music and song. Here, then, the absolute cognitive act is more or less freed from the fetters of matter; positing that matter as a mere accidental, it becomes objective and recognizable as the act of the informing of eternal subjectivity into objectivity.

What one has here is thus the reverse of the order we assume in our discussion. This alternative order might appear to recommend itself even further by providing for a more immediate and fluid transition from the formative to the verbal arts. Matter gradually dematerializes into the ideal: in painting as far as the relative-ideal, through light; then, in music and even more so in speech and poesy, into the genuinely ideal, the most complete manifestation of the absolute cognitive act.

This sequence would be based on a misunderstanding of the potences in philosophy. We have not maintained that the potences constitute the true *real* antitheses, but rather that they are universal forms recurring in the same way in all objects. The potence of the organic, for example, is by no means merely the organic being itself; it inheres with equal necessity and certainty in matter itself, except that in the latter it is subordinated to the anorganic. Matter is simultaneously anorganic, organic, and commensurate with reason, and as such is an image of the universe in general. Now the plastic arts, as the third potence of formative art, represent as *developed* precisely that which in matter is the expression of reason, and in this act of representation even proceed through various stages. As architecture, for example, the plastic arts develop matter or the anorganic only to the point of an allegory of the organic and mediately of reason. Hence, even if the plastic arts fall under the rubric of the first potence by taking matter as the actual body of art, nonetheless *in* that first potence—under the common exponent of the first element, the anorganic—they would constitute the third as well by representing reason as the essence of matter. In this way, just as *nature* represents the first potence in relation to the universe as a whole, formative art would function therefore as the first potence in relation to the universe of art as a whole.

The factor deciding the sequence of the three basic forms of formative art, however, is the following.

All formative art is the informing of the infinite into the finite, the ideal into the real. Since it is thus directed toward the transformation of the ideal into the real, the most complete appearance of the ideal as the real, the absolute metamorphosis of the first into the second, must designate or constitute the summit of all formative art.

It is self-evident that art will appear as *real* within that configuration in which it is *real*, that is, within the configuration in which it informs the infinite into the finite; in contrast, within the reverse configuration of that transformation it will appear more or less as *ideal*. Hence, in music that informing of the ideal into the real still manifests itself *as act*, as an event, and not as being; it appears as merely relative identity. In painting, the ideal has acquired contours and form, though without yet appearing as real; it merely portrays models of the real. In the plastic arts, finally, the infinite is wholly transformed into the finite, life into death, spirit into matter—yet precisely for that reason, and ***only*** because it is now wholly and absolutely *real*, is the plastic work of art also absolutely ideal.

The sequence we have presented is thus the one actually grounded in the subject matter itself, and we will encounter the same state of affairs on the ideal side of art within poesy. There, too, the highest potence is based on that particular transformation of something ideal into a total and complete being, into a reality that is itself represented as *actual*. In contrast, lyric poetry, for example, appears far more ideal.

This completes the circle of our investigation into the formative arts. Therefore we will now turn our attention to the *ideal side* of the world of art, to poesy in the stricter sense—the poetic arts at large, that is, to the extent that they express themselves through speech and language.

The Ideal Side of the World of Art; or, The Verbal Arts[101]

Let me reiterate the following main points here.

(1) According to the proofs we presented at the very beginning (§8), the universe is structured in two directions corresponding to the two unities within the absolute. Within the first, considered *in and for itself*, the absolute appears merely as the *ground* of existence, since on this side it forms its own eternal unity into difference. Within the second, the absolute appears as *essence*, *as* an absolute; for just as in the first unity essence is worked into form, so here in contrast form is worked into essence. In the first instance, form is thus dominant; in the second, essence.

(2) The two sides of the absolute-ideal are essentially one, for what in the one is expressed as real, in the other is expressed as ideal, and vice versa. Considered

separately, the two sides are thus merely the various modes of appearance of the one, of the same whole.

Nature in separation from the other unity (in which form is worked into essence) appears more as created, whereas the ideal unity appears more as creating; precisely for that reason, however, what is found in the one is necessarily also found in the other. According to §74 (General Addendum), nature is the plastic side; its image is the Niobe of the plastic arts who solidifies with her children. The ideal world is the poesy of the universe. In the first instance the divine principle veils itself in an other, a being; in the second it appears as what it is: life and activity. Yet even this difference is merely one of form, as was proved initially in our consideration of formative and verbal art. Considered in itself, nature is the most primal, the first poem of the divine imagination. Antiquity, and after it modernity, called the real world *natura rerum*, the birth of things. In it the eternal things—the ideas—first become actual, and insofar as nature is thus the revealed world of ideas, it also contains the true archetypes for poesy. Hence, any distinctions between formative and verbal art can only be based on the following considerations.

All art is the direct reflection of the absolute act of production or of the absolute self-affirmation. Formative art, however, does not allow this act to *appear* as something ideal, but rather only through an other, and thus as something real. Poesy in contrast, by being essentially of the same nature as formative art, allows that absolute act of knowledge to appear directly as cognitive act. Poesy is the higher potence of formative art to the extent that in the artistic image itself it yet maintains the nature and character of the ideal, of the essence, of the universal. The medium through which formative art expresses its ideas is in and for itself concrete; that through which verbal art expresses them, *universal*, namely, language. Hence, poesy has optimally received precisely the name *poesy*, that is, of *making* or *creating*,[102] since its works appear as an act of producing instead of a condition of being. This is why poesy can be viewed as the *essence* of all art, similar to the way the soul is viewed as the *essence* of the body. Of course, to the extent that poesy is the creating agent of the *ideas* and thereby the principle of all art, we have already addressed it in our construction of mythology. Hence, according to our own methodology we can only speak about poesy, in contrast to formative art, to the extent that it is itself a *particular* art form, and thus about that poesy that is the manifestation of the *essential nature* of all art. Yet even within these limited parameters poesy is a completely unlimited object and to that extent does differentiate itself from formative art. To mention but one example here: In the *plastic arts* any antithesis between antiquity and modernity is simply out of place, whereas such antithesis permeates all the genres of poesy. The poesy of antiquity is just as rationally limited and self-identical as is its art. Modern poesy, in contrast, is in every direction and in every constituent part as variously unlimited and in part irrational as is modern art in general. This *particular* characteristic of limitlessness, too, results from poesy being the ideal side of art, just as the plastic arts are the real side, for the ideal = the infinite.

We might express in the following way the contrast between antiquity and modernity in the context just described. In the plastic arts antiquity yet speaks, as it were, but is plastic in poesy. Speech is the most serene and immediate expression of reason. Every other activity participates to a greater degree in corporeality. Within its own images modernity places the expression itself into a forceful, corporeal activity. The images produced by antiquity, by conveying the expression of serenity, are for precisely that reason actually possessive of *speech*, and are thus truly poetic. In its poesy, in contrast, antiquity is actually plastic, and in this way expresses the kinship between and inner identity of verbal and formative art much more completely than does modernity.

This inner limitlessness of poesy also involves a difference in its systematic treatment. Just as nature is rational and can be represented according to a universal model, history, on the other hand, irrational and inexhaustible, expressing its own hidden law only in separate manifestations—so also is the relationship between formative and verbal art. Just as necessity as the universal dominates the particular in nature, in the ideal world, in contrast, the particular, unfettered, strives freely toward the infinite—so also in formative and verbal art. Thus our consideration of poesy cannot, first of all, follow the universal on into the particular by means of the kind of construction possible within formative art, for particularity possesses more power and freedom in the latter. The universal that *can* be expressed here can thus only attain to that expression in a broader sense and in a larger series of examples. In contrast, the less the universal imperiously determines the particular, the more strongly—second, now—does individuality demand portrayal in its absoluteness. Our own presentation here will thus tend toward an inclusion of the characterization of individuals.

I shall, by the way, linger less with the individual than with main points, and for this reason, too, can now present less the specifics than the larger perspectives as a whole.

I shall now first answer the question: *By what means does speech become poesy*? This question will necessarily involve a discussion (a) of the *essential nature* of poesy insofar as it has not already been determined in our previous considerations, and (b) of the various forms through which poesy as such separates itself from speech—thus primarily rhythm, meter and so on. Thereupon we must construe in a general fashion the particular unities included within the basic unity of poesy, that is, the genres and classes of poetic art, the most notable of which are the lyric, epic, and dramatic. Then we must treat each of these genres separately.

When one examines the usual theoreticians of the fine arts, one finds them hard pressed to offer a concept or so-called definition of poetic art. And among those who offer such, not even does the form of poesy—much less its essence—

find expression. The first prerequisite for understanding poesy, however, is doubtlessly to determine its *essence*, for only from this does its form follow, since only *such* a form can be commensurate with *this*, its essence.

Now, the *essential nature* of poesy is the same as that of all art: it is the representation of the absolute or of the universe in the particular.[103] If various kinds of poetic art appear to violate this premise, this merely proves that such allegedly poetic works actually possess no poetic reality at all. Just as nothing can be a work of art that is neither mediately nor immediately a reflex of the infinite, so also—and this is especially the case here—can nothing be poetic or a *poem* that does not represent something absolute, that is, precisely the absolute in its relationship to some particularity. This implies nothing, by the way, concerning the nature of that particularity. Poetic sense consists precisely in requiring nothing over and above actuality or reality except possibility. Whatever is poetically possible is for just that reason also categorically actual, just as in philosophy whatever is ideal is also real. The principle of false poesy, just as that of false philosophy, is empiricism, or the impossibility of recognizing anything as true or real except that which derives from experience.[104]

In our discussion of mythology we have already considered the great objects of poesy: the world of the ideas, a world that for art is the world of the gods; the universe; nature. By proving as we did in that section the necessity of mythology for all art, we have also proved this same necessity for poesy in particular. We likewise demonstrated there the extent to which modernity also has a mythology, and how that mythology continually allows itself to be enhanced or created anew from the material at hand. The application of these general propositions, however, must wait until we discuss the poetic genres individually.

The universal *form* of poesy in the larger sense is that it portrays the ideas in speech and language. Regarding the basis and significance of language itself, let me refer you to §73, where we proved that it is the most appropriate symbol of the absolute cognitive act, for this act appears in language on the one hand as *ideal*, not real, as in being, and yet integrates itself on the other hand through something real without ceasing to be ideal. In particular regarding the relationship between language and sonority, let me recall the following. Sonority = pure informing of the infinite into the finite, conceived as such. In language this informing is completed, and the realm of the opposite unity begins already. We might thus say that language is substance raised to the highest power,[105] substance that has emerged from the informing of the infinite into the finite. Matter itself is the divine word that has entered into the finite. This word—recognizable in sonority through pure differences (in the differentiation between tones), and itself anorganic, thus yet lacking the corresponding body—finds this body in language. Just as in the flesh of the human body all differences of colors are suspended, and the highest indifference of all colors emerges, so also speech is the material of all tones and sonorities reduced to indifference.

It is necessary, as becomes clear in the course of general philosophy, that the highest embodiment and binding of intelligence is simultaneously the moment of its liberation. The highest point of contraction of the universe and of the intelligence dwelling in it is found in the human organism. Yet precisely in that human being it also breaks through to freedom. Hence, here, too, sonority and tone appear as the expression of the infinite within the finite, but as the expression of the completed informing—in *language*, which relates to simple sonority in the same way the matter of an organic body, matter wedded to light, relates to general matter.

Language in itself is the chaos from which poesy is to construct the bodies of its ideas. The poetic work of art, however, like every other work of art, should be an absolute in the particular, a universe, a cosmic body. This is possible only by the separation of *speech*, in which the work of art expresses itself, from the totality of language. Yet this separation, on the one hand, and the absoluteness, on the other, are possible only if that speech possesses its own independent movement and for that reason its own time within itself, just as does any independent cosmic body. It separates itself from everything else by following an *internal* regularity. Viewed externally, speech moves freely and independently, and only internally is it actually ordered and subject to regularity. In art to the extent that it is music or verbal art, rhythm corresponds to that whereby a cosmic body is self-contained and possesses it own internal time. Since both music and speech are characterized by movement in time, their works would not be self-contained wholes if they were subject to time, and if they did not rather subject time to themselves and possess it internally. This control and subjugation of time = *rhythm*.[106]

Rhythm as such is the informing of identity into difference. It thus includes change, yet an autonomously ordered change subordinated to the identity of that in which the change takes place. (Regarding the general concept of rhythm one should refer to that which was presented in our discussion of music.)

For the time being I am taking rhythm in its most general meaning insofar as in the larger sense it constitutes an inner regularity of sequential tonal movement. Yet even in this widest meaning it encompasses two forms. The one can be called rhythm in the narrower sense and as the informing of unity into multiplicity corresponds to the category of quantity.[107] The other, and the opposite one, must correspond to the category of quality. We can see easily that rhythm in the narrower sense is the determination of the *sequence of tonal movements according to laws of quantity*. In contrast, the form corresponding to quality can be specified more closely as follows.

Aside from duration or quantity, tones involve no differences other than highness or lowness of pitch, and these differences are suspended and eliminated within speech according to the proof presented earlier (for in *song*, itself *music*, the identity attained in language is once again broken down or dismantled, and speech returns to elementary tones). Further, in speech as such neither highness

nor lowness of tones obtains, and the unities of language can just as little be constituted of tones as can those of an organic body be constituted of colors. Finally, the unities of language are already organic constituent parts or syllables, and thus the qualitative determination cannot depend on the highness or lowness of tones. Hence, nothing remains in which that determination can consist than, on the one hand, the drawing of attention to one syllable by raising the voice, whereby a number of other syllables become bound or related to this one, and the resulting unity is made accessible to the ear, and, on the other hand, the de-emphasis of other syllables by lowering the voice. This, however, is what we call accent.[108]

I shall move on now to the *individual poetic genres* by first offering the following general introductory remarks.[109]

A *poetic work* in the larger sense is a *whole* possessive of its own internal time and momentum, and thereby separated from the larger whole of language and completely self-enclosed.

An immediate consequence of this self-enclosed existence of speech through rhythm and meter is that its language must be unique and different from common language in another respect as well. By means of rhythm, speech makes known that its own end inheres absolutely within it. It would make no sense for such speech to accommodate itself in this self-emphasis to the usual goal of language, namely, understanding, and to imitate all the forms serving such goals. It strives rather to be as absolute as possible even in its constituent parts (no logical subordination, elimination of conjunctions). In any case, all poesy—lyric, epic, or dramatic—is at its source composed for the ear. Enthusiasm appears here most immediately as inspiration that does not allow the person seized by it to think of external purpose. Hearing only the voice of the god, he moves, as it were, outside common laws of regularity, with daring, yet securely and effortlessly.

It is only a prejudice that poesy is able to speak in no other language than that which is also used in prose (Gottsched, Wieland).[110]

Prose as such—if I may insert this explanation here—is language that has been occupied by the understanding and formed according to its purposes. In poesy we find nothing but limitation and strict separation of forms. Prose is to that extent itself indifference, and its primary error is in wanting to step out of that indifference, a situation generating the afterbirth of poetic prose. Poesy differentiates itself from prose not only through rhythm, but also through language that is in part simpler, in part more beautiful. By this we do not mean a wild fire expressing itself in the empty excitement of language, which the ancients called *parenthyrsos*.[111] To be sure, there are art critics who speak of the wild fire of Homer.

Simplicity is the highest element in poesy just as it is in the formative arts. Dionysius of Halicarnassus,[112] the most admirable art critic of antiquity, shows specifically the merit of poetic *synthesis* in a passage from the *Odyssey* that, as he says, is composed in the basest expressions that perhaps a farmer or worker might use.

Furthermore, lyric and dramatic diction are different in this respect from epic diction insofar as they are for the most part lyrical. Yet here, too, inspiration expresses itself more through the daring departures from logical or mechanical sequences of thought than through verbal bombast. Language becomes a higher organ and is allowed to use shorter turns of phrase, more unusual words, unique inflections of words—yet all this within the bounds of genuine inspiration.

In poetic treatises one usually also speaks about *metaphors*, *tropes*, and the other embellishments of speech, and all the other epithets, comparisons, and parables. Metaphors actually belong more in the realm of rhetoric, which itself can seek to speak through images in order to make itself more vivid, or in order to deceive and to awaken passion. Poesy never has its purpose outside itself, although it does also elicit externally that particular feeling inhering internally within it. Plato compares the effects of poetry with those of a magnet.

Hence, in poesy everything belonging to the embellishment of speech is subordinated to the highest and ultimate principle of beauty. For this reason, no general or universal law can be presented regarding the use of imagery, tropes, and so on, other than precisely that of such subordination.

Construction of Individual Poetic Genres

The essence of all art as the portrayal of the absolute in the particular is pure limitation on the one hand and undivided absoluteness on the other. In nature poesy, these elements must already be differentiated, and consummate *art* is posited only with strict separation. In all forms, the poesy of antiquity is the most strictly limited and formed, and the more flowing, mixed versions are those of modernity, which accounts for the large number of mixed genres that have emerged from the latter.

If our treatise of the various literary forms were to follow the natural or historical sequence, we would have to begin with the epic as identity and from there proceed to lyric and dramatic poesy. Yet we must orient ourselves here completely according to scientific sequence. Since according to the sequence of potences already prescribed, that of particularity or difference is the first, that of identity the second, and that wherein unity and difference, the universal and the particular are one, is the third, then here, too, we will remain true to this sequence and accordingly begin with lyric art.

We can see that among the three poetic genres *lyric* poesy corresponds to the

real form because its designation points to the analogy with music. We can clarify this even further in the following way.

In the form corresponding to the informing of the infinite into the finite, the predominating element must for just this reason be the finite, difference, particularity. Yet precisely this is the case in lyric poesy. More directly than any other poetic genre it takes the subject and, accordingly, particularity as its point of departure, be it that it expresses the condition of a subject, for example, the poet, or takes the occasion of an objective portrayal from an element of subjectivity. For just this reason and *in* this capacity it can be called the subjective poetic genre, subjectivity, that is, in the sense of particularity.

In every other kind of poem there is the possibility of a change of conditions or circumstances, in spite of its inner identity. In lyric poetry, as in every piece of music, only *one* tone, *one* basic feeling predominates. And as in music, precisely because of the predominance of particularity, all tones that combine with the predominant one can only be *differences*; in lyric poesy, too, every movement expresses itself as difference. Lyric poesy is most extensively subordinated to rhythm, completely dependent on and even swept away by it. It avoids uniform rhythms, whereas the epic moves within the highest identity in this regard.

The lyric poem as such is the portrayal or representation of the infinite or universal within the particular. Hence, every Pindaric ode takes as its point of departure a particular object and a particular event, yet strays from this point into generality, for example, into the later mythological sphere; by returning from such generality to the particular again, it generates a kind of identity of the two, a real portrayal of the universal within the particular.

Since lyric poesy is the most subjective poetic genre, freedom is necessarily the predominating element within it. No poetic genre is less subject to coercion. The most daring jumps or departures from customary thought sequence are allowed here, since the main point of everything is that one particular association or context obtain within the disposition of the poet or listener, not objectively or external to him. Perfect constancy governs within the epic, but is suspended in the lyric poem, just as it is in music, where nothing but differences obtain; between one tone and the next, genuine continuity is impossible, whereas in colors all differences flow together into *one* mass as if from *one* vessel.

The *essential nature* of all lyric poesy is the portrayal of the infinite within the finite; yet since it moves only in succession, *contrast* between the infinite and the finite thereby emerges as a kind of inner principle of life and movement. The infinite and the finite are absolutely one within the epic, and there are thus no stirrings of the infinite—not as if the latter were not present, but rather because it rests in a common unity with the finite. In the lyric poem, on the other hand, this contrast is a declared one. Hence, the most appropriate subjects of the lyric poem are in general *moral*, bellicose, passionate.

Passion as such is the character of the finite or of particularity in contrast with universality. Again, the *poesy of antiquity* portrays this character of lyric art most purely and most originally, both regarding its origin and its general disposition. The emergence and initial development of lyric poesy in Greece take place simultaneously with the blossoming of freedom and the emergence of republicanism. At first poesy united with laws and served their transmission. Soon, as lyric art, its inspiration inclined toward fame, freedom, and beautiful sociability. It became the soul of public life, the glorifier of the festivals. That energy that previously was directed completely toward the outside, and that was lost in an objective identity—the epic—now turned inward and began to restrict or limit itself. The first lyrical tones emerged within this awakening consciousness and emerging differentiation, tones that soon developed the highest variety. The rhythmic element of the Greek states, that quality of reflection of the Greeks that had been directed completely toward itself and its own existence and activity, now ignited the nobler passions, passions worthy of the lyrical muse. Simultaneously with lyric poetry, music enlivened the festivals and public life. In Homer, sacrifices and worship services are yet without music. The identity of the Homeric epic includes the heroic principle, the principle of kingship and of rule.

Lyric poesy began with Callinus and Archilocus[113] after the full development of the epic; compared to the epic, lyric art up to its final perfection in Pindar is a completely republican form of poesy.[114]

Almost all the lyrical songs of antiquity—about whose existence we know either through historical transmission or from fragments or sometimes entire pieces—refer to public or common life, and those lyric poems from antiquity that refer more to individual themes express sociability of a sort that could develop and thrive only within a free and great state. Everything suggests that the bud that was yet closed in the epic is finally open, and that the more liberated cultivation of life is developing.

Hence, the Greeks are objective, real, and expansive also within the particularity of lyric poetic art.

The first lyric rhythms, as indicated, were those in which the laws of free states were sung. This was still the case at the time of Solon.[115] The war songs of Tyrtaeus[116] spurred a completely objective passion. Alcaeus[117] was the head of the conspirators against the tyrants, fighting them not only with the sword but also with songs. We hear of several lyric poets of this period who were summoned on the advice of the gods to settle civic disagreements. Others were honored at the courts of the rulers and tyrants of the period—Arion, for example, by Periander.[118] The age of innocence had also passed in that the singers were no longer contented like the Homeric singers.They demanded pay, rewards, and respect for their talent. Pindar, whose lyre sounded at the public competitions, was also in this—objective—aspect of Greek lyric poetry the high point. He anticipated the cultivation of the Periclean Age. The cruder form of republican-

ism has already reverted to the rule of the educated. He unified the dignity of a Pythagorean philosopher with the fire of the lyric poet, just as the legend is well known that he loved the teachings of Pythagoras[119] (this constitutes the plastic, almost dramatic element in the Pindaric odes).

This objectivity of Greek lyric poetry does, however, obtain only within the general character of the genre itself, which is that of inwardness and of particular, present reality. The epic relates the past. The lyric poem sings of the present, and digresses to the immortalization of the most individual and transient features of that present: enjoyment, beauty, the love toward individual youths as in the poems of Alcman and Sappho,[120] and here even as far as the details of beautiful eyes, hair, and individual bodily parts such as in the poems of Anacreon.[121]

Dionysius of Halicarnassus asserts that the most excellent quality of the epic is that the poet *not* appear. Lyric art, in contrast, is the real sphere of self-perception and of self-consciousness, just as is music, where no actual concrete form at all expresses itself, but rather only inner disposition, no object, but rather only mood.

The character of *difference*, of severance and separation inhering in lyric poetry in and for itself, expresses itself in the lyric art of the Greeks no less definitely than all others. We find the complete development of all rhythmic genres such that nothing was left for drama. There was a sharp distinction between all the various types as regards both the external differences of rhythm and the inner diversity of content, language, and so on, and there obtained a sharp distinction, finally, between the different styles of lyric art, the Ionic, Doric, and so on.

Regarding lyric art we once again encounter the same general contrast between antiquity and modernity.

Just as the highest blossoming of the lyric art of the Greeks coincides with the emergence of the republic, the highest blossoming of public life, so also do the beginnings of modern lyric poetry coincide with that period in the fourteenth century of public disturbances and of the general dissolution of the republican alliances and states in Italy. When public life more or less disappeared, it had to direct itself inward. The more fortunate age that Italy owed to a few magnanimous princes, primarily the Medicis, only came later, and was favorable for the development of the romantic epic, which cultivated itself in Ariosto. Dante and Petrarch, the first founders of lyric poesy, lived in the age of upheaval, of social dissolution; whenever their songs make reference to these external affairs, they loudly express the misfortune of this age.

The poetic art of antiquity celebrated primarily the masculine virtues that war and common public life generate and nourish. Of all the emotional relationships, friendship among men was thus the predominant one, whereas love toward a woman was completely subordinate. Modern lyric poetry was at its inception consecrated to love and all the emotions in the contemporary concept of love. The first inspiration of Dante was the love of a young girl, Beatrice. He immortalized the story of this love in sonnets, canzones, and prosaic works intermixed with poems, particularly the *Vita nuova*. The more severe fate of his later life, the exile from Florence, the misfortune and crimes of the age, first spurred his divine spirit to his higher work, the *Divina Commedia*, although here, too, Beatrice is the basis and beginning of the poem.

The entire life of Petrarch was dedicated to that spiritual love that contents itself in worship. This harmonious soul, filled with the blossom of education and culture and with the noblest virtues of the age, was needed in order to cultivate Italian poesy to its highest degree of lyrical beauty, purity, and excellence. One would err greatly by seeking in Petrarch a poet dissolving and melting in love, since his forms are just as strict, precise, and determined in their own way as those of Dante.

Boccaccio also joins this group, since the muse of his poesy is also love.[122]

The spirit of the modern age, already presented earlier in a general fashion, introduces the restriction of modern lyric poetry as regards the objects themselves. The lyric poetry in modern states could no longer be the image and accompanist of a public and common life, a life within an organic whole. For it, there remained no other objects than either the completely subjective, individual, momentary emotions in which lyric poesy lost itself even in the most beautiful gushings of the later world, emotions from which a *whole* life emanates only very indirectly, or enduring emotions directed toward objects themselves, as in the poems of Petrarch, where the whole itself becomes a kind of romantic or dramatic unity.

The sonnets of Petrarch are works of art, not only in their individual elements, but also as a whole. (The sonnet is capable of a merely architectonic beauty.)

It is unmistakable, however, that science, art, and poesy began with the clerical class; this accounts for the unheroic element and the fact that love stories pertained more to matrons than to unmarried girls.

Otherwise, lyric poesy divides itself into poems with moral, didactic, and political content, and always with a preponderance of reflection and subjectivity, since it lacks any objectivity in life. The only kind of lyric poems that refer to public life are the religious ones, since only in the church could public life still be found.

We now come to the epic.

The lyric poem designates as such the first potence of the ideal series, and thus that of reflection, knowledge, and consciousness, and for that reason stands completely under the dominance of reflection. The second potence of the ideal world in general is that of *action*, that which is objective *in itself*, just as knowledge is the potence of the subjective. Just as the forms of art in general are the forms of things in and for themselves, however, so also must that particular poetic genre corresponding to the ideal unity portray not just visible action itself, but rather action viewed absolutely and as it is in its *essential nature*.

Action viewed absolutely or objectively is history. The task of the second type is thus *to be an image of history as it is in itself or within the absolute*.

That this poetic genre is the *epic* can be seen most clearly from the fact that all the characteristics deduced from the given description coincide and unite in the epic.

(1) The characteristic quality of the epic is not simply that action or history is portrayed, but rather that these are portrayed *within the identity of absoluteness*. Action viewed objectively or as history is essentially *pure* identity without any contrast between the infinite and the finite, for in its *essential nature*, of which all action is merely the external appearance, the finite is yet within the infinite and thus outside any difference with it. The latter is possible only where the finite is something in and for itself, or is real, thus insofar as the infinite is represented within the finite. The contrast between particularity and universality expresses itself regarding action as that between freedom and necessity. Hence, these, too, are unified in the essential nature of action. If, then, there is no opposition in the epic between the infinite and the finite, no conflict between freedom and necessity can be portrayed in it. Both appear interwoven in a common unity.

The conflict between freedom and necessity can be decided only by fate, and actually elicits that fate. All opposition between necessity and freedom is possible only within particularity, in difference. Through this relationship of difference within particularity, identity acquires the function of basis or ground and appears accordingly as fate. In the essential nature of action, as absolute identity, there is no fate.

The first determination of the epic should thus be formulated as follows: *it portrays action in the identity of freedom and necessity, without opposition between the infinite and the finite, without conflict, and, for that reason, without fate*.

It is quite noteworthy that when one compares the Homeric epic even with the earliest works of lyric poesy, one finds in it not the slightest stirrings of the infinite. The life and actions of people take place from one perspective in pure finitude, yet for just that reason also within the absolute identity of freedom and necessity. The husk yet encompassing the two in the bud is not yet broken; nowhere is there any rebellion against fate, though there is some defiance of the gods, since the latter are not beyond or outside nature, and themselves fall within the realm of human events. One might object that even Homer is acquainted with the black Keres and destiny,[123] to which even Zeus and the other gods are subject. Although this is true, destiny for just that reason does not yet *appear* as fate, since no opposition to it appears. Gods and human beings, the whole world encompassed by the epic, are portrayed in the highest identity with it. An extremely significant passage in this respect is the one in the sixteenth song of the *Iliad*, where Zeus wants to rescue his beloved Sarpedon from the hands of Patroclus and from death, and Hera admonishes him with the words: "Do you wish to bring back a man who is mortal, one long since doomed by his destiny, from ill-sounding death and release him?"[124]

She explains that other gods, too, would demand the same for their sons if he now were to snatch him away alive, and she continues:

> No, but if he is dear to you, and your heart mourns for him,
> then let him be, and let him go down in the strong encounter . . .
> but after the soul and the years of his life have left him, then send
> Death to carry him away, and Sleep, who is painless,
> until they come with him to the countryside of broad Lykia
> where his brothers and countrymen shall give him due burial
> with tomb and gravestone. Such is the privilege of those who have perished.

In this passage destiny appears in the mildness of a quiet necessity against which there is as yet no rebellion, no opposition, for Zeus, too, obeys Hera and "sheds a rain of blood upon the earth in honor of his son . . ."

Far less do the heroes of the *Iliad* experience any feeling or internal opposition against fate. The epic thus falls quite significantly between the other two genres: the lyric poem where simple conflict between the infinite and the finite predominates, the dissonance between freedom and necessity, yet without full, and anything but, subjective resolution; and tragedy, where both the conflict and fate are simultaneously portrayed. The identity that still predominated in the epic in a concealed fashion as a gentle force, unloads itself in severe and violent blows wherever conflict is juxtaposed with it. Tragedy can indeed be viewed as the synthesis of the lyric and epic elements to the extent that in it the identity of the latter is transformed into fate by the opposition itself. Compared to the tragedy, the epic thus lacks any opposition against the infinite, but it also lacks fate.

(2) In its *essential nature*, action is atemporal, for all time is merely the difference between possibility and actuality, and all manifested action is only the dismantling of that identity in which everything is simultaneous.[125] The epic must be an image of this timelessness. How is this possible?

As speech, poesy is itself bound to time, and all poetic portrayal is thus necessarily successive. Although there thus appears to be an insoluble contradiction here, it resolves itself in the following way. Poesy itself as such must appear to be outside time, untouched by time, and thus must place all time, all successive elements, purely into the object, thereby maintaining itself in a serene condition and floating above it immobile and unmoved by the sequential flow. Hence, in the *essential nature* of all action, in whose place poesy itself steps, there is no time. Time is only in the objects *as such*, and every idea, by emerging as an object from within its own essential nature, thus steps into time. Hence, the epic itself must be the calming element, the object in contrast to the moving element.

Let us try to imagine the reverse, namely, that the epic be the portrayal through movement of that which is itself at rest, such that the movement itself

would be attributed to the poesy and the quality of rest to the object. This would immediately destroy the epic character, and descriptive poetry would be the result, the so-called poetic painting. Nothing could be more alien to the epic. It is a repugnant sight to see the descriptive poet exert himself in movement, while the object always remains immobile. This is why even when the epic describes something at rest, that element of rest itself must be transformed into movement and progressive action. An example is the shield of Achilles, even though for other reasons as well this part of the *Iliad* counts among the latest.

If, however, we now reflect on the general model lying behind all forms of art, we find that the epic in poesy corresponds to painting in the formative arts. As is the latter, so also is the epic the portrayal of the particular within the universal, the finite within the infinite. Just as in painting light and nonlight flow together into *one* identical mass, so also in the epic do particularity and universality. Just as the surface is the predominating element in painting, so also does the epic expand itself toward all sides like an ocean that connects lands and peoples. How are we to understand this relationship?

One might protest that the object in a painting is motionless, the object in the epic, in contrast, in constant forward movement. Yet this objection takes that which is merely the limit of painting to be its essence. Viewed objectively, that which we can call the object in the painting is not without forward movement. It is merely a—subjectively—fixed moment. Yet we see particularly in emotional objects, and always in historical paintings, that the next moment will change everything, even though this next moment is not portrayed and all the figures in the painting remain in their original position. It is a moment eternalized empirically. One cannot, however, say that because of this—in the present context merely accidental—limitation that the object is at rest. Rather, it moves forward, and merely the next moment has been withdrawn. This is the same state of affairs as in the epic. In the epic, this forward progress coincides completely with the object itself, which is eternally moving; the element of rest is placed into the form of the portrayal, as is the case in painting, where that which moves continually forward is actually only fixed by the portrayal. The lingering element that in painting appears to inhere in the object, here reverts back to the subject; this explains a peculiarity of the epic that we will explain later, namely, that the moment is of value here, that there is no hurry precisely because the subject itself is at rest, in a sense, untouched by time, external to it.

Hence, we might express how the epic constitutes an image of the timelessness of action in its essential nature in the following way. That which itself does not exist in time encompasses all time within itself, and vice versa, yet for that reason it is indifferent toward time. *This indifference toward time is the fundamental characteristic of the epic*. It is equal to the absolute unity within which everything is, becomes, and changes, a unity that itself, however, is subject to no

change. Although the chain of cause and effect reaches back infinitely, that which encompasses this series of succession within itself does not itself lie within that series, but is rather outside all time.

The further characteristics follow automatically and are to a certain extent the mere consequence of the one just given; namely,

(3) Since absoluteness is not based on extension, but rather on the idea,[126] and therefore in the essential nature everything is equally absolute and the whole is not more absolute than the part, this characteristic must also be transferred to the epic. Hence, the beginning and end in the epic are equally absolute, and to the extent that the unconditioned portrays itself phenomenally as *chance*, both appear as *accidental*. The chance or accidental quality of the beginning and the end is thus in the epic the expression of its infinity and absoluteness. The singer who claimed the Trojan War began in the egg of Leda has with some justification become proverbial. It is against the nature and idea of the epic that it appear conditioned either forward or backward. In the succession of things prefigured in the absolute, everything is an absolute beginning; yet for just that reason there is here also no beginning. By beginning itself absolutely, the epic constitutes itself as a piece seemingly heard from within the absolute itself, which, by being absolute within itself, is yet only a fragment of an absolute and incalculable whole; similarly, the ocean, because it is bounded only by heaven itself, points directly to eternity. The *Iliad* begins absolutely, with the intention of singing the anger of Achilles, and is closed off just as absolutely, since there is no reason to end with the death of Hector (for, as we know, the final two songs are later additions, and even if one figures these to be a part of the whole now designated by the name of the *Iliad*, here, too, there is no real reason to end the story). The *Odyssey* begins just as absolutely.

Once one comprehends this absoluteness appearing as chance, an absoluteness lying deep in the nature of the epic, this alone allows Wolf's latest view of Homer to appear less alien and incomprehensible than most find it to be. They have taken from the usual theories certain principles regarding the artificiality of the epic, and are then unable to rhyme it with the quality of chance with which, according to their interpretation of Wolf's hypothesis, Homer has been put together. To be sure, this crude quality of chance is nullified as soon as one understands the idea that an entire people can constitute an individual (something we discussed earlier in our presentation of mythology).[127] Yet even that particular fortuitousness that really did govern the development of the Homeric songs coincides precisely here with necessity and art, since according to its own nature the epic must portray itself with the appearance of chance. This is confirmed further by the following characteristics.

(4) The indifference toward time must necessarily also result in an indifferent treatment of time, so that in that time encompassed by the epic, everything has a

place, the largest as well as the smallest element, the most insignificant as well as the most significant. This generates in a much more complete fashion than in common appearances the image of the identity of all things in the absolute, namely, *constancy*. Everything belonging to that constancy—the apparently insignificant acts of eating, drinking, getting up, going to bed, getting dressed, putting on jewelry—all this is described with the same relative thoroughness as everything else. Everything is equally important or unimportant, equally large and small. In this way particularly, the poesy within the epic and the poet himself raise themselves, in a sense, to a participation in the divine nature, before which the large and the small are equal, and which, as one poet put it, watches with a calm gaze as a kingdom or an anthill is destroyed. For

(5) In the *essential nature* of action all things and all events carry the same weight. None is dislodged by the other, because none is larger than the other. Everything is absolute here, as if nothing had preceded it and nothing were to follow it. The same is thus the case in the epic. The poet must linger in the present with an undivided soul, without recalling what has been and without foreseeing the future, and he himself must not hurry forward, since he, too, is resting while in movement, and is allowing only the object itself to move.

Everything is finally summarized in the fact that poesy or the poet floats above it all like a higher being touched by nothing. Only within that circumscribed area described by his poem do things push and dislodge one another, one event the other, one passion the other. The poet himself never enters into this zone, and thereby becomes a god and the most perfect image of the divine nature. Nothing compels him; he quietly allows everything to happen and does not reach in to change the course of events, since he is himself not moved by it. He gazes quietly down on everything, since nothing that happens seizes him. He never feels anything of the object itself, and this object can thus be the highest or the lowest, the most extraordinary or the most common, tragic or comic, without *the poet himself* ever becoming high or low, tragic or comic. All passion falls to the object itself. Achilles weeps and grieves painfully for the lost friend, Patroclus. The poet himself appears neither moved nor unmoved, for he does not appear at all. In the wide expanse of the whole, and next to the splendid figures of the heroes, Thersites also has his place, and next to the great figures of the underworld in the *Odyssey*, in the upper world the divine swineherd and the dog of Odysseus have their place.

To this spiritual rhythm floating in the eternal equilibrium of the soul there must now correspond also an equal, yet perceivable rhythm. Aristotle calls the *hexameter* the weightiest and most constant of all poetic meter. The hexameter has as little a transporting, passionate rhythm as it does a lingering, retarding one. Here, too, in this balance between lingering and transport, it expresses that indifference upon which the entire epic is based. Furthermore, since the hexameter in its own identity nonetheless allows great variety, it is best suited for adjusting itself to the object without doing violence to it, and to that extent is the most objective of all verse meter.

These are the primary and most distinguishing characteristics of the epic poem, characteristics of which you can find a more critical and historical presentation in the review of Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea* by August Wilhelm Schlegel.[128]

Now let us speak a bit about some particular forms of the epic, such as speeches, parables, and episodes.

Because of its nature, and when left to itself, the *dialogue* is inclined toward lyrical elements, since it proceeds from and moves toward self-consciousness more. Speech would thus change the character of the epic itself if in a reverse fashion its own character were not modified according to the epic. This modification must be determined by the antithesis toward the *unique* character of speech, which is actually a limiting of the intention of the speech itself and thus a hastening toward the goal, where something is to be achieved or attained. Hence, we find vehemence and brevity where passion is to be expressed. All this is moderated in the epic and subordinated to the main characteristics. Even in the most passionate speech, we still find epic fullness and circumstantiality, the use of adjectives, whereby the language acquires a certain satiety such as in the flow of simple narrative. The same is true of the *parable*. In the lyric poem, and also in the tragedy, it often resembles a bolt of lightning that suddenly illuminates the darkness and is then swallowed up again by the night. In the epic it possesses life within itself, and itself constitutes a small epic.

Finally, as regards the *episode*, this, too, is first and foremost an expression of the indifference of the singer toward his objects—even the most important—and of the absence of fear of no longer overseeing even the most complex developments, or of losing the main object from view in the face of some secondary object. The episode is thus a necessary part of the epic poem in order that the latter be made into a complete image of life.

In the usual theories the element of the *miraculous* is also presented as a necessary lever of the epopee. Yet this can hold true of the modern genre and reveals a completely distorted view of the old epic only when presented as a characteristic of the epic as such. The gods of Homer and their effects could appear only as miracles to Nordic barbarianism, just as the art critics of this type consider it to be intentional, rhetorical, and poetic pathos when Homer says "Zeus sent lightning bolts" instead of "there was lightning."

The element of the miraculous is completely alien to the Greeks and the ancient epic, for their gods dwell within nature.

Regarding the actual epic *subject matter*, what we have already said about the essential nature of the epic, namely, that it be an image of the absolute itself,

requires a *truly universal* subject matter. To the extent that such subject matter can exist only through mythology, we see that epic poetry is inconceivable *without mythology*. Indeed, the identity of the two is so great that mythology first acquires true objectivity only in the epic itself. Since the epic is the most objective and most universal poetic genre, it is most likely to coincide with the subject matter of all poesy. Just as mythology is only *one* and unified, so also can the epic only be *one* in view of this inseparability of content and form within a regulated cultural structure such as that of Greek poesy. At most, it can follow the universal law of phenomenal appearance by expressing itself in its own identity through two different unities. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are merely the two sides of the same poem. The question of different authors is of no consequence here. They are one through their nature and for that reason also through the common name of Homer, who himself is allegorical and significant. Some have portrayed the contrast between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as that between the rising and setting sun. I prefer to call the *Iliad* the centrifugal, the *Odyssey* the centripetal poem.

Let me make the transition to the more *contemporary* poems undertaken in the spirit of the ancient epic by making a brief *comparison between Virgil and Homer*.

One can contrast Virgil with Homer in all the given characteristics. Concerning the first, the absence of fate in the epic poem, Virgil sought rather to introduce fate into his action through a kind of tragic entanglement. The requirement of the epic poem to place movement only in the object itself is observed just as little, since Virgil often lowers himself to participation in his object. The sublime fortuitousness of the epic, whose beginning and end are just as indeterminate as the dark time of the primordial world and the future, is completely suspended by the *Aeneid*. It has a definite purpose, namely, to deduce the founding of the Roman Empire from Troy, and thereby to flatter Augustus. This purpose is announced right at the beginning, and as soon as this intention is achieved, the poem closes. The poet here does not allow the object its own movement, but rather makes something out of it. The lack of concern in the treatment of time is completely absent; the poet even avoids constancy and consistency and seems to have the circumstances of his educated audience continually in mind so as not to insult them through any narrative simplicity. Hence his expression is also artificial, rhetorically involved, pompous. In his speeches he is completely lyrical or oratorical, and in the episode of the love story of Dido almost modern.

The respect Virgil enjoys in schools and with modern art critics not only long adulterated the theory of the epic (the usual theories are modeled completely on Virgil, one of the many proofs that people prefer the inferior secondhand to the excellent firsthand), it also has had a detrimental influence on later attempts at epic poesy. Indeed, Milton betrays a spiritual flexibility and adaptability that

hardly leave any doubt that, had he used the undistorted model of the epic, he would have come far closer to it than he actually did—assuming that an even more profound knowledge had not led him closer to the insight that a language in which the old poetic meters cannot gain a foothold can in no way compete with antiquity in the sphere of epic poetry. Milton does, by the way, share most of the mistakes of Virgil, for example, the lack of that particular purposelessness that is part of epic poetry, even though as regards language, to cite but one instance, he comes relatively closer to epic simplicity than does Virgil. In addition to the mistakes he shares with Virgil, there are also the ones more peculiar to him, those whose basis lies in the concepts and the character of the age as well as in the nature of the subject matter.

After all we have presented until now, no proof is needed that the subject matter Klopstock has chosen,[129] and particularly the manner in which he has used it, is not epic material. Klopstock wanted to take it as sublime, and through his own efforts to push his conceptions to the level of sublimity, conceptions not of mystic dogmatism, but rather of unmystic and unpoetic dogmatism still laced with a bit of enlightenment. Yet if in the first place the life and death of Christ could be treated epically at all, it would have to be taken on a purely human level and treated with the utmost simplicity—almost idyllically. Or the poem would have to be completely filled with the modern spirit and with the ideas of Christian mysticism and mythology; then it at least would be absolute in its own right as an absolute contrast to the epic of antiquity. Klopstock is also one of those poets in whom religion dwells least as a living perception or vision of the universe and an intuition of ideas.[130] The predominating element in him is the concept of understanding. He takes both the infinity of God and the majesty of Christ in this sensibility; instead of placing that infinity and majesty in the object itself, it falls rather continually back to the poet, so that always only *he himself* and *his* movement appear, while the object itself remains immobile and acquires neither contours nor forward movement. The most nonsensical element is that the decision of God to give his son over for the redemption of mankind is taken from eternity itself. Christ, who is himself God, knows of this decision; thus the hero of the poem has no doubt whatsoever concerning the outcome, whereby the entire course of events in the poem drags on, and all the machinery through which the end is introduced appears to be completely useless. One can, by the way, not turn away from this poem without regretting that so great a talent has been wasted so fruitlessly.

Our purpose was to speak only of those *particular* contemporary epics that claim to be composed more or less in the style of the epic of antiquity. I will speak later specifically about Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea*, the only epic poem in the true sense of antiquity, as well as about the actual modern version of the epopee.

We still must look at some of the particular epic forms. One might ask from the outset how the epic poem as the highest identity can be capable of any real difference. It is self-evident that the space in which the epic poem can modulate itself must be extremely limited. It is even more immediately self-evident that through such modulation away from its unique position it also necessarily discards those characteristics associated only with that position.

There are initially only two possibilities inhering within the epic poem, which in their differentiation constitute two particular genres. The epic is the most objective genre if by objective we understand the absolute-objective. It is absolutely objective because it is the highest identity between subjectivity and objectivity. Poesy can step out of this identity only by becoming either *relatively* more objective or relatively more subjective. In the epic both the subject (the poet) and the object behave objectively. Now, this identity can be suspended in two ways: (a) such that the subjectivity or particularity is placed into the object, the objectivity or universality into the artist; (b) such that the objectivity or universality is placed into the object, the subjectivity into the artist. These two poles really are represented in poesy, though they do differentiate themselves, in their own turn, toward the subjective or objective side. The sphere of the relatively objective epic poesy (where it is the portrayal itself) is circumscribed by the *elegy* and *idyll*, which in their own turn then behave as subjective and objective. The sphere of the relatively more subjective poesy (where it is the portrayal) is circumscribed by the *didactic poem* and the *satire*, of which the former is the subjective, the latter the objective.[131]

One might be tempted to object against this subdivision on the grounds that it is impossible to see how the elegy, which is generally considered to be the most subjective and lyrical gushing, can be more objective than the didactic poem, which in contrast one might tend to consider the most relatively objective type. We must recall, however, that we by no means are admitting here the usual concept of elegy, which does indeed rob it of its objectivity, though also of its epic element, thus making it into a merely lyrical poem. Regarding the didactic poem, its poesy returns to *knowledge* as the first potence, which *as knowledge* always remains subjective. The more specific reasons for this division are the following.

If we compare the elegy and idyll on the one hand, and the didactic poem and satire on the other, we find the first two in agreement together and different from the other two in that they lack purpose and intention and appear to exist only for their own sake, whereas the latter two always have a specific purpose. This already directs the last two genres into the sphere of subjectivity. If we further compare the elegy and idyll to each other, we find them similar in their renunciation of universal and objective subject matter. The former treats the condition or event of an individual, but does so objectively, whereas the latter portrays the condition and life of a collective that is completely isolated and constitutes a particular world. This is the case not only in the so-called pastoral poems but also in other kinds, for example, in domestic idylls. In the latter, perhaps only love itself is portrayed, for example, a love that restricts the lovers only to themselves and makes them forget the outside world, such as in Voss's *Luise*.[132] The two genres are different, however, precisely in that the elegy is more lyrically inclined, the idyll, in contrast, necessarily more dramatically inclined.

One can also juxtapose the elegy and idyll *together* with the didactic poem and satire. One ascertains that in the former the subject matter or object is restricted and to that extent, if one will, subjective, whereas the locus of portrayal is universal and objective. In the latter, on the other hand, the subject matter or object is universal, while the portrayal or guiding principle from which they take their point of departure is subjective.

Hence, since on the one hand the didactic poem and satire are similar as regards subject matter, on the other hand they can be juxtaposed as subjective and objective only by virtue of that subject matter. The subject matter of the didactic poem is subjective because it lies in knowledge; that of the satire is objective because it refers to action, which is more objective than knowledge. The principle of portrayal in both, however, is subjective. In the former it resides in the spirit, in the latter more in the disposition and moral atmosphere.

Brief Consideration of These Genres Individually

I do not wish to present any definitions. Every type of art is determined by its position; this position is its explanation. Art can, by the way, correspond or do justice to that position in whatever way it chooses. Every poetic genre is based on an idea. Now, if its concept is determined according to the individual artistic phenomenon, it is necessarily in danger of eventually being found too narrow—since the phenomenon itself can never be completely commensurate with the idea—and thus of being rejected or even used in order to reject an excellent work of art that does not, however, fit into its restrictions. The idea of every poetic genre, however, is determined by the possibility fulfilled by it.

The concept of the *elegy* that modernity has held almost universally is that it is a poem of lament, and its predominating spirit is emotionally charged sadness. It is undeniable that lament and sadness have definitely expressed themselves in this poetic genre, and that the elegy was meant particularly for songs of lament for the deceased. This, however, is only *one* mode of appearance, though one of infinite variety and flexibility such that this one genre, though to be sure only in fragments, is capable of encompassing all of life. As a type of the epic poem, the elegy is essentially *historical*. As a song of lament, too, it does not deny this characteristic; indeed, one might say that it is capable of grief only because it is capable of looking into the past, as is the epic. It does, by the way, linger in just as pronounced a fashion in the present and sings of satisfied yearning no less than

of the thorn of unsatisfied yearning. Its boundaries in portrayal are not set by the individual and specific condition; rather, it really does roam from there into the epic sphere itself. The elegy is by nature already one of the most unlimited genres. For this reason—and in addition to its general character, which is determined by its relationship to the epic poem and the idyll—precisely this infinite malleability can be designated as its most unique and natural essence.

We acquire the most immediate acquaintance with the spirit of the elegy through the examples from antiquity. Some of the most beautiful fragments of Phanocles and Hermesianax are translated in the *Athenaeum*.[133] Yet the elegy was able to come to life again also in the Roman language of Tibullus, Catullus, and Propertius,[134] and in our own age Goethe has reproduced the true genre through his *Roman Elegies*.[135] In Goethe's *Elegies* we could show most directly that as regards the elegy, subjectivity is placed in the object, while objectivity is placed in the portrayal and its guiding principle. These *Elegies* sing of the highest charm of life and of desire, yet in a genuinely epic fashion expanding over the immense object of the poet's surroundings.

The *idyll* is the more objective genre when compared to the elegy, and is thus in general the most objective among the four genres subsumed under the epic poem. Since in it the object is (subjectively) more restricted than in the epic, and the generally obtaining condition of rest is thus placed only in the portrayal, it thereby resembles *painting* more, and this is indeed its original meaning, since idyll designates a tiny picture, a painting. Since further it must place the emphasis into the objective element of the portrayal, it will be most effectively an idyll if the object throws itself into relief with a kind of crude particularity and is thus less cultivated than that of the epic. Hence, the idyll not only takes its subject matter in the larger sense from a restricted world, but also makes it yet sharply individual within that world. Indeed it renders its subject matter quite local according to customs, language, and character; such, for example, must the human figures in a landscape be—earthy and removed as far as possible from ideality. Thus nothing contradicts the nature of the idyll more than to imbue these people with sentimentality or a kind of innocent morality. The earthiness of the idyll of Theocritus[136] can be abandoned only if in its place the entire character becomes romantic, such as in the most excellent pastoral poems of the Italians and Spaniards. If, however, as in Gessner,[137] the romantic principle, in addition to the genuine element of antiquity, is also absent, one can only interpret the admiration his idylls have found, especially in foreign countries, as one of the countless expressions of unpoetic sensibility. In Gessner's idylls, as in a great many of the French, a kind of flaccid, morally sentimental universality is placed into the object—something completely against the spirit of the idyll—and the genre is thus totally perverted. The true spirit of the idyll has lately reawakened in Germany, too, in Voss's *Luise*. He was not, however, able to overcome the unfavorable choice of locale, and, as regards the charm and freshness of colors

and the living quality of natural expressions, his relationship to the spirit of Theocritus is like that of the northern country, Germany, to the beauty of Sicilian landscapes. The Italians and the Spaniards also brought the romantic principle to fruition in the idyll, though within the parameters of the genre itself. Since, however, I am familiar only with the *Pastor fido* of Guarini,[138] I can only present this one example. The essence of romanticism is that it arrives at its goal by means of contrasts, and is concerned less with portraying identity than totality. This is also the case with the idyll. The earthy element, and the purely, strictly separated qualities, are given to a few characters in the *Pastor fido*, and the contrasting qualities to others. By doing this the whole actually transcends antiquity and yet maintains the genre intact. The idyll in the *Pastor fido*, by the way, has attained real dramatic excellence, and yet we could show that the absence of fate in the idyll, though suspended on the one hand, has been reinstated on the other.

—The affinity of the idyll with all forms. Particular inclination toward the dramatic, since the portrayal is even more objective. Pastoral novels (*Galatea* by Cervantes).[139]

Among those epic forms that through a preponderance of *subjectivity* in the portrayal depart from the indifference of the genre, the *didactic poem* is the more subjective form. Above all, we must doubtlessly investigate the *possibility* of a didactic poem, by which we understand, of course, the poetic possibility. First of all, one can object to the genre in general, and thus also to the satire, that it necessarily has a purpose—the didactic poem seeks to teach, the satire to chastise—and, since all beautiful art lacks external purpose, that neither can be considered to be forms of art. This extremely important principle does not, however, say that art cannot take as its form a purpose existing independent of it, or a genuine need, as is indeed the case with architecture. The requirement is merely that *within itself* it be able to make itself independent of such purpose, and that the external purposes be *merely* form for it. At least from the perspective of poesy itself, there exists no conceivable reason why the intention of presenting methodical teaching cannot become a form for poesy. The requirement for the didactic poem would merely be to suspend finally that intention in the work itself such that the work can appear to exist for its own sake. This, however, can never be the case except if the form of *knowledge* in the didactic poem is internally capable of being a reflex of the All. Since it is a requirement of knowledge quite independent of poesy, viewed in and for itself, that it be an image of the All, then in *knowledge* in and for itself the possibility does reside that it emerge as a *form* of poesy. Accordingly, we have merely to determine the kind of knowledge for which this is eminently and uniquely the case.

The teaching presented in the didactic poem can be either of a moral, theoretical, or speculative nature. The gnomic poesy of antiquity is an example of the first kind, for example, that of Theognis.[140] Here human life as the objective element is made into the reflex of the subjective, namely, of wisdom and of prac-

tical knowledge. When moral teaching makes use of natural objects, as in the work of Hesiod, in poems about agriculture, and so on, the image of nature as the actually objective element permeates the whole and is the reflex of the subjective. The opposite occurs in the genuinely theoretical didactic poem. Here knowledge is made into the reflex of something objective. Now, since regarding the highest requirement this objective element can only be the universe itself, the *mode* of knowledge serving as a reflex must similarly be of a universal nature. It is well known how many didactic poems have been composed about completely individual and particular objects of knowledge, about medicine, for example, or individual illnesses, about botany, comets, and so on. The restrictedness of the object in and for itself is not to be criticized here as long as it is conceived universally and in reference to the universe. Lacking any truly poetic view of the object, some artists then sought to embellish it poetically in various ways. They enlisted the aid of the conceptions and images of mythology, tried to enliven the dryness of the object through historical episodes, and that sort of thing. Yet none of this ever produced a genuine didactic *poem*, that is, a *poetic* work of this kind. The first requirement is that *what is to be portrayed* already be poetic *in and for itself*. Since that which is to be portrayed is in this case always knowledge, this knowledge in and for itself, and as knowledge, must already be simultaneously poetic. This, however, is possible only for absolute knowledge, that is, for knowledge based on ideas. Hence, a poem is not a genuine didactic poem unless in it the All itself, as it is reflected in knowledge, is either directly or indirectly the object. Since formally and essentially the universe is *one*, there ideally can be only *one* absolute didactic poem, of which all individual ones are mere fragments, namely, the poem *about the nature of things*.[141] Attempts at this speculative epic—at an absolute didactic poem—were made in Greece. We can only know in a very general sense whether they achieved their goal, since time has transmitted only fragments of their works down to us. Parmenides and Xenophanes[142] both presented their philosophy in a poem about the nature of things, just as earlier the Pythagoreans and Thales[143] transmitted their teachings poetically. About the poem of Parmenides we know only that it was composed in extremely incomplete and awkward verses. We know more about the poem of Empedocles, who united the physics of Anaxagoras with the seriousness of Pythagorean wisdom.[144] We can evaluate approximately the extent to which this poem achieved the idea of the universe from the fact that it was based on the physics of Anaxagoras. I must presuppose an acquaintance with this physics here. If, however, it did not achieve the speculative archetype from the scientific perspective, we must in contrast—at least according to the unanimous witness of antiquity, Aristotle, to name one source—attribute to it the greatest rhythmic energy and a genuinely Homeric dynamic. As luck also would have it, the poem of Lucretius has preserved a trace of the dominant spirit in it.[145] Lucretius, who could find no model in the poor writing of Epicurus and his followers, doubtlessly borrowed his own poetic energy and mode of presentation from Empedocles, and followed him regarding the form just as he followed Epicurus[146] regarding the material of the poem. In its own way, the poem of Lucretius comes closer than any other Roman poem, for example, that of Virgil, to the truly ancient models, and only Lucretius shows us the energy of genuinely epic rhythm, since we have only fragments by Ennius.[147] Lucretius's hexameters constitute the greatest contrast to the filed and polished verses of Virgil. The essence of his work displays completely the imprint of a great inner disposition, and only the truly poetic spirit was able to put such reverence and the inspiration of a true priest of nature into the presentation of the Epicurean doctrine. Since the object to be portrayed is in and for itself unpoetic, it is necessary that all poesy revert back to the subject; for the same reason we can only consider the poem of Lucretius to be an attempt at an absolute didactic poem, which must already be poetic by virtue of the object itself. Yet those passages in which his personal inspiration expresses itself—such as the introduction to the first book, which is an invocation of Venus, as well as all those passages in which he praises Epicurus as the one who revealed the nature of things and first overthrew the illusion and superstition of religion—thoroughly display the loftiest majesty and the imprint of a masculine art. Just as antiquity said that Empedocles spoke in his own poem with genuine rage about the limitations of human knowledge, so also does the fire of Lucretius against religion and false morality often change into genuine inspired rage. The complete external destruction of all that is spiritual, the reduction of nature to a game of atoms and of emptiness, which he practices with genuinely epic lack of concern, is replaced by the moral grandeur of his soul, which in its own turn elevates him above nature. The nullity of nature itself simultaneously allows his spirit to lift itself above all yearning into the realm of understanding. One cannot speak more genuinely or excellently than he does about the futility of yearning, the insatiability of desire, the emptiness of all fear as well as of all hope in life. Just as the teachings of Epicurus himself are great, not from the speculative, but rather from the moral perspective, so also those of Lucretius. Whenever his enthusiasm as a priest of nature can only be subjective, he appears objective as a teacher of practical wisdom and as a being of a higher order observing both the common course of things and the passion and confusion of life as if from a higher vantage point, one from which this being itself is out of reach of all such things. One cannot repress mentioning the contrast between the Epicurean philosophy and that of those who elevate petty attitudes into a position of ethical prominence by extirpating magnanimous and masculine virtues, while on the other hand pretending to achieve greater flights within the realm of the speculative. One need not take this comparison too far and must only take Kantian philosophy as an example.

I think I can free myself from speaking about the *didactic poems* of contemporary authors, for since we justifiably doubt that any poem of antiquity achieved

the true archetype within the genre, we can doubtlessly assert categorically that contemporary authors can present not a single genuinely poetic work of this type. Hence, we must still await that didactic poem in which not merely the forms and aids of presentation, but rather that which is to be portrayed is itself poetic. We can say the following about the idea of such a poem.

The didactic poem κατ' ἐξοχήν can only be a poem about the universe or the nature of things. It must portray the reflex of the universe in knowledge. The most perfect image of the universe must thus be achieved in science itself, which is called to be just such an image. It is certain that a science that achieves this identity with the universe will agree with the universe, not only from the perspective of content, but also from that of form; to the extent that the universe itself is the archetype of all poesy, and indeed is the poesy of the absolute itself, science in that identity with the universe, regarding both form and content, will in and for itself already be poesy and will resolve itself into poesy. The origin of the absolute didactic poem or of the speculative epic thus coincides with the perfection of science; just as science originally emerged from poesy, so also is its final and most beautiful destiny to flow back into this ocean.[148] Indeed, according to what we showed earlier concerning the only possibility for genuine epic poetry and mythology in the contemporary age—namely, that the gods of the contemporary world, which are gods of history, must take possession of nature in order to appear as *gods*—in this respect, let me repeat, the first true poem about the nature of things will likely come about simultaneously with the true epic.

In the subjective sphere of the genres subsumed under the rubric of the epic poem, the *satire* is the more objective form, since its object is the real, objective element and, primarily at least, *action*. Let it suffice for me to draw your attention to its epic nature. Since it is not narrative, like the epic, and thus cannot introduce speaking characters in an epic fashion as does the epic itself, and yet must primarily portray characters and actions, it thus necessarily more closely resembles the drama, and must necessarily have a dramatic life of its own as regards the inner portrayal in order to do justice to its task. The concept of satire in the strict sense, of course, cannot include anything that is dramatic in an absolute fashion or in itself. It would be equally foolish—or even more foolish yet—to consider the comedies of Aristophanes as belonging to the genre of satire, the way one often makes *Don Quixote* of Cervantes into a satire.

The satire, by the way, constitutes a double genre: the serious and the comical. Both types require both the dignity of an ethical character of the sort expressed in the noble anger of Juvenal and Persius,[149] as well as the superiority of a penetrating spirit that is able to view relationships and events in reference to the universal, since the most eminent effect of the satire is based precisely on the contrasting of the universal and the particular. The fact that in Germany those who themselves are the caricatures or creations of the age by and by feel the urge to scribble satirical sketches onto paper with a crude quill can surprise us no more,

for example, than the fact that people who know neither the world nor anything in it believe themselves capable of poesy and its most noble genres.

For comic satire the Greeks had their own representatives in the particular species of half-animal, half-human beings, from whom the satire itself most likely acquired its name. It is well known that Aeschylus and later Euripides also wrote satyr plays. The law of comic satire is expressed, in a sense, in its inception here. If the serious satire chastised vice, particularly audacious vice coupled with power, then, in contrast, comic satire must remove as much guilt and responsibility as possible from its subjects and try to make them completely irresolute, as much like animals and as completely sensual as possible, like the satyrs and fauns. Crudeness combined with wickedness and baseness awakens only loathing and disgust, and can thus never be the subject of poetic humor. These traits become such only through the complete elimination of the human element and a total reversal in which they appear purely comical without insulting our feeling, and in which, on the other hand, they most deeply denigrate the subject.

This completes the circle of the rational epic forms. We must now speak yet about the *modern* or *romantic* epic, and follow it through its particular variations.

Since the contrast between antiquity and the romantic, as far as possible, was already presented earlier in *general* terms, and since modern forms always more or less maintain the irrational element, I believe it best to proceed for the most part historically regarding the romantic epic, thereby emphasizing both the contrasts and agreements between it and the epic of antiquity.

Commensurate with my intention of characterizing poesy also in its most noteworthy individuals, let me begin straightaway with Ariosto,[150] since first and foremost there can be no doubt that he composed the most genuine modern epic. His predecessors—Boiardo[151] particularly among others—cannot be considered, since, although they were on the right track, they nonetheless did not achieve excellence in this area and remained boring and bombastic. Tasso's *Gerusalemme Liberata*[152] on the model of Ariosto is much more the appearance of a beautiful soul striving for purity than objective poetry, and only the completely restricted elements in it—the chaste, Catholic elements—are noteworthy. Hardly any Frenchman would want us to mention the Henriade.[153] The Portuguese have a poem—the *Lusiade* by Camoëns,[154] with which I am not familiar.

Ariosto moves about in an extremely familiar mythological world. The court of Charlemagne is the Olympus of Jupiter of the age of chivalry. The sagas of the twelve Paladins are and were known everywhere and belong collectively to all more cultivated nations, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Germans, English. The element of the miraculous had spread from Christianity and had in combination with the bravery of the later age ignited itself into the flame of a romantic world. On this fortunate ground the poet could now rule as he wished, invent anew, embellish. All means stood at his disposal: bravery, love, magic, and to all this also the contrast of the Orient and the Occident and of the various religions.

Just as the individual or subject emerges on the whole more in the modern world, so also in the epic, such that it lost the absolute objectivity of the epic of antiquity and is comparable to it only as its complete negation. Ariosto, too, modified his subject matter to suit himself by giving it a healthy admixture of reflection and mischievousness. Since a main characteristic of the romantic as such resides in the admixture of seriousness and jest, we must grant him the former, since, in its own turn, his roguishness, so to speak, takes the place of the lack of concern and nonparticipation of the poet in the epic. He thereby makes himself lord of his object. His poem adheres most closely to the concept of the epic of antiquity in that it has neither a definite *beginning* nor a definite *end*. It is an excerpt from his world, one that just as conceivably could have begun earlier as ended later. (This has earned him the criticism of uninformed art critics in comparison with the artificial composition of Tasso. In the latter case everything, indeed, is cut more regularly such that one is never in danger of getting lost. Ariosto's poem is like a garden labyrinth in which one gladly gets lost and yet has no fear.) Another reference point is that the protagonist is not emphasized alone and is often completely removed from the stage, or rather, that there is in general a plurality of protagonists. The story of *one* hero, followed through all his catastrophes such as in Wieland's *Oberon*,[155] for example, is—if we are to preserve even a modicum of purity within this genre—merely a romantic, often sentimental biography in verse form, and thus neither a true epic nor a genuine novel (which must be written in prose).

The concept of the miraculous, as already noted, is a *new* addition to the epic, for even if Aristotle speaks about the Θαυμαστόν ["extraordinary, miraculous, amazing"—Trans.] of the Homeric epic, he intends a completely different meaning than the modern element of the miraculous, namely, in the larger sense merely the extraordinary (more about this in our discussion of drama). There is no miraculous element in Homer, but rather nothing but the natural, since even his gods are natural. Poesy and prose show themselves in battle in the miraculous. Things are miraculous only juxtaposed with prose and in a *divided* world. In Homer, if you will, *everything*, yet for just that reason nothing, is miraculous. Only Ariosto has really understood well how to transform the miraculous into something natural by means of his own lightness and facility, and his irony and often completely unembellished presentation. Indeed, he is probably less likely to be equaled in precisely those passages narrated with complete dryness. In the transition from those passages to others, however, a transition over which he pours all the grace and finery of his rich fantasy, those contrasts and mixtures of subject matter are painted that are necessary in the romantic poem—and one can say in the strictest sense that they are *painted*, since everything about him is living color, a moving, impetuous painting in which the outlines sometimes disappear entirely, sometimes emerge in stark emphasis. This painting appears increasingly like a colorful aggregate of parts of a whole, and not, even considered within its own partial and limited sphere, like a painting in which a thoroughgoing constancy expresses itself.

Strictly speaking, Ariosto has made only a national and mildly intended attempt here, particularly if one compares him to the higher idea of an—albeit modern—epic, one that, unlike the Homeric epic, is no longer composed by one age and one people, but rather necessarily by an individual. Such an epic must always have a different character and render the elements of antiquity and objectivity differently. Yet the charm of a bright understanding and an inexhaustible richness of eagerness and mood extinguishes the element of particularity in this poem. There is no unnecessary accumulation in Ariosto;[156] the noble features are pleasingly distributed and support the airy edifice like columns. Angelica is the beautiful Helen, the discord among the Paladins for her the Trojan War. Orlando steps onto the stage as seldom as does Achilles. Neither is a character corresponding to Paris absent, who without great merit and worthiness is able to carry the beautiful woman away, namely, the well-known Meda. Of course, this parallel is not intended too seriously. The most beautiful figure of the poet, conceived completely romantically and with complete delicacy, is Bradamant, who takes up arms and sets out on adventures for her beloved. Bravery constitutes the miraculous element in her, love the natural element, and thus a pleasing charm predominates. She is also a Christian, whereas bravery is shown with more masculine qualities in a different female figure from the Orient. Orlando and Rinaldo also constitute a stark contrast between the cultivated and uncultivated. In the sea of episodes (to mention them here) and chance encounters, the various characters disappear and then reappear, always recognizable and individuated. The episodes here are the novellas that the poet has interwoven as did Cervantes in his own novel. They display both extremely touching and pathetic as well as audacious content, whereby the poet always departs as if nothing had happened. If he does add an element of reflection, he never does so in a lingering fashion, but rather such that things immediately move forward again and a new horizon appears.

The regularity and identity of the spirit of this poetic genre are also expressed externally by the most identical meter of modernity: the stanza. To abandon it, as does Wieland, means to abandon the form of the romantic epic itself.

The characteristics of the romantic epic or *courtly poem* provided by this presentation of Ariosto suffice to show both its difference and contrast to the epic of antiquity. We can describe its essence in the following way. It is epic by virtue of its subject matter, that is, the subject matter is more or less universal. By virtue of its form, however, it is subjective in that the individuality of the poet plays a much greater role, not only in that he constantly accompanies the narrated event with reflection, but also in the organization of the whole, which does not really develop from within the object itself. Since such organization is actually the product of the poet himself, and not of the object, it allows us to admire no other beauty save that of free choice or even caprice. In and for itself the romantic-epic

content resembles a wild, overgrown forest full of strange beings, a labyrinth in which there is no guiding thread other than the mischievousness and mood of the poet. This alone shows us that the romantic epic is neither the highest nor the only type in which this *particular* genre (namely, the epic) can exist in the modern world.

The romantic epic has an opposite within its own genre. If, namely, it is indeed universal as regards subject matter but individual as regards form, then from the outset we can expect a second corresponding genre in which a universally more valid and, as it were, more indifferent portrayal is attempted on a partial or more restricted subject matter. This genre is the *novel*, and by designating this its position we simultaneously determine its nature as well.

One can, to be sure, call the content of the romantic epic only relatively universal, since it always requires of the subject that he transport himself into a world of fantasy, something the epic of antiquity never does. Yet for just this reason as well, since the subject matter requires something of the subject—faith, enthusiasm, the mood of fantasy—the poet must also add something of his own. Through his portrayal he takes away from the subject matter from one perspective what from another it may already possess in the way of universality. He exempts himself from this necessity and comes closer to an objective portrayal only by renouncing the universality of subject matter and seeking it in the *form*.

The entire mythology of the courtly poem is based on the miraculous, that is, on a divided world. This division necessarily enters into the portrayal, since in order to allow the miraculous as such to appear the poet must himself be in that world where the miraculous does indeed appear *as the miraculous*. Hence, if the poet wants to become truly identical with his subject matter and surrender himself to it undividedly, there is no other way to do this than for the individual himself, as is the case in the modern world as such, to enter into the medium itself and put down the yield of *one* life and spirit in creations that, the higher they stand, the more they acquire the power of a mythology. This is the origin of the *novel*, and I do not hesitate to rank it in this respect above the courtly poem, though admittedly only the fewest works bearing this name have achieved that objectivity of form by virtue of which they stand even closer to the actual epic than does the courtly poem.

This express restriction that the novel be objective or universally valid only through the *form* of its portrayal already indicates the only parameters within which it can approach the epic. According to its own nature, the epic encompasses unrestricted action; it does not really begin, and could continue endlessly. The novel, as stated, is restricted through its object, and thereby resembles more the drama, which is a limited and self-enclosed action. In this respect one might describe the novel as a mixture of the epic and drama such, namely, that it shares the characteristics of both genres. Here, too, the whole of modern art shows itself

to be more similar to painting and to the realm of colors, whereas in contrast the plastic age or realm of forms strictly separated things from one another.

Modern art does not possess for the objective form of portrayal a poetic meter that is as even and that floats between opposites as well as does the hexameter of the art of antiquity. All its poetic meters individualize themselves more strongly and restrict themselves more to a certain tone, color, mood, and so on. The most even of contemporary verse forms is the stanza; yet even it does not possess the appearance of immediate inspiration and dependence on the progress of the object itself characteristic of the hexameter, if for no other reason than that it is an irregular meter and divides itself into strophes. This causes it to appear in general more artificial and more like the work of the poet than like the form of the object. Hence, the novel seeking to achieve the objectivity of the epic as regards form, yet with more restricted subject matter, has no other choice than prose, which is the highest indifference. Yet this implies prose in its highest perfection, where it is accompanied by a quiet rhythm and an ordered periodic structure, one which, to be sure, does not command the ear like rhythmic meter, but which on the other hand displays no trace of coercion and thus requires the more careful cultivation. A person who cannot perceive this prosaic rhythm in *Don Quixote* and *Wilhelm Meister*[157] can, quite frankly, not learn it either. Like epic diction, this prose or rather this style of novel is allowed to linger, to expand, and not to overlook even the smallest detail in its proper place. Neither, however, is it allowed to lose itself in embellishment, particularly not in mere verbal ornamentation, since this generates the unbearable condition bordering directly on so-called poetic prose.

Since the novel cannot be dramatic and yet on the other hand must seek the objectivity of the epic in the form of portrayal, the most beautiful and suitable form of the novel is necessarily the *narrative*. A novel in letters consists in nothing but lyrical parts that—within the *whole*—transform themselves into dramatic parts, and the epic character is lost.

Since the novel should resemble the epic as far as possible in the form of portrayal, and yet a limited object actually constitutes the subject matter, the poet must replace the epic universality by a relatively greater indifference toward the main object or the protagonist than that exercised by the epic poet. Hence, he is not allowed to bind himself too strictly to the protagonist, and even less to subject everything in the book to him. Since the limited elements are only chosen in order to manifest the absolute in the form of the portrayal, the protagonist must, in a sense, already by nature be more symbolic than personal and be taken as such in the novel as well, such that everything lightly connect with him and he be the collective name or belt around the full garb.

The indifference even may go so far as to turn into irony toward the protagonist, since irony is the only form in which that which goes out from the subject—or must go out—can detach itself from him most distinctly and become objective. In this respect, then, imperfection can in no way harm the protagonist. In

contrast, pretended perfection will destroy the novel. This recalls what Goethe, with particular irony, places into the mouth of the hero himself in *Wilhelm Meister* concerning the retarding power of the protagonist.[158] Since, namely, on the one hand the novel possesses the necessary inclination toward the dramatic, and yet on the other should linger as does the epic, it must place this energy moderating the impetuous course of action into the object itself, namely, into the protagonist. When in the same passage of *Wilhelm Meister* Goethe says that in the novel primarily *disposition* or *attitudes* and *events* should be presented, in the drama *characters* and *deeds*, he is referring to the same thing.[159] Attitudes can also obtain for only a certain time and place, and are more changeable than the character. The character presses more immediately than attitudes toward action and toward the end, and the deed is more decisive than events, just as it comes from the decisive and strong character and in both good and bad demands a certain perfection or completeness of that character. Yet this admittedly does not imply a total negation of active power in the protagonist, and the most perfect combination will always remain that which is successfully rendered in *Don Quixote*: the deed emerging from the character becomes an *event* for the protagonist through the encounter and the circumstances.

The novel should be a mirror of the world, or at least of the age, and thus become a partial mythology.[160] It should invite us to serene, calm observation and everywhere maintain an even level of participation. Each of his parts, every word, should be equally golden, as if composed in an internal, higher poetic meter, since it lacks an external one. For this reason it can be only the fruit of a completely mature spirit, just as the ancient tradition always portrays Homer as an old man. It is in a manner of speaking the final cleansing of the spirit whereby it returns into itself and transforms its life and cultivation again into blossom. It is the fruit, yet crowned with blossoms.

In stimulating everything in human beings the novel should also set their passions into motion. The highest element of the tragic is allowed, as is the comic, and the poet must only remain untouched by both.

We remarked earlier that the element of chance is permitted in the epic. The novel is allowed to employ such devices even more and to introduce surprise, entanglement, and chance, as long as chance does not rule alone, in which case a capricious, one-sided principle replaces the true image of life. On the other hand, even if the novel can borrow from the epic that fortuitousness of events, nonetheless the principle of fate that is introduced through its inclination to the dramatic is similarly too one-sided and too harsh for the more comprehensive and pleasant nature of the novel. Insofar as character is also a necessity that can prove fateful for a person, in the novel character and chance must play into each other's hands. In this juxtaposition of both we see particularly the wisdom and inventiveness of the poet reveal themselves.

Since the novel, in a manner appropriate to its kinship with the drama, is based more on contrasts than is the epic, it must employ these contrasts for irony and for a picaresque portrayal. Such is the tableau in *Don Quixote*, where Quixote and Cardenio are sitting across from one another in the forest conversing reasonably until the madness of the one stimulates that of the other. In general, the novel may strive for the picaresque, for this is how one can designate in a general sense what is actually a kind of dramatic and merely fleeting manifestation. It goes without saying that it should always possess intrinsic value in its content, and a reference to disposition or feelings, to customs, peoples, events. In this sense, what can be more picaresque than Marcela's appearance in *Don Quixote* on the pinnacle of the cliff at whose base the shepherd is buried whom love for her has killed?[161]

When the basis or ground of the poetry itself is not favorable to such development, the poet must create it himself, as Goethe does in *Wilhelm Meister*. Mignon, the harpist, and the household of the uncle are his work alone.[162] Everything custom offers in the way of romantic elements must be extracted, and the adventurous must not be avoided as soon as it can serve the symbolism of the piece. *Common* reality should be portrayed only in order to serve irony or some specific contrast.

The position of events themselves is another mystery of art. They must be distributed wisely, and even if toward the end the river becomes wider, and the entire splendor of the conception unfolds, events themselves should nowhere press, crowd, or rush. The so-called episodes either must be an essential part of the whole and organically structured with it (*sperata*),[163] and not merely attached in order to prompt this or that event, or they must be inserted totally independently as novellas, a procedure to which nothing can be objected.

(Since we cannot examine all these subtypes individually, let me mention in passing that the *novella* is actually a novel structured toward the lyrical side, much like what the elegy is in relationship to the epic, a story for the symbolic portrayal of a subjective condition, a particular truth, or a peculiar feeling.)

Everything in the novel must be progressively ordered around a flexible core—a *center* that neither devours everything nor pulls everything violently into its vortex.

These few characteristics illuminate what the novel may *not* be, taken in the highest sense. It may not be a sampler of virtues and vices; nor may it be the psychological preparation of an individual person's feelings or disposition that might be preserved on a shelf. No violent passion should greet us at the outset and sweep us away through all its stations, a passion that finally leaves the reader stunned at the end of a path he would not want to traverse again at any cost. The novel should also be a mirror of the general course of human affairs and of life, and thus not merely a partial moralistic painting where we are never taken beyond the narrow horizon of the social circumstances of even the largest city or

of a people of restricted customs, not to speak of the endless, even worse stages of circumstances sinking even deeper.

It follows naturally from this that almost the entirety of what one calls *novels*—as Falstaff calls his militia *fodder* for powder[164]—is fodder for human hunger, the hunger for material deception and for the insatiable gullet of spiritual emptiness and of empty time seeking to be killed.

It is not too much to assert that until now there have been only two novels, namely, *Don Quixote* by Cervantes and *Wilhelm Meister* by Goethe, the former belonging to the most splendid, the latter to the most solid nation. *Don Quixote* should not be judged according to the earliest German translations, where its poesy has been destroyed and the organic structure ruined. One need only think of *Don Quixote* to see the implications of the concept of a mythology created by the genius of an individual. Don Quixote and Sancho Panza are mythological persons extending across the entire cultivated earth, just as the story of the windmills and so on are true myths or mythological sagas. What in the restricted conception of an inferior spirit would have appeared intended only as a satire of a certain foolishness, this poet has transformed by the most fortunate of inventions into the most universal, meaningful, and picaresque image of life. That this *one* invention runs through the whole, and then appears varied only in the richest fashion, fragmentation being visible nowhere along the way, lends it a particularly superb overall character. In the meantime, however, the whole does contain an obvious and extremely decisive contrast, and it would be neither completely inappropriate nor completely untrue to call the two halves the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of the novel. The theme on the whole is the struggle between the real and the ideal. In the first half of the work the ideal is treated only *naturally*-realistically, that is, the ideal of the protagonist encounters only the common world and common movements in that world. In the other part it is then mysticized; that is, the world with which it comes into conflict is itself an ideal one, and not the usual, common world; similarly, the island of Calypso in the *Odyssey* is, as it were, a more fictional world than that in which the *Iliad* moves. Just as here Circe appears, so in *Don Quixote* the Duchess, who has everything in common with her except beauty. This mystification is, to be sure, taken so far as to be painful, indeed crude, such that the ideal element in the person of the protagonist—since this element has become distorted—succumbs in total fatigue. In contrast, it shows itself within the whole of the composition as totally triumphant, and in *this* part, too, it is triumphant through the express baseness of the opposition.

Hence, the novel of Cervantes is based on an extremely imperfect, indeed daft protagonist, yet one who is simultaneously of such noble nature, and who—as long as the *one* point is not touched—displays so much superior understanding that no outrage can actually disgrace him. The most wonderful and rich fabric was then attached to this mixture (in *Don Quixote*), one that offers consistent

enjoyment and attunes the soul to the most serene reflection as attractively in the first moment as in the last. The necessary accompaniment of the hero, namely, Sancho Panza, is, in a sense, a perpetual holiday for the spirit. An inexhaustible source of irony is opened and pours itself out in daring games. The ground upon which the whole takes place collected at that time all the romantic principles extant in Europe and combined them with the splendor of gregarious life. In this the Spaniard found himself in thousandfold more favorable conditions than the German poet. He had the shepherds living in the open fields, a knightly nobility, the people of the Moors, the near coast of Africa, the background of the events of the age and of the campaigns against the pirates, and, finally, a nation in which poesy is popular—even picturesque costumes, and for the common element the mule drivers and the Baccalaureus of Salar. Nevertheless, the poet allows his delightful occurrences to develop from events that are not national but rather completely universal, such as the encounter involving galley slaves, a marionette player, and a lion in a cage. The innkeeper whom Don Quixote selects as his castellan, and the beautiful Maritornes are at home everywhere. Love, on the other hand, always appears in the unique romantic surroundings he found in his own age, and the entire novel takes place under the open sky and in the warm air of his own climate and amid that heightened southern color.

Antiquity praised Homer as the most fortunate creator; modernity justifiably praises Cervantes.

What here *one* divine creation was able to execute and create from *one* mold, the German had to produce and create under totally unfavorable, fragmented circumstances by means of an enormous power of thought and depth of understanding. The design itself appears less powerful, the means more paltry, yet the power of conception holding the whole together is truly immeasurable.

In *Wilhelm Meister*, too, we see the struggle between the ideal and the real that is virtually unavoidable in any more comprehensive portrayal, a struggle characteristic of our world that has stepped out of identity. Only here it is not one and the same struggle, one that continually renews itself in different forms such as in Don Quixote, but rather a variously broken and more dispersed struggle. Hence, the opposition within the whole is milder, the irony quieter, and the influence of the age itself necessitates that everything must have a practical ending. The protagonist promises much and many things; he appears destined to be an artist, but he loses this false conception, since through the four volumes he appears or is treated continually not as a master, as his name implies, but as a *pupil*. He remains a likeable, gregarious character who makes contacts easily and is always attractive. To that extent he is a fortunate center for the whole and constitutes an enticing foreground. The background reveals itself toward the end and displays an infinite perspective on all the wisdom of life behind a kind of illusory game, for the secret society is actually nothing other than precisely this, and it dissolves itself at just the moment it becomes visible. Only the mystery of the

apprenticeship itself articulates this wisdom: namely, only *he* who has recognized his own destiny is a master. This idea is clothed with such fullness and richness of independent life that it nowhere unveils itself as the dominant concept or the conceptual purpose of the poetry. Everything from local customs that could be employed romantically in any way has been used: itinerant actors, the theater in general—which takes up that element of irregularity banned from the social world—an army led by a prince, even tightrope walkers and a band of robbers. Wherever custom and fortuitousness—the latter having to be modified according to the former—no longer sufficed, the romantic element was placed into the characters themselves, from the free and charming Philine all the way up to the noblest style in Mignon, through whom the poet reveals himself in a creation in which the most profound inwardness of spirit and strength of imagination participate equally. The splendor of the creative artist resides in this wonderful being and in the story of her family—in the tragic novella of the *sperata*. The wisdom of life seems almost small by comparison, and yet in his artistic wisdom he placed no more emphasis on this episode than on any other part of the book. One might say that these characters, too, merely fulfilled their destiny and served their daemon.

What the coloring of the novel as a whole lacks as a result of the dearth of the age and the environment must be placed into the individual characters. This is the primary secret of the composition of *Wilhelm Meister*. The poet exercised this power to such an extent that even the most common characters—for example, old Barbara—acquire a momentary, miraculous elevation in which they utter genuinely tragic words, words before which the protagonist of the story himself seems to pale.

What Cervantes had to invent only once, the German poet had to invent repeatedly; he had to create a new path at every step under extremely unfavorable circumstances. Furthermore, since the adversity of the circumstances prevented his creations from displaying any of the more pleasant qualities inherent in those of Cervantes, he carries his intention even deeper and replaces this external deficiency through the inner power of inventiveness itself. Here his structure is organized with eminent artistic ingenuity; both the leaf and the blossom are equally prefigured in the first seed, and from the outset he neglects not the smallest circumstance, which surprisingly reappears later.

Besides the novel itself in its most perfect form, insofar as with a certain limited content it acquires the universality of the epic through its form, one must also recognize *romantic* books in general. Let me point them out here: not the novellas and fairy tales, works that exist in and for themselves as genuine myths (in the immortal novellas of Boccaccio) out of a real or fantastic realm, and that similarly move about in the external element of rhythmic prose; I mean rather other excellent works of a mixed nature, such as the *Persiles* of Cervantes, the *Fiammetta* of Boccaccio, and, in any case, *The Sorrows of Young Werther*.[165] The

latter, by the way, belongs completely to Goethe's youthful period and constitutes the misdirected attempt of that poesy reborn in Goethe. It is a lyrical-passionate poem of great material energy, though the scenery resides completely in the interior and only in disposition.

As far as the much-praised English novels are concerned, I consider *Tom Jones* to be a tableau not of the world, but rather of morals, one executed with coarse colors where even the moral contrast between a totally base hypocrite and a healthy, sincere young man is rendered somewhat crudely and with only mimical talent, yet without any romantic or delicate constituent parts. In the novels *Pamela* and *Grandison*, Richardson is little more than a moralistic writer. In *Clarissa* he displays a truly objective gift for portrayal, though entangled in pedantry and diffuseness. *The Vicar of Wakefield*, though not romantic, is objective and universally valid somewhat in the fashion of an idyll.[166]

(Mention of the romance and ballad, whose characteristics are not sharply differentiated, though one can view the former as the more subjective, the latter as the more objective form.)[167]

We have now traversed the circle of epic forms to the extent that they are possible in the spirit of modern and romantic poesy. The question remains concerning the possibility of the epic form of antiquity for the poets of the present age. We have already spoken about the unsuccessful attempts of this sort. The first thing the poet would seek would doubtlessly be subject matter capable in and for itself of treatment in the epic fashion of antiquity. Either he could choose material from antiquity itself that would then attach itself to the epic whole of the Greeks or at least be part of the sphere of epic mythology, or he would have to choose contemporary subject matter. It would be impossible to choose it from history because (1) whatever is extracted epically from history will always appear merely fortuitously extracted, and (2) the motives, habits, and customs belonging to history would necessarily have to be modern, as if a poet were to treat the history of the Crusades in the epic fashion of antiquity.

Perhaps the likeliest choice for epic subject matter would be the boundary between antiquity and modernity, since through such a contrast with paganism itself Christianity would acquire a higher coloring and might even assume the appearance that in the *Odyssey* the mythical element of the customs of peoples, for example, and the miraculous element of some countries or islands had. In a word, in such juxtaposition Christianity would be most capable of undergoing genuinely objective treatment. One would not be able to view such an epic as a mere study according to the principles of antiquity; it would be capable of an indigenous and unique energy and color. Yet aside from this *one* moment of time, which itself constitutes the turning point from the old to the new, in all of later history probably no other universally valid event or occurrence capable of epic portrayal can be found. Like the Trojan War, besides being universal it would have to be simultaneously national and communal in a larger sense, since more

than all others the epic poet must strive to be the most popular, and popularity can be found only in living truth and in verification through custom and tradition. The action itself would also have to be capable of thoroughness in the treatment of details of the narrative, something that is part of the epic style. Yet it is extremely unlikely that material can be found in the contemporary world fulfilling these conditions, and least of all which might correspond to the last requirement, since in wars, for example, the personality is, as it were, suspended, and only the masses are active. Epic attempts with contemporary subject matter in and for themselves thus would be directed more toward the world of the *Odyssey* than of the *Iliad*; yet even there one could find archaic customs and a world such as that required for epic development, clarity, and simplicity, only in restricted spheres (such as in Voss's *Luise*). Yet the epic poem would thereby assume more the nature of the idyll if the poet could not find a way to draw the universality of a great occurrence into this restrictedness. This has happened in Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea* in such a way that in spite of the limitation imposed by the subject matter itself one must attribute to this poem a certain degree of epic character, whereas Voss himself has characterized his *Luise* more as an idyll, as a *painting*, namely, more as a portrayal of serenity than as that of progressing action. The poem by Goethe thus solves one problem of contemporary poesy and opens the way to further attempts of this sort. It would not be inconceivable, if such attempts would only attach themselves from the outset to a definitely structured core, that out of the singularity of such attempts a common whole might even emerge subsequently through a synthesis or expansion such as that practiced with the Homeric songs. Yet even a totality of such smaller epic wholes would never achieve the true idea of the epic that the modern world thus necessarily lacks as the inner identity of culture and the identity of the condition from which it has emerged. Hence, we must conclude these reflections on the epic with the same view with which we concluded those on mythology, namely, that the Homeros[168] who in the art of antiquity was the first, will be the final one in modern art and will complete the ultimate destiny and calling of that art.

This result cannot defeat partial attempts to anticipate the Homeros for a certain time, though the only condition under which genuine attempts of this kind become possible is that one not lose sight of the basic characteristic of the epic: universality; that is, the transformation of everything dispersed in time, and yet decisively present, into a common identity. For the culture of the contemporary world, however, science, religion, and even art itself possess no less universal reference and significance than does history, and the true epic for the modern age would have to consist in the indissoluble mixture of just these elements. Each of these elements comes to the aid of the other, and whatever is incapable of epic treatment in and for itself becomes capable through something else; something at least totally and thoroughly *unique* would have to be the fruit of this mutual permeation before that which is completely and thoroughly universally valid can emerge.

One attempt of this kind began the history of modern poesy: the *Divine Comedy* of Dante. It stands incomprehensible and misunderstood because in the subsequent period it remained singular and alone. That is, from that particular identity characterizing this poem, poesy and general culture scattered and dissipated themselves in so many directions that it was universally valid only through the symbolic element of form, yet at the same time became one-sided through the exclusion of so many other impulses in contemporary culture.

The *Divine Comedy* of Dante is so self-enclosed that the theory abstracted from the other genres is totally inadequate for it. It requires its own theory, constitutes its own genre, and is a world unto itself. It designates a level that according to the measure of the remaining circumstances subsequent poesy did not achieve again. I do not conceal my own conviction that this poem, as much as has been said regarding it that is admittedly partially true, nonetheless has not yet been recognized *universally* and in its truly symbolic significance, and that there exists yet no theory or construction of this poem. For this reason alone it is worthy of a completely unique investigation. It cannot be compared to anything else or subsumed under any of the other genres. It is not an epic, it is not a didactic poem, it is not a novel in the real sense, it is not even a comedy or drama such as Dante himself called it. It is the most indissoluble mixture, the most complete interpenetration of everything. It is the most universal representative of modern poesy not as this *individual* poem (for to that extent this poem, too, adapts itself to time), but rather as a genre per se, not an individual poem, but rather the poem of all poems, the poesy of modern poesy itself.

This is the reason why I make the *Divine Comedy* of Dante the object of a special presentation and do not subsume it under any other genre, but construe it rather as a genre in and for itself.[169]

Dante in Relation to Philosophy

Those who love the past more than the present will not be disappointed when we now turn our attention from the not always rewarding view of the latter toward a distant monument to the combination of philosophy and poesy, the works of Dante, which long have been cloaked with the sacredness of antiquity.

For the time being I claim no other justification for the place these considerations occupy than that the poem to which they refer is one of the most noteworthy problems of the philosophical and historical construction of art. What follows will show that the investigation itself encompasses a far more general investigation concerning the circumstances of philosophy, and is of no less interest for philosophy than for poesy, whose mutual fusion, one to which the entire present age is inclined, requires equally definite conditions on both sides.

In the holy of holies,
Where religion and poesy are one,

Dante stands as the high priest and initiates all of modern art into its destiny. Representing not one merely individual poem, but rather the entire genre of modern poesy, and itself a genre unto itself, the *Divine Comedy* stands so completely self-enclosed that any theory abstracted from more individual forms is completely inadequate for it; as its own world it also requires its own theory. Its author gave it the predicate of divinity because it deals with theology and with divine things. He called it a comedy according to the simplest concepts of the latter and of the opposing genre, because of the terrible beginning and the happy ending, and because the mixed nature of his poem, whose subject matter is sometimes more sublime, sometimes more base, also necessitated a mixed presentation.

Yet one easily sees that it cannot be called dramatic in the usual sense, since it does not present limited action. Insofar as Dante himself is viewed as the main character, the one who serves merely as the link between the immeasurable series of faces and tableaux and who is more passive than active, this poem resembles the novel. Yet even this concept exhausts the poem as little as does the usual understanding of the term epic, since in the objects of its portrayal there is no real sequence of events. It is also impossible to view it as a didactic poem, since it is written in a much more unconditional form and with a much more unconditional intention than that of instruction. Hence, it is nothing of all this in particular, and is not really a combination, but is rather a completely unique, organic mixture of all the elements of these genres, one incapable of being reproduced through intentional art, an absolute individual comparable to nothing but itself.

The subject matter of the poem is in general the expressed identity within the entire age of the poet, the interweaving of its events with the ideas of religion, science, and poesy in the most eminent spirit of that century. Our intention is to comprehend it, not in its immediate temporal references, but rather in its universality and archetypal quality for all of modern poesy.

The necessary law of modern poesy, up to that point in an indeterminable future when the great epic of the modern age emerges as a self-enclosed totality, an epic that until now has announced itself only rhapsodically and in individual phenomena, is: that the individual structure into a whole that part of the world revealed to him, and from the subject matter of his own age, its history and its science, create his own mythology. Just as the old world generally was the world of the collective, so the modern world is that of individuals. In the former the universal is truly the particular; the collective functions as an individual. In the latter the reverse is true: particularity is the point of departure, and it should become universality. For that reason everything is enduring and immortal in the former; number has, in a sense, no real power, since the universal concept coincides with that of the individual. In the latter the enduring law is change and alteration; it is not a closed circle encompassing its determinations, but rather one that is to be expanded through individuality into the infinite. Because universality belongs to the essence of poesy, the necessary requirement is that the individual become universally valid again through the highest degree of uniqueness, and absolute again through perfected particularity. Precisely through the absolutely individual, incomparable quality of his poem Dante is the creator of modern art, which cannot be conceived without this arbitrary necessity and necessary arbitrariness.

From the very beginnings of Greek poesy, in Homer, we see it cleanly separated from science and philosophy, and we see this separation process continued to the point of total antithesis between the poet and the philosopher, an antithesis that tried in vain to effect harmony through an allegorical explanation of the Homeric poems. In the contemporary age the science of poesy and mythology was first, a mythology that cannot be mythology without being universal and drawing all the elements of present culture—science, religion, art itself—into its sphere and without connecting not only the subject matter of the present but all that of the past into a perfect unity. Since art requires the self-enclosed and limited, whereas the spirit of the world drives toward the unrestricted and tears down every limitation with immutable steadfastness, the individual must step into this conflict, employ absolute freedom, and try to extract enduring forms from this mixture of the age. Within these arbitrarily drawn forms he must through absolute individuality lend inner necessity and external universality to the structure of his poesy.

Dante did this. Before him he had the subject matter of the history of both the present and the past. He could not work it into a pure epic, partly because of his own nature, partly because there he would have excluded other aspects of the culture of his time. The entirety of that culture also encompassed the astronomy, the theology, and the philosophy of the age. He could not present these in a didactic poem, since that too would limit him, and in order for his poem to be universal, it simultaneously had to be historical. A completely arbitrary invention was needed emerging entirely from the individual in order to combine this subject matter and structure it into *one* whole. It was impossible to present the ideas of philosophy and theology in symbols, since no symbolic mythology was available. Neither could he make his poem completely allegorical, since in that case it could not be historical. Hence, it had to be a completely unique combination of the allegorical and historical. Yet no alternative of this sort was available in the exemplary poesy of antiquity; only an individual could effect this, only absolutely free invention pursue it.

The poem of Dante is not allegorical in the sense that its figures merely mean something different without existing independently of such meaning in and for

themselves. On the other hand, none of them is independent of that meaning such that it simultaneously would be the idea itself and more than merely an allegory of it. His poem thus contains a totally unique medium between allegory and symbolic-objective configuration. There is no doubt, and the poet explains it himself elsewhere, that Beatrice, for example, is an allegory, namely, of theology. The same holds true of her companions and many other characters. Yet they also count for something by themselves and enter as historical characters without for that reason being symbols.

In this respect Dante is archetypal, since he has expressed what the modern poet must do in order to present in a poetic whole the entirety of the history and culture of his age, the only mythological subject matter available to him. With absolute willfulness he must combine the allegorical and historical. He must be allegorical, and indeed is even against his will, because he cannot be symbolic. He must be historical, because he should be poetic. The invention or creation he makes in this respect is singular every time, a world in and for itself, belonging completely to the individual person.

The only German poem of universal design combines in a similar fashion the most extreme poles into the striving of the age through the completely unique invention of a partial mythology, the figure of Faust, although it can be called a comedy in a far more Aristophanic sense and divine in another, more poetic sense than the poem of Dante.

The energy with which the individual structures the particular mixture of available subject matter of his age and of his own life determines the measure of mythological power it receives. The characters of Dante acquire a kind of eternity through the position into which he places them and which is eternal. Yet not only the real elements he takes from the epoch, such as the story of Ugolino and others, but also the things he invents completely, such as the end of Ulysses and his companions, acquire genuinely mythological certainty within the context of his poem.

It could only be of extremely secondary interest to present the philosophy, physics, and astronomy of Dante in and for themselves, since his uniqueness resides only in the manner of their fusion with the poesy itself. The Ptolemaic cosmic system, which to a certain extent is the foundation of his poetic edifice, already possesses its own mythological color. Yet when his philosophy in general is characterized as Aristotelian, this implies not the purely peripatetic philosophy but rather that combination, unique to that period, of the peripatetic with the ideas of Platonic philosophy, as one could demonstrate in a great many excerpts from his poem.

We do not wish to linger over the energy and richness of individual passages or with the simplicity and infinite naïveté of particular images in which he expresses his philosophical ideas. An example might be the well-known image of

the soul that comes from the hands of God as a small girl who acts childishly, whining and laughing, a simple little soul that knows nothing except that, moved by its serene author, it gladly turns its attention to whatever pleases it. Let us speak only of the universally symbolic form of the whole in whose absoluteness we recognize the universality and eternity of this poem more than in anything else about it.

If the combination of philosophy and poesy is conceived even in its most subordinate synthesis as a didactic poem, then since the poem should be without external purpose, it is necessary that this intention (to instruct) itself be suspended and transformed into an absoluteness such that it might appear to exist for its own sake. This is conceivable, however, only if knowledge itself, as an image of the universe and in the most perfect accord with that universe as the most primal and beautiful poesy, is already poetic in and for itself. Dante's poem is a much more sublime permeation of science and poesy, and hence its form, even in its freer autonomy, must be all the more commensurate with a universal worldview.

The division of the universe and the ordering of subject matter according to the three realms—the *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, and *Paradiso*—is a universally symbolic form quite apart from the particular significance of these concepts in Christianity, so that one cannot see why every eminent epoch could not possess its own divine comedy in the same form. Just as for contemporary drama the form of five acts is accepted as customary, since every occurrence can be viewed in its beginning, continuation, its culmination, inclination toward the end and actual ending, so also that trichotomy of Dante is conceivable as a universal form for higher, prophetic poesy that would express an entire age. The actual filling out of that form would merely be infinitely different, just as it could be revivified ever anew through the power of original invention. Yet not only as external form, but also as the graphic expression of the inner model of all science and poesy, that form is eternal and capable of encompassing the three great objects of science and culture: nature, history, and art. Nature, as the birth of all things, is the eternal night, and that unity through which these things exist in themselves; it is the aphelion of the universe, the locus of removal from God as the true center. Life and history, whose nature is a gradual progression, are only purification, a transition to an absolute condition. This condition, however, is present only in art, which anticipates eternity and is the paradise of life and truly within the center.

Hence, when viewed from all sides, Dante's poem is not the individual work of a particular age or of a particular stage of culture, but is rather archetypal through the universal validity it unites with the most absolute individuality, through the universality by virtue of which it excludes no aspect of life and culture, and finally through the form, which is not a particular model but rather the general model of a view of the universe.

The particular inner configuration of the poem cannot, of course, possess such universal validity, since it is structured according to the concepts of the age and according to the particular intentions of the poet. In contrast, as can be expected from such an artistic and thoroughly deliberate work, the universal inner model is also symbolized externally by the form, color, and tone of the three larger sections of the poem.

In view of the uncommon nature of his subject matter, Dante required for the form of his creations in the more specific sense a kind of confirmation that only the science of his age could give him, a science that for him functions as the mythology and general foundation supporting the daring edifice of his creations. Yet even within specifics he remains completely true to his intention of being allegorical without ceasing to be historical and poetic. The *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, and *Paradiso* are, in a sense, merely the concretely, architectonically rendered system of theology. The measurements, numbers, and relationships he observes internally here were prescribed by that science, and he intentionally renounced free invention here in order through form to lend necessity and limitation to his poem, a poem actually unrestricted in its subject matter. The universal sanctity and the significance of numbers constitute another external form upon which his poesy bases itself. Hence, in the larger sense the entire logical and syllogistic scholarship of his age is for him merely form that must be added to the poem in order to reach that particular region in which his poesy resides.

Nevertheless, in this turn to religious and scientific concepts as the most universally valid elements his age offered, Dante never sought a kind of common or base poetic probability, but rather in precisely this turn suspends all intention to flatter crude sensibility. His first entrance into Hell takes place just as it had to, without any unpoetic attempt to motivate it or to make it comprehensible, and in a condition similar to that of a face or countenance, without the intention of making it responsible for that entrance. His elevation through the eyes of Beatrice, through which divine energy is conducted to him, is expressed in a single line; he transforms the miraculous nature of his own encounters directly into a metaphor for the mysteries of religion, and confirms those encounters through the yet higher mystery, as when he makes his assumption to the moon—an assumption resembling that of light through water—into an image of the incarnation of God.

It would be a science unto itself to portray the richness of this art and the profundity of the intentionality, penetrating all the way into specifics, of the inner construction of the three parts of the world. His own nation recognized this shortly after the death of the poet by establishing a university chair for Dante, which Boccaccio was the first to occupy.

The individual creations of each of the three parts of the poem are not the only elements allowing the universally significant qualities of the first form to manifest themselves; the law in question expresses itself even more clearly in the inner, spiritual rhythm through which they are juxtaposed to one another. The *Inferno*, just as it contains the most terrible of objects, is also the strongest in expression, the most austere in diction, and verbally the darkest and most dreadful. In one part of the *Purgatorio* a deep stillness resides, since the laments of the lower world go silent; on the heights, the antecourts of heaven, everything becomes color. The *Paradiso* is a true music of the spheres.

The variety and diversity of the punishments in the *Inferno* have been conceived with an almost unequaled inventiveness. There is always only a poetic connection between transgressions and the torments. Dante's spirit is not shocked by the dreadful; indeed, he takes it to its extreme. Yet one could show in every such instance that he never ceases to be sublime and accordingly truly beautiful, for what some people have in part called base, people who are not in a position to comprehend the whole, is not really base at all in that sense, but is rather a necessary element within the mixed nature of the poem that prompted Dante to call it a comedy. The hatred of the wicked, the rage of a divine disposition expressed in Dante's terrible composition are not the inheritance of base souls. The usual presupposition, of course, is still quite doubtful, namely, that the exile from Florence first spurred his serious and extraordinary spirit, which until then had dedicated his poesy primarily only to love, to its highest creation, one in which he exposed the entirety of his life and of the fate of his heart and fatherland simultaneously with his accompanying displeasure. That vengeance, however, that he displays in the *Inferno*, he displays as if in the name of the Last Judgment, as an appointed judge with prophetic power, not out of personal hatred, but rather with a pious soul roused to indignation by the horrors of the age and out of an almost unknown love of his fatherland; he even portrays himself thus in a passage from the *Paradiso* where he says:

> Should it e'er come to pass that the sacred poem to which both heaven and earth so have set hand, that it hath made me lean through many a year,
>
> should overcome the cruelty which doth bar me forth from the fair sheepfold wherein I used to sleep, a lamb, foe to the wolves which war upon it;
>
> with changed voice now, and with changed fleece shall I return, a poet, and at the font of my baptism shall I assume the chaplet.[170]

He mitigates the horror of the torments of the damned through his own feeling, which almost at the goal of so much misery so enraptures his eyes that he wants to weep, and Virgil says to him: "Why are you gazing still?"[171]

We have already noted that most of the punishments in the *Inferno* are symbolic of the transgressions they chastise; yet several of these are symbolic in a far more general sense. Such is the nature in particular of the portrayal of a meta-

morphosis where two natures transform themselves simultaneously into and through one another and, in a sense, exchange material. None of the metamorphoses of antiquity can compare to this one as regards pure invention, and if a natural scientist or didactic poet were able to design equally powerful emblems or symbols of the eternal metamorphosis of nature, he could consider himself fortunate indeed.

As already indicated, the *Inferno* differentiates itself from the other parts not only according to the external form of presentation, but by constituting primarily the realm of forms and accordingly the plastic part of the poem. One must recognize the *Purgatorio* as the picturesque part. Not only are the penances imposed on sinners here treated in part quite graphically and often even with humor, but particularly the journey over the sacred hills of the place of penitence offers a quick variation of transient perspectives, scenes, and various light effects. Finally, at the last boundaries, after the poet has arrived at the river Lethe, the highest splendor of painting and color emerges in the descriptions of the divine and ancient groves of the area, of the heavenly clarity of the water covered by their eternal shadows, and of the maiden he encounters on its shores, and, finally, in the arrival of Beatrice in a cloud of flowers, under a white veil, crowned with olives, concealed in a green mantle, and clothed in the scarlet of living flame.

The poet has penetrated through the heart of the earth itself to light. In the darkness of the underworld only form itself could be distinguished. In the *Purgatorio*, light emerges still wedded to earthly matter and becomes color. In the *Paradiso*, only the pure music of light remains; the reflex ceases, and the poet elevates himself in stages to the vision of the colorless, pure substance of the deity itself.[172]

The view of the cosmic system, a view still clothed in mythological dignity during the age of the poet, and of the quality of the stars and of the measure of their movements, is the foundation upon which his inventions in this part of the poem are based. And if in this sphere of absoluteness he nonetheless allows gradations and distinctions to take place, he suspends them again immediately through the splendid words he has one of the sister souls speak whom he encounters on the moon: "How everywhere in heaven is Paradise."[173]

It follows naturally from the design of the poem that precisely during the elevation through paradise the highest propositions of theology are discussed. The great reverence for this science is prefigured through his love for Beatrice. It is necessary to the degree the vision resolves itself into the purely universal element that the poesy itself become music, form disappear, and in this respect the *Inferno* appear as the more poetic part. Yet this does not require us to make individual judgments; the particular excellence of each part is preserved and truly discernible only through the congruity of the whole. If the relationship between the three parts within the whole is understood, one necessarily recognizes that the

Paradiso is the purely musical and lyrical part, even in the intention of the poet, who also indicates this in the external forms through the more frequent use of Latin words from church hymns.

The admirable stature of this poem, which shines through in the interpenetration of all the elements of poesy and art, comes in this way to complete external manifestation. This divine work is neither plastic, picturesque, nor musical, but rather all this at once and in consonant harmony. It is neither dramatic, epic, nor lyrical, but rather a completely unique, singular, and incomparable combination of them all.

I believe I have shown simultaneously that it is prophetic and prototypical for the entirety of modern poesy. It encompasses all its conditions and determinations and emerges from the yet variously combined material of those conditions as the first growth elevating itself above the earth and expanding toward heaven, the first fruit of the transfiguration. Those who wish to become acquainted with the poesy of later periods, not according to superficial concepts, but rather at its very source, should exercise their skills on this great and austere spirit in order to know through which means the entirety of the modern period is encompassed, and to see that no lightly tied bonds unite it. Those who are not called to do this should apply the words at the beginning of the first part to themselves: "Leave all hope, ye that enter."[174]

In the preceding discussions we have considered both the essence of the epic poem and the various genres generated by its admixture with other forms. Epic poetry as identity served as the point of departure for poesy, as the state of innocence, as it were, in which everything is still together and unified that later exists only in dispersion, or that only from a condition of dispersion can come back into one of unity. In the course of development this identity flared into a conflict within lyric poetry, and only the ripest fruits of later development provided the means by which unity itself became reconciled on a higher level with that conflict and both became one again within a more complete development. This higher identity is *drama*, which by encompassing the characteristics of the other two antithetical genres is the highest manifestation of the nature and essence of all art.

The course of all natural development is so orderly that what according to the *idea* is the final synthesis—the unification of all opposites into a totality—is also the final manifestation in time.

We have, in our discussion of lyric and epic poetry, already demonstrated in a general fashion that the fundamental antithesis between the infinite and finite expresses itself for art in the highest potence as the antithesis between necessity and freedom. Poesy, however, must in any case—and especially in its highest

forms—doubtlessly portray this opposition itself in its highest potence, and thus *as* the opposition between necessity and freedom.

Although, as has been shown, this conflict does inhere within lyric poetry as well, it does so as conflict and as resolution of the conflict only within the subject, and reverts into the subject. On the whole, lyric poetry is thus characterized primarily by freedom as such.

There is no conflict at all in epic poetry. Here necessity predominates as identity, except that, as already mentioned, since there is no real conflict, it can manifest itself not as necessity to the extent that necessity is *fate*, but rather in identity with freedom and even, to a certain extent, as chance. The epic poem is far more concerned with *success* than with deed. That success prompts necessity or good fortune to come to the aid of freedom, and it executes what freedom is not able to execute. Here necessity is thus in agreement with freedom without any difference. This is why the hero in the epic cannot end up unhappy without suspending the very nature of this poetic genre. Achilles, if he is the main character in the *Iliad*, cannot be overcome, just as Hector cannot be the hero of the *Iliad* precisely because he is overcome. Aeneas is an epic hero only as the conqueror of Latium and founder of Rome.

If we were to maintain that identity or necessity is the predominating element in the epic, one might object that necessity might demonstrate its power much more persuasively by executing precisely what freedom does not want rather than, in a reverse fashion, proving to be one with freedom and carrying out what freedom begins. However, (1) necessity cannot appear allied with freedom within the epic without working against freedom from the other side. Achilles is not the victor unless Hector succumbs. (2) If necessity appeared opposed to freedom in the way suggested, that is, by seeking precisely what freedom opposes, the hero would either succumb to *necessity* or elevate himself above it. In the first case the main character would succumb; in the second, freedom would prove its superiority over necessity—which, however, is not supposed to be the case.

We can thus assume the following to obtain. Although conflict does inhere within the lyric poem, it is merely subjective. There is never any real objective conflict with necessity. In the epic poem only necessity predominates, yet it must be one with the subject *to the extent that* if this were not the case, one of the two possibilities just discussed would have to occur. Hence, misfortune, insofar as it arises on the one side, must be countered by relatively good fortune on the other.

If according to these principles we now ask in a general fashion, with no particular form in mind, what the nature of that poem must be that, as the totality, would be the synthesis of the two antithetical forms, the first characteristic emerges immediately: a poem of this kind must contain an actual and thus objective conflict between the two elements freedom and necessity, and must contain it such that both *appear* ***as such***.

Hence, a poem of this kind will be able to portray neither a merely subjective conflict nor the presence of *pure* necessity, necessity which to that extent is congenial to the subject and thus ceases to be necessity. Rather, it must portray necessity genuinely caught in a struggle with freedom, yet such that a balance obtains between the two. The only question now is how this is possible.

A genuine conflict is present only when the possibility exists that either side may win. Yet this appears to be unthinkable on both sides in the case at hand, since neither of the two can really be overcome. Necessity cannot, for if it were, it would not be necessity. Freedom cannot, for it is freedom precisely because it cannot be overcome. Yet even if it were conceptually possible for the one or the other to succumb, it would not be poetically possible since it would generate absolute disharmony.

The possibility of freedom being overcome by necessity is a thoroughly repugnant thought; just as little, however, can we desire that necessity be overcome by freedom, since this offers to us a vision of the highest anarchy. There thus remains quite naturally no other alternative in this contradiction than that *both*, necessity and freedom, emerge from this struggle simultaneously as victorious *and* vanquished, and accordingly ***equal*** in every respect. But precisely this is doubtlessly the highest manifestation of art, namely, that freedom elevate itself to a position of equity with necessity, and that necessity appear as the equal of freedom without the latter losing in significance in the process. For only within such a relationship does that true and absolute indifference become objective, that indifference inhering within the absolute itself and resting on equality in being rather than on simultaneity in being. Freedom and necessity, like the finite and the infinite, can become one only in a condition of equal absoluteness.

Since *freedom* and *necessity* are the *highest* expressions of that particular antithesis upon which all art is based, the highest manifestation of art is thus the one in which necessity is victorious without freedom succumbing, and in a reverse fashion in which freedom triumphs without necessity being overcome.

The question is now how this, too, is possible.

Necessity and freedom, inasmuch as they are universal concepts, must in art necessarily appear symbolically. Since only human nature is subjected to necessity on the one hand, yet capable of freedom on the other, both concepts must be symbolized in and through that human nature, which itself must be represented by individuals who—as just such natures in which freedom and necessity are bound to one another—are called *persons*. Yet precisely in human nature, too, do the conditions of possibility obtain for necessity to be victorious without freedom succumbing, and in a reverse fashion for freedom to triumph without the course of necessity being interrupted. For the same person who succumbs to necessity can elevate himself above it through his disposition such that both—conquered and victorious at the same time—are manifested in their highest indifference.

In general, then, human nature is the only means of representation for that relationship. One may well ask, however, in *which relationships* human nature is itself capable of demonstrating that power of freedom that, independent of necessity, raises its own head victoriously at the same time necessity triumphs.

Freedom will be at one with necessity concerning all that is favorable or is in accordance with the subject. Hence, in happiness freedom can appear neither in genuine conflict nor as genuinely equal with necessity. It will become manifest as such only when necessity imposes or inflicts misfortune, and freedom—elevating itself above this victory—*freely* accepts that misfortune to the extent that it is necessary or inevitable. In this way it nonetheless equates itself *as* freedom with necessity.

That highest manifestation of human nature through art will thus never be possible except where courage and greatness of character are victorious over misfortune, and where out of the struggle that threatens to destroy the subject freedom emerges as that absolute freedom for which there is no conflict.

But further: What will be the nature and form of the *portrayal* of this elevation of freedom to complete equality with necessity? The epic poem portrays pure necessity, pure identity *as such*, which for that reason does not *itself* appear as necessity, since necessity is a concept determined solely by antithesis. Necessity, however, is at one with itself and is constant, such that even the idea of necessity—in that *particular* sense in which it predominates in the *epic* poem—as eternally and *evenly* flowing identity, does not prompt any movement of the soul, but rather leaves it completely calm. It moves the soul only where it encounters genuine opposition. In the mode of portrayal we are presupposing, however, such opposition *is supposed* to be manifest, and not merely subjectively—for then the poem would be lyrical—but rather *objectively*. Yet neither should it be manifest objectively as is the case in the epic poem such that the soul's disposition remains calm and unmoved. There is only *one* possible mode of portrayal in which what is portrayed is just as objective as in the epic poem, and yet in which the subject is just as moved as in the lyric poem. It is that mode in which the action is not portrayed in the narrative, but rather is itself actually presented (the subjective is portrayed objectively). The presupposed genre that should be the final synthesis of all poesy is thus drama.

Let us remain a moment with this opposition between drama—as action actually presented—and epic. If in the epic poem pure identity or necessity must predominate, then a narrator is necessary who by means of the equipoise of his narration himself continually calls one back from too great a participation in the action of the characters, and who draws one's attention to the *simple* element of *success*. The same event that in an epic portrayal would leave behind only an objective interest in that success would in a dramatic portrayal directly mix with it the interest in the characters and thereby suspend the pure objectivity of perception. The narrator, by being unknown to the characters, not only precedes and leads the audience in his moderate observation and attunes them to such observation by means of the narrative itself, he also takes the place of necessity, as it were; since necessity cannot express its own purpose or goal, he guides the audience to it. Since in the dramatic poem, on the other hand, the natures of the two antithetical genres are to be united, participation in the characters must be added to that in the events themselves. Only through this association of events with the participation in characters does that antecedent participation become action and deed. Deeds, however, if they are to move the soul, must be seen—just as events, if they are to leave the soul calmer, must be narrated. Deeds emerge at least in part from internal conditions of reflection or of passion and so on, conditions that, because they are essentially subjective, cannot be portrayed objectively except to the extent that the subject in whom they occur is himself actually placed before our eyes. Events allow internal states to appear less frequently and touch upon them less by directing both the object itself as well as the spectator toward the external.

As is readily evident, we have from the start deduced drama as tragedy, and to that extent apparently have excluded the other form, namely, comedy. This was necessary, since drama as such can emerge only from a genuine and actual conflict between freedom and necessity, difference and indifference. This says nothing, admittedly, concerning *on which side* freedom, and on which side necessity resides. The original and absolute manifestation of this conflict, however, is that in which necessity is the objective, freedom the subjective element. This is the state of affairs in tragedy. Tragedy is thus the first form, comedy the second, since it arises as a result of a mere reversal of tragedy.

I will accordingly continue in the same way and construe tragedy according to its essence and form. Most of what obtains for tragedy concerning form is also true for comedy, and afterward we can specify with great precision what is altered by a reversal of the essentials.

On Tragedy

The essence of *tragedy* is thus an actual and objective conflict between freedom in the subject on the one hand, and necessity on the other, a conflict that does not end such that one or the other succumbs, but rather such that both are manifested in perfect indifference as simultaneously victorious and vanquished. We must now determine more precisely than before just how this can be the case.

We remarked that only when necessity imposes *misfortune* can it genuinely manifest itself as being in conflict with freedom.

The question, however, is precisely just what the nature of that misfortune must be in order to be appropriate to tragedy. Mere *external* misfortune cannot possibly generate genuinely tragic conflict, since we insist in any case that a

person elevate himself above external misfortune; should that person fail to do this, we merely find him despicable. A hero who, like Odysseus on his homeward journey, struggles against a series of unfortunate events and various hardships may well awaken our admiration; we gladly follow him, but he holds no tragic interest for us because the opposition can be overcome by means of a similar power, namely, physical strength or intelligence and shrewdness. Yet even misfortune against which no human help is possible—for example, incurable disease or loss of property—holds no tragic interest for us to the extent that it is merely physical. For we consider the patient bearing of unchangeable misfortune to be merely a subordinate effect of freedom, one that of itself does not transcend the limitations of necessity.

In the *Poetics*,[175] Aristotle presents the following cases of changes of fortune: (1) A just person falls from a state of fortune into one of misfortune. Aristotle remarks quite rightly that this is neither terrible nor pitiable, but rather only horrible and for that reason unsuitable as subject matter for tragedy. (2) An unjust person moves from unfortunate to fortunate circumstances. This is the least tragic case. (3) A highly unjust and wicked person is removed from fortunate circumstances into misfortune. This configuration may indeed touch our love of man, but it can evoke neither sympathy nor fright.

The only possibility is thus a case mediating between these. The subject of tragedy is a person who is exceptional as regards neither virtue nor justice, and who does not fall into misfortune as a result of wickedness or crime, but rather as a result of *error*. The person to whom this happens is one who earlier stood in fortunate circumstances and was held in high esteem, such as Oedipus, Thyestes, and others. Aristotle adds that for this reason—since poets earlier brought a wide variety of stories onto the stage—at that time, during *his* lifetime, the best tragedies limited themselves to a small number of families such as that of Oedipus, Orestes, Thyestes, Telephus, and others who were brought into circumstances in which they were to suffer greatly or cause others to suffer greatly.

Now, Aristotle considered tragedy—as he did poesy as such—more from the perspective of understanding than from that of reason. Considered from the former perspective, he did indeed describe the singularly highest instance of tragedy. That same instance, however, reveals a yet higher perspective in every single case he presents, namely, that the tragic person is *necessarily* guilty of a transgression (and the greater the guilt—like that of Oedipus—the more tragic and involved it is). This is the highest possible misfortune: by fate to become guilty without genuine guilt.

It is thus necessary that this guilt itself be necessity, and that it be contracted not through error, as Aristotle says, but through the will of destiny and an unavoidable fate, or by the vengeance of the gods. Such is the nature of Oedipus's guilt. An oracle discloses to Laius that fate has preordained he be slain by the hand of his and Jocasta's son. The son, scarcely born, is bound by the feet

after three days and put out on an intraversable mountain range. A shepherd on the mountain finds the child or receives it from the hands of a slave from the house of Laius. He brings the child to the house of Polybus, the most respected citizen of Corinth, where because of its swollen feet it receives the name Oedipus. Upon becoming a youth, Oedipus is driven out of the house of his alleged parents because of the insolence of someone who while drunk calls him a bastard child. He questions the oracle in Delphi concerning his lineage, and although he receives no answer to that *particular* question, the pronouncement is made that he will sleep with his mother, beget a hated line unbearable to other people, and slay his own father. Having heard this, he bids Corinth farewell in order to avoid his fate and decides to flee to a place so distant that he could never commit the predicted transgressions. During his flight he encounters Laius without knowing that it is Laius, the king of Thebes, and slays him in an argument. Along the way to Thebes he liberates the area from the monstrous Sphinx and enters the city where the decision has been made that whoever would slay the Sphinx would become king and receive Jocasta as his wife. Oedipus's fate thus fulfills itself unknown to him. He marries his mother and begets with her that unfortunate line of sons and daughters.

The fate of Phaedra is similar, though not quite the same. Through the hatred of Venus toward her family, ignited by Pasiphaë, she is inflamed into love for Hippolytus.

We thus see that the struggle between freedom and necessity actually obtains only where the latter undermines the will itself, and freedom is thus attacked on its own ground.

Instead of understanding that *this* situation is the only genuinely tragic one, one with which no other can even be compared in which misfortune does not reside precisely *in* the will and in freedom itself, people have asked rather how the Greeks were able to endure these terrible contradictions inherent in their tragedies. A mortal, preordained by fate for guilt and transgression, even—as is the case with Oedipus—struggling *against* fate and fleeing that guilt, nonetheless is frightfully punished for a transgression that was actually a work of fate. Are these contradictions, people have asked, not simply devastating? And where is that foundation of beauty the Greeks nonetheless did achieve in their tragedies?

The answer to this question is the following. We have already proved that a genuine struggle between freedom and necessity can occur only in the situation just discussed, one in which fate itself makes the guilty person into a transgressor. That this guilty person, a person who after all only succumbed to the superior power of fate, nevertheless is punished, was necessary precisely *in order* to show the triumph of freedom, and constituted a recognition of freedom and the *honor* due it. The protagonist had to struggle against fate; otherwise there was no struggle at all, no expression of freedom. He had to succumb within that which is subject to necessity. Yet in order not to allow necessity to overcome him without

simultaneously overcoming it, the protagonist also had to atone voluntarily for this guilt—guilt imposed by fate itself. This is the most sublime idea and the greatest victory of freedom: voluntarily to bear the punishment for an unavoidable transgression in order to manifest his freedom precisely in the loss of that very same freedom, and to perish amid a declaration of free will.

This, as presented here as well as in my own *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*,[176] is the innermost spirit of the Greek tragedy. This is the basis for the reconciliation and harmony residing in that tragedy, the reason it does not devastate us, but rather leaves us feeling healed and, as Aristotle says, cleansed.

Freedom cannot exist as mere particularity. This is possible only insofar as it elevates itself to universality, and thus comes to an agreement with necessity concerning the consequences of guilt. Since it cannot avoid the unavoidable, it imposes the consequences on itself.

I maintain that this is also the only genuinely *tragic* element in tragedy. Not the unfortunate ending alone, for how can one in any sense call an ending unfortunate in which, for example, the protagonist voluntarily gives his own life, which he can no longer conduct with dignity or in which he brings down upon himself other consequences of his unmerited guilt—as does Sophocles' Oedipus, who cannot rest until he himself has disclosed the entire, terrible entanglement and that entire, frightful fate itself?

How can we call someone unfortunate who has reached *such* perfection, who has cast aside both fortune and misfortune equally and has reached that particular condition of the soul where neither really exists for him any longer?

Misfortune obtains only as long as the will of necessity is not yet decided and apparent. As soon as the protagonist himself achieves clarity, and his fate lies open before him, there is no more doubt for him, or at least there should not be. And precisely at the moment of *greatest* suffering he enters into the greatest liberation and greatest dispassion. From that moment on, the insurmountable power of fate, which earlier appeared in absolute dimensions, now appears merely relatively great, for it is overcome by the will and becomes the symbol of the absolutely great, namely, of the attitude and disposition of sublimity.

Hence, the tragic effect is by no means based only or at least initially on what one usually calls the unfortunate ending. The tragedy can also end with complete reconciliation not only with fate but even with life, as Orestes is reconciled in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus. Orestes, too, was preordained by fate and the will of a god, namely, Apollo, to be a transgressor. Yet this guiltlessness does not remove the *punishment*. Orestes flees from the house of his father and immediately sees the Eumenides, who pursue him even into the sacred temple of Apollo, where the shadow of Clytemnestra awakens those who sleep. Guilt can be removed from him only by actual atonement, and even the Areopagus, to whom Apollo directs him and before whom Apollo himself stands by him, must place equal votes in

the two urns so that the equality of necessity and freedom will be preserved before the moral consensus. Only the white stone Pallas casts into the acquittal urn frees him, though even this does not go into effect without simultaneously the goddesses of fate and of necessity—the avenging Erinyes—being reconciled and from thenceforth revered among the people of Athena as divine powers, thereby acquiring their own temple *in* her city itself across from the mount upon which she dwells.

The Greeks sought in their tragedies *this* kind of equilibrium between justice and humanity, necessity and freedom, a balance without which they could not satisfy their moral sensibility, just as the highest morality itself is expressed in this balance. Precisely this equilibrium is the ultimate concern of tragedy. It is not tragic that a premeditated, free transgression is punished. That a guiltless person unavoidably becomes increasingly guilty through fate itself, as remarked earlier, is the greatest conceivable misfortune. But that this guiltless guilty person accepts punishment voluntarily—this is the *sublimity* of tragedy; thereby alone does freedom transfigure itself into the highest identity with necessity.

After thus determining the essence and true object of tragedy in the preceding discussion, we must now speak first about the *inner structure* of tragedy, then about the external form.

Since that which in tragedy is opposed to freedom is necessity, it is self-evident that in tragedy absolutely nothing can be left to chance. Even freedom insofar as it produces the entanglement through its own acts appears in this respect to be driven by fate. It might appear fortuitous that Oedipus encounters Laius at a certain place, yet we see from the course of events that this encounter was necessary for the fulfillment of fate. To the extent, however, that its necessity can be comprehended only by the development, it is actually not part of the tragedy and is relegated to the past. Let me remark that in *Oedipus*, for example, everything belonging to the execution of the first oracle's prediction appears necessary precisely through this prediction, and appears bathed in the light of a higher necessity. As for the acts of freedom, however, insofar as they occur only after and in reaction to the blows of fate, they, too, are not accidental precisely because they occur as a result of absolute freedom, and because absolute freedom itself is absolute necessity.

Since all empirical necessity itself is necessity only when viewed empirically—viewed in and for itself, however, fortuitousness—then genuine tragedy also cannot be based on empirical necessity. Everything empirically necessary depends on something else through which it is possible; yet even this something else is not necessary in and for itself, but rather only through yet something else. Empirical necessity would not, however, suspend fortuitousness. That particular necessity that appears in tragedy can accordingly only be of an absolute sort, and can only be one that empirically is sooner incomprehensible than comprehensible. So as not to neglect the perspective of understanding—to the extent that even

an empirical necessity is introduced in the sequence of events—this sequence itself must not be comprehended empirically, but rather only absolutely. Empirical necessity must appear as the tool of higher, absolute necessity. It must serve only to elicit in actual appearance what has already *occurred* in absolute necessity.

This includes the so-called *motivation*, which is a necessitating element or foundation of action within the subject and which occurs primarily through external means.

The parameters of this motivation have already been determined by the preceding discussion. If motivation intends the production of a truly empirical-comprehensible necessity, it should be rejected completely, particularly if the poet thereby tries to lower himself to the crude mental capacity of the spectators. The art of motivation would then consist in giving the protagonist merely a character of enormous breadth out of which nothing can emerge in an absolute fashion, and in which thus all possible motives can have free play. This is the perfect way to render the protagonist weak and to make him appear to be the playground for external determining factors. Such a protagonist is not tragic. The tragic hero must, in whatever respect, possess an absoluteness of character such that external elements are merely *material* for him, and there can never be any doubt how he will act. Indeed, lacking any other fate, his own character would have to take its place. No matter what the nature of external elements, the action itself must always emerge from within him.

Overall, however, the initial structure of tragedy, the initial design, must be such that in this respect, too, the action appears *unified* and constant, and is not dragged along laboriously by means of totally dissimilar motives. Material and fire must be combined such that the whole continues to burn automatically. Let the foremost element of tragedy be a synthesis, an entanglement that can be resolved only in the precise way it is indeed resolved later, such that it leaves no choice for the entire subsequent development. Whatever transitional elements the poet may choose to put into play in order to guide the action to its end, in the final analysis they must themselves emerge from the fateful misfortune hovering over the whole and appear to be tools of that pending misfortune. If this is not the case, the spirit is constantly removed from the higher order of things to the lower, and vice versa.

The parameters of a dramatic work regarding what is ethically possible within it are expressed by what one calls the *morality* of the tragedy. Originally one doubtlessly understood by this the level of ethical development upon which the characters of a drama were placed, and whereby certain kinds of actions were excluded for them, whereas those that do occur are rendered necessary. The first requirement is doubtlessly that made by Aristotle that this morality be of a noble nature, whereby, considering his assertion presented earlier concerning the only possible and indeed highest tragic case, he does not require absolutely guiltless,

but rather in the larger sense noble, great morality. The presentation of a real transgressor, yet one who is such only because of the necessity of character, would be possible only in the other tragic case where an extremely unjust person is cast from fortune to misfortune. Among those tragedies remaining from antiquity I know of no such case, and the transgression, if it is presented in a genuinely ethical tragedy, itself always appears imposed by fate. This point, namely, that modernity lacks fate, or at least that it cannot set fate into motion in the same fashion as did antiquity—this *one* point, I would maintain, already shows us why modernity has often taken recourse in this situation of presenting great transgressions without thereby suspending the noble element of the morality involved, and for that reason of placing the necessity of the transgression into the power of an indomitable character, as Shakespeare has done so often. Since the Greek tragedy is so completely ethical and is actually based on the highest morality, there can be no more question in it concerning its truly moral disposition or atmosphere, at least not in the final analysis.

The totality of the portrayal requires that levels obtain also in the morality of the tragedy; particularly Sophocles understood in a general sense not only how to achieve the greatest effect with only a few characters, but also how to produce a self-enclosed totality of morality within these parameters.

In the employment of what Aristotle called the Θαυμαστόν, the extraordinary, the drama distinguishes itself essentially from the epic poem. The epic poem portrays an auspicious set of circumstances, an undivided world where gods and men are one. As we remarked earlier, the intervention of the gods is not miraculous here, because they themselves belong to this world. The drama is actually based more or less on a divided world in that it juxtaposes necessity and freedom. Here the appearance of the gods, in the same fashion as in the epic, would assume the character of the miraculous. Since in the drama there should be no chance, and everything should be either externally or internally *necessary*, the gods could appear in it only because of some element of necessity residing within them, and thus only insofar as they themselves are coparticipants or at least characters who are involved in the action from the outset. By no means may they appear in order to help the characters themselves, particularly the main character, or to be hostile toward them (as in the *Iliad*), for the protagonist of the tragedy should and must fight his battle alone. Only the moral greatness of his soul should see him through, and the external healing and aid that gods can grant him are hardly even *sufficient* for his particular condition. His situation can be resolved only internally, and if the gods constitute the reconciling principle—as in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus—they themselves must submit to the same conditions as do human beings. They, too, can neither reconcile nor rescue except insofar as they reestablish the balance of freedom and necessity and enter into negotiations with the deities of justice and fate. In this case, however, there is nothing miraculous in their appearance; the rescue and aid they do effect, they do

not achieve as gods, but rather by subjecting themselves to the lot of human beings and accommodating themselves to justice and necessity. Whenever gods function as hostile elements in the tragedy, they are themselves fate. Neither do they do this in person, but rather their hostile effect manifests itself through an inner necessity in the characters themselves, as is the case with Phaedra.

Hence, it would be ruinous for the whole essence of tragedy to call on the gods for help for the sake of ending the action externally, whereas one is actually merely interrupting it internally and leaving it inconclusive. That particular misfortune that gods as such can ameliorate through their mere intervention is in and for itself not a genuinely tragic malady. In reverse fashion, where such a malady is present, they can do nothing; if they are nonetheless called upon in such a situation, this is what one calls the *deus ex machina*, something generally considered eversive for the essence of tragedy.

The reason—if we may conclude the investigation into the inner structure of tragedy with this characterization—is that the action must not be merely externally but rather internally self-enclosed, in the disposition of the character himself, just as it is an internal rebellion that the tragic element actually provokes. Only from this *inner* reconciliation does that harmony emerge that is required for completion. It suffices bad poets to conclude the laboriously continued action merely externally. Just as little as this may occur, the reconciliation itself may not take place through anything heterogenous, extraordinary, or anything lying outside the disposition of the character and the action, as if the harshness of true fate could be mitigated by anything other than the greatness, free acceptance, and elevation of the inner disposition. (The primary motive of reconciliation is religion, as in *Oedipus at Colonus*. The highest transfiguration occurs when the god calls him, "Hark, hark, Oedipus, why do you hesitate?" and he then disappears from the eyes of mortals.)[177]

I will now move on to the *external form* of tragedy.

Our initial concept suggests that the tragedy must not be a narrative, but rather actual and objective action. Yet this concept also yields with strict necessity the other consistent determinations of its external form. When action is narrated, it proceeds through thought, which according to its own nature is the most free process, one in which even the most distant elements come into direct contact with one another. Action presented objectively and actually is viewed, and must thus accommodate itself to the laws of vision and perception. The latter, however, necessarily require constancy and continuity. Continuity of action is accordingly the necessary characteristic of every rational drama. Any variation here must simultaneously effect a variation in the rest of the entire conformation. Hence, it is admittedly foolish to bind oneself to this law of ancient tragedy when one cannot come even remotely close in any other feature, as when the French observe the unity of time in their pieces, which they call *abusive* tragedies. Yet the French stage does not really observe it except insofar as it is *merely* limiting,

when the poet allows time to pass during the different acts. Suspending the unity of action in this case while trying to observe it in other respects merely betrays the paltriness and inability to allow a great action to occur concentrically, as if around one and the same point.

The continuity of time is actually the predominant of the three unities Aristotle mentions. Concerning the so-called unity of place, this need obtain only insofar as it is necessary for the continuity of time; among the few remaining tragedies of antiquity there does exist—indeed, in Sophocles himself (in *Ajax*)—the example of a necessary change in place.

External continuity of action—something belonging to the most perfect manifestation of tragedy regardless of what modern art critics, out of misunderstood zeal and contrary to their usual ignorance toward it, may have said against the misunderstood unity of time in the French pieces—is merely the external manifestation of the inner continuity and *unity* of action itself. According to its own nature, the latter cannot take place except insofar as the chance features of a genuinely, empirically occurring action and its accompaniment are suspended. Only through the presentation of the essentials, what we might call the pure rhythm of the action, without any embellishment of circumstances and of that which accompanies the main action, is the genuinely plastic completion and perfection in the drama achieved.

The most splendid invention in this respect, one inspired completely by the most sublime art, is the *chorus* of the Greek tragedy.[178] I call it a sublime invention because it does not flatter crude sensibility, and elevates the spectator completely away from the common desire for deception directly into the higher realm of true art and of symbolic portrayal. Although the chorus of the Greek tragedy does indeed encompass multiple functions, the primary one is that it suspends the accidental feature of the accompaniment, since naturally no action can proceed that in addition to the coparticipants would not also include other characters who are inactive regarding the main action. To allow them *merely* to observe or to execute *merely* secondary gestures would deplete the action, which in every point should be like a full blossom, fertile and pregnant. If now this deficiency is to be eliminated realistically, some weight must be placed in these secondary characters as well and the whole thereby given that breadth possessed by contemporary tragedy. Antiquity takes this relationship more idealistically, symbolically. It transformed the accompaniment into the chorus, and made it truly, that is, poetically, necessary in their tragedies. The chorus acquired the function of anticipating what went on in the spectator, the emotional movement, the participation, the reflection, and thus in this respect, too, did not allow the spectator to be free, but rather arrested him entirely through art. To a large extent the chorus represents objectivized reflection accompanying the action. Just as free contemplation also raises itself above the fearsome and painful beyond the initial violence of fear and pain, so also was the chorus, in a sense, a continuous means of comfort

and reconciliation within the tragedy whereby the spectator was guided toward more serene reflection and thereby relieved, as it were, of the feeling of pain by that feeling being placed into an object and presented there as already mitigated. That this consummation of tragedy was the primary intention of the chorus—a consummation in which tragedy leaves nothing outside itself and, in a manner of speaking, even draws both the reflection it awakens as well as the movement and the participation itself into its own circle—can be seen from its own constitution.

(1) The chorus consisted of not one but several people. If it consisted of *one* person, then either it would have to speak with the spectators—yet precisely these spectators should be excluded here *in order* that they see their own participation objectivized—*or* it would have to speak with itself; yet neither could it do this without appearing too moved or upset, which was contrary to its meaning. It thus had to consist of several persons who nonetheless portrayed only one, whereby the wholly symbolic structure of the chorus reveals itself completely.

(2) The chorus was not included *in* the action as such, for if it were itself the main actor, it could not fulfill its function of ensuring that the disposition of the spectators was settled. The exception that appears to take place in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, where the spectators constitute the chorus themselves, is only apparent, and to a certain extent this feature is part of the high, unsurpassed ethical disposition in which this entire tragedy is composed, since in a certain sense the chorus is the objectified reflection of the spectators and is in agreement *with them*. Aeschylus thus assumed here that the spectators were on the side of justice and right. Otherwise the chorus is more or less indifferent. The actors speak as if they were completely alone and had no witnesses. Here, too, the wholly symbolic significance of the chorus reveals itself. Like the spectator, it is the confidante of both parties and does not betray the one to the other. Whenever it does participate, however, because it is impartial, it always takes the side of right and of fairness. It counsels peace, seeks to ameliorate, laments injustice, and supports the oppressed, or it reveals its participation in the misfortune through gentle compassion. (On the basis of this indifference and impartiality of the chorus one can see why Schiller's imitation of the chorus in *The Bride of Messina* was not successful.)[179]

Since the chorus is a symbolic person, everything can be transferred to it that is otherwise necessary for the action but not already included in that action. Thus it relieves the poet of a large number of other accidental difficulties. Contemporary poets suffocate the action under the burden of devices employed setting it into motion. At the very least they do need a confidante or adviser for the protagonist. This, too, is alleviated by the chorus; since it sees both what is necessary and unavoidable as well as what is avoidable, it functions when appropriate with advice, admonishment, and inducement.

Finally, the enormous burden on contemporary poets never to leave an empty theater is eliminated by the chorus.

After having construed the tragedy completely from the inside, if we now proceed to the final manifestation we find that among the three forms of poesy it is the only one that shows us the object from all sides, and thus absolutely. The epic restricts the spectator in every individual case to a certain perspective, as does painting, and always allows him to see only as much of the object as pleases the narrator. Finally, among these three forms the drama is the only genuinely symbolic form precisely in that it does not merely mean or signify its objects, but rather places them before our very eyes. Hence, it corresponds to the plastic arts among the verbal arts and, as the final totality, concludes *this* side of the world of art just as sculpture concluded the other.

On Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides

After construing in this fashion the essence and inner and outer form of tragedy from completely universal principles, if one now views the genuine works of Greek tragedy and finds them completely in accord with what can be understood universally about them, one can for the first time fully understand the purity and rationality of Greek art. The *epic* of the Greeks also carries this imprint, though because its rational character permits more fortuitousness one cannot demonstrate it there as strictly and in as much detail as in Greek tragedy, which one can almost view as a geometric or arithmetical problem that unfolds with complete purity and without a break. It belongs to the essence of the epic that it has no definite beginning or ending. The opposite is the case in tragedy. It requires just such a pure unfolding, an absolute self-enclosed nature without anything remaining unsatisfied.

If the three Greek tragedians are compared with one another, we find that Euripides must be separated from the other two in more than one respect. The essence of the genuine tragedy of Aeschylus and Sophocles is based wholly on that higher morality that was the spirit and life of their age and of their city. The tragic element in their works is never based on merely external misfortune. Necessity appears rather in a direct struggle with the will itself and combats it on its own ground. Aeschylus's Prometheus does not suffer merely because of *external* pain, but rather much more deeply in his inner feeling of injustice and oppression; his suffering does not express itself as subjection, since it is not fate but rather the tyranny of the new ruler of the gods that causes this suffering. It expresses itself rather as defiance, as rebellion; freedom *triumphs* over necessity precisely because in this feeling of his own *personal* suffering nonetheless only the *universal* rebellion against the unbearable dominion of Jupiter motivates him. Prometheus is the archetype of the greatest human inner character, and thereby also the true archetype of tragedy.

We have already drawn attention to the moral purity and sublimity in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus. Yet in all his pieces we could demonstrate the funda-

mental law of tragedy, namely, that transgression and guilt are either directly or indirectly the work of necessity. The high morality and absolute purity of the Sophoclean works have been admired by all ages, and express themselves fully in the works of the chorus in Oedipus:

> May destiny still find me winning the praise of reverent purity in all words and deeds sanctioned by those laws of range sublime, called into life throughout the high clear heaven, whose father is Olympus alone; their parent was no race of mortal men, no, nor shall oblivion ever lay them to sleep; the god is mighty in them, and he grows not old.[180]

Something further common to both Sophocles and Aeschylus is that the action is never merely externally self-enclosed, but rather internally and externally at the same time. The effect on the soul is to cleanse it from passion instead of arousing it, and to round it off and make it inwardly whole rather than wresting it out and dividing it.

Things stand quite differently with the tragedies of Euripides. That high ethical atmosphere is a thing of the past; other motives take its place. They concern themselves less with the sublime compassion Sophocles effected than with material emotion or feeling wedded more with suffering. Hence, in those passages where he pursues this goal he often displays the most moving images and concepts, though the latter, because at the heart of the matter they lack ethical and poetic purity, nevertheless cannot make us overlook the whole. The older subject matter no longer sufficed for his purposes, which quite often or almost always lie outside the parameters of high and genuine art. He thus had to change the myths in an often sacrilegious fashion, and for this reason also had to introduce the prologue into his plays, which is another proof of the sunken tragic art in them, regardless of what Lessing may say in recommending such prologues.[181] Finally, he is *never* as concerned with concluding the action in the inner disposition of the character as rather only externally, and in this, as well as in the stronger devices of material stimulus he employs, we can understand what Aristotle means when he says that Euripides had the greatest effect on the spectators. In his attempts to flatter crude sensibility, and, in a fashion, to calm such sensibility, he frequently sinks to the basest of motives, motives that perhaps a contemporary poet might employ, indeed a poet of the worst sort; for example, he finally has Electra . . . marry Pylades.[182]

In general one can thus assert that Euripides is great primarily in the portrayal of passion, though neither in that hard yet calm beauty unique to Aeschylus, nor in that beauty wedded with goodness and purified into divinity which is unique to Sophocles. If we compare the two greatest tragic poets, we find that the works of Aeschylus parallel the plastic works of that high and austere style of art,[183] just as those of Sophocles parallel the plastic works of the beautiful style that began before Polyclitus and Phidias. This is not to say that moral sublimity does not

radiate through in Aeschylus, even if it does not dwell quite as endemically in all the characters of his works as in those of Sophocles. Nor are we implying that this atmosphere in his presentation is not recognizable where he portrays only great transgressions and terrible characters, such as the malicious murder of Agamemnon and the character of Clytemnestra. Rather, here this germ of morality is yet enclosed in a harder husk and is more austere and inaccessible, whereas in Sophocles moral goodness flows commonly with beauty itself, generating thereby the highest image of divinity.

Furthermore, whereas Aeschylus strictly delineates and closes off each of his works, and then places his characters in them, Sophocles distributes art and beauty evenly over the various parts of his works, and lends to each not only an internal absoluteness, but also that element of harmony with the others. We have seen, however, how in the plastic arts that *harmonious* beauty emerging after the high, austere style was a blossom that could be achieved only at one particular point.[184] It subsequently had to wither or continue in the opposite direction of merely sensual beauty. The same happened in dramatic poesy. Sophocles is the true pinnacle upon which Euripides immediately follows, who is less a priest of unborn, eternal beauty than a servant of temporal, transient beauty.

On the Essence of Comedy

We remarked at the beginning that the general concept does not designate on which side freedom and on which side necessity must be, but that the original relationship between freedom and necessity is that in which necessity appears as the object, freedom as the subject. This, however, is the relationship in tragedy, and for this reason, too, tragedy is the first and what we might call the positive manifestation of drama. The reversal of this relationship must thus yield that form in which necessity or identity is rather the *subject*, freedom or difference the object; this is indeed the relationship within *comedy*, as can be seen from the following observations.

Every reversal of a necessary and decisive relationship posits an obvious contradiction or absurdity within the subject of this reversal. Now, certain kinds of absurdities are *unbearable*, partly insofar as they are theoretically perverse and ruinous, partly insofar as they are disadvantageous in a practical sense and have serious consequences. In the case of reversal in question, however, (1) an *objective* and thus not really theoretical absurdity is posited, and (2) the relationship within that absurdity is such that the objective is not necessity but rather difference or freedom. Necessity insofar as it is the objective element, however, appears only as *fate* and only to that extent is it terrible. Since, then, all *fear* of necessity as fate is simultaneously suspended through this assumed reversal of the relationship, and since we assume that in *this* relationship of the action no genuine fate is even possible, a pure enjoyment of the absurdity in and for itself

becomes possible; this pleasure is what one calls the comic in the larger sense. It expresses itself through a free variation of tension and release. We become tense and prepare to look this absurdity—one transcending our powers of comprehension—squarely in the eye, yet notice immediately in this tension the complete nonsense and impossibility of the whole affair such that this tension quickly turns into relaxation, a transition expressing itself externally as laughter.

If now we can call the reversal of every possible relationship based on contrast a comical relationship, then without a doubt the highest element of the comic and, in a sense, its blossom is where the opposites are reversed in their highest potence—thus as necessity and freedom. Furthermore, since a struggle between these two elements in and for itself constitutes objective action, the relationship resulting from such a reversal is already essentially dramatic.

We do not deny that every possible reversal of an original relationship has a comical effect. Whenever the coward is put into the position of having to be brave, or the miser wasteful, or whenever in one of our domestic dramas, for example, the wife of the house plays the role of the husband, the husband that of the wife, this is a type of comedy.

We cannot pursue this general possibility into all the ramifications out of which the countless situations arise upon which contemporary comedy is based. We must only determine the pinnacle of this manifestation. This occurs where a universal contrast between freedom and necessity obtains, yet such that the latter falls to the subject, the former to the object.

It is self-evident that because necessity is essentially objective, any necessity in the subject can only be pretended or assumed, an affected absoluteness that is put to shame by necessity in the figure of external difference. Hence, just as freedom and particularity, on the one hand, feign necessity and universality, necessity, on the other, assumes the appearance of freedom under the assumed external appearance of inconsistency and destroys that alleged universality, and yet does so in a deeper sense according to a necessary order. It is *necessary* that particularity come to nothing wherever it assumes an objective relationship to necessity. Hence, *to that extent* the highest fate does inhere within comedy, and comedy itself is the highest tragedy. Yet precisely because it itself assumes a nature antithetical to its own, fate appears in an amusing form and only as irony, not, however, as the destiny of necessity. Since every possible affectation and pretension to absoluteness is an unnatural condition, it is the primary task of comedy, since as drama it directs itself wholly toward viewing, not only vividly to present this pretension, but also, because such vividness encompasses primarily only the necessary elements, to lend it a kind of necessity. Subjective absoluteness, whether it be genuine and in harmony with necessity, or merely assumed and thus in contradiction with it, expresses itself as character. Character, however, both in tragedy and in comedy, is a postulate precisely because it is the absolute. It cannot itself be further motivated. It is necessary, however, precisely in the highest potences of absurdity and nonsense that graphic qualities tend to dissipate if they are not introduced in some other way. (This is not the case with the novel, since it is epic.) This is possible only if the character is already forced by factors independent of him, by a kind of external necessity, to assume a certain character and display it publicly. The highest manifestation of comedy thus necessarily requires *public* characters, and in order that maximum vividness be achieved, it must be *actual* people of public character who are portrayed in the comedy. In this case alone does the poet acquire so much ahead of time that he now can risk everything and comically enhance all the characteristics of these people, since he is accompanied by the constant verification of the independently existing character of the person outside his dramatic poem. Public life in the state becomes a mythology for the poet. Within these parameters he need deny himself nothing, and the more audaciously he employs his poetic rights, the more does he raise himself above the limitations, since, in a sense, the person takes off his personal character under this treatment and becomes universally significant or symbolic.

The single highest type of comedy is thus that of *ancient* Greece or Aristophanes to the extent that it is based on the public characters of real people and takes these as the form into which it pours its creations.

Just as Greek tragedy in its perfection proclaims and expresses the highest morality, so also does ancient Greek comedy proclaim the greatest conceivable freedom in the state, a freedom that *itself* is the highest morality and is inwardly one with that morality. Even if nothing from the dramatic works of the Greeks were left to us besides the comedies of *Aristophanes*, we would still have to conclude on the basis of these alone that the Greek possessed a degree of culture and a condition of moral concepts that is not only alien to the modern world, but even totally incomprehensible. Spiritually, Aristophanes is genuinely one with Sophocles, and *is* Sophocles himself, though in the only form in which the latter could still exist after the perfect age of Athens was past and the blossom of morality had passed into licentiousness and luxuriant debauchery. Both are like two identical souls in different bodies, and that moral and poetic crudeness that does not comprehend Aristophanes is also incapable of understanding Sophocles.

The usual understanding of the comedies of Aristophanes is to consider them either farces and farcical comedies or immoral pieces, partly because he introduced real people to the theater, partly because of the other liberties he took. Concerning the first point, it is sufficiently well known that Aristophanes presented demagogical heads of the people and even Socrates himself on the stage. The question is merely in what fashion he did this.

When Aristophanes brings Cleon onto the stage as an unworthy leader of the people, a thief and squanderer of public funds,[185] he is merely practicing the right inherent in the perfect free state in which every citizen had the right to express his opinion about public and general affairs. That is why Cleon could use no other countermeasures against him than to dispute his citizenship. Yet this

right that Aristophanes enjoyed as a citizen is for him actually only the means to an artistic effect, and if his comedy is understood as a mere accusatory file against Cleon, there is *nothing* unethical about that; it would merely be unpoetic.

This same holds true of *The Clouds*, in which Socrates is presented. As a philosopher, Socrates enjoyed public stature. Yet it would never occur to any Athenian that that particular Socrates Aristophanes portrays was the real Socrates; even without any consideration of his own personal character, which in any case was well able to raise him above the satire, Socrates himself could well be a spectator at the performance of *The Clouds*. If it were ever to occur to our own dear German imitators to imitate Aristophanes, nothing would come of it except lampoons. Aristophanes does not portray the individual person, but rather the one elevated into the universal, and thus a person quite different from the real one. Socrates is for Aristophanes a name, and he avenges himself on this ***name*** doubtlessly because Socrates was known as a friend of Euripides, whom Aristophanes quite justifiably criticized. In no way did he avenge himself on the person of Socrates. It is a symbolic Socrates he portrays. Precisely that feature that one considers to be a deficiency in Aristophanes, namely, that he distorts Socrates so badly and gives him characteristics and actions that are totally out of character—precisely this feature makes his poem poetic, whereas in the opposite case it would only have been common, base, or a lampoon.

In order to lend his creations credibility, vividness, and accessibility, Aristophanes needed a famous name upon which he could heap all his ridicule. Besides the popularity the name enjoyed, this was doubtlessly the most important factor prompting him to choose precisely the name of Socrates.

The comedies of Aristophanes would suffice to prove even without recourse to any universal concept that the comedy in its true manifestation is wholly the fruit of the highest culture, and that it can exist only in a free state. Immediately following the appearance of the first dramas of Aristophanes, which still belong to the older comedy, the rule of the thirty tyrants began in Athens, a rule that by law forbade comic poets from using the names of real people on stage. From this prohibition onward, at least for a time, the comic poets stopped naming their characters after real people of public stature. (The result was cheeky allegories.) As soon as Athens was free again, the usage was reimplemented so that even in the newer comedies we find the names of real persons. Yet even the poets of the so-called middle comedy, though not using real names, nonetheless portrayed real people and genuine occurrences using fictitious names.

By its very nature the comedy is dependent on public life. It has no mythology and no fixed circle of portrayals in the way tragedy has its own tragic period. Hence, the comedy must create its own mythology out of the age itself and public circumstances, which admittedly requires a set of political conditions not only offering appropriate material but also allowing its employment. As soon as the old comedy underwent the aforementioned restrictions, the comic poets were

really forced to return to the old myths. Because, however, they could treat these neither epically nor tragically, they had to undertake a reversal and treat them by means of parodies. That which in the old myths had been portrayed as revered or moving was now pulled down into the base and ridiculous. Hence, comedy *lives* actually from freedom and the flexibility of public life. In Greece it resisted as long as possible sinking from public and political life into domestic life, whereby it lost its mythological power. This occurred in the so-called newer comedies, since according to the usual reports at the time of Alexander, when the democratic form was a thing of the past, a new law even prohibited taking content from public life and presenting it on stage under whatever disguise.

We mentioned earlier that there were some exceptions. The inclination to parody public life and the custom of referring everything portrayed in comedy to public life appears to have been so insurmountable that Menander,[186] the head of the newer comedy, while being careful to avoid any reference to public life, began to transform the masks into true caricatures in order to escape even suspicion. We are acquainted with the products of the newer comedy only in fragments and from the remaining translations and imitations of Plautus and Terence. Yet it is necessary to prove both in and for itself and historically that the intrigue plays with completely fictitious characters and entanglements originated first in the later comedy, and the comedy that initially had lived in the atmosphere of public freedom sank into the sphere of domestic customs and events.

I mention nothing of the comedy of the Romans because it never enjoyed the public image of the Greek comedy and in its own cultivated time lived primarily only from the fragments of the newer and middle comedy of the Greeks. I will mention only that the form of ancient comedy was analogous to that of the tragedy, except that in the final stage of the newer comedy even the chorus disappeared.[187]

On Modern Dramatic Poesy

I will now proceed to the presentation of the tragedy and comedy of modernity. To avoid going completely under in this vast sea, I will attempt to draw attention to those few significant main points of *difference* between modern drama and that of antiquity, to the areas of *coincidence* with the latter and to its unique characteristics. I will also base all these references on the specific view of what we must consider to be the highest manifestations in modern tragedy and comedy. I will thus refer primarily to Shakespeare regarding the main points.

The first point with which to begin these considerations is that the *combination of opposites*, and thus primarily that of the tragic and comic, is the principle upon which modern drama is based. The following reflections will serve to clarify the significance of this combination. The tragic and the comic could be portrayed either in a condition of perfection or in one of indifference that has not

been suspended; yet then the poesy itself would appear neither tragic *nor* comic. It would be a completely different genre, namely, epic poesy. In epic poesy the two elements that are estranged and at odds in the drama are, not united, but rather not even separated yet. The combination of the two elements such that they do not appear separated at all can thus not be the unique characteristic of modern tragedy. It is rather a combination in which both are definitely differentiated, and are differentiated such that the poet shows himself to be simultaneously a master in both, as does Shakespeare, who concentrates his dramatic strength toward both poles and is the *emotionally impressive* Shakespeare in Falstaff and in Macbeth.

Meanwhile we can view this combination of opposing elements as the striving of the modern drama back toward the epic, though without becoming epic. In contrast, that same poesy in the epic strives through the novel toward the dramatic, and thus from both sides suspends the pure limitation of higher art.

This *combination* requires that the poet have access to the tragic and the comic not only in the larger sense and in quantity, but also in its nuances, as does Shakespeare, who in the comic is simultaneously gentle, adventurous, and witty, as in *Hamlet*, and earthy (as in the Falstaff pieces) without ever becoming base or crude. In contrast, he is similarly devastating in the tragic (as in *Lear*), chastising (as in *Macbeth*), touching, moving, and calming, as in *Romeo and Juliet* and several mixed pieces.

If we now look at the subject matter of modern tragedy, this, too, at least in the most perfect manifestation, had to have a mythological dignity. There were thus only three possible sources from which it could be drawn. First, the individual myths that, like those of Greek tragedy, had not united into epic wholes and remained outside the larger circle of the universal epic. They expressed themselves in the modern world through the *novellas*. History, either legendary or poetic, could be the second source. The third was the religious myth, the legends, the lives of the saints. Shakespeare drew from the first two, since the third did not offer his age and nation any appropriate subject matter. Primarily the Spaniards drew from the third source, and among them particularly Calderón. Shakespeare thus found his subject matter already there. In this sense he was not a creator in the sense of an *inventor*. Yet in the way he employed, ordered, and animated his subject matter, he shows himself to be equal to antiquity in *his own* sphere and as the wisest artist. People have remarked, and it is certainly the case, that Shakespeare bound himself precisely to the given subject matter, particularly that of the novellas, that he took up every detail of circumstance—even the smallest—and left nothing unused (a practice that might often provide a key to the elements of many of his plots that otherwise appear inscrutable), and that he changed the given material as little as possible.

Here, too, he is akin to antiquity, though dissimilar to Euripides, who as the more frivolous poet arbitrarily distorts the myths.

Our next investigation concerns to what extent the *essence* of ancient tragedy recurs in the modern version, or whether it is present at all. Do we find genuine fate in modern tragedy, that higher fate that encompasses even the element of freedom within tragedy?

As we saw earlier, Aristotle expresses the highest tragic case as being that in which a just person transgresses through *error*. We must add that this error must be imposed by necessity or the gods, and if at all possible even *against* free will. The latter case appears to be impossible according to the concepts of the Christian religion. Those powers that undermine the will and impose not only misfortune but *evil*, are themselves evil, infernal powers.

In any case, if an error occasioned by divine providence could be the cause of disaster and transgression, then in the same religion in which this is possible there must also exist the possibility of a corresponding reconciliation. This is indeed given in Catholicism, which, by nature a combination of the sacred and the profane, postulates sins in order to prove the power of grace in their reconciliation. This provided in Catholicism the possibility of *truly* tragic fate, albeit one different from that of antiquity.

Shakespeare was a Protestant, and for him this was not a possibility. If, then, there is an element of *fatum* in his works, then it can only be one characterized by a dual nature. Disaster is caused by the temptation of evil and hellish powers—yet according to Christian concepts the latter cannot be invincible, and one should *and* can resist them. The necessity of their effect, insofar as it does occur, thus ultimately reverts back into character or the subject. This is also the case with Shakespeare. In his works the element of character takes the place formerly occupied by fate, yet he posits such a powerful *fatum* into that character that it no longer can be considered free, but stands there rather as insuperable necessity.

Although a hellish deception lures Macbeth into murder, there resides no truly objective necessity in the deed itself. Banquo does not let himself be deluded by the voice of the witches; Macbeth does. Hence, it is the inner character that is decisive.

The childish foolishness of an old man appears in Lear like a confusing Delphic oracle, and the gentle Desdemona must succumb to the gloomier color wedded to jealousy.

For the same reason—because he had to place the necessity of transgression into the inner *character*—Shakespeare had to treat with terrible consequence the case *not* accepted by Aristotle of a transgressor who falls from fortune into misfortune. Instead of actual fate he introduces *nemesis*, yet does so in all the figures in which outrage is overcome by outrage, where one bloody wave drives the next, and the curse of the cursed is always fulfilled. This is particularly the case in English history in the Wars of the Roses. Here he *must* show himself as a barbarian, since he is undertaking to portray the highest barbarism, the raw slaughter of families among themselves in which all art appears to be at an end and the

naked power of nature enters, as we read in Lear:[188] "If the tigers of the forest or the monsters of the deep were to emerge from torpidity, they would act in such a way." Yet we do find features in which he has sent the grace of art among the *Furies*, who themselves do not appear personally. *Such* is the nature of Margaret's lament of love over the head of her illicit and guilty beloved and her farewell from him.[189]

Shakespeare ends this series with Richard III, whom he allows to pursue his goal with enormous energy until he is driven from its pinnacle into the narrowness of despair, and in the turmoil of a losing battle he cries out, with no hope of rescue: "A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse!"[190]

In the figure of Macbeth the element of revenge penetrates through step by step to the more noble transgressor whom ambition misguided, yet such that he, seduced by hellish deception, still believes it far away.

We encounter a gentler, indeed the mildest nemesis in *Julius Caesar*. Brutus is ruined not so much because of chastising powers as because of the gentleness of his own beautiful, delicate disposition, one that after the deed causes him to take the wrong measures. He had offered to virtue the sacrifice of his deed, a sacrifice he believed he had to make, and also offers himself.

The difference between this nemesis and true *fate*, however, is extremely significant. It emerges from the real world and resides in *reality*. It is the same nemesis governing history; as with all his subject matter, Shakespeare found this nemesis also in history. *Freedom struggling with freedom* provokes it. It is a matter of *succession*, and revenge is not immediately one with the transgression.

Nemesis also governed within the cycle of the Greek portrayals, though here necessity restricted and punished itself directly through necessity, and every situation considered in and for itself was a self-enclosed plot.

From the very outset, all the tragic myths of the Greeks belonged more to art, and a constant trafficking between gods and men and fate was endemic to them, and thus also the concept of irresistible influence. Perhaps even *chance* plays a certain role in the most unfathomable of the Shakespearean pieces (*Hamlet*); yet Shakespeare recognized both it *and* its consequences, and for that reason chance, too, becomes an intended effect and an element of the highest understanding.

If we now summarize our findings and express succinctly Shakespeare's relationship to the sublimity of the tragedy of antiquity, we must call him the greatest creator of *character*. He cannot portray that sublime, purified, and transfigured beauty that proves itself in the face of fate, a beauty that coincides with moral goodness. The particular beauty that he does portray, he does not render such that it would appear as permeating the *whole*, and such that the work as a whole would carry its image or imprint. He *knows* that highest beauty only as individual character. He was not able to subordinate everything to it, because as a modern—as one who comprehends the eternal not within limitation, but rather within boundlessness—he is too widely involved in universality. Antiquity possessed a

concentrated universality, and viewed allness not in multiplicity but rather in unity.

There is *nothing* human that Shakespeare did not touch upon; yet he touches it only individually, whereas antiquity touched it in totality. The elements of human nature from the highest to the lowest lie dispersed within him. He knows it *all*, every passion, every disposition, youth as well as age, the king and the shepherd. If our world were ever lost, one could recreate it from the series of his works. Whereas that ancient lyre enticed the whole world with *four* strings, the new instrument has a thousand strings; it splits the harmony of the universe in order to create it, and for that reason it is always less calming for the soul. That austere, all-soothing beauty can exist only in simplicity.

Commensurate with the nature of the romantic principle, modern comedy does not present action purely as action, isolated and within the plastic limitations of the drama of antiquity, but rather simultaneous with its entire accompaniment. Yet in this regard Shakespeare lends his tragedy the densest richness and pregnancy in every part, including the dimension of breadth, yet without arbitrary superfluity, but rather such that it appears as the richness of nature itself conceived with artistic necessity. The intention of the *whole* remains clear and then descends into an inexhaustible depth into which all viewpoints can immerse themselves.

It follows automatically that with this kind of universality Shakespeare does not have a restricted world; neither—inasmuch as the ideal world itself is a restricted, self-enclosed world—does he have an ideal world. On the other hand, neither does he have that world directly opposed to the ideal world, one whereby the miserable taste of the French replaces the ideal world: the conventional one.

Shakespeare thus portrays neither an ideal nor a conventional world, but rather always the *real* world. The ideal element is based on the structure of his pieces. Furthermore, he transfers himself easily into every nationality and age as if it were his own; that is, he sketches it as a *whole*, not concerning himself with the less significant features.

That which human beings attempt, the how and why of their designs—Shakespeare knew all of this. Hence, he is at home everywhere. Nothing is alien or surprising to him. He observes a far higher costume than that of customs and epochs. The style of his pieces is structured according to the object itself and varies itself from play to play (and not only chronologically), extending itself to the harshness, softness, regularity, or looseness of his verses, or to the brevity and abruptness or the length of his phrases.

Now, in order to mention the other features, those regarding the external configuration of modern tragedy, and in order not to linger too long in a discussion of the changes necessarily emerging within that configuration as a result of the previously mentioned differences, such as the departure from the three unities, the division of the whole into acts, and so on—in order not to linger too long

here, let us remark that the peculiar *combination* of prose and regular verse in the modern drama is itself merely the external expression of its internally mixed epic-dramatic nature. Neither do we wish to say much about the so-called bourgeois and other inferior tragedies where the characters appropriately express themselves in prose. Furthermore, that *varying* employment of such a combination of verse and prose was necessary precisely because of the emergence of the dramatic fullness of secondary characters. We might add that in the combination and in the observation of the appropriate level of language not only as regards the individual, but the whole of a work as well, Shakespeare has shown himself to be a superior artist. Hence, in *Hamlet* the structure is confused, abrupt, and cloudy, like the hero. In the historical pieces from older and more contemporary English history and from Roman history there predominates a tone quite different in cultivation and purity. In the Roman pieces we find almost no rhyme, whereas in the English ones, as well as in those from older history, we find not only a great many but quite a few extremely picaresque ones.

That which in Shakespeare one usually considers to be mistakes, distortions, or even crudeness is for the most part not this at all, and is considered such only by narrow and impotent taste. No one, however, fails to recognize him in his true greatness more than his own countrymen and his *English* commentators and admirers. They always cling to individual portrayals of passion, of a single character, to the psychology, to individual scenes or words, without any sense for the whole and for his art. Tieck remarks quite appropriately that when one glances at the English commentators it is as if while traveling through a beautiful landscape one passes a tavern in front of which drunken farmers are quarreling.[191]

The idea that Shakespeare wrote simply through fortunate inspiration and in unconscious splendor is an extremely base error and is a legend from a completely uncultivated age that in England began with Pope. The Germans, of course, frequently misunderstood him, not only whenever they became acquainted with him on the basis of a formless translation, but also because all belief in art had perished.

Shakespeare's early poems, the *Sonnets*, *Adonis*, *Lucretia*, all testify to an extremely likeable character and an extremely *inward*, *subjective* sensibility, not some unconscious storm-and-stress genius.[192] Shakespeare later lived completely within the world to the extent that his sphere allowed, until he began to reveal his own existence in a more unrestricted world and in a series of artworks that really do portray the entire infinity of art and of nature.

Shakespeare is so all-encompassing in his genius that one could easily consider him, like Homer, to be a collective name and, as has already occurred, to attribute his works to different authors. (Here the individual is collective, whereas in antiquity it was the work itself.)

We would, however, always be forced to view Shakespeare's art with a kind of disconsolateness if we had to view him absolutely as the pinnacle of romantic art

in the drama, since one does have to grant him a certain element of barbarism in order to recognize him as being great, indeed divine within it. In his boundlessness Shakespeare can be compared with none of the tragedians of antiquity. We must, however, be allowed to hope for a Sophocles of the differentiated world, and for a reconciliation within what me might call *sinful* art. At least the possibility of the complete fulfillment of this expectation seems to be hinted at from a previously little-known corner.

Spain has produced a spirit that, it is true, has already become an element of the past for us regarding subject matter and concerns; nonetheless, regarding form and art, he is eternal and already displays as achieved and present that which theory seemed to predict perhaps only as a task for future art. I am speaking of Calderón and I am speaking about him on the basis of his *one* tragedy I know, just as from *one* work of Sophocles' one can surmise his entire spirit. It can be found in the *Spanisches Theater*, translated by August Wilhelm Schlegel, whom we can thank not only for giving us the first genuine translation of Shakespeare but also for allowing Calderón to appear in the German language.[193] Hence, what I can say about Calderón refers only to this one work. It would be too presumptuous to formulate an evaluation of the entire art of this great spirit from this one work. Yet what is evident in this *one* piece is the following.

At first glance one might be tempted to call Calderón the southern, perhaps Catholic, Shakespeare, yet additional features distinguish the two poets from one another. The primary feature and the foundation of the entire edifice of his art Calderón has, of course, received from the Catholic religion, whose view of the universe and of the divine order of things essentially requires that there be *sin* and sinners so that through the mediation of the church God may prove his grace. This introduces the general necessity of sin, and in Calderón's piece under discussion the entire element of fate develops out of a kind of divine providence. Eusebio, the protagonist of the tragedy, is the unconscious and unrecognized son of a certain Curtio, whose daughter Julia was born of the same mother simultaneously with Eusebio under a miraculous cross in the forest after Curtio had tried to murder their mother there on the basis of unjust suspicion. Through a miracle of the cross, the mother is transported out of the forest back to her house, where Curtio, who has returned thinking he has murdered her, finds her alive with her lovely daughter Julia. The boy Eusebio had remained back at the cross, where he falls into the hands of a gallant man who rears him. The mother remembers only vaguely that she has borne two children. This is the basis of the story, though in the tragedy itself it plays only a historical role, that of the first synthesis from which all else emerges.

Eusebio, who does not recognize his father and sister (for in the meantime the mother has died), loves Julia. From this the entire fate of the two develops. This fate and the following misdeeds of the two are caused by the *divine* arrangement that decreed that Eusebio remain at the cross after the birth. At the same time,

that particular kind of fate is introduced which, though not exclusively unique to the Christian religion, is definitely at work there as well, namely, that the guilt of the fathers be avenged on the children into the third and fourth generations (for the curse of the father also pursues the line of Oedipus, just as the abominations of the ancestors follow the line of Pelops). This, too, removes the guilt as a subjective element from the protagonist and directs it to necessity.

The first consequence of this love for Julia is that Lisardo, an older brother, demands satisfaction from Eusebio because he has dared to begin a love relationship with her even though he has neither name nor parents. Lisardo falls; this is the beginning of the tragedy, whose first development through several incidents is that Julia enters a convent, whereas Eusebio, who wishes to avenge his own infinite suffering through unending crimes, becomes the leader of a band of robbers. Amid all this destruction heaven sends him the future savior of his soul in the person of the Bishop of Trent, whose life he has saved and who in return promises to be with him at his death and hear his confession.

Eusebio and Julia both stand under the particular guardianship of the miraculous cross, whose image nature itself has put on the breast of both. Eusebio knows the effect of this sign and of reverence for the cross, which already has rescued him from the wildest dangers. Now that sign again directs the fate of both. At night Eusebio penetrates into Julia's convent through the cloister gallery all the way into her cell. Yet we see him, startled by a fear Julia does not comprehend, hurrying back over the convent walls where his comrades await him. The sign of the cross he discovers on her breast as on his own separates the two and rescues Julia from the ultimate guilt of incest and from breaking her vow. Yet that same sign drives Julia into a further fate. Since the ladder has been left standing because of Eusebio's hasty departure, Julia follows him in the confusion of aroused passion and climbs down. At some distance she comes to her senses and wants to return to the cloister, but in the meantime Eusebio's companions have taken the ladder away. Cast out into the wide world in a nun's habit, the delicate Julia now also goes the way of Eusebio and avenges her suffering and her despair through repeated murders and misdeeds, until after a series of such deeds she finally reaches Eusebio. In the meantime, Curtio sets out against the robbers. In a pitched battle swinging this way and that, one in which Julia, dressed in a man's clothing, defends her beloved, Eusebio is finally mortally wounded. Already in his death throes he calls out for Bishop Alberto, who as if by divine providence is passing by and hears his confession, after which Eusebio peacefully dies. This, too, takes place at this lonely place in the forest before the crucifix that protected his birth, decided his fate, and now also makes his end blessed. Curtio, a witness to what is happening, recognizes the place, recognizes Eusebio as his son and Julia in her disguise. Julia confesses to him that her short career since her escape from the convent has been characterized by murder and abominations. The father blesses his son, yet damns her and wants to destroy her, whereupon she embraces

the cross and, promising to atone for her guilt in the convent, pleads with it for help. The cross raises itself and rises with her into the air.

This is the brief content of the tragedy, in which, as is evident, most of what occurs does so through divine providence and is imposed by a Christian fate according to which there must be sinners so that the power of divine grace can be revealed in them. This decides the *essential* features of the tragedy, which needs neither diabolical powers for seduction nor merely external nemesis for chastisement.

If, then, we actually admire in Shakespeare only that element of infinite *understanding*, which by being infinite appears as reason, in Calderón we must recognize *reason* itself. These are not purely real relationships and circumstances into which an unfathomable understanding puts the reflection of an absolute world; these are absolute relationships, it is the absolute world itself.

Although essential features of his characters are grand and rendered with uncommon sharpness and sureness, Calderón needs to rely on such characteristics less, since he employs a more genuine element of fate.

Yet we must elevate Calderón equally with respect to the inner form of his composition. If we subject this work to the highest standard—namely, that the intention of the artist has passed over into the work itself, become completely one with it and thus indiscernible by virtue of precisely this absolute discernibleness—in this respect he can be compared only with Sophocles.

In Shakespeare the objectivation and indiscernibleness of intention as such are based only on unfathomability. Calderón is completely transparent. One sees all the way to the bottom of his intention; indeed, he frequently expresses it himself, as does Sophocles. Yet it is so fused with the object that it no longer appears *as* intention, just as in a crystal the most perfect pattern can be perfectly presented and yet indiscernible. Among contemporary authors, Calderón alone has achieved this highest and absolute presence of mind and circumspection, this ultimate indifference between intention and necessity. Such transparency already necessitates that the superfluous accompanying elements cannot be as thoroughly rendered as in Shakespeare. The entire form is more concentrated, and although here, too, comic passages exist next to the tragic ones, from the one perspective they do not possess that heavy import as in Shakespeare, and from the other perspective are more indissolubly cast from the same mold as the tragic ones.

One would be greatly mistaken to expect the work of Calderón to be a pious and saintly portrayal of the kind most people—out of ignorance—expect from such works. This is no *Genoveva*,[194] in which Catholicism is intentionally presented as pious and extremely gloomy. We find rather a completely poetic and indissoluble cheerfulness in it. Everything in it, in the highest style, is profane, except the art itself, which appears truly holy.

The structure of the whole is more rational to a degree one probably would not have expected from modern poesy if one had abstracted its character from Shake-

speare alone. Calderón has collected the dispersed principles of the romantic genre into a stricter unity, one approaching true beauty. Without observing the old rules, he has compressed the action. His drama is more dramatic and hence more pure. Within this form his art always constitutes pure rendering of contours side by side with the highest coloration, such that from the largest to the smallest, even unto the choice of poetic meter, form and content interpenetrate one another in the most intimate fashion. Motivation has not been neglected, but it does not obtrude. It is a completely integrating part of the organization of the whole, from which nothing can be removed and to which nothing can be added. Within the whole that motivation is always based on providence, although in individual circumstances it can manifest itself (a) as *chance*, as when Julia no longer finds the ladder, (b) with a *moral* element, since the arousal in her breast drives her to crimes, or (c)[195] *absolutely* in the appearance and reappearance of the priest.

Finally, in the higher world upon which his poesy is based, Calderón has the advantage that reconciliation is prepared simultaneously with sin, and necessity directly with difference. He treats the miracles of his religion as an indisputable mythology, and faith in it as the insuperable divinity of disposition and attitude. Through these Eusebio and Julia are saved. The reconciliation he has the father speak over Eusebio in words of that particular genuine simplicity exemplary of antiquity,

> No, you are no victim of misfortune,
> You my beloved son,
> Who in his tragic end
> Earned such glory.[196]

—this reconciliation soothes as does the end of Oedipus or the final lot of Antigone.

In the transition from contemporary tragedy to comedy it is doubtlessly most appropriate to mention the greatest poem of the Germans: *Faust* by Goethe. It is difficult, however, to lend persuasive enough substantiation to one's evaluation of the spirit of the whole from that which we now possess.[197] Hence, one holding the usual view of it may find rather surprising my assertion that with respect to its intention this poem is far more Aristophanic than tragic.

I will thus content myself with presenting the most general perspective on this poem to the extent I believe I understand it.

Fate does not just apply to action. Over against the *knowledge* of the individual as individual stands the essential nature of the universe and of nature as an unconquerable necessity. The subject as subject cannot enjoy the infinite as infinite, yet it is a necessary inclination of that subject. Here is thus an eternal contradiction. Let us call this a more ideal potence of fate, one that with respect to

the subject stands in no less a position of opposition and conflict than in action. The disrupted harmony can express itself on two sides here, and the conflict can seek a dual resolution. The point of departure is the unsatisfied thirst to view and enjoy as subject the inner essence of things; the first development is to still this insatiable desire outside the goals and parameters of reason, through excesses of the spirit, as expressed in this passage from *Faust*:

> Go, spurn intelligence and science,
> Man's lodestar and supreme reliance,
> Be furthered by the liar-in-chief
> In works of fraud and make-believe,
> And I shall have you dead to rights.[198]

The other way to alleviate the unsatisfied yearning of the spirit is to plunge into the world itself, and to bear both its woes and joys. In this direction, too, the outcome is already decided. Here, too, it is eternally impossible for something finite to participate in the infinite, something expressed in the following words:

> Fate has endowed him with a forward-driving
> Impetuousness that reaches past all sights,
> And which, precipitately striving,
> Would overleap the earth's delights.
> Through dissipation I will drag him,
> Through shallow insignificance,
> I'll have him sticking, writhing, flagging,
> And for his parched incontinence
> Have food and drink suspended at lip level;
> In vain will he be yearning for relief.

In Goethe's *Faust* these two directions are portrayed, or rather are directly united such that from the one the other simultaneously emerges.

Because of dramatic considerations the emphasis had to be placed on the other direction, namely, the encounter of such a spirit with the world. According to the limited overview we have of the poem at this point, we can see clearly that in this direction Faust is to travel through the highest sphere of the tragic.

Yet the serene design of the whole even in its initial contours, the truth of misguided striving, and the authenticity of the yearning for the highest life already suggest that the struggle will *resolve* itself in a higher realm of authority and that Faust will be consummated after being elevated into higher spheres.

In this respect this poem, as alien as this may seem, possesses a truly Dantian significance, although it is to a far greater degree a comedy and in the poetic sense more divine than the work of Dante.

The wild life into which Faust throws himself becomes an inferno for him according to a necessary consequence. In light of the serene intention of the

whole, the first purification from the torments of knowledge and false imagination will have to consist in an initiation into the principles of deviltry as the actual foundation of the rational view of the world, and the consummation must involve his learning to recognize and enjoy the essential through being elevated above himself and above the nonessential.

Even these few features, features more suspected than really known concerning the nature of this poem, show that it is a completely original work in every respect, comparable only to itself and self-enclosed. This particular type of fate is *unique* and might even be called a new invention if it were not rendered in the German manner so to speak, and thus already originally represented by the mythological person of Faust.

Through this unique conflict beginning in knowledge, the poem acquired its scientific side such that if ever a poem could be called philosophical, that predicate must be attributed to Goethe's *Faust* alone. This splendid spirit, united with the energy of an extraordinary poet and the profundity of the philosopher, has opened in this poem an eternally fresh source of science that alone sufficed to rejuvenate the science of the age and to bathe it in the freshness of new life. Let anyone wishing to penetrate into the true sanctuary of nature approach these tones from a higher world and absorb at an early age the energy emerging here as if in dense rays of light and moving the innermost depths of the world.

One might call Goethe's *Faust* a modern comedy in the high style, constructed out of the entire material of the age. Just as the tragedy lives in the atmosphere of public morality, so the comedy lives in the air of public freedom. Public life disappeared with the coming of the new world. The state was displaced by the church, just as in the larger sense the real was displaced by the ideal. Universal life could be found only in the church. As if out of a mythology, comedy could develop only out of that church and its customs, rituals, and public actions. The first comedies were thus performances of biblical stories in which the devil usually played the comic person; in Spain, probably the first fatherland of these works, and the place they endured up into the past century, they were called *autos sacramentales*. This type of comedy was the original element of the muse of Calderón, who was as great in comedy as in tragedy and lived almost exclusively in this subject matter. A second genre developed from the first, the comedies of the saints; only very few of these were not actually performed. In this genre, too, Calderón is a master.

In Spain, the pastoral plays constituted the first transition from this ideal world into the common, real world. Shakespeare, one might say, whose birth and epoch did not offer that higher ground, himself created for the comedy a completely unique, romantic world, to a certain extent also a pastoral world, but of much richer coloration, energy, and fullness. Here, too, the individual had to step into

the picture and create the world that was not actually given to him. What can be more unique and further from the conventional than the world in *As You Like It* and *What You Will*. In one particular work, *The Comedy of Errors*, Shakespeare has treated an old theme, yet in an even higher potence and with a multiplication of confusion. Calderón, too, whenever he based the material of his comedy completely on invention, also took a romantic world as its basis, as did Shakespeare. He did, however, have the advantage of nation and actuality, which Shakespeare did not have, since in Spain in the age of Calderón there still existed a kind of public life—at least in the sphere of the romantic—and his heroes, as romantic as they may appear, nonetheless did have the customs of the age and the life of that particular world as a background.

Just as the French first put the reversed ideal world—the conventional world—in the place of the ideal world to which they could not elevate themselves, so also in the comedy; their influence has actually totally driven aside that true, absolute comedy based on some element of public life.[199] This is not to say that the Spaniards would not have been acquainted as well with character pieces and intrigue plays; they are rather the real inventors of such pieces, though theirs are based on a romantic life. Those of the French are based on common, social, or domestic life, just as they are the inventors of the *comédie larmoyante*.[200] The Germans also experienced some initial, still genuine, and earthy stirrings of a type of comedy similarly emerging from religion, as demonstrated in several pieces by Hans Sachs[201] in which religion is treated without mockery and yet in a paradoxical fashion, and biblical myths are treated comically. After these initial stirrings, however, and after Protestantism damaged the public life of religion here, Germany lived almost exclusively from foreign spoils; the only unique invention of the Germans as a group is still that they have struck the most profound chord of Philistinism and cheap domesticity in their family poems, and in the usual comedies have documented with the most natural facility the infamy of predominating moral concepts and of vile high-mindedness. There is no consolation for this shame of the German theater except perhaps that other nations have pursued this German refuse with lust.

After the highest totality in the drama in its two forms is achieved, the verbal arts can only strive back toward the formative arts, but not cultivate themselves further.

In song, poesy returns to music, to painting in dance, partly insofar as it is ballet, partly insofar as it is pantomime, and to the actual plastic arts in the theater arts, which constitute a living form of the plastic arts.

Since these arts, as already stated, emerge through a reverse inclination from the verbal to the formative arts, they constitute their own sphere of secondary arts. I believe I need only *mention* them within the parameters of our *present*

construction, since their laws as complex arts emerge from the laws of those from which they are composed. Whatever cannot be comprehended in this fashion can only be based on empirical or technical rules, which from the outset are excluded from our construction.

I will remark only that the most perfect composition of all the arts, the unification of poesy and music through song, of poesy and painting through dance, both in turn synthesized together, is the most complex theater manifestation, such as was the drama of antiquity. Only a caricature has remained for us: the *opera*, which in a higher and nobler style both from the side of poesy as well as from that of the other competing arts, might sooner guide us back to the performance of that ancient drama combined with music and song.

Music, song, dance, as well as all the various types of drama, live only in public life, and form an alliance in such life. Wherever public life disappears, instead of that real, external drama in which, in all its forms, an entire people participates as a political or moral totality, only an *inward*, ideal drama can unite the people. This ideal drama is the worship service, the only kind of *truly* public action that has remained for the contemporary age, and even so only in an extremely diminished and reduced form.

Appendix

The purpose of this essay is to illuminate several prejudices and utterances against and concerning the philosophy of nature that have arisen partly from a one-sided and false view of philosophy, and partly from shallowness and complete lack of scientific sensibility.

When we assume a relationship between the philosophy of nature and philosophy in general, this relationship is by no means to be understood as a subordinate one. What philosophy is, it is completely and undividedly. Whatever is not philosophy in just this sense, or whatever merely borrows its principles from philosophy and for the rest is completely removed from the subject matter of philosophy and pursues goals other than philosophical ones, cannot be called philosophy or even philosophical science in the stricter sense.

All distinctions made in this regard are empty and merely ideal. There is only *one* philosophy and *one* science of philosophy. What one calls different philosophical sciences are mere presentations of the *one*, undivided whole of philosophy under different ideal determinations, or, to use the familiar term, in different potences.

The complete manifestation of philosophy emerges only within the totality of all potences. The principle of philosophy, as the identity of all these potences, thus necessarily has no potence itself. This point of indifference of absolute unity, however, resides in its own turn in every particular unity in and for itself, just as in every unity all unities recur. The construction of philosophy does not direct itself to a construction of potences as such and thus as different potences, but rather within each potence only to the presentation of the absolute such that

each in and for itself is the whole. The relationship between the individual parts in the closed and organic whole of philosophy resembles that between the various figures in a perfectly constructed poetic work, where every figure, by being a part of the whole, as a perfect reflex of that whole is actually absolute and independent in its own turn.

One can extract the individual potence out of the whole and treat it in and for itself, but only insofar as one really presents the absolute within it is this presentation itself *philosophy*. In every other case, where one treats the individual potence *as* a *particular* and presents laws or rules for it as a particular, it can only be a theory of a specific object, such as a theory of nature or a theory of art. One can comprehend this in a more general sense by noting that all antitheses and differences are merely different forms that are nonessential within those differences. Only in their unity are they real, and since the unity of all cannot itself be a particular, they are real only to the extent that each in itself represents the absolute whole, the universe. By basing laws on the particular as particular, one thereby removes the object from the absolute, and science from philosophy.

The philosophy of nature as such is thus philosophy wholly and undividedly. Inasmuch as nature is objective *knowledge*, and inasmuch as the expression of the point of indifference insofar as it resides in nature is *truth*, and the expression of that point insofar as it resides in the ideal world is *beauty*, all of philosophy viewed from the theoretical side can be called the philosophy of nature.

It does not concern us here that in a different respect the theory of nature, as speculative physics, takes its principles from the philosophy of nature, and for now we are excluding this reference entirely. We are speaking here of the philosophy of nature as *such* and *in and for itself*, and not about that which is merely derived from it, even though this is almost universally mistaken for it.

According to this explanation one can only speak of a relationship between the philosophy of nature to philosophy either insofar as its idea is referred to something one considers philosophy, or insofar as it in its absoluteness is viewed as an integral and necessary part of the entirety of philosophy.

Philosophy itself, however, can be viewed from a dual perspective, either from the *purely scientific* side or in its *reference to the world*. The latter itself has two sides: the reference to religion insofar as the latter is itself speculation that has become an unchangeable objective view of things; and the reference to morality insofar as the latter is an objective expression of speculative ideas within action.

Poesy, as long as it has not yet become the affair of the collective or at least of an entire larger community and the most important element of a nation, is itself viewed only within such references. Only the two already discussed are valid as unconditional and universal points of reference, points to which for this reason we will restrict ourselves in the present investigation as well.

Notes

Notes

Foreword

1. *System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978).

2. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, second impression (1933; rpt. London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 310-13.

3. Cited from a copy, in Hegel's handwriting, of Schelling's draft, in *On University Studies*, trans. E. S. Morgan, ed. Norbert Guterman (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966), p. xii.

4. The conclusion to the *System* is included in *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel*, ed. David Simpson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 120-32.

5. On the early relationship between the two men, see Franz-Gabriel Nauern, *Revolution, Idealism and Human Freedom: Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel and the Crisis of Early German Idealism* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). Hegel's lectures have been translated by T. M. Knox: *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

6. *Shelley's Poetry and Prose*, ed. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers (New York & London: Norton, 1977), pp. 487, 485.

7. Schelling's formulation here is a very close anticipation of Coleridge's famous distinction between the primary and the secondary imaginations: see *Biographia Literaria*, ed. James Engell and Walter Jackson Bate, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), I: 304-5.

8. See *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (1910; rpt. New York & Evanston: Harper & Row, 1967).

9. Søren Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. David Swenson, rev. Howard V. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962).

10. See Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), p. 76.

11. The seeds of an ethical concern are there in Socrates and Sophocles (p. 139); they begin to

bear fruit as the gods become less fully integrated into the natural world—a process culminating in Christianity.

12. August Wilhelm Schlegel, *Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature*, trans. J. Black, rev. A. J. Morrison (London: Bohn, 1846), p. 6.

Translator's Introduction

1. F. W. J. Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, ed. Horst Fuhrmanns, vol. 1 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1962), p. 236.

2. A. W. Schlegel, *Vorlesungen über schöne Literatur und Kunst* (1801-4), ed. J. Minor, 3 vols. (Heilbronn: 1884). All references from this letter to Schlegel refer to *Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. 2 (1973), pp. 429ff.

3. Schlegel's lectures did, in fact, also deal with a philosophical understanding of art, particularly in the first volume (*Die Kunstlehre*). In referencing Schlegel's lectures, I have concentrated on this volume, since in 1802 Schelling did indeed acquire a copy from Schlegel of this part; furthermore, of the three volumes, it corresponds most closely with Schelling's own lectures in intention and execution.

4. Cf. Alan White, *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 2-3.

5. This point is crucial for an understanding of the lectures. Cf. Michael Vater's introduction to his translation of *Bruno; or, On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things*, p. 4:

> And in order to investigate reality outside the context of experience, he must abandon the Kantian path of transcendental questioning and the merely heuristic answers it obtains, and boldly operate as a metaphysician, that is, seek to generalize certain features of experience and fashion a comprehensive account of all the domains of reality in terms of these generalized features. As will become apparent, the features Schelling chooses to generalize are logical relations, the identity-and-difference of the subject and object in the situation of knowing, and that of the mental and physical aspects of the self-conscious organism. The fact that his metaphysical models are logical relations rather than properties may make Schelling's endeavors less suspect to Kantian eyes, but the *Bruno* abundantly and pointedly states Schelling's conviction that philosophy must once again acquire a metaphysical foundation if it is to be a systematic account of reality.

6. For a discussion of the implications of Schelling's philosophy of nature in this context, see Joseph L. Esposito, *Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of Nature* (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1977).

7. Alan White (*Schelling*) discusses this problem extensively; concerning the term "factical," see his note on p. 9, which reflects my own usage here: " 'Factical,' like 'factual,' refers to what in fact is; I use the former term for its connotations. Whereas the factual is opposed to the merely apparent, the factical is opposed to the necessary: what is factical exists, but might not have existed. The important connotation is that of contingency." See also his section "A Second Spinozist Flaw: No Derivation of Content," pp. 37ff., and Michael Vater, *Bruno*, p. 74: "He is aware, as well, that questions such as, 'Does the absolute cause appearances?' or 'What is the cause of separated existence?' are metaphysical in Kant's sense and thus unanswerable, though he clearly shows some uneasiness about not being able to pose and answer the latter questions."

8. See Alan White, *Schelling*, pp. 81ff., "From Nature to Spirit: The *System* of 1804."

9. F. W. J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)*, trans. Peter Heath, intro. Michael Vater (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), p. 219. Further citations refer to this edition.

10. Cf. James Engell, *The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 310:

> Schelling, wishing to avoid pantheism, identifies the Absolute with God, who is not merely the sum of all his material or spiritual creations. God dwells in all things and in all forms of spirit, but is fundamentally and originally one as well: the source of unmanifested Being itself . . . Schelling's *Identitätsphilosophie* in fact plunges into pantheism. God is not only the animated sum of things but is also the being who creates and animates.

11. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria; or, Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions* in *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, vol. 7, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), II, p. 287 and footnotes.

12. Concerning this information see Thomas McFarland, *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), p. xxxiii.

13. Schelling's term *Indifferenz* actually implies *nondifference* rather than *indifference* in the sense of apathy or lack of concern. I have retained the cognate *indifference* in keeping with Schelling's own (doubtlessly conscious) use of the foreign term. Concerning the implications of the terms *Differenz*, *Indifferenz*, and their translations, see Michael Vater's introduction to *Bruno; or, On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things*, p. 18, note 27.

14. See *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (Exhibition of my system of philosophy) (1801), §46.

15. Cf. *System of Transcendental Idealism*, p. 226:

> For the art-product differs from the organic product of nature primarily in these respects: [(a) that the organic being still exhibits unseparated what the aesthetic production displays after separation, though united; (b)] that the organic production does not proceed from consciousness, or therefore from the infinite contradiction, which is the condition of aesthetic production. Hence [if beauty is essentially the resolution of an infinite conflict] the organic product of nature will likewise not necessarily be *beautiful*, and if it is so, its beauty will appear as altogether contingent, since the condition thereof cannot be thought of as existing in nature.

16. For a discussion of Schelling's understanding of imagination in relationship both to the *Philosophy of Art* and to his other philosophical works, see Engell, *The Creative Imagination*.

17. See note 15. The passage cited there from the *System of Transcendental Idealism* continues as follows:

> From this we may explain the quite peculiar interest in natural beauty, not insofar as it is beauty as such, but insofar as it is specifically *natural beauty*. Whence it is self-evident what we are to think of the imitation of nature as a principle of art; for so far from the merely contingent beauty of nature providing the rule to art, the fact is, rather, that what art creates in its perfection is the principle and norm for the judgment of natural beauty.

18. The German term *Poesie* has several connotations. It can variously imply the poetic arts at large; the dynamic, generative, and creative force in the universe at large; that same creative force in human beings; or specifically poetry in the usual sense. I prefer the translation *poesy* to *poetry* for much the same reason I prefer *potence* to *power* or *exponential*. The multiple connotations do not inhere in the English term *poetry*, and I believe the invariable overlapping of these connotations often accompanying Schelling's use of it can be maintained by using *poesy*. For a discussion of the term, see Ernst Behler's introduction to Friedrich Schlegel's *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, trans. Ernst Behler and Roman Struc (University Park & London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968).

19. In the section of the *Philosophy of Art* in question, Schelling uses the term in a somewhat unexpected sense to designate the *real* side of art, or the formative arts, whereas he uses the term *art* (*Kunst*) to designate the *ideal* side, or the verbal arts. He is drawn to this usage by the etymological root of the word *poesy* in the Greek verb ποιέω, to make or do (for Schelling here: the creation of something real), and accordingly understands poesy in the narrower sense to refer to the informing of the infinite into the finite (approximately: "changing thought into substance"; see Engell, *The Cre-*

ative Imagination, p. 302). Art in this sense is the opposite potence, or the informing of the finite into the infinite (to reverse the analogy: changing substance into thought). Cf. A. W. Schlegel, *Vorlesungen über schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 91: "Either we seek an external form for something spiritual, or we relate something external to something invisible and inner." Schlegel, too, discusses the etymology of the term *poesy*, but emphasizes that it discloses that which is common to *all* the arts; this is why he considered using the term *Poetik* to designate his own doctrine of (all) the arts. See Schlegel, ibid., I, pp. 10 and 261.

20. Henry Crabb Robinson heard the Jena version of Schelling's lectures on the philosophy of art, and his notes have been published by Ernst Behler, "Schellings Ästhetik in der Überlieferung von Henry Crabb Robinson" (*Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 83 [1976]). These notes included four schemata designated as "Schelling's Tables," which were probably distributed by Schelling himself during the lectures. They offer a slightly different angle of vision on the structure I outline here, and also mention some art forms not actually included in the present lectures (e.g., dancing, a form August Wilhelm Schlegel treats in his *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*); on the whole, however, the systematic intention is equally, if not even more, clear even in the Jena version of the lectures. For schemata organizing Schelling's philosophy of nature, see Esposito, *Schelling's Idealism*, pp. 121ff.

21. References to Karl F. A. Schelling's introduction to the *Philosophy of Art* are from Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's *Sämmtliche Werke*, erste Abtheilung, fünfter Band (Stuttgart and Augsburg: J. G. Cotta'scher Verlag, 1859), pp. XVI-XVIII.

22. See Behler, "Schellings Ästhetik," pp. 133 and 135.

23. See Behler, ibid., p. 138.

24. Such borrowing and mutual representation characterized much of the critical writing during the Romantic period in Germany, and deserve some discussion at this point, since we will have occasion to refer to such influence often during Schelling's lectures. In his massive work *Die romantische Schule* (1870; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977), Rudolf Haym calls Schlegel's *Schöne Literatur und Kunst* "a complete overview of the content and scope of the strivings of the new [Romantic] school" (p. 767); Jacob Minor, who edited Schlegel's lectures in 1884, similarly asserts that "their primary purpose was by no means the presentation of new ideas, but rather the organization of the common Romantic property" (p. LXV). In those lectures, Haym continually asserts, Schlegel represented either expressly or by implication the views of virtually every one of the members of the Romantic circle in Berlin and Jena, including those of his brother Friedrich, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), and Ludwig Tieck, and especially the philosophical views of Schelling. One continually encounters sentences such as the following in Haym's work: "We do not encounter a single sentence in this [Schlegel's] entire introduction that cannot be traced back to Friedrich—but neither do we encounter a single sentence that has not gained in clarity in the hand of the borrower" (p. 770). "In a word, as regards the philosophy of the beautiful, Schlegel is a Schellingian" (p. 773; Schlegel cites from Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*). "Just because others provided him [Schlegel] with the material for these discussions, one cannot value their ingenious, accurate quality any less" (p. 774). Schelling and Schlegel corresponded a great deal during this period, and Schelling "knew that many of his own ideas had proved useful for Schlegel, and thus felt he could justifiably enlist some of Schlegel's treasures for his own use" (p. 837).

In his book *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition*, Thomas McFarland discusses in depth the question of plagiarism during the period. Although his primary focus is Coleridge, particularly as regards Schelling, he sheds a great deal of light on the situation in the philosophical community at large (p. xxxiv):

> No, the tendency of German philosophy in its great age was to stabilize terminology, to attempt to make it public and precise. All the German philosophers were *au courant*: they all were in command of the history of philosophy, and they all read each brochure of their contemporary peers and rivals. In such a milieu it was simply pointless to play the provincial game of originality or priority, and it is a documentable fact of philosophical history that only very rarely did they play it. Though the polemics that stemmed from the combination of their intellectual intensity and their physical proximity often became bitter and even libellous, the one charge that almost never seemed to occur was the charge of plagiarism. "Goethe," reminisces Henry Crabb Robinson, "despised all imputations of plagiarism, and all disputes about originality," and Goethe's attitude was in this instance normative for his contemporaries. Kant, Herder, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, Jacobi, Maimon used a common vocabulary of words and concepts without quarrelling about priorities. We find that such terms as "reason," "understanding," "subject," "object," "idea," "concept," "imagination," are used by all these thinkers, not as their own terminological property, but as public words referring to the universal interests of philosophy.

Such shared intellectual property extended from terminology to include commonly held views in the larger sense as well. The German Romantic school engaged in such mutual borrowings, reworkings, and polishing both in the area of terminology and in that of general views. Quite apart from being a reprehensible practice, it was more the norm, and was characteristic particularly of the members of the Berlin and Jena circles. The proximity of these writers and of their mutual endeavors is illustrated by the fact that it was August Wilhelm Schlegel who edited and found a publisher for the philosophical treatise by Schelling, *Bruno; or, On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things*, which appeared in the summer of 1802, shortly before both Schlegel and Schelling commenced their respective lectures on art.

25. Friedrich Schlegel has left us a fictionalized example—though one based on the reality of the Jena circle—of such a literary discussion among friends, the *Dialogue on Poetry* (see note 18 above); see especially p. 141.

26. See Haym, *Die romantische Schule*, p. 844:

> Only with some qualification can one call the aesthetician Schelling a Romantic. In his *Philosophy of Art* he is such only in individual points; he is such without qualification only in the form and method of his entire system insofar as it directly projects the estimation of art onto the surface of scientific abstraction.
>
> Even if one must prefer [August Wilhelm] Schlegel's aesthetics over Schelling's because of the richer [empirical] details, the philosopher in contrast is at a clear advantage over the historian [Schlegel] as regards the whole of that science itself. This world-embracing tendency inhered in the very spirit of Romanticism. (my bracketed insertions—Trans.)

27. See Behler, "Schellings Ästhetik," pp. 144ff., "Robinson, Schelling und Madame de Staël."

28. Cf. Dieter Jähnig, *Schelling: Die Kunst in der Philosophie*, 2 vols. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1966, 1969).

29. Some discrepancy exists here concerning specifics; see Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. 1, pp. 169-70.

Introduction

1. The initial pages of this introduction were reprinted in Schelling's lecture series entitled *On University Studies*, fourteenth lecture, under the title "On the Science of Art in Relation to Academic Study."

2. Among many others, Schelling may be thinking here of Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-93), who after 1789 held a position at the Academy of Arts in Berlin. Schelling, as will be seen, thought especially highly of Moritz's views on the mythology of antiquity. Kant, in the *Critique of Judgement*, book 2, "The Analytic of the Sublime," had also offered a system for ordering the various art forms. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964).

3. Schelling is underscoring the relationship between philosophy and art he first discussed in the concluding section to the *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), though now—particularly after

the reflections of the essay *Bruno* (1802)—the relationship is more equitable. In the *System of Transcendental Idealism* Schelling had written the following (p. 233):

> Take away objectivity from art, one might say, and it ceases to be what it is, and becomes philosophy; grant objectivity to philosophy, and it ceases to be philosophy and becomes art. Philosophy attains, indeed, to the highest, but it brings to this summit only, so to say, the fraction of a man. Art brings *the whole man*, as he is, to that point, namely to the knowledge of the highest, and this is what underlies the eternal difference and the marvel of art.

In *Bruno; or, On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things*, philosophy has risen in stature as regards what it is able to disclose of that absolute identity; *intellectual intuition* (in philosophy) becomes the equal of *aesthetic intuition* (in art). Art portrays *objectively* what philosophy portrays *subjectively*. Schelling will make this point several times during the present lectures.

4. This passage illustrates well Schelling's proximity to the thought of Goethe (1749-1832). At Goethe's first meeting with Schiller (1759-1805) in 1794, he and Schiller had engaged in a conversation concerning the "dissecting manner of dealing with Nature." Goethe remarked that "perhaps there was still the possibility of another method, one which would not tackle Nature by merely dissecting and particularizing, but show her at work and alive, *manifesting herself in her wholeness in every single part of her being*." As we shall see, this concept will be fulcral in Schelling's own estimation of art and its metaphysical implications. Schiller insisted in that conversation that such insights actually emerge from experience itself. Goethe continues: "I explained to him with great vivacity the Metamorphosis of Plants [Goethe's theory of plant morphology] and, with a few characteristic strokes of the pen, conjured up before his eyes a symbolical plant [that is, a prototypical plant or 'plant as such,' an approximation of the archetype or idea 'plant']. He listened, and looked at it all with great interest and intelligence; but when I had ended, he shook his head saying: This has nothing to do with *experience*, it is an *idea*. . . . Well, so much the better [Goethe counters]; it means that I have ideas without knowing it, and can even *see them with my eyes*." "How," Schiller asks, "can one ever equate experience with ideas? For an idea is characterized precisely by the fact that experience can never be fully congruous to it" (Schelling will discuss this point in §5). Goethe draws the conclusion later that if "he [Schiller] takes for an idea what to me is experience, then there must, after all, prevail some mediation, some relationship between the two." Indeed, this is precisely Schelling's point, one he will work out in more detail in the present lectures; just as Goethe *intuits* in a particular, concrete plant the idea "plant," so also, according to Schelling, can aesthetic intuition *intuit* the ideas of philosophy in a particular, concrete work of art. For a discussion of this complex regarding Goethe, see Erich Heller, "Goethe and the Idea of Scientific Truth," in *The Disinherited Mind: Essays in Modern German Literature and Thought*, 3rd ed. (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1971).

5. Since, as was pointed out in the Translator's Introduction earlier, art reveals in actuality (in concrete, individual works of art) a reflection of that absolute identity lying as the absolute behind all things, it possesses religious (revelatory) significance. Hermann August Korff, in his survey of this period of German literary history, cites the "religion of art" as one of the three main movements during the period (*Geist der Goethezeit*, 4 vols., 1923ff.). The early Romantic circle in general was enamored of the idea of the religious significance of art, and we shall encounter several reflections of this in these lectures.

Perhaps the most influential piece in this regard during the period was *Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar* by Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1773-98) and Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853). In this work as in no other, the religious implications of both art and nature are extolled on virtually every page. "Art must come before love in his [the artist's] heart, for art is of heavenly provenance. Only religion may be dearer to him. Art must become a sacred love or a loved religion, if I may express myself in such terms" (p. 27). Although Wackenroder and Tieck were particularly concerned with art, the references to nature clearly show the kind of parallel thinking characterizing Schelling's lectures, that is, the assertion that ultimately the realms of nature, intellect, and art reveal one and the same divinity. In the essay "Of Two Wonderful Languages and Their Mysterious Power," Wackenroder and Tieck sound remarkably Schellingian:

> Yet I know of two wonderful languages through which the Creator has granted man the means of grasping and comprehending the Divine in all its force, at least (not to appear presumptuous) insofar as that is at all possible for poor mortals. These languages speak to our inner selves, but not in words; suddenly and in wondrous fashion they invade our whole being, permeating every nerve and every drop of blood in our veins. One of these wonderful languages is spoken by God alone; the other is spoken only by a few chosen men whom He has anointed as His favorites. They are: Nature and Art" (p. 59).

One even finds in this work the suggestion of a dialectic of the spirit through both nature and art of the kind both Schelling and Hegel will speak: "In every work of art, in every zone of the earth, He sees the trace of that divine spark which, issuing from Him, passed through the souls of men and into their little creations, which reflect it back to the great Creator again" (pp. 45-46).

Similarly, Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), brother of August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) and a member of the early Romantic circles in Berlin and Jena, extolled the same view concerning the proximity of art, religion, and philosophy as Schelling does in this paragraph: "He who has religion will speak poetry." "Poetry and philosophy are, according to how you take them, different spheres, different forms, or factors of religion. Try to really combine both, and you will have nothing but religion." From Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, pp. 152 and 154 ("Selected Ideas," aphorisms 34 and 46).

6. Monsieur Jourdain is the principle character in Molière's play *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme* (1670), act II, scene 4. A. W. Schlegel makes the same point with the same example in his lecture series *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 264.

7. As already pointed out in the Translator's Introduction, the Romantics were keen on the social or communal nature of much of their work (sympoetry, symphilosophy). From Friedrich Schlegel we have the account of such an encounter in his *Dialogue on Poetry*; from August Wilhelm Schlegel we have an account of a visit to the Dresden Art Gallery: "Die Gemählde: Ein Gespräch" (The paintings: a dialogue), in *Athenaeum* II, 1. In that dialogue, Louise complains to her artist friend that art galleries are not there primarily to instruct artists in their own craft. "No, my friend, mutual participation and social contact is the main purpose. . . . For all arts, no matter which ones, language is, after all, the universal organ of communication . . . the common currency wherein all spiritual goods can be exchanged. Hence, one must talk and communicate, communicate!" (pp. 49-59).

8. Schelling may be thinking here of several writers: Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-79), *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (General theory of the fine arts and sciences) (1771-74, 1792-94); Johann Augustus Eberhard (1739-1809), *Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften &c* (Theory of the fine arts and sciences) (1783; 3rd ed., 1790) and *Handbuch der Ästhetik* (1803-5); Johann Joachim Eschenburg (1743-1820), *Entwurf einer Theorie und Literatur der schönen Wissenschaften* (Outline of a theory and literature of the science of the fine arts) (1783). In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, August Wilhelm Schlegel took a similarly strident attitude toward traditional aesthetics, and also avoided the word, suggesting instead *Kunstlehre* (doctrine of the arts) or *Poetik* (from the Greek root, meaning to make or create). He, too, was concerned with replacing the traditional views with a philosophical theory of art, which would determine the goal or essence of art (the "what"), whereas a technical theory of art would determine the means (the "how) to realize that goal. See Schlegel, *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, pp. 1-5.

9. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement* (1790). Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-62), professor of philosophy at Frankfurt an der Oder and a follower of Christian Wolff (1679-1754, the leading rationalist philosopher in the early years of the Enlightenment), is generally recognized as the founder of aesthetics as a systematic discipline and part of philosophy; he published the first two volumes of his *Aesthetica* between 1750 and 1758 (his death prevented the completion of the work). A. W. Schlegel similarly rejects the designation *aesthetics*, and wishes rather that we understand it

based on its etymology, as the study of sensory perception, and refers to Kant's use of the term in his "Transcendental Aesthetic."

10. This, of course, was what prompted Schelling to request a copy of Schlegel's *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*; see the Translator's Introduction.

11. Schelling again underscores the equal access both art and philosophy have to the ideas or archetypes; see the illuminating introduction to the archetypes and their relationship to the ideas given by Michael G. Vater in the introduction to his translation of *Bruno*.

12. For a different presentation of the potences or ideal determinations, see *System* of 1804, §54-§57.

13. That is, history insofar as it is determined by the activity of the spirit. Schelling often uses the terms *spirit* and *history* interchangeably when referring to philosophy from this perspective.

14. See the Appendix. In the edition of 1859 Schelling's son referred the reader to this passage, which is actually the beginning of the essay " Über das Verhältnis der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie Überhaupt," from the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*. Schelling's son was anxious to publish these lectures on the philosophy of art in part to prove Schelling's authorship of this and coauthorship of another essay ("Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik Überhaupt, und ihr Verhältnis zum gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophie insbesondere") in the *Kritisches Journal*, essays that had originally been attributed to Hegel and even published in his collected works. Schelling's son cites several other passages from this essay in support of his claim that parts of the *Philosophy of Art* actually serve as a running parallel and commentary to the essay in the *Kritisches Journal*. See *Sämmtliche Werke* I, V, p. VI.

15. In *Bruno* Schelling expressed this in yet another fashion, asserting that philosophy was esoteric, whereas art was exoteric (p. 231):

> But tell me what you think, should we not call every sort of cognition that displays ideas only in things, not in themselves, "exoteric"? And, on the other hand, should we not call those kinds of cognition that exhibit the archetypes of things in and for themselves "esoteric"?
>
> That seems quite appropriate to me.
>
> Then the artistic creator will never exhibit beauty in and for itself; he will depict beautiful things instead.
>
> So we have said.
>
> Then the mark of his artistry will not consist in the presence of the idea of beauty itself. It will instead be his ability to produce so many things that are possibly similar to beauty.
>
> Of course.
>
> Necessarily, then, his art is exoteric.
>
> That is obvious.
>
> But the philosopher strives to recognize truth and beauty in and for themselves, not the particular truth and the particular beauty.
>
> That is the case.
>
> He thus employs, but in an inward way, the same God-given faculty that the artist uses externally and unknowingly.

16. The discussion of this point is of fulcral significance in the essay *Bruno*, pp. 224ff., as well as in these lectures.

17. The problem of the derivation of finite content from the absolute plagued Schelling during the entire period of his philosophy of identity. It has been argued that dissatisfaction with his own treatment of the problem prompted him, ultimately, to abandon the philosophy of identity in this form and move on to a different treatment of metaphysical problems. See especially Alan White, *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom*, pp. 37ff., 76ff., and passim.

18. German: *Ideen oder Urbilder*. I have translated *Urbild* as *archetype* for several reasons. The first is that Schelling is very much a Platonist in his use of certain terminology, and in this instance is recalling the Platonic use of *idea* (which German renders as *Idee*), and *eidos*, which German renders in this context as *Idee* or *Urbild*. Etymologically, *archetype* closely approximates that meaning here. Schelling often uses the terms interchangeably, as this passage suggests, or in close proximity. The use of the term by C. G. Jung in depth psychology is somewhat removed from the Platonic (and here Schellingian) use, and the reader is advised against associating that usage too freely here. Furthermore, my translation of *Urbild* as *archetype* follows Michael Vater's translation of the term in *Bruno* (see bibliography); the reader can thus cross-reference the two works with a certain degree of confidence.

1. Construction of Art as such and in general

1. The philosophy to which Schelling refers here encompasses several pieces he worked on during this period, especially the *System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)*, *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (Exhibition of my system of philosophy) (1801), *Bruno; or, On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things* (1802), *Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie* (Further exhibitions from the system of philosophy) (1802), and *System der gesammten Philosophie und der Natur-philosophie insbesondere* (System of all philosophy and of the philosophy of nature in particular) (1804). He has extracted, abbreviated, reworked, and ordered anew those parts of his speculative philosophy that most adequately prepare his following philosophical construction of art, often lifting entire sentences or phrases directly from the speculative treatises. Since this first section—Construction of Art As Such and in General—is the most speculative in the philosophy of art, it accordingly borrows most heavily from those speculative works. The following section—the construction of the content of art (mythology)—borrows from the speculative philosophy most heavily during the initial sections, up to and including §29, and then strikes out in a new direction, namely, that leading into the construction of mythology and, subsequently, of the individual art forms themselves. The speculative philosophy is itself the conceptual framework for the entire subsequent construction, and indeed governs the progress of that construction, as Schelling will show. That same fundamental conceptual basis and delineation of the absolute as absolute identity governs the subsequent constructions within the philosophy of nature, spirit (transcendental idealism), and art. Schelling constantly reworked the speculative framework during this period, which accounts for the multiple speculative treatises compressed into such a short time span. Both the essay *Bruno* and the *System* of 1804 are particularly well represented in this section. Although the section on mythology is developed here only to the extent that it prepares the construction of art itself, Schelling later returned to mythology in the extensive lectures on the philosophy of mythology.

2. This passage, of course, suggests the proximity of Schelling and Hegel during this period of their careers; shortly after Schelling left Jena for Würzburg, Hegel—who remained in Jena—published the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

3. Although Schelling does not discuss further art and the recognition of beauty as a prerequisite for philosophy here, his friend and former classmate Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) had done so in his novel *Hyperion; or, The Hermit in Greece* (1797, 1799). In a discourse on the culture of ancient Greece, the protagonist discusses this relationship (p. 93):

> "The man," I resumed, "who has not at least once in his life felt full, pure beauty in himself, when the powers of his being merged like the colors in the rainbow, who has never felt the profound harmony that arises among all things only in hours of exaltation—that man will not even be a philosophical sceptic, his mind is not even capable of tearing down, let alone of building up. For, believe me, the sceptic finds contradiction and imperfection in all that is thought, because he knows the harmony of perfect beauty, which is never thought. The dry bread that human reason well-meaningly offers him, he disdains only because he is secretly feasting at the table of the gods."
>
> "Visionary!" cried Diotima [his companion]. "So that is why you, too, were a sceptic. But the Athenians!"

> "I am close upon them," I said. "The great saying, the εν διαφερον εαυτῳ (the one differentiated in itself) of Heraclitus, could be found only by a Greek, for it is the very being of Beauty, and before that was found there was no philosophy.
>
> "Now classification became possible, for the whole was there. The flower had ripened; now it could be dissected.
>
> "The moment of beauty was now well known to men, it was there in life and thought, the infinitely one existed.
>
> "It could be analyzed, taken apart in men's minds, it could be reconstituted from its components, and so the being of the highest and the best could be increasingly known, and the knowledge of it be set up as the law in all the multifarious realms of the spirit."

We will have occasion to cite the context of Hyperion's discourse on Athens yet again, since it contains points that are remarkably similar, often even in the choice of words, to many of those in Schelling's lectures. During much of the 1790s Schelling and Hölderlin discussed certain philosophical issues that ultimately would be pivotal in Schelling's own philosophy and understanding of aesthetics. Indeed, Hölderlin is even credited by many scholars as having provided Schelling with the understanding of the absolute that ultimately made the latter's philosophy of identity possible, of which these lectures on the philosophy of art are a part. For a thorough discussion see Manfred Frank, "Hölderlins Anregung," in *Eine Einführung in Schellings Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985). See also Fritz Marti's section entitled "Recent Work on Schelling's Beginnings" in F. W. J. Schelling, *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge. Four Early Essays (1794-1796)*, pp. 26-27. Mention should also be made of the so-called *Erstes Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus*, a short outline in Hegel's handwriting that is now generally conceded to be the product of Schelling under the auspice of Hölderlin's idea of beauty and dates as far back as perhaps 1795. In it, much is made of the kinship between ethics, aesthetics, philosophy, and religion, and the significant assertion is made that "we must have a new mythology; this mythology, however, must stand in the service of the ideas, it must be a mythology of reason." We will hear much of this again shortly in Schelling's discussion of mythology. The *Systemprogramm* has been published with annotations in Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Friedrich Beissner (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1961), vol. 4, pp. 297-99. Virtually all of Hölderlin's own theoretical writings—writings whose importance for the dialogue between Romantic and Idealist thinking can hardly be overestimated—are available in the English translation by Thomas Pfau, *Friedrich Hölderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987); the volume includes a critical introduction and notes.

4. This derivation of content from the absolute was of extreme importance to Schelling, particularly the manifestation of the ideas within real, concrete objects. He variously refers to such objects as "individual things," "concrete beauty," "beautiful things," "souls of individual things" (*Bruno*, pp. 227-34), or "concrete things" (*System* of 1804, §36).

5. See *Bruno*, pp. 228-34, for a discussion of this same relationship.

6. Throughout these lectures, Schelling will deliver constant invectives against *naturalism* and *formalism*.

7. Schelling alludes here to the well-known programmatic essay by Friedrich Schiller, *On Grace and Dignity* (1793). The essay is based on Kantian ethics and discusses the relationship between art and beauty on the one hand, and ethics on the other. A "beautiful soul" is an individual in whom the inclination to act ethically (according to ideals or principles) coincides with natural inclination, and in whom accordingly one senses no internal struggle between natural inclination and the sense of duty. This manifests itself externally as "grace," a balanced condition of internal harmony. On the other hand, dignity characterizes that individual who freely subdues personal inclination for the sake of acting according to ethical principles that are opposed to natural inclination.

8. "Art depicts man in his most perfect form. Nature—at least as much of it as is visible to our mortal eye—is like a fragmentary oracular utterance from the mouth of the Divinity. If one may speak so familiarly of such things, one might perhaps say that in a sense the world of nature or the entire universe is to God what a work of art is to man." Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder and Ludwig Tieck, *Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*, pp. 62-63.

9. This is not to be confused with absolute unity or identity, since these can be applied only to the absolute itself.

10. Schelling variously uses the German term *Stoff* to mean content, material, subject matter, or even matter. The field of meaning is wide and depends on the context.

2. Construction of the Content of Art

1. Once again Schelling is treating an aspect of the problem of the derivation of content from the absolute.

2. Schelling is referring, of course, to Plato.

3. "The first child of divine Beauty is art. . . . Beauty's second daughter is religion. Religion is love of Beauty. The wise man loves Beauty herself, eternal, all-embracing Beauty; the people love her children, the gods." Friedrich Hölderlin, *Hyperion; or, The Hermit in Greece*, p. 91.

4. In the *System* of 1804 Schelling asserts that "the genuinely real element in all things can only be the *idea* or the complete ideality of the universal and the particular" (§33). He continues later:

> The question whether the ideas themselves are subjective or objective is nonsensical, and is posed only by someone who remains completely within the realm of reflection, someone who knows the universal only as a phantom of thought, as a product of abstraction, and who in contrast knows the particular as *that which is real*, without considering that the particular arises just as much through abstraction from the essence and is to that extent just as much a phantom of thought as the universal. Logic in its usual meaning is that doctrine through which the purely universal is viewed in its opposition to the particular, that is, in its emptiness; this emptiness can then only have an equally empty particular as its counterpart, namely, the physically particular. This accounts for the misunderstanding of the Platonic doctrine of the ideas, which most historians of philosophy conceived sometimes as merely logical abstractions, sometimes as real, physically existing beings"(§33).

Invectives against empiricism will appear throughout the lectures, just as they do in August Wilhelm Schlegel's *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*; see especially I, pp. 58ff., and 90: "Let one not imagine that the infinite is a philosophical fiction and seek it beyond the world: it surrounds us everywhere, we can never escape it; we live, move, and exist in the infinite." "The unpoetic view of things considers that the perceptions of the senses and the determinations of the understanding have the last word" (p. 91).

5. Schelling is referring here to Moritz's treatise *Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtungen der Alten* (Doctrine of the gods or the mythological poetry of antiquity) (1791).

6. *Iliad* V, 424ff. Schelling cites the German verse translation of Homer by Johann Heinrich Voss (first published together with the *Odyssey* in 1793); see 4, Construction of the Forms of Art, note 132. For this passage I have cited from the translation by Samuel Butler (Roslyn, N.Y.: Walter J. Black, 1942), since it better reproduces the text Schelling actually cites. In other instances I have used the translation by Richmond Lattimore.

7. In his *Götterlehre oder mythologische Dichtungen der Alten* (1791), Moritz had suggested that "the poetical treatment of mythology must be viewed as a language of fantasy: taken as such, it constitutes what we may call a world in and for itself" (Moritz, *Schriften*, p. 195).

8. "[The gods are] higher powers that are elevated above all accountability. . . . These higher powers are in no way to be viewed as moral beings. . . . as such a presentation [they are] elevated above any concept of morality" (Moritz, *Schriften*, p. 197). "They [the gods in Homer] are neither moral nor immoral, just as little as is nature herself" (A. W. Schlegel, *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 338).

9. *Oedipus at Colonos*, vv. 607ff., trans. R. C. Jebb.

10. Schelling's son refers the reader here to Schelling's essay "Philosophie und Religion," *Sämmtliche Werke*, I, V, p. 61.

11. "Since the world of the ideas in Greek mythology actually coincides with the world of the senses, this means that the actual world of merely apparent reality—the world of shadows—is the realm of the dead, which thus relates to the world of the senses just as the latter, according to philosophy, relates to the world of the intellect" (footnote in edition of 1859).

12. Asclepius, in Greek myth the son of Apollo and god of medicine. The most famous seat of his cult was Epidaurus. Here patients coming to be cured slept in his temple, and the cure was effected in the night, or its means communicated by dreams.

13. Schelling's son refers the reader here to Schelling's later remarks in the *Philosophie der Mythologie*, vol. 1 (*Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie* [Introduction to the philosophy of mythology; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976]), pp. 241ff., and the *Philosophie der Offenbarung* (Philosophy of revelation; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), vol. 1, p. 429.

14. Kant's discussion of schematism is found in *The Critique of Pure Reason* in the chapter entitled "The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding."

15. Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729-1812), classical scholar and archaeologist, after 1763 professor at Göttingen. A prodigious writer, he was the first to attempt a scientific treatment of Greek mythology, and in 1802 published an edition of Homer's *Iliad*. Heyne's daughter was a childhood friend of Schelling's first wife, Caroline. August Wilhelm Schlegel similarly criticizes Heyne on this point (*Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 339).

16. Schelling's son refers the reader here to the second lecture in the *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*.

17. *La Henriade* (1723 as *La Ligue*, then 1728 under present title), an epic poem in ten cantos by Voltaire dealing with the siege of Paris by Henri III. Schelling will discuss the Italian poets Dante, Ariosto, and Tasso in the section on the verbal arts.

18. Schelling's own Kantian inclination toward triplicity is evident here. See the tables in the Translator's Introduction.

19. See note 5 above.

20. In 1786 Moritz had given up his teaching post to travel in Italy; there he met Goethe, with whom he had a great many discussions on art and its theoretical foundation. Moritz later visited Goethe in Weimar. For a study in English of this influential writer and thinker, see Mark Boulby, *Karl Philipp Moritz: At the Fringe of Genius* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1979).

21. Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824), professor at Halle and one of the founders of classical philology. In his *Prolegomena in Homerum* (1795), he suggested that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were not the work of a single author, but rather the collection of a number of orally transmitted poems unified at a later time. *Prolegomena to Homer*, trans. Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, and James E. G. Zetzel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).

22. Herodotus, *Histories*, book II, 53.

23. "For the modern generation, for Europe, this source [of poetry in history] resides in Greece, and for the Greeks and their poetry it was Homer and the old school of the Homerids. This was the inexhaustible source of the poetry which in every respect was capable of being formed, a mighty stream of representation in which waves of life rush against one another, a peaceful ocean where the fullness of the earth and the splendor of the heavens are amiably reflected." Friedrich Schlegel, "Epochs on Literature" in *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 60. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, August Wilhelm Schlegel similar calls poesy "the ocean into which everything flows back," and mentions that "the Greeks themselves frequently assert that mythology is the common root of poesy, history, and philosophy" (I, p. 342; see also pp. 262-63 and 344).

24. Greek for mind, spirit, reason, intellect. Anaxagoras of Ionia, born about 500 B.C., acquaintance of Pericles in Athens. Fragments of his *On Nature* have come down to us. According to Anaxagoras, the unlimited constituent parts of the universe are combined in bodies in changing proportions and are directed by spirit or intelligence, a supreme and independent force.

25. Schelling's son refers the reader here to the later treatment of the figure of Prometheus in the twenty-third lecture in the *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*. August Wilhelm Schlegel presents a similar view of ancient Greek tragedy and of the figure of Prometheus (*Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, pp. 347-48).

26. A scholarly controversy continues today concerning Friedrich Hölderlin's assertion about the fundamental cultural inclinations of the Greeks and of modernity. In a now-famous letter to his friend Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff (4 December 1801), who had sent Hölderlin an original drama to critique, Hölderlin writes:

> It sounds paradoxical, but I will assert it again and offer it to you for evaluation and use: the actual national or natural inclination will always become less dominant within the development of a culture. That is why the Greeks are less masters of holy pathos, since it was natural to them, or inborn, whereas they are excellent in the clarity of portrayal from Homer onward, since this extraordinary man possessed enough depth of soul to procure the Occidental *sobriety of Juno* for his Apollonian realm, and thus genuinely to acquire that alien quality for himself.
>
> The reverse is the case for us. That is why it is also so dangerous to abstract rules of art from Greek excellence alone.

Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Adolf Beck (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1954), vol. 6: *Briefe* (Letters), letter 236.

27. A footnote in the edition of 1859 refers here to Friedrich Schlegel's treatise on the *Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer* (History of the poesy of the Greeks and Romans) (1798), p. 24. Since his university days, Schlegel had undertaken an extensive study of classical literature, particularly of the Greeks, and had formulated a theory of the difference between classical and romantic poesy. He then turned his attention more and more to modern literature (from Dante to Shakespeare and Cervantes, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Ariosto, Guarini, and even the Portuguese poet Camoëns—all of whom Schelling will discuss in one context or another). The fruit of his previous studies, however, was the first volume of this *Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer* (although in 1800 he announced the publication of the second volume, it never appeared), a work with which he had hoped to become the "Winckelmann of Greek poesy."

28. Orphism, a mystic Greek cult connected with Orpheus. Musaeus was a legendary pre-Homeric poet alleged to have been a pupil of Orpheus, and a collection of oracles and poems connected with Orphism was attributed to him. Epimenides was a semilegendary prophet and poet of about the first half of the sixth century B.C.

29. Herodotus, *Histories*, book II, 53.

30. The original sacred writings of the Zoroastrians constitute the *Avesta*, written in Avestan, an old Iranian language related to Old Persian and Sanskrit; after centuries of oral transmission, they began to be written down probably no earlier than the second century B.C. and attained their final written form in the sixth century. The *Zend* books are actually a secondary set of writings composed when the older ones were no longer comprehensible. The first European translation was done by Anquetil du Perron in 1771.

31. The premier writer of the golden age of Sanskrit literature (fourth and fifth centuries B.C.) was the poet and dramatist Kalidasa; his dramatic masterpiece is the *Shakuntala*, the story of a king who falls in love with the daughter of a hermit, gives her his ring as a pledge, and then is reunited with her after losing his memory as the result of the curse of an angry sage. Goethe praised the work enthusiastically. A later poet (twelfth century) was Jayadeva, whose dramatic poem, the *Gita-Govinda* celebrates the loves of the youthful Krishna and the Gopis or milkmaids of Mathura.

32. After further study of Gothic architecture, as Schelling's son points out in his introduction to his edition of the *Philosophy of Art*, Schelling came to different conclusions.

33. Matthew 26:56 and elsewhere (Revised Standard Version).

34. Tacitus (ca. A.D. 55-117), Roman historian; of his major works, the *Histories* treat the reigns of the emperors from Galba to Domitian, and the *Annals* the earlier period from the accession of Tiberius to the death of Nero. His work *Germania* (A.D. 98) (to which Schelling will refer later) deals with the various (for the most part Germanic) tribes of the area east of the Rhine River and north of the Danube. Suetonius (ca. A.D. 70-160), Roman writer whose main works were the *Lives of the Caesars*, *De Grammaticis*, *De Rhetoribus*, and various biographies of poets.

Mention should be made here of Schelling's proximity to August Wilhelm Schlegel in both the preceding and following paragraphs. This entire discussion of the transition between the religions of antiquity and modernity recurs in Schlegel's *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, often verbatim, as well as, in principle, in Friedrich Schlegel's discussions on the difference between the literatures of antiquity and modernity. The discussion was of central importance to the early Romantic circle, particularly because they considered themselves to be actively advocating a new cultural and literary sensibility that took into account the different character of the two periods and fostered the development of a literature commensurate with the character of modernity.

35. What follows in brackets is material referenced by Schelling's son from the eighth lecture of *On University Studies* (1803), which his son considered to be an excerpt from the present lectures.

36. *Paradiso*, canto 33.

37. Schelling's friend Hölderlin held an astonishingly similar view of Christ as the final god of antiquity. In the poem "Bread and Wine," Hölderlin refers to the sacraments of bread and wine as a sign that Christ—and all the gods of antiquity—had been here and would return:

> For, when some time ago now—to us it seems ages—
> Up rose all those by whom life had been brightened, made glad,
> When the Father had turned his face from the sight of us mortals
> And all over the earth, rightly, they started to mourn,
> Lastly a Genius had come, dispensing heavenly comfort,
> He who proclaimed the Day's end, then himself went away,
> Then, as a token that once they had been down here and once more would
> Come, the heavenly choir left a few presents behind,
> Gifts in which now as ever humanly men might take pleasure,
> . . . . . .
> Therefore in tasting them we think of the Heavenly who once were
> Here and shall come again, come when their advent is due.

Christ himself, the "Genius" in this passage, is referred to in the same poem as the final god of antiquity, the one who closes the feast:

> Only, where are they? Where thrive those famed ones, the festival's garlands?
> . . . . . .
> Why no more does a god imprint on the brow of a mortal
> Struck, as by lightning, the mark, brand him, as once he would do?
> Else he would come himself, assuming a shape that was human,
> And, consoling the guests, crowned and concluded the feast.

Friedrich Hölderlin, *Poems and Fragments*, trans. Michael Hamburger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 249-51.

We, Hölderlin asserts, now live in the "night of the gods" and must await their return. Elsewhere Hölderlin invokes the gods of antiquity and calls Christ "the last one of your race" (in the poem "Der Einzige" [The only one]). Friedrich Hölderlin, *Hymns and Fragments*, trans. Richard Sieburth (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 85. See also the poem "Patmos" (ibid., p. 97):

> But when he [Christ] dies . . .
> and temples destroyed, when the honor
> Of the demigod and his disciples
> Is scattered to the winds and even
> the Almighty averts
> His face, leaving nothing
> Immortal to be seen in the sky
> Or on green earth, what is this?

38. What follows in brackets is material referenced by Schelling's son from the eighth lecture of *On University Studies* and from an essay in the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, "Über das Verhältnis der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie überhaupt." See Schelling's Introduction, note 14.

39. Friedrich Gottlob Klopstock (1724-1803), after becoming acquainted with Milton's *Paradise Lost* (1667), resolved to write a religious epic himself. Between 1748 and 1773 *Der Messias* appeared in twenty cantos. During his own lifetime Klopstock was eventually enormously popular and influential, and is generally acknowledged as having begun a new period in German poetry. He is especially remembered for his development of the language's poetic potential, and wrote various treatises on language.

40. Christoph Martin Wieland (1733-1813), prolific and popular German writer who began with religious writings and ended with more rationalistic and lightly erotic or sensuous works. After 1772 he lived in Weimar and also edited one of the leading German intellectual periodicals, *Der teutsche Merkur*.

41. Ludovico Ariosto (1474-1533), Italian poet and playwright, whose Romantic epic *Orlando Furioso* (1516), a continuation of the *Orlando innamorato* of Boiardo (1441-94), portrays the knight Orlando's pursuit of the beautiful Angelica in the romanticized world of the waning age of chivalry.

42. Calderón de la Barca (1600-81), the major dramatist of the golden age of Spanish literature. Schelling will later discuss his drama *La devoción de la cruz*, which had been recently translated by August Wilhelm Schlegel, for whom Calderón had virtually replaced Shakespeare at this time.

43. Schelling actually uses the term *Freidenkerei*, a term first used in 1697 by W. Molyneux to refer to the English Deists (*libres penseurs*, freethinkers). The term usually refers now to the system of natural religion that was first developed in England in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The classic exposition is J. Toland's *Christianity Is Not Mysterious* (1696), which argues against revelation and the supernatural altogether. The movement was widespread in Germany during the reign of Frederick II of Prussia.

44. Schelling slightly misquotes Klopstock here, apparently in order to imply the rest of the stanza; the ode is "Dem Erlöser" ("To the Redeemer"), and the first four lines actually read:

> The seraph stammers and Infinity
> Quakes in response through the circumference of its fields
> Thy high praise, oh Son! who am I,
> That I, too, force my way into the celebration?

45. Such analogies do, of course, sound somewhat farfetched to us today, and did so to many of Schelling's contemporaries as well. In many ways this kind of thinking was the weaker part of the philosophy of nature, and did indeed get out of control with some of Schelling's successors. Nonetheless, it is helpful to bear in mind that Schelling is making relational analogies in such instances, not material ones. That is, he is concerned with the relational features of the pairs, not those concerning actuality or phenomenal existence as such. In any case, Schelling was well aware of the effect such analogies had; when he returned August Wilhelm Schlegel's manuscript of the lecture series *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, which Schlegel was delivering in Berlin at the same time (letter of 1 November 1802), he warned Schlegel against making too much of such analogies in the lectures: "It is probably possible that my astronomical ideas appear crypto-astrological to the Berlin journalists, since these people can evaluate nothing in and for itself and possess no other standard for measurement besides historical relationships. But watch out! If you persist in using such—for Berlin highly risqué—ideas in your aesthetic lectures, they will start treating you like some public astrologer." *F. W. J. Schelling. Briefe und Dokumente*, ed. Horst Fuhrmanns, vol. 2 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1973), p. 468.

For a discussion of the heavenly bodies in *Bruno*, see Michael Vater's introduction to his translation of that work.

46. Schelling's discussion on the next few pages parallels Friedrich Schlegel's "Talk on Mythology," which constitutes part of Schlegel's famous and influential *Dialogue on Poetry* (in *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 81):

> You above all others must know what I mean. You yourselves have written poetry, and while doing so you must often have felt the absence of a firm basis for your activity, a matrix, a sky, a living atmosphere. The modern poet must create all these things from within himself, and many have done it splendidly; up to now, however, each poet separately and each work from its very beginning, like a new creation out of nothing.
>
> I will go right to the point. Our poetry, I maintain, lacks a focal point, such as mythology was for the ancients; and one could summarize all the essentials in which modern poetry is inferior to the ancient in these words: We have no mythology. But, I add, we are close to obtaining one or, rather, it is time that we earnestly work together to create one.

Virtually the same assertion is made in the *Ältestes Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus*; see 1, Construction of Art As Such and in General, note 3.

47. "You have set a worthy prototype. Certainly Dante is the only one who, altogether alone, under certain favorable and innumerable adverse circumstances, through his own gigantic power, invented and formed a kind of mythology as was possible at the time." Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 92.

48. In his "Talk on Mythology," Schlegel mentions Shakespeare and Cervantes in the same context as does Schelling here. Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 86.

49. Between 1773 and 1775 Goethe had written but not published what is now known as the *Urfaust*; it is a considerably shorter rendering of what is now *Faust, Part 1*, and was not discovered until 1886 by Erich Schmidt. In 1790, however, Goethe did publish the Faust *Fragment*, which differs from the present *Faust, Part 1* only in minor additions. In 1800 he published the *Helena* fragment from what would later become *Faust, Part 2*. Hence, Schelling is basing his criticism of the work on the *Fragment* of 1790 and the *Helena* fragment of 1800, though he will cite only from the *Fragment* itself.

50. Speculative physics is not to be confused with empirical physics, by which Schelling understood the science of physics in its empirical investigations and applications (much as we understand it today). Speculative or higher physics is another designation for the philosophy of nature, whose task it is to disclose the *ideas* behind natural phenomena and the relations obtaining between the world of natural phenomena and the absolute. Schelling delineates this more fully in his *Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, Oder über den Begriff der speculativen Physik und die innere Organisation eines Systems dieser Wissenschaft* (Introduction to the first outline of a system of the philosophy of nature, or on the concept of speculative physics and the inner organization of a system of this science) (1799).

Schelling may well be alluding here to Friedrich Schlegel's "Talk on Mythology." There Schlegel had asserted that "if a new mythology can emerge only from the innermost depths of the spirit and develop only from itself, then we find a very significant hint and a noteworthy confirmation of what we are searching for in that great phenomenon of our age, in idealism" (*Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 82). He is speaking here of the post-Kantian philosophy of Fichte's *Theory of Science* (which in an aphorism he called, along with the French Revolution and Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meister*, one of the three "tendencies of the age") and its parallel development in Schelling's own philosophy of nature (physics in the sense just discussed). "Idealism in any form must transcend itself in one way or another," Schlegel continues, "in order to be able to return to itself and remain what it is. Therefore, there must and will arise from the matrix of idealism a new and equally infinite realism, and idealism will not only by analogy of its genesis be an example of the new mythology, but it will indirectly become its very source. Traces of a similar tendency you can now observe almost

everywhere, especially in physics where nothing is more needed than a mythological view of nature" (pp. 83-84). "I cannot conclude without urging once more the study of physics, from whose dynamic paradoxes the most sacred revelations of nature are now bursting forth in all directions" (p. 88). That Schlegel, too, is thinking of physics as speculative physics in the Schellingian sense, is shown by the assertion that "it is in fact wonderful how physics—as soon as it is concerned not with technical purposes but with general results—without knowing it gets into cosmogony, astrology, theosophy, or whatever you wish to call it, in short, into a mystic discipline of the whole" (p. 90). It must be pointed out, however, that Schelling, like August Wilhelm Schlegel, was somewhat averse to the more mystic and rhapsodic pronouncements of Friedrich Schlegel, though in his own lecture series *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, August Wilhelm Schlegel also mentions the newer physics as a source of mythology, though he also suggests that "I am not asserting too much if I say that the doctrines of the newest physics could be clothed in the old mythical images" (I, p. 345; see also p. 355).

51. "In general, one must be able to press toward the goal [of a new mythology] by more than one way. Let each pursue his own in joyful confidence, in the most individual manner; for nowhere has the right of individuality more validity—provided individuality is what this word defines: indivisible unity and an inner and vital coherence—than here where the sublime is at issue. From this standpoint I would not hesitate to say that the true value, indeed the virtue of man is his originality" (Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 87).

52. Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), English physician, philosopher, poet, and grandfather of the naturalist Charles Darwin. Known for his unorthodox but successful methods of treating illness, he also became the center of a circle of inventors and philosophers called the Lunar Society because of their habit of meeting at each full moon. He was interested in botany as well, and cultivated a garden visited by people from all over England. Schelling is referring to his poem "The Botanic Garden," which was immensely popular when its two parts appeared in 1789 and 1791, though it is generally held in low esteem today.

53. "Actually, every work should be a new revelation of nature. Only by being individual and universal does a work become *the work*. Only in this way does it differ from studies" (Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 92).

54. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), also a member of the early Romantic school and a contributor to the Schlegels' periodical *Athenaeum*, wrote the following about the nature of religion: "The universe is a condition of continual activity and reveals itself to us at every moment. Every form it generates, every being to which it gives a particularized existence according to the fullness of life, every event it disperses from within its own rich and perpetually fertile womb is an activity affecting us; and thus to take every individual thing as a part of the whole, and every limited feature as a representation of the infinite—that is religion." *Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern* (On religion. Speeches to its cultured despisers) (1799) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1970), p. 32.

55. "Why won't you arise and revive those splendid forms of great antiquity? Try for once to see the old mythology, steeped in Spinoza [i.e., in the speculative and monistic philosophy of the type Spinoza produced] and in those views which present-day physics must excite in every thinking person, and everything will appear to you in new splendor and vitality" (Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 86). For a discussion of the significance of Spinoza to Schelling's whole philosophical enterprise virtually from its inception, see Alan White, *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom*, particularly the initial chapters, and Thomas McFarland, *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969).

56. "In the ancients, one sees the accomplished letter of entire poetry; in the moderns, one has the presentiment of the spirit in becoming." Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 130, aphorism 93. "We may find later that what we now view as the opposite pole [of the poesy of antiquity] is merely a transition, a becoming (a characteristic that in all probability can indeed be shown to obtain in romantic poesy), and that only the future will actually deliver that whole

which corresponds and contrasts to the poesy of antiquity'' (A. W. Schlegel, *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, pp. 22-23).

57. Schelling writes *Homeros* instead of *Homer* both here and in the final paragraph of this section, where he will refer to the play on words possible in Homer's name. In §58 he even cites the Greek itself.

58. Schelling may be thinking of the following passage (Joshua 10:13-14): ''Is this not written in the Book of Jashar? The sun stayed in the midst of heaven, and did not hasten to go down for about a whole day. There has been no day like it before or since, when the LORD hearkened to the voice of a man; for the LORD fought for Israel'' (Revised Standard Version).

59. Schelling's son refers the reader here to the essay '' Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik überhaupt'' (On the nature of philosophical criticism as such) in the *Kritisches Journal*, I, 1, p. XI. See Schelling's Introduction, note 14.

3. Construction of the Particular, or of the Form of Art

1. In the essay *Bruno* Schelling had discussed this in more detail:

> But is the beautiful artwork created through the eternal, considered in itself, or through the eternal insofar as it directly pertains to the creative individual?
>
> The latter.
>
> But how do you think the eternal is related to this individual?
>
> Right now, I cannot comprehend it.
>
> Did we not say that all things subsist in God solely through their eternal concepts?
>
> Certainly.
>
> So the eternal is related to all things through their eternal concepts.
>
> Hence it is related to the creative individual through the concept of that individual. This concept subsists in God, though it is one with the individual's soul, just the way his soul is with his body.
>
> Then we will consider the eternal concept of the individual to be the creator of the artwork that displays supreme beauty.

Much of the following discussion (through §69)—on the beautiful and the sublime, on the naïve and sentimental, and on style and mannerism—is predicated on the thought of Schiller and Goethe.

2. Schelling's son refers the reader here to Schelling's remarks in the *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie* (1856; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), p. 242.

3. This is not quite an accurate rendering of Schiller's actual passage in the essay *On the Sublime*: ''The sublime object is of a dual sort. We refer it either to our *power of apprehension* and are defeated in the attempt to form an image of its concept; or we refer it to our *vital power* and view it as a power against which our own dwindles to nothing.'' Friedrich Schiller, *On the Sublime*, trans. Julius A. Elias (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966), p. 198. In his account of a visit to the Dresden Art Gallery (*Athenaeum* II, 1), August Wilhelm Schlegel had put this imagery into the mouth of the participants; while discussing the problem of rendering the wide horizon in a painting, a high mountain range, or the limitless ocean, the participants discuss the effect of such phenomena. ''Directly beneath threatening, overhanging cliffs, we admittedly do have the standard for our own smallness right at hand.'' ''You are right,'' responds Louise. ''It's frightful and unnerving that the world is so great. In the evening, when I see the starry heavens and consider the incomparable distances, I feel like a person in a tiny boat floating in the middle of the wide ocean'' (pp. 54-55).

4. Schiller, *On the Sublime*, pp. 203-4. Schelling, as in the previous quote, does not cite Schiller accurately; I have given an accurate rendering in the text.

5. Schiller, ibid., p. 204.

6. Schelling's son refers the reader here to Schelling's remarks ''formlessness = absolute (highest) form'' in the introduction to the *Kritisches Journal* ''Ueber das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik überhaupt,'' p. IX. See Schelling's Introduction, note 14.

7. Schiller, *On the Sublime*, p. 207; again, Schelling does not cite accurately, though I have given the correct quote here.

8. Schiller, ibid., pp. 207-8.

9. Goethe had brought a cast of the Juno Ludovisi back from his journey to Italy, and Schelling doubtlessly saw it in Goethe's house on the Frauenplan in Weimar, where it still stands today (in the so-called Juno Room).

10. Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-68), former schoolmaster and librarian who became perhaps the premier writer on the art of antiquity in Germany during the latter half of the eighteenth century, during which time he traveled in Italy. With the exception of his *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst* (Thoughts on the imitation of Greek works in painting and sculpture) (1755), he wrote most of his influential works while living in Rome. His most famous is perhaps the *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (History of the art of antiquity (1764). He was enormously influential in forming the European understanding of classical antiquity as elevated, serene simplicity and nobility. (Schelling will refer to these qualities and cite Winckelmann accordingly; Nietzsche was later to take issue with this view in his first publication, *On the Birth of Tragedy*.) Schelling draws heavily from Winckelmann's writings, often verbatim and without referencing. Schelling's attraction to Winckelmann's views was doubtlessly strengthened by Winckelmann's own assertion in the preface to his *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* that the ''essence of art,'' not the ''mere presentation of temporal sequence and of changes'' in art history, constitutes the true history of art. He, too, lamented that virtually no writer of histories of art really penetrates or guides us into ''the essence and interior of art.'' Furthermore, Schelling was at one with Winckelmann's own assertion that nature and even the most beautiful natural phenomena are seldom without defects (*Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, pp. 165ff., 188ff.). In his later lecture *Concerning the Relationship of the Plastic Arts to Nature*, Schelling praised Winckelmann even more profusely than in the present lectures. A collection of Winckelmann's writings on art in English can be found in *Winckelmann. Writings on Art*, trans. David Irwin (London: Phaidon Press Limited, 1972). The German edition cited is a more extensive anthology. Both volumes contain photographs or reproductions of many of the main works Winckelmann (and Schelling here) discusses.

11. Schelling cites—or rather, paraphrases—here quite loosely; I have given the original citation in the notes.

12. ''However, this kind of interest in nature can take place only under two conditions. First, it is absolutely necessary that the object which inspires it should be *nature* or at least be taken by us as such; second, that it be *naive* (in the broadest meaning of the word), i.e., that nature stand in contrast to art and put it to shame. As soon as the latter is joined with the former, not before, nature becomes naive.'' Schiller, *On the Sublime*, pp. 83-84.

13. ''The poet, I said, either *is* nature or he will *seek* her. The former is the naive, the latter the sentimental poet.'' Ibid., p. 110.

14. ''The feeling of which we here speak is therefore not that which the ancients possessed; it is rather identical with that which *we have for the ancients*. They felt naturally; we feel the natural.'' Ibid., p. 105.

15. Schiller, ibid., pp. 111-12:

> Once man has passed into the state of civilization and art has laid her hand upon him, that *sensuous* harmony in him is withdrawn, and he can now express himself only as a *moral* unity, i.e., as striving after unity. The correspondence between his feeling and thought which in his first condition *actually* took place, exists now only *ideally*; it is no longer within him, but outside of him, as an idea still to be realized, no longer as a fact in his life. If one now applies the notion of poetry, which is nothing but *giving mankind its most complete possible expression*, to both conditions, the result in the earlier state of natural simplicity is the completest possible *imitation of actuality*—at that stage man still functions with all his powers simultaneously as a harmonious unity and hence the whole of his nature is expressed completely in actuality. Whereas now, in the state of civilization

where that harmonious cooperation of his whole nature is only an idea, it is the elevation of actuality to the ideal or, amounting to the same thing, the *representation of the ideal*, that makes for the poet. And these two are likewise the only possible modes in which poetic genius can express itself at all.

16. In his lecture series *Schöne Literatur und Kunst* (I, 104ff.), August Wilhelm Schlegel also discusses the "extremely important concepts of mannerism and style" at length. The background for the discussions of both Schelling and Schlegel is Goethe's important essay "Einfache Nachahmung der Natur, Manier, Stil" (Simple imitation of nature, mannerism, style), which was first published in 1789 in Wieland's *Teutscher Merkur*. Goethe himself was influenced by Karl Philipp Moritz's essay "Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen" (On the formative imitation of the beautiful) (Braunschweig: 1788), which had grown out of the discussions Moritz and Goethe had had in Italy.

17. Schelling, too, hyphenates in the German (*in-eins-bilde*), though the second hyphen is ambiguous, since it occurs at the end of the line and may simply indicate a normal break.

18. Moritz had written a piece on Michelangelo in which one of the subheadings was entitled "Mannerism and Style." See Moritz, *Schriften*, pp. 218ff.

19. Antonio Allegri da Correggio, Italian painter (1489-1534), particularly admired for his understanding of light and chiaroscuro.

20. The passage to which Schelling is here referring is found in the "Abhandlung von der Fähigkeit der Empfindung des Schönen in der Kunst und dem Unterrichte in derselben" (Treatise on the capacity for perceiving the beautiful in art and on the instruction of such capacity); *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 160. A. W. Schlegel cites the same passage and makes the same point in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 107.

21. Elsewhere, Schelling refers to the transition between the absolute and concrete, phenomenal reality (the derivation of finite content from the absolute) as an "outflowing" (*Ausfluss*), "emanation" (*emanieren*), "transition" (*Übergang*), "flowing" or "gushing up" (*hervorquellen*), "self-bearing" (*selbstgebieren*), "flowing" (*fliessen*), and—one of his favorites—"issuing" in the sense of "following from" (*folgen, Folge*). In *Bruno*, Schelling similarly discusses this transition into "individual, real things . . . [or] bodies." Cf. *Bruno*, pp. 227-34, and 1, Construction of Art As Such and in General, note 4. The terminology he employs particularly in the former cases indicates both his proximity to Neoplatonic thought and the difficulty he had in specifying this activity.

22. See Joseph L. Esposito, *Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 88ff.

23. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), in *Über den Ursprung der Sprache* (On the origin of language) (1772), asserted that language arises with conscious thought. Cf. also August Wilhelm Schlegel, *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, pp. 270ff., especially pp. 272ff.; Schlegel was particularly interested in the origin of language, and also considered it bound to the development of reason in human beings: "for without languages men do not exist . . . at all as men."

24. Kant discusses this in the second book of his *Critique of Judgement*, the "Analytic of the Sublime," §51-§53 ("The division of the fine arts," "The combination of the fine arts in one and the same product," and "Comparative estimate of the aesthetic worth of the fine arts." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964).

25. Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-79), a Swiss writer who studied under the Swiss critics Bodmer and Breitinger and ultimately held a post at the Berlin Academy. His *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (General theory of the fine arts and sciences) (1771-74, with posthumous supplements 1792-94) was an attempt to systematize the views of Bodmer and Breitinger. The latter had published a series of aesthetic writings asserting that the imagination was not necessarily a result of inspiration, but more a faculty for the combination of perceptions. A. W. Schlegel mentions Sulzer as a follower of Baumgarten and criticizes him for his view of the arts as a means of education, and for his assertion that the purpose of art is to guide us to the true and good (moral goals) by means of sensual impressions (*Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 58).

Briefly, Schlegel derives his own system of the arts from the theory of sensual perception (aesthetics). Space, simultaneity, the sense of sight, and optics determine the formative arts as the plastic arts (which depict forms by means of themselves) and painting (which depicts forms by means of color and lighting); time, succession, the sense of hearing, and acoustics determine the formative arts as music. That which synthesizes the two is poesy, which uses signs we can hear to represent external objects we normally can see, though through rhythm and sound poesy is most akin to music *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, pp. 112ff.).

The reference to a "concert of taste" Schelling makes here is also used by Schlegel ("a tasty meal is actually a concert, a symphony of good tastes"; ibid., p. 32).

4. Construction of the Forms of Art in the Juxtaposition of the Real and Ideal Series

The Real Side of the World of Art; or, Formative Art

1. This subtitle does not appear in Schelling's text itself, though it does appear in the son's table of contents. I have inserted it into the text at this point, just as I have its counterpart later—The Ideal Side of the World of Art; or, The Verbal Arts—for the sake of structural clarity.

2. See Joseph L. Esposito, *Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 88ff. In the following discussion of music, Schelling postulates a different series of unities in music than does August Wilhelm Schlegel. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst* (I, p. 240), Schlegel views the three parts of music as rhythm, modulation (highness or lowness of tones), and harmony, whereby rhythm and modulation together constitute melody. Schelling's series is rhythm, modulation, and melody, whereby melody is the subordination of the three unities under the first (rhythm), harmony the subordination under the second.

3. Source in Leibniz uncertain. Leibniz mentions music often. In his *Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason* (1714) he had written: "Music charms us, although its beauty consists only in the agreement of numbers and in the counting, which we do not perceive but which the soul nevertheless continues to carry, of the beats or vibrations of sounding bodies which coincide at certain intervals." In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 2nd ed.; trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel, 1976), vol. 2, p. 641.

4. Franz Joseph Haydn, *Die Schöpfung* (The creation) (1797-98).

5. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Dictionnaire de Musique* (1768).

6. One must recall here that Schelling's understanding of the absolute involves logical and relational rather than material properties, and that the characteristics of that absolute "flow out," as he puts it, into the phenomenal world and manifest themselves there (as relational properties).

7. Schelling may be thinking here of relationships akin to those inhering within sheet music: the relations disclosed by sheet music are in a manner of speaking already music, though they neither demonstrate nor *cause* sound. In his own lecture series *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, August Wilhelm Schlegel discusses the music of the spheres as well, but does not quite know what to make of it; after a rather weak discussion, he then continues with "Be that as it may . . ." (I, pp. 253-54).

8. The reference is probably to Eryximachus's speech in the *Symposium*. Here Schelling indicates more clearly than in many other passages that he is concerned with relations rather than with music in its manifestation as actual perceivable sound.

9. Again, Schelling is concerned here with logical, relational, and even mathematical properties rather than material ones, whereby these analogies seem less farfetched than at first glance.

10. Schelling also uses the analogy of centrifugal and centripetal in "Philosophie und Religion" (*Sämmtliche Werke*, VI, p. 57), whence apparently Samuel Coleridge also acquired it. Cf. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria; or, Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions*, in *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, vol. 7, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), I, p. 286. Cf. also Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue*

on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms (p. 152, aphorism 31): "Religion is the centripetal and centrifugal force within the human mind and that which combines both." Schelling will use the same analogy later in his discussion of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (an analogy he already makes in "Philosophie und Religion").

11. This understanding of the absolute's journey toward self-recognition or self-consciousness clearly anticipates Hegel's views not only in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (composed just after Schelling left Jena for Würzburg and thus during the period Schelling was actually delivering these lectures on the philosophy of art), but also in Hegel's *Aesthetics*.

12. This discussion is predicated on Schelling's speculative philosophy of nature. See Joseph L. Esposito, *Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 80ff, especially pp. 88ff.

13. Goethe had been instrumental in Schelling's appointment to a chair of philosophy in Jena in 1798, was drawn to Schelling's views of nature, and had found Schelling quite personable. During Schelling's stay in Jena they met frequently, performing optical experiments as part of Goethe's development of his theory of colors, and discussing such topics as the refraction of light, Schelling's own philosophy of nature, and empiricism (of which both were suspicious). Indeed, so great was the mutual understanding that Goethe considered entrusting to Schelling the composition of a great epic poem on nature. Goethe was intensely interested in the scientific developments of the age, and published several works himself. His *Metamorphosis of Plants* (1790; also, significantly, the title of a poem) and *Contributions to Optics* (1791) appeared well before the *Theory of Colors* (1810). Indeed, Goethe once estimated his scientific achievements above his poetic ones. Concerning particularly Goethe's anti-Newtonian, amathematical (as opposed to antimathematical) physics in the spirit of Schelling's own philosophy of nature, and derivatively, of these lectures on art, see Erich Heller's essay, "Goethe and the Idea of Scientific truth," in *The Disinherited Mind*, 3rd ed. (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1971), pp. 3-34 (see also Schelling's Introduction, note 4). Schelling himself constantly delivers invectives against empiricism—which counts only the empirically real as real—as opposed to speculative physics—which counts only the ideal as real.

14. In the 1859 edition of the *Philosophy of Art* the subheading "b" was mistakenly omitted here.

15. See Esposito, *Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of Nature*, pp. 88ff.

16. See Esposito, ibid., pp. 95-97. The particular configuration A^2 and A = B refers to the limiting interaction between the ideal and real principles, whereby the ideal is represented by A^2, the real by A = B. This is worked out in detail in *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (Exhibition of my system of philosophy) (1801), §58ff.

17. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst* (I, pp. 96ff.), August Wilhelm Schlegel makes the same distinction between naturalism and artificiality, and discusses deception in terms of the misunderstood concept of imitation of nature. The artist should study nature, he asserts, and not merely the totality of things, but rather things to the extent they reveal *universal* natural laws (pp. 100-101). Schlegel, too, subdivides painting into drawing, chiaroscuro, and coloring (ibid., p. 184).

18. Friedrich Schlegel had discussed this briefly in the article "Nachrichten von den Gemählden in Paris" (News of the paintings in Paris) in the first volume of his periodical *Europa. Eine Zeitschrift*. Reprint ed. Ernst Behler (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), vol. 1, p. 125.

19. It is not clear here whether these are parenthetical remarks Schelling entered as a reminder to himself, or deletions and abbreviations made by his son.

20. Again, this refers to merely naturalistic truth, though in what follows Schelling will specify more clearly than before what he considers genuine truth to be. See note 17 above, and *Bruno*, pp. 122-23.

21. *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 57.

22. Apelles, born at Colophon in Ionia in the first half of the fourth century B.C., considered by many to have been the greatest painter of antiquity, also wrote technical treatises on painting, though none of his works has survived, and we are dependent primarily on anecdotes about him. August Wilhelm Schlegel makes a similar point using the same example in his *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 134. Schlegel also makes the same point Schelling makes at the end of this paragraph, namely, that an exact copy of an object (e.g., an insect) does not constitute painting as a fine art; it is more valuable to a natural scientist, who seeks to know things as they really are, and not as they appear (ibid., p. 200).

23. That is, the real as opposed to the ideal form within the thoroughgoing triplicity characterizing Schelling's system of the arts; see the tables in the Translator's Introduction.

24. It is unclear whether these are parenthetical notes Schelling wrote to himself or abbreviations of deletions made by his son.

25. Benvenuto Cellini (1500-71), Florentine goldsmith, metalworker, and sculptor. He left behind the manuscript of his autobiography, though its racy content prevented its publication until 1728. In 1771 an English edition appeared, and Goethe's translation into German appeared in 1796/97 in the *Horen* (a periodical edited by Schiller). Goethe later reworked it and published it again in 1803.

26. Michelangelo, *The Last Judgment* (1536-41; Sistine Chapel).

27. That is, the ideal as opposed to the real form. See note 23 above.

28. The painting is *La Notte* (also known as *Adoration of the Shepherds* or *Holy Night*), a nativity by Correggio that had been sold to August III of Saxony for the Dresden Gallery in 1746. A. W. Schlegel makes the same point using the same example in his *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 192. For reproductions of paintings from the Dresden Gallery, see Hans Posse, *Die Gemäldegalerie zu Dresden*, 2 vols. (Berlin, Dresden: 1920, 1921), and especially Hans Posse, *Die Staatliche Gemäldegalerie zu Dresden. Vollständiges beschreibendes Verzeichnis der älteren Gemälde*, part 1, "Die romantischen Länder. Italien, Spanien, Frankreich und Russland" (Dresden, Berlin: Baensch Stiftung, Bard Verlag, 1929).

29. Wackenroder and Tieck had spoken of "the magical lighting effects of Correggio" (*Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*, p. 55). J. D. Fiorillo, in *Geschichte der zeichnenden Künste* (History of the drawing arts) (Göttingen: 1798), vol. 2, p. 315, asserts that Correggio was "unsurpassable in his understanding of chiaroscuro" (Schelling owned the first two volumes of this work). Fiorillo (1748-1821), painter and art historian, later professor of art history in Göttingen.

30. Anton Raffael Mengs (1728-79), son of a court painter of Dresden, brought up to be a painter on the models of Correggio, Raphael, and antiquity. He went to Rome in 1741, met Winckelmann (of whom he also did a portrait) in 1755, and was influenced by the latter's theories. Winckelmann dedicated his own *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (History of the art of antiquity) (1764) to Mengs. Mengs wrote a treatise on beauty in painting in 1762, *Gedanken über die Schönheit und den Geschmack in der Malerei* (Thoughts on beauty and taste in painting), which was plagiarized by Daniel Webb as the *Inquiry into the Beauties of Painting* (1762). His best-known work is the *Parnassus* (1761) in the Villa Albani, Rome. As was Winckelmann, Schelling was doubtlessly attracted to Meng's assertion that art should surpass the beauty of nature, since perfect beauty is never found in nature. There was, however, considerable opposition to this understanding of idealized beauty, particularly from J. D. Fiorillo, who asserted that Mengs and Winckelmann caused the outbreak, "primarily among the alleged connoisseurs of art in Germany, of a plague which one might call the Ideal-epidemic" (*Geschichte der zeichnenden Künste*, vol. 1, p. 235). Friedrich Schlegel, too, in his periodical *Europa* I, 2, felt Mengs misunderstood Raphael by asserting that ideal beauty characterized Raphael's paintings (though Mengs otherwise praised Raphael as the apex of painting; see note 33 below).

31. Parrhasius, Greek painter of the later fifth century B.C., chief representative of the Ionic school, known for his strong rendering of emotion. For Apelles, see note 22 above.

Schelling draws the comparisons of different stylistic periods in this paragraph from Winckelmann's discussion of the four stylistic periods of Greek art, periods Winckelmann himself then

applies to modern stylistic periods in painting. Winckelmann discusses these periods in "Von dem Wachstume und dem Falle der griechischen Kunst, in welcher vier Zeiten und vier Stile können gesetzt werden" (On the growth and decline of Greek art, in which four periods and four styles can be postulated), in *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (*Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, pp. 249ff.). The oldest period was emphatic, hard, powerful, and without grace. This was followed by the grand and high style, characterized by sublimity and angular features; its highest achievement was the Niobe group. The third, beautiful style was characterized by flowing features and grace. The fourth, that of decline, was characterized by imitation.

32. Schelling cites much of Winckelmann's passage verbatim; see *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 259. Albius Tibullus (ca. 60-19 B.C.), Roman elegiac poet. Lucretius Carus (ca. 99-55 B.C.), Roman philosophical poet. Quintus Horace (65-8 B.C.), Roman writer of epodes, satires, odes, epistles, and the famous *Ars Poetica*. Pindar (518-438 B.C.), Greek lyric poet; the "Pindaric rhythm" had attracted the attention of Schelling's friend Hölderlin, who translated many of Pindar's works in an effort to consolidate his own understanding of the stricter form of Greek poetry. Schelling will mention Tibullus and Lucretius again later.

33. This high appraisal of Raphael is not without precedent among the Romantics. In the *Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*, Wackenroder and Tieck continually cite Raphael as "the divine" (p. 18) and as "a man whose excellence surpasses all my comprehension" (p. 19); August Wilhelm Schlegel refers to Raphael's "holy name" ("Die Gemählde: Ein Gespräch," in *Athenaeum* II, 1, p. 125). Fiorillo, in his *Geschichte der zeichnenden Künste*, similarly praises Raphael as one above whom "perhaps no mortal will ever elevate himself" (vol. 1, p. 120), and Winckelmann considers him to be the master of the high style of beauty (*Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, pp. 261, 278).

34. Il Perugino, born Pietro Vannucci (ca. 1446-1523), Italian painter, perhaps the most significant member of the Umbrian school, painted frescoes at the Sistine Chapel (with, among others, Botticelli) and worked in 1500 with Raphael. He established his reputation with his painting *Christ Delivering the Keys to Saint Peter*. A later favorite of the Pre-Raphaelites in the nineteenth century. There is some question concerning the identity of at least one painting in the Dresden Gallery which was originally (1754) attributed to Perugino, *The Adoration of the Magi*; it later proved to be by Francia (Francesco Raibolini). August Wilhelm Schlegel discusses the painting as one by Perugino, in "Die Gemählde: Ein Gespräch."

35. A footnote in the edition of 1859 refers the reader to Goethe's translation of "Diderot's Essay on Painting" (1799) in the *Propyläen*, a periodical founded by Goethe in 1798 as a means of advancing his classical views concerning art in the face of such writers as Wackenroder and Tieck in their *Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*. Schelling is very often on the side of Goethe in such matters. The passages to which Schelling is referring are found in Goethe's translation of and annotations to Diderot's "The Color of Flesh." *Propyläen*, pp. 378-84.

36. Moritz had done a short piece called "Geheimniss der Farben selber" (Titian: the secret of colors) in his work *Reisen eines Deutschen in Italien* (Travels of a German in Italy), part III (1793).

37. The passage is in *Faust, Part I*, lines 2691ff. *Faust. A Tragedy*, trans. Walter Arndt, ed. Cyrus Hamlin (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976):

> How all here breathes a sense of stillness,
> Of order and of calm content!
> Within this penury, what fullness!
> What bliss in this imprisonment! . . .
> I sense, dear girl, your very spirit
> Of plenitude and order all about,
> Benignly counseling domestic merit,
> Seeing the tablecloth all tidily spread out,
> Even the sanded floor in patterns fine.

38. Ossian, a legendary Gaelic warrior in the *Fragments of Ancient Poetry Collected in the Highlands of Scotland* (1760), *Fingal* (1762), and *Temora* (1763). Although James Macpherson (1736-96) claimed to have translated the poetry, it was actually his own composition. A German translation appeared in 1768-69 and was received enthusiastically by many German writers, including Goethe, Herder, and the following generation.

39. Pliny the Elder (A.D. 23/24-79); *Naturalis Historia* IV, 2. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 215, A. W. Schlegel cites the same passage. See also the following note.

40. Cf. Schlegel, *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 214:

> Indeed, the way portraits are sought and executed in common life . . . they are pure naturalism. . . . A genuinely artistic portrait can be executed only if the physiognomy of a person is understood and, as it were, reconstructed from the inside out in its identity, such that both the intentions of nature and that which the individual has freely made of himself is presented.

41. Hans Holbein the Younger (1497-1543). The painting is *The Meyer Madonna* (also called *The Darmstadt Madonna*), now in the Darmstadt Schlossmuseum. A. W. Schlegel discusses it in his article "Die Gemählde: Ein Gespräch," in *Athenaeum* II, 1, pp. 69ff.

42. In the fictional dialogue (*Athenaeum* II, 1, p. 69), August Wilhelm Schlegel introduced his description of the Holbein painting with the following words: "That better time" [*die gute alte Zeit*, literally "the good old time," the same words Schelling uses in this passage], "when a family portrait might still be a monument of piety, not of vanity." The friend's reaction to the actual description was then: "The recollection of the time when we were on the way to acquiring a genuine indigenous art—if unfavorable circumstances and the addiction to foreign cultures had not prevented it—still makes me melancholy." In their book *Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*, Wackenroder and Tieck, though favoring the Italian painters such as Raphael, did nonetheless draw attention to the city of Nuremberg and its German artists, particularly Albrecht Dürer, and the decline of German painting since then: "How is it that our modern artists contrast so unfavorably with those admirable men of old, and especially with you, my beloved Dürer? How is it that all of you appear so much more earnest, weighty, and reverent in your approach to painting than these simpering artists of the present?" (p. 51). "His [Dürer's] paintings, too, clearly and faithfully reflect this earnest, honest, and sturdy character, not only in their externals and in the faces of their subjects, but in their very spirit. In our day this distinctive German character and, with it, German art have disappeared" (p. 55). In his later lecture *Concerning the Relationship of the Plastic Arts to Nature*, Schelling withdrew from a one-sided insistence on returning to the alleged simplicity of such older periods.

43. Winckelmann, *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, in *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 195. Winckelmann uses the term *concept* (*Begriff*) in this passage, not *idea* (*Idee*), as does Schelling here. The passage actually begins as follows:

> The highest beauty is in God, and the concept of human beauty becomes more complete the more commensurate and in agreement it can be conceived with the highest essence which the concept of unity and of indivisibility differentiates for us from matter.

The section from which this passage is taken in Winckelmann's work is entitled "Von dem Wesentlichen der Kunst" (On the essentials of art), and anticipates a great deal of Schelling's own understanding and exposition of the ideal nature of beauty and of art. Schelling cites the passage again in *Concerning the Relationship of the Plastic Arts to Nature*.

44. Although August Wilhelm Schlegel describes three such paintings in the Dresden Gallery, ("Die Gemählde. Ein Gespräch," *Athenaeum* II, 1, pp. 76ff.), Schelling is probably referring to the one by Francesco Albani (see the following note), which had been acquired by the Dresden Gallery in 1742. Another possibility is the painting by Francesco Trevisani, which is listed in the Dresden inventory of 1754. Though both paintings show angels in the branches, in neither does Mary actually fan the infant. Although Rubens had also treated the theme, the Romantics (like Schelling in these lectures) were generally uncomplimentary concerning his or any Dutch paintings, and preferred the

Italians: "It is true; some things are virtually nonexistent for me. I always pass by the paintings by Rubens" ("Die Gemählde: Ein Gespräch," p. 106). "You won't be angry, will you, if I lead you most often into the Italian room?" (p. 54).

45. Francesco Albani (1578-1660), Italian painter of the Bolognese school. Besides altarpieces in Rome, he also did many allegorical paintings and idyllic landscapes that were popular in England in the late eighteenth century.

46. Nicolas Poussin (1593/94-1665), French painter who lived in Rome; his landscapes later influenced the heroic style of landscape painting. *The Exposing of Moses* was acquired by the Dresden Gallery in 1742, and August Wilhelm Schlegel describes this painting in "Die Gemählde: Ein Gespräch," in *Athenaeum* II, 1, pp. 115ff.

47. From "Attempt at an Allegory" (1766), in *Winckelmann: Writings on Art*, trans. David Irwin (London: Phaidon Press, 1972), p. 146

48. Guido Reni (1575-1642), Italian Baroque painter; perhaps his most famous pieces are *The Massacre of the Innocents* in the Pinacoteca, Bologna, and the ceiling fresco in Rome, *Aurora* (1614), in the Casino Rospigliosi. Whereas Raphael represented the second period, or high style for Winckelmann, Reni represented the beautiful or flowing style, and was characterized by grace (*Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 261). Fiorillo (*Geschichte der zeichnenden Künste*, vol. 2, p. 563) asserted that his female heads were modeled on the figures of the Niobe group.

49. *Imagines*, chapter 2. Lucian (ca. A.D. 115-ca. 200), Greek rhetorician and writer. His *Imagines* contain references to the chief works of some of the great Greek artists, such as Phidias, Praxiteles, and Apelles. The work by Lucian is *Slander* (the story of Apelles' betrayal is actually fictionalized). Although Schelling does not indicate such, he is quoting Lucian virtually verbatim, so I have used a standard translation of the passage, indicating by ellipses the phrases he omits. *Lucian in Eight Volumes*, trans. A. M. Harmon (London; New York: Heinemann; Macmillan, 1913), vol. 1, pp. 365-66. Botticelli later painted this scene in *La Calunnia* (ca. 1495).

50. Harpocrates, the Greek equivalent of the Egyptian Harpechrat, or "Horus the Child," in his character as the useful sun was represented as a boy with a finger on his mouth. From a misunderstanding of this position, he came to be regarded by the Greeks and Romans as a god of silence.

51. Lachesis was one of the three Fates (Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos) represented as old women spinning. Clotho held the distaff, Lachesis drew off the thread, and Atropos cut it short.

52. In 1622 the Flemish painter Rubens was commissioned to do the series on the life of Maria de' Medici in the Medici Gallery in the Palais du Luxembourg in Paris; it is now housed in the Louvre.

53. It is not clear to which painter Schelling is referring here: Aristides the Elder or Younger; Greek painters of the late fifth century B.C.

54. The *Parnassus* (ca. 1511) and *The School of Athens* (1510-11); Moritz gives a description of *The School of Athens* in his *Reisen eines Deutschen in Italien*; Moritz, *Schriften*, p. 229.

55. "Not only ought the poet to choose impossible likelihoods rather than unpersuasive possibilities, but he ought not to construct arguments from unreasonable parts." From Aristotle, *Poetics* 1460a; trans. Kenneth A. Telford (Lanham/London: University Press of America, 1985).

56. Source of citation in Winckelmann is uncertain.

57. This particular characterization of the art of antiquity occurs frequently in Winckelmann's works, and was of enormous influence in the succeeding generation's estimation of that art.

58. Laocoön, a marble group representing the Trojan priest Laocoön and his two sons being crushed to death by snakes as a penalty for warning the Trojans against the wooden horse of the Greeks; it is usually assigned to the Hellenistic period. Winckelmann knew it from a cast in Dresden, and in the "Gedanken über die Nachahmnung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst" (Thoughts on the imitation of Greek works in painting and sculpture) (1755) he treated it as an excellent example of the controlled simplicity and dignity of Greek art. Goethe was also enthusiastic about the significance of this sculpture.

59. *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, pp. 17ff.

60. In Greek mythology, Niobe was the daughter of Tantalus and mother of seven sons and seven daughters. Apollo and Artemis killed her children after she had boasted of her superiority to Leto, who had only two children. Niobe wept for them until she was turned into a column of stone. The group *Niobe and Daughters* dates probably from the fourth century B.C. Winckelmann saw the group statue in Rome at the Villa Medici.

61. Greek: false sentiment, or affectation of style. Longinus uses the term in *On the Sublime* (3.5), though he is himself citing Theodorus Epigrammaticus:

> A third, and closely allied, kind of defect in matters of passion is that which Theodorus used to call *parenthyrsus*. By this is meant unseasonable and empty passion, where no passion is required, or immoderate, where moderation is needed. For men are often carried away, as if by intoxication, into displays of emotion which are not caused by the nature of the subject, but are purely personal and wearisome. In consequence they seem to hearers who are in no wise affected to act in an ungainly way. And no wonder; for they are beside themselves, while their hearers are not.

Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 2nd ed., trans. W. Rhys Roberts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907). In "Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst" (1755), Winckelmann writes about Laocoön:

> All actions and positions of Greek figures not characterized by such wisdom, actions and positions which thus were much too passionate and wild, were designated by the one error which the artists of antiquity called 'parenthyrsos.' The more tranquil the position of a body, the more will it be able to portray the true character of the soul. In all positions deviating too much from such a tranquil posture the soul does not find itself in its most proper position, but rather in a violent and forced one. . . . In Laocoön, pain portrayed by itself would have constituted 'parenthyrsos.' Hence in order to unify the characteristic and noble qualities of his soul, the artist portrayed him within an action most closely approximating the condition of tranquility within such pain.

Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band, p. 18. Although Schelling had likely read Longinus as well, he probably acquired this Greek term from Winckelmann's text specifically, since most of the present and following paragraph (concerning Raphael) is taken—often verbatim—from the complex surrounding Winckelmann's passage.

62. Raphael, *Encounter of Attila and Leo the Great* (ca. 1523-24).

63. Winckelmann had discussed the merits of the various parts of painting, including drawing, composition, color, and shading, and of the various artists' mastery of these parts, in his "Abhandlung von der Fähigkeit der Empfindung des Schönen in der Kunst und dem Unterrichte in derselben" (Treatise on the capacity for perceiving the beautiful in art and on the instruction of such capacity) (1763).

64. Both Moritz and Winckelmann discuss this work, which is actually the work of Giulio Romano and assistants.

65. See note 35 above. In the *Propyläen* Goethe had written the following (see also Schelling's previous paragraph, concerning the use of historical subject matter in painting):

> The art of antiquity almost always limits itself to the sphere of its own mythology, whereas that of modernity and especially painting has taken up actual historical facts. The history of almost all ages and peoples—primarily, however, that of the Greeks, Romans, and, in a religious context, the Jews—has provided the subject matter for countless paintings in which even in the case of the greatest masters we discover examples of a completely inappropriate choice of subject. . . . Let us remark at the same time, however, that precisely the sphere of history does not offer appropriate subjects as frequently as is usually assumed; even among the more useful ones, most are still quite narrowly circumscribed, and accordingly are better suited for a cyclical form of presentation than for portrayal in a single picture. . . . [the cyclical form being] when other pictures portray both what happened previously and what follows.

Propyläen, pp. 252-53. A. W. Schlegel also discusses such cycles in his *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 222, where he does take it—in Schelling's words—a bit too literally.

66. William Hogarth (1697-1764), English painter and engraver. He popularized the use of sequential pictures or anecdotes to satirize pedantry and immorality. A. W. Schlegel similarly rejects Hogarth as "the one who perfected this completely false and worthless genre [Bambocciade], and who in all aspects of painting was an archblunderer" (*Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 236).

67. The reader may recall that although Schelling subdivided drawing into perspective, truth, and necessity, he did not subdivide chiaroscuro and coloring, nor any of the other unities on this level. Here at the end of his discussion of painting, one begins to see how the lectures do not fully realize the thoroughgoing triplicity implied by his original schema.

68. German *indifferenziert*, recalling *Indifferenz*.

69. Henrik Steffens (1773-1845), a Norwegian natural scientist of German descent, lectured at Kiel University (1796) and at Jena (1799), where he came into contact with Goethe, Schelling, and other notable literary and philosophical figures and was very much a part of the intellectual circles. He subsequently lectured in Copenhagen, Halle, and Breslau, and in 1832 received a professorship in Berlin. Like Schelling, Steffens was interested in the interface between science, philosophy, and religion, and he had a significant impact on the Romantic movement.

70. This assertion at first led to a certain amount of ridicule or at least skepticism toward Schelling's view of architecture. Schelling's point, however, is that the relational features of architecture, if realized (objectified or actualized as opposed to remaining merely abstract relations) are spatial and static, whereas those of music, if actualized within the medium of sound, are temporal and dynamic. Both Madame de Staël and Goethe later used the term. See Ernst Behler, "Schellings Ästhetik in der Überlieferung von Henry Crabb Robinson," in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch 83* (1976), p. 146. Such analogies are not, of course, without precedent. Plutarch (*Moralia* 346F) attributes to the poet Simonides (ca. 556-468 B.C.) the reference to the formative arts as silent poetry.

71. For Tacitus, see 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 34.

72. William Hodges (1744-97), English landscape painter and engraver. In 1772 he sailed to the Antarctic as a draughtsman to Captain Cook, and in 1780 on the invitation of Warren Hastings he went to India. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst* (I, p. 181), A. W. Schlegel makes similar conjectures concerning the origins of Gothic architecture.

73. Vitruvius Pollio, Roman architect, second half of the first century A.D., wrote a treatise *De Architectura* dealing with architecture and building in general; it is of a more practical nature, and apparently was not intended to provide a theoretical basis for the aesthetics of architecture. Vitruvius, *The Ten Books on Architecture*, trans. Morris Hicky Morgan (1914; reprint, New York: Dover, 1960), book III, chapter 2, "The Proportions of Intercolumniations and of Columns."

74. Vitruvius, ibid., book IV, chapter 2, "The Ornaments of the Orders."

75. Antiope, loved by Zeus, became the mother of twin brothers, Amphion and Zethus, who became rulers of Thebes and built its walls. Amphion was a harpist of such skill that the stones were drawn into their places by his music.

76. Vitruvius, *Ten Books on Architecture*, book IV, chapter 1, "The Origins of the Three Orders, and the Proportions of the Corinthian Capital."

77. Although Schelling gives virtually a literal translation of this passage—a *locus classicus*—from Vitruvius, he does not set it off in quotation marks. I have thus set it off and provided the English translation. Vitruvius, ibid., pp. 104ff. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst* (I, pp. 173-74), A. W. Schlegel also offers a close rendering of the passage (and otherwise cites Vitruvius).

78. During the following discussion, a certain amount of terminological confusion arises concerning sculpture. Here Schelling refers to sculpture (*Sculptur*) as the quintessential plastic art form (*Plastik*); in the subsequent discussion, however, he generally prefers the German term *Plastik* over that of *Sculptur*, though he uses the latter as well. In this context, however, both now refer only to sculpture. Previously, *Plastik* has referred only to the plastic arts as such, and thus to architecture, bas-relief, and sculpture collectively. In the following discussion (through §131) I have thus rendered both *Sculptur* and *Plastik* as *sculpture* when appropriate.

79. Here, too, Schelling is not entirely consistent with his use of the term *Plastik*, since in §105 it clearly refers to the plastic arts collectively, whereas here he is introducing sculpture as the third form of the plastic arts. In the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant had spoken of the three kinds of fine arts (*schöne Künste*): the art of speech (*redende Kunst*), formative art (*bildende Kunst*), and the art of the play of sensations (*die Kunst des Spiels der Empfindungen*). Under formative art ("those for the expression of ideas in *sensuous intuition*"), the first for Kant is plastic art (*Plastik*), the second painting. "To plastic art, as the first kind of formative fine art, belong *sculpture* [*Bildhauerkunst*] and architecture [*Baukunst*]." He speaks of a work of architecture (*Bauwerk*) on the one hand, and a mere piece of sculpture (*Bildwerk*) on the other. Schelling does use *Baukunst* in §107, but he seems to be differentiating it as "building arts" in the broader sense from *Architektur* as fine art. He does speak of formative art (*bildende Kunst*) as does Kant, though for Schelling it includes music, painting, and the plastic arts in the broader sense (architecture, bas-relief, and sculpture). Cf. 3, Construction of the Particular, or of the Form of Art, note 24, and tables in the Translator's Introduction. Citations from Kant are from *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 183ff. (§51-§53).

80. "He made man stand erect, bidding him look up to heaven, and lift his head to the stars." Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, trans. Mary M. Innes (New York: Penguin Books, 1955), book I, lines 85-86, a *locus classicus* that A. W. Schlegel also cites in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 131 (though in German rather than Latin).

81. Concerning the human form compared with that of animals, Moritz had written: "We see body and head everywhere; nowhere, however, does everything else so strongly point to the head and eye as is the case with human beings"; Moritz, *Schriften*, p. 246. In the *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, Winckelmann discussed the proportions and beauty of the human body in considerably more detail than Schelling does here, though it is clear Schelling draws from him, not least because he cites various passages almost verbatim.

82. *Timaeus* 88.

83. *Iliad* XV, 80ff. Schelling has taken his examples in this paragraph almost verbatim from Winckelmann, "Von dem Wesentlichen der Kunst" (On the essentials of art) in *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 202.

84. Atalanta, in Greek mythology a huntress opposed to marriage who would marry no one who could not beat her in a foot race. Malanion (or Hippomenes) got three golden apples from Aphrodite and delayed her by throwing them on the course. The Apollo Belvedere is perhaps the most famous classical rendering of the god Apollo, and for many years counted as an example of Greek art, though in reality it is a marble copy from the Roman period of a classical or Hellenistic Greek bronze. Winckelmann's frequent remarks on it were extremely influential in the eighteenth century. The passage cited from Winckelmann (see previous footnote) continues: "The gait of the Vatican Apollo floats, as it were, without his feet touching the earth."

85. "Beschreibung des Torsos im Belvedere zu Rom," *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 58. The torso is now believed to be that of Philoctetes.

86. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

87. In an essay on Laocoön in the *Propyläen*, Goethe remarked that "all high works of art portray human nature; the formative arts concern themselves particularly with the human body" (p. 54). See also A. W. Schlegel, *Über schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 144: ". . . and thus we return to the assertion that just as the human figure in general, so also human beauty in particular is the object of sculpture."

In the discussion immediately following, Schelling acknowledges his indebtedness to Winckelmann's understanding of the four stylistic periods; see note 31 above.

88. Phidias, Athenian sculptor of the mid-fifth century B.C.; he and Praxiteles were generally regarded as being the greatest sculptors of antiquity. Although his major works are known primarily only from descriptions, he did supervise Pericles' architectural program. Polyclitus, Greek sculptor during the latter half of the fifth century B.C.; according to tradition, he laid down a canon of ideal male beauty embodied in a system of mathematical proportions.

89. *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, in *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, pp. 260-61. This passage is consonant with the understanding of beauty Schelling develops both in these lectures and in the essay *Bruno*.

90. Winckelmann, ibid., p. 263.

91. Winckelmann, ibid., pp. 264-65.

92. Praxiteles, Athenian sculptor of the mid-fourth century B.C. See note 88 above.

93. Winckelmann, "Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst," in *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, pp. 17ff.

94. In the *Propyläen* essay "Über Laocoön" (p. 56) Goethe wrote:

> Hence, I will dare assert yet again that the Laocoön group, in addition to all the other acknowledged excellent features, is simultaneously a model of symmetry and variety, of repose and movement, of contrasts and stages that together, partly sensually and partly spiritually, present themselves to the spectator and elicit a pleasant sensation in addition to the high pathos of the presentation, and which mitigate the storm of suffering and passions through grace and beauty.

95. Again, Schelling is underscoring the difference between the higher, ideal truth of which he speaks and merely naturalistic or formalistic truth of the kind he discussed in *Bruno*, pp. 226-27.

96. Mengs, see above, note 30.

97. "Beschreibung des Apollo im Belvedere" (Description of the Apollo Belvedere), in *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 61.

98. Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*, trans. Reginald Snell (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965), pp. 80-81. Part of Schelling's paragraph here is a loose rendering of the final paragraph of the fifteenth letter, and the material Schelling allegedly quotes from Schiller is actually not cited accurately.

99. *Winckelmanns Werke in einem Band*, p. 61.

100. August Wilhelm Schlegel makes this point in several places. "The Greeks more than any people recognized the dignity of the body" ("Die Gemählde: Ein Gespräch," in *Athenaeum* II, 1, p. 42). "Hence, they alone rid themselves of false prudery, and knew how to cast off all their clothes with sublime decency. . . . Art did not transgress against morality through the nakedness of its representations, a nakedness that was intended neither as a sign of want nor of desire, but which witnessed rather to a free dignity and could be the object of chaste, unaffected observation" (*Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, pp. 134-35).

The Ideal Side of the World of Art; or, The Verbal Arts

101. This subtitle is not found in Schelling's text itself, though it is included in the son's table of contents. I have entered it here, just as I did its counterpart earlier—The Real Side of the World of Art; or, Formative Art—for the sake of structural clarity.

102. From the Greek verb ποιέω, to make or do. A. W. Schlegel, too, makes this point several times in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, though he emphasizes more than does Schelling that such creating or making is actually that which is common to *all* the arts. See ibid., I, pp. 10 and 261.

103. Cf. Goethe in *Maximen und Reflexionen*, number 752: "True symbolism is where the particular represents the universal, not as a dream or shadow, but as the living, momentary revelation of the unfathomable." Similarly, A. W. Schlegel, in his discussion of Schelling's assertion that "the infinite finitely displayed is beauty" (*System of Transcendental Idealism*, p. 225), suggested that beauty is the symbolic representation of the infinite (*Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 90).

104. Cf. Friedrich Schlegel, "Talk on Mythology," in *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms* (p. 84):

> I, too, have long borne in me the ideal of such a realism, and if it has not yet found expression, it was merely because I am still searching for an organ for communicating it. And yet I know that I can find it only in poetry, for in the form of philosophy and especially of systematic philosophy realism can never again appear. But even considering a general tradition, it is to be expected that this new realism, since it must be of idealistic origin and must hover as it were over an idealistic ground, will emerge as poetry which indeed is to be based on the harmony of the ideal and the real.

105. German: *der potenzirteste Stoff*.

106. "The listener is removed from reality and placed into an imaginative temporal series only if he perceives in speech itself a law-governed subdivision of succession, or tempo" (A. W. Schlegel, *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, p. 116).

107. Schelling is employing the language of the Kantian categories here. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Transcendental Logic," section 3.

108. Footnote by Schelling's son: "The following explanations concerning meter, verse structure, the application of rhythmic meter to contemporary languages, and concerning contemporary meters (rhyme, etc.) have been deleted here because they contained nothing unique (and consisted in part only in allusions), all the more so since the author himself explains during the course of the discussion that he oriented his own information for the most part according to that of well-known writers on the subject (A. W. Schlegel, Moritz). The Editor [K. F. A. Schelling]." In 1786 Moritz had published his *Versuch einer deutschen Prosodie* (Attempt at a German prosody); in it, he addressed the troubling question of the adaptation of classical poetic meters to German and formulated an understanding of the difference between German and the classical languages, establishing that German poets need not struggle with poetic meters alien to the nature of the language. A. W. Schlegel had published several pieces on metrics and poetic language (in Schiller's periodical *Die Horen*, 1795), and had discussed the topic in considerably more detail in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst* (and cites Moritz himself). The works of both Moritz and Schlegel were so influential and widely read, and Schelling was so closely acquainted personally with A. W. Schlegel, that it is not surprising Schelling draws from them in these lectures. Furthermore, his son could assume that readers in the mid-nineteenth century would still be familiar with the names and works.

109. In the *Dialogue on Poetry*, Friedrich Schlegel had raised the question of the possibility of a theory of genres, giving both the advantages and objections to such a theory; his discussion echoes Schelling's concern for a theory of genres as such, that is, for a classification based on inherent necessity (p. 76):

> Marcus. Yet a theory of genres is just what we lack. And what else can it be but a classification which at the same time would be a history and theory of literature?
>
> Ludovico. Such a theory would elucidate for us how and in what way the imagination of a fictitious poet—who, being a prototype, would be the poet's poet—by means of its activity and through it necessarily must limit and divide itself.

After emphasizing that such classification is a means, and not an end, the dialogue continues:

> Marcus. . . . Of most importance are the definite purpose and the separation through which alone the work of art receives form and becomes complete in itself. The imagination of the poet should not spend itself in a chaotic generalization of poetry, but each work should have a thoroughly definite character according to form and genre. . . .
>
> Lothario. . . . The theory of genres would then be the true aesthetics of literature.

110. Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-66), professor at Leipzig University, wrote extensively on the use of the German language in literature and on the reform of the German stage according to the French model. For Christoph Martin Wieland (1733-1813), see 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 40.

111. *Parenthyrsos*, see above, note 61.

112. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (active ca. 25 B.C.), Greek literary critic and historian who lived in Rome during the reign of Augustus. The text to which Schelling is referring is *On Literary Composition*, and the passage from Homer's Odyssey is XVI, 1-16:

> But where does their [these lines'] power to persuade us lie, and what causes them to be what they are? Is it the selection of words, or the composition [synthesis]? No one will say "selection," I am sure: for the whole passage is woven together from the most commonplace, humble words, such as might have come readily to the tongue of a farmer, seaman or artisan, or anyone else who takes no trouble to speak well. . . . What alternative, therefore, is left but to attribute the beauty of the style to the composition?

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *The Critical Essays in Two Volumes*, trans. Stephen Usher (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), vol. 2, p. 29.

113. Callinus of Ephesus, an early Greek elegiac poet of uncertain date, perhaps of the seventh century B.C. In the text of 1859, Schelling's son names Archelaus as the other poet; Archelaus, however, was not a poet but rather a king of Macedonia noted for his sympathy with Greek culture (he had brought Euripides, among others, to his court). Schelling's son has perhaps misread the manuscript, reading Archelaus for Archilocus, who was a celebrated Greek poet of the seventh century B.C., chiefly noted for his iambic poetry, though he also composed elegies and hymns. Friedrich Schlegel also mentions him as one of the "sources of Greek poetry, its basis and beginning" (*Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 61).

114. A footnote in the edition of 1859 cites here Friedrich Schlegel's *Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer*, p. 218. See 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 27. For Pindar, see above, note 32.

115. Solon (ca. 640-ca. 558 B.C.), famous statesman and poet, eventually became an archon in Athens and introduced the constitution and various reforms.

116. Tyrtaeus, a poet who lived at Sparta about the middle of the seventh century B.C. at the time of the second Messenian War. He "spurred" the Spartans on with his war songs (in anapests) and also wrote elegies, some of them exhorting the people to political peace and order, others to virtue and bravery.

117. Alcaeus, a lyric poet born on Lesbos, active during the seventh to sixth centuries B.C., who took part in the war with Athens and in the local struggles against tyrants.

118. Arion, semimythical poet of uncertain date, probably spent the greater part of his life at the court of Periander (625-585 B.C.), tyrant of Corinth.

119. Pythagoras, Greek philosopher born ca. 580 B.C., founded a school in Croton in Magna Graecia which was primarily religious and philosophical in character; they developed some basic principles of mathematics and astronomy, originated the doctrine of the harmony of the spheres, and believed in a theory of metempsychosis, the eternal recurrence of things, and a numerical mysticism.

120. Alcman, Greek lyric poet of the second half of the seventh century B.C. Sappho, Greek Lesbian poetess of the middle of the seventh century B.C.

121. Anacreon (sixth century B.C), Greek lyric poet, best known for his light and playful songs of love and wine, without depth and passion. In the middle of the eighteenth century, a group of German poets referred to themselves as *Anakreontiker*, and asserted that their poems were based on those of Anacreon. Accordingly, the poems sing of love, wine, nature, and friendship in a superficial manner, and many were intended to be sung at convivial social gatherings.

122. In his "Epochs of Literature" in the *Dialogue on Poetry* (p. 68), Friedrich Schlegel names these three poets (Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio) as "the pillars of the old style of modern art."

123. Keres, malignant spirits, the bringers of all sorts of evil, including death. Sometimes it must be rendered "fate," as when Achilles is given the choice between two Keres (*Iliad* 9, 411).

124. *Iliad* XVI, 442ff., trans. Richard Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

125. Cf. Michael Vater, in his introduction to *Bruno*, p. 14: "Time . . . externalizes relations which are unitary and internal in the absolute, thus producing the causal order of phenomena."

126. This statement emphasizes once again the purely relational nature of the absolute as *idea* rather than (material) extension.

127. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, III, pp. 111ff., A. W. Schlegel also applies Wolf's thesis to the origin of the Middle High German epic poem *Nibelungenlied*.

128. This review appeared in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, Jena and Leipzig, 11, 12, and 13 December 1797, and today is still considered one of the better evaluations of the work. Some editions of Goethe's works, such as the *Hamburger Ausgabe*, cite excerpts from it. It was subsequently published in August Wilhelm Schlegel's *Sämmtliche Werke*, volume 11, pp. 183ff.

129. The reference is to Klopstock's epic poem on the life of Christ, *Der Messias*. See 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 39.

130. Schelling uses the German terms *Anschauung* and *Intuition* in this passage, and his listeners would presumably have recognized the allusion here to the language of the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1767-1834), whose *Über die Religion* had appeared in 1799. In that first edition (1799), Schleiermacher stressed in several passages that religion was an affair not of the understanding but rather of feeling and intuition; he spoke of "an astonished intuition of the infinite," and insisted that religion "is neither thinking nor acting, but rather intuition and feeling," and that "it seeks to intuit the universe." "Intuition of the universe: I beg you to befriend this concept, it is the hinge of my entire speech, it is the most universal and highest formula of religion." "To have religion means to intuit the universe, and the manner in which you intuit it, the principle you find in its actions, determines the value of your religion." "That is the spirit of the world which reveals itself within the smallest just as perfectly and visibly as in the largest, that is an intuition of the universe which emerges from everything and seizes the soul . . ." Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern* (On religion: speeches to its cultured despisers), ed. Hans-Joachim Rothert (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1958; reprint, 1970), pp. 15, 29, 31, 70, 48. The standard English translation is by John Oman (New York: Harper & Row, 1958); though based on the third edition (1821), which Schleiermacher had edited to reflect his less pantheistic attitude toward religion, the translation's appendix contains portions of that first edition. I have rendered them anew in order to focus on the terminological congruity with Schelling's remarks in this present passage.

131. Schiller had discussed the didactic poem and the satire in his essay entitled *Naïve and Sentimental Poetry*.

132. Johann Heinrich Voss (1751-1826), German journalist and teacher. Voss published translations of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* that became standards during this period. An interest in Theocritus prompted him to try his own hand at German idylls. The best known of these is the longer poem *Luise: Ein ländliches Gedicht in drei Idyllen* (1795). The poem portrays idealized rural scenes (a picnic), the courtship and wedding of Luise, and has no real action as such, ending with the newly married pair going to the bridal chamber.

133. Phanocles, Greek poet, probably of the first half of the third century B.C. Hermesianax of Colophon, probably born ca. 300 B.C., Greek poet whom scholars generally do not now regard as particularly talented. The *Athenaeum* was a literary periodical edited by Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel as the organ of the early Romantic school. Besides the Schlegels, the other contributors included Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), Schleiermacher, and Caroline Schlegel (later Schelling's wife). It appeared twice yearly from 1798 to 1800, and its demise signaled the demise of the Romantic circle in Jena as well. The translations Schelling mentions were done by both Schlegels and appeared in the first volume of 1798. For a thorough discussion of the theory of literature implied by the *Athenaeum* circle, including Schelling, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarth and Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism*, trans. by Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987).

134. Albius Tibullus (ca. 60-19 B.C.), Roman elegiac poet and part of a group standing somewhat apart from the court poets of the day. Gaius Valerius Catullus (ca. 84-54 B.C.), versatile Roman poet; his refinement of standards regarding technique reached its full development in his Augustan successors. Sextus Propertius (ca. 50-16 B.C.), Roman elegiac poet, possessed an instinct for sound and cadence and introduced the elements of self-absorption and self-pity into the elegiac genre.

135. *Römische Elegien*, a cycle of twenty poems written by Goethe between 1788 and 1790, first published as a whole in Schiller's periodical *Die Horen* in 1795. They were written after Goethe's return from Italy in 1788, and reflect his nostalgic appreciation of Italy both as the shrine of the art of antiquity and as the locus of his reawakening to life and physical love (in one well-known passage he describes how he counted out hexameters on his sleeping lover's back).

136. Theocritus (active ca. 270 B.C.), idyllic poet of the old country life of Sicily, some of whose pieces later served as the model for such elegies as Milton's "Lycidas" and Shelley's "Adonais."

137. Salomon Gessner (1730-88), Swiss painter and poet who illustrated his own works; he wrote idylls in poetic prose that became enormously popular, since in them he eliminated all the rougher or cruder features of country or rural life, thus playing up to the city dweller's longing for idealized nature.

138. Battista Guarini (1538-1612), Italian poet, courtier, and diplomat, particularly important for his pastoral drama *Il Pastor fido* (The faithful shepherd) (1590). He also called the poem a "pastoral tragicomedy," and it remained one of the most popular works of secular literature in Europe for almost two hundred years. Besides the theme of sensual and sentimental love, it also treats such motifs as blindness and illusion, deceit and heroic virtue, all against a backdrop of fate. A. W. Schlegel had translated selections from this work (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 4).

139. These cryptic remarks are likely either catchwords Schelling wrote to himself in his lecture notes, or abbreviations of deletions his son made. Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (1547-1616), the most famous novelist produced by Spain so far. *La Galatea*, his first book, actually has few novelistic elements, being a series of loosely connected episodes in the pastoral mode then in vogue, in which nobles disguised as shepherds and shepherdesses sing of their loves, joys, sorrows, and jealousies in ornate language. August Wilhelm Schlegel translated portions of it (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 4).

140. Theognis of Megara, an elegiac poet probably of the second half of the sixth century B.C., a time of violent political strife between the aristocracy and the plebeians of his city.

141. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, II, p. 298, August Wilhelm Schlegel speaks of "a complete philosophical poem, one in which with equal enthusiasm and energy of portrayal a system would be presented that would be just as inspirational for our view of nature as the Epicurean element in Lucretius is devastating, and whose inner core would constitute the poetical principle of the universe and the divine fantasy expressed in it."

142. Parmenides of Elea, a philosopher born probably about 510 B.C., the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy. In the poem expounding his doctrine, he asserts that the real universe is a single, indivisible, eternal, unchanging whole, and the only object of knowledge; what is mutable and perishable, and phenomena such as motion, are illusions. He was allegedly a pupil of Xenophanes of Colophon in Ionia (sixth century B.C.), a wandering poet who wrote a philosophical poem on nature, attacking the polytheism and anthropomorphism of the traditional Greek religion and asserting that God is single and eternal.

143. Thales (born ca. 624 B.C.), founder of the first Greek school of philosophy and one of the Seven Sages. His explanation of the universe was that all things are modifications of a single eternal and imperishable substance, which he held to be water.

144. Empedocles (born ca. first quarter of the fifth century B.C.), philosopher and scientist. He sought to reconcile the perception of changing phenomena with the logical conception of an underlying unchanging existence, and found the solution in four immutable elements—earth, air, fire, and water—whose association and dissociation produce the various changing objects of the world as we know it. These views are embodied in a poem even Aristotle thought important enough to be combated. Anaxagoras, see 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 24.

145. Lucretius Carus (ca. 99-55 B.C.), philosophical poet who lived at a time when the old Roman religion had lost its hold on the educated classes and a general skepticism prevailed; in his didactic poem *De Rerum Natura* (On the nature of things), he sought to dispel the superstition and anxiety of his contemporaries. The poem intends to instruct and convince rather than please, and much of the matter does not lend itself easily to poetic treatment.

146. Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), founder of the Epicurean school of philosophy; some fragments of his work *On Nature* survive. He held that philosophy consisted in the wise conduct of life, to be attained by reliance on the evidence of the senses and the elimination of superstition and of the belief in supernatural intervention. He is usually associated with the doctrine that pleasure is the only good, and that the best pleasure is accompanied by no painful want. His system was subsequently expounded by Lucretius.

147. Quintus Ennius (239-169 B.C.), one of the greatest and most versatile of the early Roman poets.

148. See *System of Transcendental Idealism*, p. 232:

> Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge, and with it all those sciences it has guided toward perfection; we may thus expect them, on completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into the universal ocean of poetry from which they took their source.

Cf. also Friedrich Hölderlin's novel *Hyperion* (pp. 91-93):

> "What has philosophy," he answered, "what has the cold sublimity of philosophical knowledge, to do with poetry?"
>
> "Poetry," I answered, confident of my argument, "is the beginning and the end of philosophical knowledge. Like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, philosophy springs from the poetry of an eternal, divine state of being. And so in philosophy, too, the irreconcilable finally converges again in the mysterious spring of poetry."

A. W. Schlegel, too, uses this figure in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, I, pp. 262-63.

149. Juvenal (born ca. A.D. 60-70), great Roman satirist, attacked the vices, abuses, and follies of Roman life. Persius Flaccus (A.D. 34-62), Roman writer; except for one work, his poems are actually homilies. His satire in the narrower sense is a criticism of the poetasters and the debased literary taste of the day as being symptomatic of the corruption of Roman virtue and loss of manhood.

150. Ludovico Ariosto, see 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 41. August Wilhelm Schlegel translated portions of this work (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 4).

151. Matteo Maria Boiardo (1441-94), Italian poet and humanist who wrote some of the best love sonnets of the period; he owes his fame to his romantic epic *Orlando innamorato*, begun in 1472, with which he inaugurated the Italian chivalric romance. It served as the source and point of reference for Ariosto's *Orlando furioso*.

152. Torquato Tasso (1544-95), master of modern epic poetry. He owes his fame primarily to his *Gerusalemme Liberata* (Jerusalem delivered), which treated the conquest of Jerusalem by the crusader Gottfried of Bouillon. A. W. Schlegel translated selections from his work (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 4).

153. Voltaire's *Henriade*, see 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 17. A. W. Schlegel had also delivered a short but cutting condemnation of the *Henriade* in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, II, pp. 213ff.

154. Luiz vaz de Camoes (or Camoëns) (ca. 1524-80), considered the greatest Portuguese poet. His entire life was deeply rooted in national existence, and the character of that existence is reflected in his poetry. His greatest work is *Os Lusíadas* (1572). Since he considered no one hero or idea strong enough to encompass his vision of Portugal, he composed a poem using all the martial heroes of the country (*Lusitania*, or "men of Portugal"). The work is actually more a paean than a heroic narrative. Schelling had probably read about him in Friedrich Schlegel's new periodical *Europa* (1803-5),

or had heard about him from Schlegel earlier. August Wilhelm Schlegel translated portions of this work (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 4).

155. Wieland, see 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 40. *Oberon* is a verse romance he published in 1778-80, set during the time of Charlemagne. It is a tale of adventure and daring (one task is to pluck the beard and pull four teeth of the Sultan of Baghdad), love and intrigue, designed to entertain and delight. Its Orientalism, magic, and fairy-tale character anticipate Romanticism.

156. Schelling is again referring to the poem *Orlando furioso*.

157. *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (Wilhelm Meister's apprenticeship, 1795-96), a novel by Goethe that traces the development of a would-be actor through various adventures and trials. The actual focus is the education of Wilhelm's personality by experience and his self-realization, and is the classic example of the German apprenticeship or development novel (*Bildungsroman* or *Entwicklungsroman*). Friedrich Schlegel had called Fichte's philosophical treatise *The Theory of Knowledge*, the French Revolution, and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* "the three greatest tendencies of the age." Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 143 (aphorism 216 in the *Athenaeum*, 1798).

158. The passage is in book V, chapter VII: "The novel must proceed slowly and the feelings of the principal person must, in some way or other, restrain the tendency of the whole to its development." Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister. Apprenticeship and Travels*, trans. R. O. Moon (London: G. T. Foulis, 1947), vol. I, p. 265.

159. Ibid. Schelling cites the passage virtually verbatim.

160. "Romantic poetry alone can, like the epic, become a mirror of the entire surrounding world, a picture of its age" (Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 140; *Athenaeum* fragment no. 116).

161. Miguel de Cervantes, *The Adventures of Don Quixote de la Mancha* (1605, 1615), book II, chapter 14.

162. In Goethe's novel, Mignon is a mysterious and enigmatic character who secretly loves Wilhelm and turns out to be the child through incest of an equally enigmatic character, the harpist. The house of the uncle, or the "Society of the Tower," turns out to be a secret society that has kept watch over Wilhelm's development.

163. Latin *sperata* (past participle from the verb *spero*): that which is anticipated or expected.

164. *Henry IV Part 1*, act IV, scene ii, line 72: "Tut, tut; good enough to toss; food for powder, food for powder; they'll fill a pit as well as better; tush, man, mortal men, mortal men."

165. Cervantes, *Los Trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda* (1617); traditional Byzantine novel with complicated plot intrigues and threadbare characterization, a fantasy world and characters with extraordinary adventures. Giovanni Boccaccio (1313-75), *Elegia di Madonna Fiammetta* (Amorous Fiammetta, 1343-44); the first modern novel in epistolary form, it concentrates on the inner events of the character's psyche. She, rather than the man, is the jilted one. *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* (The sorrows of young Werther, 1774), a novel by Goethe, the first part of which is in epistolary form. Werther is a high-strung young man of great sensitivity who falls in love with a woman already promised to another. In the end, Werther commits suicide. The book was an instant success and established the young Goethe's literary fame virtually overnight.

166. Samuel Richardson (1689-1761), English writer whose novels had a considerable influence on the further development of the European novel: *Pamela* (1740 and 1741), *Clarissa Harlowe* (1747-18), and *The History of Sir Charles Grandison* (1753-54). *The Vicar of Wakefield*, a novel by Oliver Goldsmith, was published in 1766.

167. This parenthetical remark may be an abbreviation by Schelling's son of material he chose to delete, or notes Schelling made to himself.

168. German: *Homeros*; see 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 57.

169. The following section on Dante (1265-1321) is virtually the same article that appeared under the title "On Dante in Relation to Philosophy" in the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie* (1803), pp. 35-50 (later in Schelling's *Sämmtliche Werke*, I, V, pp. 152-63). It is also translated by Elizabeth Rubenstein and annotated by David Simpson in the anthology *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism*, pp. 140-48.

170. Dante, *The Divine Comedy*, the Carlyle-Wicksteed translation, ed. C. H. Grandgent (New York: Modern Library, 1950), pp. 555-56 (*Paradiso*, canto XXV).

171. Ibid., p. 154 (*Inferno*, canto XXIX).

172. In *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, III, p. 201, August Wilhelm Schlegel referred specifically to this part of Schelling's interpretation of Dante (the *Inferno* as the plastic part, the *Purgatorio* as the picturesque part, and the *Paradiso* as the musical part). Schelling's essay on Dante, we recall, not only served the lecture series *Philosophy of Art*, but also was published in the *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*; Schlegel thus had direct access to the essay, and used the material extensively in his own lectures.

173. *Divine Comedy*, p. 417 (*Paradiso*, canto III).

174. Ibid., p. 22 (*Inferno*, canto III). Schelling's son included the following footnote here: "As an 'addendum' to this essay, or actually as a counterpart to his own view of Dante, the author presented at the end of the article in the *Kritisches Journal* Bouterwek's view of Dante. This as well as another, similar presentation there has been deleted here." Friedrich Bouterwek (1766-1828), professor of aesthetics at Göttingen University. Bouterwek's *Geschichte der neuern Poesie und Beredsamkeit* (History of contemporary poesy and eloquence) was published in twelve volumes between 1801 and 1819.

175. Chapter XIII.

176. *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* (1795; second edition, 1804), in *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794-1796) by F. W. J. Schelling*, trans. Fritz Marti, tenth letter.

177. Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 1538ff. (spoken by Oedipus): "But to that place—for the divine summons urges me—let us now set forth, and hesitate no more." Translated by R. C. Jebb.

178. August Wilhelm Schlegel also dealt with the problem of the chorus in Greek tragedy in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*; the essentials of that discussion—as well as his discussion of the three major Greek tragedians—were taken over virtually verbatim into his Vienna lectures on dramatic art and literature in 1808. These lectures became a standard work in German literary criticism. August Wilhelm Schlegel, *Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature*, 2 volumes, trans. John Black (Ridgeway Press, n.d.). Cf. also the reprint of the 1846 edition (AMS Press). Selections from Schlegel's *Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature* are included in *German Romantic Criticism*, ed. A. Leslie Willson, The German Library, volume 21 (New York: Continuum, 1982).

179. *Die Braut von Messina; oder, Die feindlichen Brüder*, tragedy published by Schiller in 1803 with an accompanying essay entitled "On the Use of the Chorus in Tragedy." Schiller wrote the piece on the model of the Greek tragedy and employed a chorus, though he did attribute the choric passages to separate speakers.

180. *Oedipus the King*, act V, lines 864-71; trans. R. C. Jebb.

181. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81), prolific and influential German writer who as a critic may be said to have lifted German criticism from a provincial to a European level. He wrote on a variety of topics, including dramaturgy, aesthetics, philosophy, and theology, and wrote poetry and dramas as well.

182. In his "Epochs of Literature" in the *Dialogue on Poetry*, Friedrich Schlegel similarly underscores the inferiority of Euripides.

183. In his "Epochs of Literature" in the *Dialogue on Poetry*, Friedrich Schlegel calls Aeschylus "the eternal prototype of austere greatness and unrefined enthusiasm" (p. 63). Schelling again is employing Winckelmann's proposed stylistic periods of Greek art.

184. In his "Epochs of Literature" in the *Dialogue on Poetry*, Friedrich Schlegel calls Sophocles "the model of harmonious perfection" (p. 63).

185. Aristophanes satirized or otherwise attacked Cleon (died 422 B.C.), an Athenian demagogue prominent at the time of the Peloponnesian War, in the *Babylonians* (lost), the *Acharnians*, and the *Knights*.

186. Menander (ca. 342/1-293/89 B.C.), by later consensus the leading writer of New Comedy; although many titles are known, only one complete play and excerpts from six others have survived.

187. The following section "On Modern Dramatic Poesy," has also been translated by Elizabeth Rubenstein and annotated by David Simpson in the anthology *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism*, pp. 133-39.

188. As a matter of fact, one does not read this in *King Lear*. I have translated Schelling's own quote, but as David Simpson (*German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism*, p. 270, note 6) points out, Schelling's citation is not accurate and seems to conflate features of Albany's speech (*King Lear*, act IV, scene ii, lines 40ff.). Although, as we have seen, Schelling is anything but consistent in his citations, the editions of Shakespeare from which he may have drawn may not have been accurate.

189. *Henry VI, Part II*, act IV, scene iv.

190. *Richard III*, act V, scene iv, line 7.

191. Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853), prolific and versatile member of the early German Romantic circle in Jena, to which Schelling himself belonged; he later published extensive studies on Shakespeare. Schelling is referring to Tieck's *Letters on Shakespeare* (1800). See also David Simpson's note 11 to Elizabeth Rubenstein's translation in *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism*.

192. *Sturm und Drang* (usually translated "storm and stress"), actually a play by F. M. Klinger published in 1777. The title later came to be used to designate the whole movement, otherwise called the *Geniezeit*. As a term designating a literary period, it refers to the movement and a group of writers of the 1770s that lasted from 1771 to about 1778, and to which Goethe belonged. The movement exalted freedom, nature, strength, and unfettered emotion, praised Shakespeare and Rousseau among others, and influenced the entire subsequent generation with its extravagant language and unmitigated emotion.

193. Schlegel's first translations of Shakespeare appeared between 1797 and 1810. His collection of translations of plays from the Spanish, the *Spanisches Theater*, appeared between 1803 and 1809, though he had already translated a great deal from the Spanish for his own *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*. Actually, Schlegel translated a great deal for those lectures: Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Tasso, Guarini, Cervantes, Camoëns, and Ariosto (as we saw above). Much of this was later published as *Blumensträusse italienischer, spanischer und portugiesischer Poesie* (1804). Although Schelling does not here refer to the work by name, it is Calderón's *La devoción de la Cruz* (The devotion to the cross, 1640). Schlegel had sent Schelling the manuscripts of the Calderón translations he had just begun, and also wrote an article on Calderón in Friedrich Schlegel's periodical *Europa* (I, 2). Actually, Calderón had completely captivated Schlegel at this time and had replaced Shakespeare as his major dramatic concern. Goethe, too, had enthusiastically greeted Schlegel's translation of *La devoción*. Many of Schlegel's translations from world literature can be found in the third and fourth volumes of his *Sämmtliche Werke*. For an assessment of Calderón's reception in Germany during this period, see Henry W. Sullivan, *Calderón in the German Lands and the Low Countries: His Reception and Influence, 1654-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

194. *Leben und Tod der heiligen Genoveva* (1799), a play by Ludwig Tieck.

195. In the edition of 1859 there is no letter "c" marking the end of this series, though it seems in order to insert it here.

196. Act III, final scene.

197. See 2, Construction of the Content of Art, note 49.

198. This and the following quotation are from *Faust, Part I*, lines 1851-65. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust. A Tragedy*, trans. Walter Arndt, ed. Cyrus Hamlin (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976).

199. This generally anti-French attitude Schelling exhibits elsewhere as well was part of the reaction against the dominance of French style in German culture, and with the rediscovery of the German past. Wackenroder and Tieck had lamented how the distinctive German character had disappeared and "young Germans learn the languages of all the peoples of Europe, and they are required judiciously to adjust their native way of thinking by drawing on the spirit of all nations" and had sacrificed its "very soul" (*Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*, p. 55). In his *Dialogue on Poetry*, Friedrich Schlegel spoke of how "out of superficial abstractions and rationalizations, out of misunderstood antiquity and mediocre talent, there arose in France a comprehensive and coherent system of false poetry which rested on an equally false theory of literature; and from here this sickly mental malady of so-called good taste spread over all the countries of Europe" (*Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, p. 73). When questioned as to why he left the French out of his discussion of the "Epochs of Literature," he responds that "it happened without particular intention; I found no reason to do so" (p. 75). Finally, August Wilhelm Schlegel, too, continually delivers invectives against the French in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*: "Hence, a totally unpoetic nation must perceive as unnatural everything which in fact is genuinely poetic, which is indeed the case with the French" (I, p. 99; see also I, p. 33).

200. *Comédie larmoyante*, or sentimental comedy, popularized by La Chaussée, this dramatic form—an intermediary genre between comedy and tragedy—presented ordinary people in (often exaggerated) distressing situations, which made audiences weep.

201. Hans Sachs (1494-1576), one of the most prolific German writers of the sixteenth century. The greater part of his works consists of humorous fables, anecdotes, and tales in verse form, as well as some two hundred verse plays, the latter of which include tragedies, comedies, and popular plays performed during Shrovetide. Nostalgic attention had been drawn to Sachs also by Wackenroder and Tieck in their *Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*, where they spoke of sitting in Nuremberg's "venerable libraries . . . in a confined corner in the dusk by the little round-paned window, poring over the folios of the worthy Hans Sachs" (p. 50). Similarly, in *Schöne Literatur und Kunst*, III, p. 56, A. W. Schlegel speaks of Hans Sachs as the "archetype of what this period in Germany was able to produce in the way of poesy."

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